Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Scott A. Johnson ( 2023 )


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  •                     THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 22–2003
    Submitted February 22, 2023—Filed March 31, 2023
    IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
    Complainant,
    vs.
    SCOTT A. JOHNSON,
    Respondent.
    On review of the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission.
    In an attorney disciplinary action, a majority of the grievance commission
    recommends a three-year suspension for the attorney’s violations of rules of
    professional conduct. LICENSE SUSPENDED.
    Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.
    Tara van Brederode, Allison Schmidt, and Alexis Grove, Des Moines, for
    complainant.
    Scott Johnson, Spencer, pro se.
    2
    OXLEY, Justice.
    The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a complaint
    charging attorney Scott A. Johnson with nineteen violations of the Iowa Rules of
    Professional Conduct involving six different clients. The majority stemmed from
    neglect of cases and clients, but the most serious involved forgery and deception
    related to Johnson’s representation of criminal defendants where he lied to the
    courts in furtherance of his own self-interests. The Board asks that this court
    find all the alleged violations established and suspend Johnson’s license to
    practice law for three years. Upon our de novo review of the record, we are
    persuaded by the Board’s position and suspend Johnson’s law license.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    On April 27, 2022, the Board filed a five-count complaint with the Iowa
    Supreme Court Grievance Commission charging Johnson with violations of Iowa
    Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.2(a), 32:1.3, 32:1.4(a)(2)–(3), 32:1.5(a),
    32:3.2, 32:3.3(a)(1), 32:8.1(b), and 32:8.4(b)–(d). The Board alleges that Johnson
    “submit[ed] false time and expense claims to the Iowa State Public Defender’s
    Office (‘SPD’), neglect[ed] his legal matters, fail[ed] to communicate with his
    clients, fail[ed] to appear at hearings, fail[ed] to respond to the Board’s pre-charge
    investigative inquiries, and forg[ed] a client’s signature on a guilty plea.”
    Johnson was admitted to practice law in Iowa on September 18, 2015, and
    was practicing in Spencer at the time relevant to the Board’s complaint. When
    the complaint was filed—less than eight years into Johnson’s tenure as an Iowa
    attorney—Johnson had already received a private admonition and a public
    3
    reprimand, and his license was then under suspension for failure to comply with
    a client security commission audit of his lawyer trust account.1
    Johnson’s only response to the Board’s complaint came on May 17 and
    18, when he filed (and then amended) his answer. Johnson admitted almost all
    of the allegations against him but denied he had filed a guilty plea without his
    client’s consent. After filing that answer and participating in a scheduling
    conference, “Johnson ceased all involvement in the proceedings,” even failing to
    participate in discovery. (Emphasis omitted.) Accordingly, the Board successfully
    moved for sanctions pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.517(2)(b)(1), and
    as a consequence, the commission deemed admitted the allegation Johnson had
    previously denied (but not the ultimate conclusion as to whether that conduct
    did in fact violate the rules of professional conduct).
    After a one-day hearing on July 27, a five-member division of the
    commission found all of the factual allegations in the complaint proven and
    unanimously concluded that those facts established the ethical violations
    charged. The commission members disagreed, however, as to the appropriate
    sanction. Three members recommend a three-year suspension, while two
    members recommend two years.
    II. Findings of Fact.
    In attorney discipline cases, this court reviews “alleged violations and
    evidence de novo to ensure that the Board has proven each allegation of
    1After that suspension was imposed on January 28, 2022, Johnson apparently took no
    corrective action. His license thus remains suspended as this case comes to us now.
    4
    misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y
    Disciplinary Bd. v. Aeilts, 
    974 N.W.2d 119
    , 125 (Iowa 2022). This is true even
    where the responding attorney admits the alleged conduct and the rule violations
    in the complaint. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McCarthy,
    
    814 N.W.2d 596
    , 601 (Iowa 2012). “The convincing preponderance of the
    evidence standard is ‘less demanding than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but
    requires a greater showing than the preponderance of the evidence [standard].’ ”
    Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d at 125 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Adams,
    
    809 N.W.2d 543
    , 545 (Iowa 2012)).
    That said, based on Johnson’s admissions and the unresisted,
    unchallenged sanctions, “[f]or purposes of our de novo review, we deem [all of]
    the factual allegations contained in . . . the complaint admitted.” Iowa Sup. Ct.
    Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moonen, 
    706 N.W.2d 391
    , 396 (Iowa 2005). “Using these
    admissions of law and fact, together with our review of the record, we make the
    following findings of fact and determinations of [Johnson’s] ethical violations.”
    
    Id. at 397
    .
    A. Count I—Brown Representation. In January 2018, Johnson was
    appointed to represent Allison Brown in a postconviction relief (PCR) proceeding
    she initiated in September 2016. Johnson’s representation continued until he
    withdrew from the matter in January 2020. During this two-year representation,
    Johnson billed less than five total hours of work related to Brown’s case, spoke
    with Brown over the phone roughly twice, and caused her PCR trial to be
    postponed at least twice. He requested (and the court granted) an application for
    5
    travel reimbursement related to a purported in-person visit with Brown at the
    Newton Correctional Facility and submitted a time and expense log claiming
    $166.14 for that purpose; however, he never actually met with Brown in person.
    In submitting his time and expense log to the SPD, Johnson certified “under
    penalty of law that . . . the statements and information contained in [his]
    submission [were] true, accurate, and complete.”
    Throughout the entire course of the representation, Brown appeared to be
    in the dark as to what Johnson was doing to advance her case. He did not inform
    Brown when the State moved to dismiss her petition or when he subsequently
    moved to amend the petition in response to the motion for summary dismissal.
    Brown complained to the court four times about Johnson’s lack of
    communication—once in July 2018, twice in April 2019, and once in December
    2019—requesting Johnson be removed as her attorney in her final two letters.
    In the meantime, after the court denied the State’s motion for summary
    dismissal, Johnson requested a continuance of the trial due to a scheduling
    conflict. The court granted the motion, directing Johnson and the State to
    coordinate with court administration within ten days to set a new trial date.
    Johnson never followed up, leaving the trial court to eventually set a new trial
    date in October 2019—thirteen months after it was previously set. Eight days
    prior to the new trial date (and nearly five months after the court had set that
    date), Johnson requested another continuance based on a scheduling conflict.
    After the court granted it, but before a new date could be set, Johnson moved to
    withdraw from his representation. He did not notify Brown that he was moving
    6
    to withdraw. In January 2020, the court granted Johnson’s motion and
    appointed new counsel for Brown—four years out from the initiation of her PCR
    case.
    B. Count II—Monson, Kreykes, and Peterson Representations. In
    March 2020, Johnson was appointed to represent Timothy Monson, a criminal
    defendant. After a pretrial conference in September, the district court believed a
    plea agreement had been reached and scheduled a plea hearing for later that
    month. From that time until May 2021, however, the court had to continue the
    plea hearing no less than nine times. Although some of those continuances
    stemmed from COVID-19 or other health concerns, some were at the behest of
    Johnson without any clear reason given, and another was simply due to
    Johnson’s failure to obtain a signed guilty plea from the client or appear at the
    hearing. Indeed, both Johnson and Monson failed to appear for a plea hearing
    scheduled for February 22, 2021, when no guilty plea was yet on file, despite the
    court’s earlier warning that if no plea was filed and Monson failed to appear, the
    court would issue a warrant for his arrest. Only after missing yet another plea
    deadline in April and receiving another warning from the court threatening to
    issue a warrant for Monson’s arrest did Johnson finally obtain and file Monson’s
    guilty plea.
    This pattern of behavior carried over to Johnson’s representation of
    Clinton Kreykes and Tracy Peterson—criminal defendants Johnson was
    appointed to represent in February 2021 in separate O’Brien County cases. Both
    Johnson and his clients failed to appear at pretrial conferences in their respective
    7
    cases—first on February 22 and again on March 8. Both sets of conferences were
    continued after Johnson and his clients were no-shows. Johnson gave the court
    no notice before missing the February 22 conferences and failed to respond to
    the court’s attempts to contact him. He again gave the court no notice before
    missing the March 8 conferences, although he did email the prosecutor just prior
    to the conferences asking for a continuance due to a scheduling conflict. A third
    set of pretrial conferences was scheduled for April 5, and Peterson’s April 13 trial
    date had to be postponed to June (although he ultimately ended up pleading
    guilty before trial). After finally appearing at these conferences, Kreykes’s case
    proceeded to trial in April, ending in a guilty verdict. But when it came time for
    Kreykes’s May 3 sentencing hearing, Johnson arrived too late for the hearing to
    proceed as scheduled, and he only requested a continuance after the hearing
    was supposed to have taken place.
    C. Count III—Terwilliger Representation. Sometime between January
    and March 2021, Johnson agreed to represent Tiffany Terwilliger, the petitioner
    in a marriage dissolution proceeding. He filed his appearance on March 1, and
    the matter was set for trial on August 11. In the week leading up to trial, the
    court reporter emailed Johnson four times to assess the status of the case, but
    Johnson failed to respond to any of her emails. And when it came time for trial—
    despite his client showing up ready to proceed—Johnson was nowhere to be
    found. The district court judge called Johnson’s cell phone and office phone
    numbers to no avail; his cell phone voicemail was not set up, and his office
    voicemail was full. The judge then emailed Johnson to inform him that his client
    8
    had waived his presence and that the trial would proceed, adding, “In my
    opinion, your failure to appear today, as well as your failure to respond to my
    court reporter’s email of August 9, 2021, is unacceptable if not unethical
    behavior.” The client’s divorce was finalized without Johnson’s assistance, and
    he never responded to the judge’s email.
    D. Count IV—Lowery Representation. From February through August
    2020, Johnson represented Mandelo Lowery—a criminal defendant charged with
    two serious misdemeanors involving an assault and interference with official
    acts. The district court set a plea hearing in the matter for June after Johnson
    emailed the court stating that he had reached a plea agreement with the
    prosecutor. Johnson did not get Lowery’s signature on the plea agreement prior
    to the hearing, however—or, indeed, prior to the next two dates to which the
    court rescheduled the hearing. After missing those deadlines, Johnson
    attempted to renegotiate the plea with the prosecutor, who stood firm on the
    initial agreement. Finally, on August 5, Johnson filed a written guilty plea
    purportedly signed by Lowery. The district court adjudicated Lowery guilty of the
    interference charge and dismissed the assault charge as provided by the
    agreement, imposing a suspended fine and a surcharge. As it was later revealed,
    however, Lowery did not in fact sign the plea agreement; Johnson had placed
    Lowery’s signature from another court document onto the agreement without
    Lowery’s knowledge or consent. When Lowery filed a PCR petition to have the
    conviction reversed, he was able to reach an agreement with the State in which
    9
    the State agreed to dismiss the criminal case and Lowery agreed to dismiss his
    PCR case.
    E. Count V—Failure to Respond. Stemming from Johnson’s conduct in
    the cases discussed above, the Board opened an investigation and sent Johnson
    notices (by certified mail) of the complaints against him on March 29 and
    March 31, 2021. Despite receiving the notices on April 7, Johnson did not
    respond until May 6. See Iowa Court R. 35.6(4) (“The respondent [to a complaint
    alleging attorney misconduct] must provide a written response [to the Board]
    within 20 days of receipt of the complaint.”). The Board subsequently sent two
    requests for additional information, both of which went unanswered.
    III. Ethical Violations.
    The Board charged Johnson with the following violations based on the
    above-described conduct. For the following reasons, we find all of the charged
    violations established by a convincing preponderance of the evidence.
    A. Rule 32:1.2(a). Rule 32:1.2(a) provides, subject to principles discussed
    in later paragraphs, that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning
    the objectives of representation.” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.2(a). The rule
    elaborates that “[i]n a criminal case,” this means “the lawyer shall abide by the
    client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered.”
    
    Id.
     We agree with the commission that Johnson violated this rule by placing
    Lowery’s signature on a guilty plea without Lowery’s knowledge or consent and
    submitting that forged plea to the court. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
    v. Kallsen, 
    814 N.W.2d 233
    , 238 (Iowa 2012) (finding “a flagrant violation” of rule
    10
    32:1.2(a) where an attorney forged a client’s signature on a guilty plea over the
    client’s express direction that he did not want to plead guilty).
    B. Rule 32:1.3. Rule 32:1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with
    reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Iowa R. of Prof’l
    Conduct 32:1.3. Although “a violation of rule 32:1.3 does not ‘occur from one
    missed deadline,’ ” a violation does occur when a lawyer demonstrates a
    “consistent failure to perform those obligations that a lawyer has assumed[] or a
    conscious disregard for the responsibilities a lawyer owes to a client,” such as
    when the attorney consistently “fails to appear at scheduled court proceedings,
    does not make the proper filings, or is slow to act on matters.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y
    Disciplinary Bd. v. Noel, 
    933 N.W.2d 190
    , 199 (Iowa 2019) (alteration in original)
    (first and second quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. West,
    
    901 N.W.2d 519
    , 524 (Iowa 2017); and third quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y
    Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson, 
    838 N.W.2d 528
    , 537 (Iowa 2013)). “Often, this
    involves the ‘lawyer doing little or nothing to advance the interests of [the] client
    after agreeing to represent the client.’ ” 
    Id.
     (alteration in original) (quoting Iowa
    Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Moorman, 
    683 N.W.2d 549
    , 552 (Iowa
    2004)).
    Johnson’s conduct in representing Monson, Kreykes, Peterson, and
    Terwilliger sufficiently demonstrates the lack of diligence required to find a
    violation. Over the course of those four representations, Johnson repeatedly
    missed deadlines, failed to appear at scheduled hearings, and in Terwilliger’s
    dissolution case, abandoned her at trial, failing to even respond to inquiries from
    11
    the court. When he missed deadlines, he consistently did so either without any
    advance notice or without explaining why he needed more time. In the three
    criminal cases, that conduct seriously jeopardized his clients’ pretrial release;
    indeed, it appears that the only things that may have spared Kreykes from having
    a warrant issued for his arrest after failing to appear at the March 22 hearing
    were the prosecutor’s hesitance to seek sanctions since she had received
    Johnson’s last-minute email requesting a continuance and the court’s concern
    that Kreykes was not personally notified of the consequences of failing to appear
    included in the order resetting the hearing where the order was served on
    Johnson but not copied to Kreykes. In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary
    Board v. Adams, we found a violation of rule 32:1.3 established when an attorney
    failed to comply with appellate deadlines, failed to file a written plea in advance
    of a client’s arraignment, and then failed to appear at the arraignment itself.
    
    749 N.W.2d 666
    , 669 (Iowa 2008). Johnson’s neglect here was of a similar
    character, and it was much more pervasive—spanning over several months and
    multiple missed deadlines and hearings. The Board has established that
    Johnson violated rule 32:1.3.
    C. Rule 32:1.4(a)(2)–(3). The Board charged Johnson with violations of
    rule 32:1.4(a)(2)–(3) in connection with his representations of Brown and Lowery.
    This rule dictates that lawyers must “reasonably consult with the[ir] client[s]
    about the means by which the client[s’] objectives are to be accomplished” and
    must “keep the[ir] client[s] reasonably informed about the status of the[ir]
    matter[s].” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(a)(2)–(3). The facts here demonstrate
    12
    that not only did Johnson not reasonably consult with Brown or Lowery or
    reasonably keep them informed about their cases, he did not consult with them
    or keep them informed at all.
    From Brown’s perspective, Johnson had “apparently fallen off the face of
    the earth.” Johnson spoke with Brown roughly twice during the entire two-year
    course of his representation and failed to inform her in advance of his decisions
    to add a claim to her petition and to withdraw from the case. And despite Brown’s
    letters indicating that she was actively seeking to have her day in court as soon
    as possible, Johnson asked the court for a continuance and failed to follow up
    with court administration, resulting in the trial being pushed back over a year
    from when it was supposed to have taken place.
    With respect to the Lowery representation, Lowery’s PCR application
    asserts that he had “limited communication” with Johnson during the
    representation, that he specifically “instructed Scott Johnson that [he] would not
    take no deal,” and that he was unaware the guilty plea had been filed. Johnson
    presented no contrary evidence. That he failed to apprise Lowery that the court
    had accepted the guilty plea is revealed by the fact that Lowery sought to expunge
    the underlying court record, which was denied based on the conviction entered
    on the interference charge. This forced Lowery to file the PCR action to challenge
    his conviction.
    The Board has established Johnson’s violations of rule 32:1.4(a)(2)–(3). See
    Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 
    792 N.W.2d 674
    , 678 (Iowa 2010)
    (“Johnson’s failure to respond to Neef’s phone calls and requests for information,
    13
    failure to notify Neef of what progress had or had not been made on the case,
    and failure to provide notice of termination, contact information, return of
    paperwork, or a return of unearned fees violated rule[] 32:1.4 . . . .”).
    D. Rule 32:1.5(a). “A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or
    collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses, or violate
    any restrictions imposed by law.” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.5(a). Billing the
    SPD for time and travel expenses in connection with a visit to the Newton
    Correctional Facility that he never actually made violated this rule. See Iowa
    Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Noel, 
    923 N.W.2d 575
    , 585–86 (Iowa 2019) (“Noel
    violated rule 32:1.5(a) by seeking fees [from the State Public Defender] for family
    team meetings he did not attend[,] . . . [and] by making false mileage claims.”). It
    should go without saying that “[a] fee charged for services not provided is not
    reasonable.” 
    Id. at 586
    .
    E. Rule 32:3.2. “A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite
    litigation consistent with the interests of the client.” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct
    32:3.2. In representing Brown, Monson, Kreykes, and Peterson, Johnson
    violated this rule by doing just the opposite. Rather than making efforts to
    expedite these cases, Johnson left them stalled for months on end and repeatedly
    sought to delay litigation solely (if he gave any reason at all) for his own
    convenience. For example, when Johnson did bother to request continuances for
    deadlines (as opposed to simply letting them pass or failing to appear at
    hearings), and when he bothered to explain his reason for the request, he often
    cited a nebulous “scheduling conflict.” In Brown’s case, for instance, Johnson
    14
    waited until eight days before trial to claim such a conflict despite having had
    Brown’s trial date set five months in advance. “Although there will be occasions
    when a lawyer may properly seek a postponement for personal reasons, it is not
    proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation solely for the
    convenience of the advocates.” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:3.2 cmt. 1. Johnson’s
    failure to move his clients’ cases forward was sufficiently routine here for us to
    conclude by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that he violated this
    rule.
    F. Rule 32:3.3(a)(1). “A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false
    statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material
    fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer . . . .” Iowa R. of Prof’l
    Conduct 32:3.3(a)(1). In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v.
    Kallsen, 
    814 N.W.2d at 238
    , we found an attorney had knowingly violated this
    rule by directing his client’s fiancé to forge his client’s signature on a guilty plea
    and then presenting that plea to the court with the representation that the client
    had signed it in his presence. Just as in that case, Johnson’s conduct violated
    this rule. After inserting Lowery’s signature on a guilty plea knowing that he did
    not have Lowery’s consent to do so, Johnson passed it off to the prosecutor and
    the court as genuine. Further, Johnson did not act to correct the false statement
    of fact (i.e., that Lowery was pleading guilty); only when Lowery sought to
    expunge the criminal file did he learn of the forged signature, which required
    him to file a separate PCR petition and bring the forgery to the court’s attention.
    15
    G. Rule 32:8.1(b). Under rule 32:8.1(b), “a lawyer [shall not,] in
    connection with . . . a disciplinary matter, . . . knowingly fail to respond to a
    lawful     demand    for   information   from   an   admissions     or   disciplinary
    authority . . . .” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:8.1(b). “It is well established that a
    respondent’s failure to respond to a notice of complaint from the Board is a
    violation of our rules.” McCarthy, 
    814 N.W.2d at 609
    . Even when an attorney
    does eventually respond, if the response is nevertheless “not timely and required
    additional correspondence from the Board,” this rule is violated. Iowa Sup. Ct.
    Att’y Discipline Bd. v. Casey, 
    761 N.W.2d 53
    , 60 (Iowa 2009) (per curiam); see
    also Nelson, 
    838 N.W.2d at 540
     (finding violation where attorney took six months
    to respond to Board’s notice); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks,
    
    759 N.W.2d 328
    , 331 (Iowa 2009) (finding violation where attorney took three
    months to respond).
    Here, although Johnson did file an answer to the notices of complaints the
    Board sent in March 2021, he did so nine days after the twenty-day window
    provided in Iowa Court Rule 35.6(4). We hold that, in combination with
    Johnson’s subsequent failure to respond to the Board’s requests for additional
    information, Johnson violated rule 32:8.1(b). See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
    Bd. v. Nelissen, 
    871 N.W.2d 694
    , 700 (Iowa 2015) (“[W]e join the commission in
    determining that Nelissen violated rule 32:8.1(b) by ignoring requests of the
    Board for information. Between January and May 2014, the Board sent a series
    of letters to Nelissen, as to which it received no response.”). We infer from the
    16
    fact that Johnson repeatedly failed to respond (either completely or in a timely
    fashion) that he did so “knowingly.” See 
    id.
    H. Rule 32:8.4(b). “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to,” inter alia,
    “commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
    trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Iowa R. of Prof’l
    Conduct 32:8.4(b). “A lawyer need not be charged or convicted of a crime in order
    to be found in violation of this rule.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cross,
    
    861 N.W.2d 211
    , 222 (Iowa 2015). Instead, in “assessing whether a lawyer has
    violated rule 32:8.4(b), we consider ‘[t]he nature and circumstances of the act,’ ”
    including: “the lawyer’s mental state; the extent to which the act demonstrates
    disrespect for the law or law enforcement; the presence or absence of a victim;
    the extent of actual or potential injury to a victim; and the presence or absence
    of a pattern of criminal conduct.” Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d at 125 (alteration in
    original) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Schmidt, 
    796 N.W.2d 33
    ,
    40 (Iowa 2011)).
    Forgery is a criminal act that reflects adversely on an attorney’s honesty.
    See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barry, 
    908 N.W.2d 217
    , 225–26 (Iowa
    2018). The Board’s complaint identifies Iowa Code section 715A.2(1) as evidence
    that Johnson’s forging Lowery’s signature on a guilty plea is a criminal act for
    purposes of rule 32:8.4(b). Under that provision,
    [a] person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to defraud or injure
    anyone, or with knowledge that the person is facilitating a fraud
    or injury to be perpetrated by anyone, the person does any of the
    following:
    a. Alters a writing of another without the other’s permission.
    17
    b. Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, or
    transfers a writing so that it purports to be the act of another who
    did not authorize that act, or so that it purports to have been
    executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than
    was in fact the case, or so that it purports to be a copy of an
    original when no such original existed.
    c. Utters a writing which the person knows to be forged in a
    manner specified in paragraph “a” or “b”.
    d. Possesses a writing which the person knows to be forged
    in a manner specified in paragraph “a” or “b”.
    Iowa Code § 715A.2(1) (2020).
    In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Barry, we found rule
    32:8.4(b) violated where an attorney engaged in conduct “sufficient to show [he]
    committed forgery pursuant to section 715A.2 . . . [by] knowingly and
    intentionally creat[ing] a fraudulent dissolution decree and present[ing] it to [his
    clients] as an original decree signed by a judge without the judge’s authority or
    knowledge.” 
    908 N.W.2d at 225
    . To forge the judge’s signature on the fake
    dissolution decree, the attorney obtained “a signature page from an order setting
    a hearing in an unrelated case bearing [a judge’s] signature . . . [and] altered the
    case title and the case number on this signature page” to make it look like a
    judge had signed the divorce decree “[w]ithout [the judge’s] knowledge or
    authorization.” 
    Id. at 223
    .
    Johnson’s actions in the course of representing Lowery are similar.
    Johnson obtained Lowery’s signature from a different filing and electronically
    transferred it to the guilty plea to make it appear as though Lowery had signed
    the plea. He knew he did not have Lowery’s authorization to do so but
    nevertheless placed Lowery’s signature on the plea and passed it off to the court
    18
    as though Lowery himself had signed it. Lowery was directly harmed by this
    action: in addition to being convicted per the plea agreement, Lowery had to
    initiate a separate PCR claim in order to obtain relief from the judgment. This
    act “reflects adversely on [Johnson’s] honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness as a
    lawyer, even if the authorities never charged him with the crime.” 
    Id.
     at 225–26;
    see Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowe, 
    830 N.W.2d 737
    , 743 (Iowa
    2013) (“We have previously recognized the crime of forgery, by its very nature,
    reflects adversely on an attorney’s fitness to practice law.”). We conclude
    Johnson violated rule 32:8.4(b).
    I. Rule 32:8.4(c). It is also professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage
    in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Iowa R. of
    Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). “Forging a signature involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
    and misrepresentation,” i.e., everything listed in the rule. Barry, 
    908 N.W.2d at 226
     (emphasis added) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 
    Thompson, 732
     N.W.2d 865, 867 (Iowa 2007)). Thus, we have no trouble concluding that
    Johnson violated this rule by forging Lowery’s signature on the guilty plea.
    The Board alleges that Johnson also violated this rule by submitting a
    false time and travel expense claim to the SPD in connection with his
    representation of Brown. To find a violation based on this conduct, we “must find
    ‘a level of scienter that is more than negligent behavior or incompetence.’ ” Noel,
    
    923 N.W.2d at 587
     (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Suarez-Quilty,
    
    912 N.W.2d 150
    , 158 (Iowa 2018)). “The dispositive question ‘is whether the
    19
    effect of the lawyer’s conduct is to mislead rather than to inform.’ ” Id. at 588
    (quoting Suarez-Quilty, 
    912 N.W.2d at 158
    ).
    In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Noel, we found this
    rule violated where an attorney submitted false time and travel expense claims
    to the SPD even though he claimed he only did so negligently or haphazardly. 
    Id.
    In that case, there was a host of direct evidence showing that the attorney knew
    he had overbilled the SPD but still took no steps to correct the issue. 
    Id.
     Although
    that level of direct evidence is missing here, Johnson simply admits that he
    violated this rule. Thus, the logical inference from this admission, together with
    the surrounding facts and circumstances, is that Johnson acted with the
    requisite level of scienter. Johnson knew he did not visit Brown in person, but
    he nevertheless billed the SPD for the trip; so when he certified that the
    information in his submission—including the claim that he traveled to visit with
    Brown—was “true, accurate, and complete,” he knew that to be a false
    representation.   Cf.   Iowa   Sup.   Ct.    Att’y   Disciplinary   Bd.   v.   Marzen,
    
    949 N.W.2d 229
    , 239 (Iowa 2020) (“Marzen defends his actions as protecting [his
    clients’] best interests[,] . . . [but he] ignores that the [tax] returns [he filed]
    required a signature affirming the information contained in the returns was ‘true,
    correct, and complete.’ ”). We therefore conclude that Johnson also violated rule
    32:8.4(c) by submitting a false reimbursement claim to the SPD.
    J. Rule 32:8.4(d). Finally, it is professional misconduct for an attorney to
    “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Iowa R.
    of Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(d). “An attorney’s conduct is prejudicial to the
    20
    administration of justice when it violates the ‘well-understood norms and
    conventions of the practice of law’ such that it hampers ‘the efficient and proper
    operation of the courts or of ancillary systems upon which the courts rely.’ ”
    Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d at 128 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
    Rhinehart, 
    827 N.W.2d 169
    , 180 (Iowa 2013)); see also Barry, 
    908 N.W.2d at 226
    (“[A] lawyer violates rule 32:8.4(d) when his or her misconduct wastes judicial
    resources.” (citing Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGinness,
    
    844 N.W.2d 456
    , 463 (Iowa 2014))). “We have consistently held an attorney
    violates rule 32:8.4(d) when the ‘misconduct results in additional court
    proceedings or causes court proceedings to be delayed or dismissed.’ ” Noel,
    933 N.W.2d at 204 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Vandel,
    
    889 N.W.2d 659
    , 666 (Iowa 2017)).
    We agree with the commission that Johnson violated this rule in his
    representations of Monson, Kreykes, Peterson, Terwilliger, and Lowery. In each
    of these cases, Johnson’s repeated failure to meet deadlines and appear for
    scheduled hearings “undoubtedly delayed court proceedings” and “caused court
    personnel to invest time and energy” that they would not have otherwise. Barry,
    
    908 N.W.2d at 226
    . In representing Terwilliger, for example, Johnson’s failure to
    respond to the court reporter’s emails caused the judge to delay starting the trial
    while she attempted to contact him, to no avail. And in representing Lowery,
    Johnson’s submission of a forged guilty plea resulted in further litigation when
    Lowery later sought to have his conviction reversed.
    21
    Johnson also violated this rule by failing to respond to the Board’s
    investigative inquiries as alleged in Count V. “A lawyer violates [rule 32:8.4(d)]
    when the lawyer fails to respond to inquiries from the Board.” McCarthy,
    
    814 N.W.2d at 610
    . Johnson failed to timely respond to the Board’s notices, and
    he failed to respond at all to the Board’s subsequent inquiries.
    In summary, the Board proved by a convincing preponderance of the
    evidence all ethical violations charged in the complaint—Johnson engaged in
    nineteen violations of eleven different rules in matters involving six different
    clients as well as in his own disciplinary proceeding.
    IV. Sanctions.
    We must now decide on an appropriate sanction. Three members of the
    commission recommended a suspension of at least three years, while two
    members recommended two years, but the commission provided no explanation
    for the discrepancy. The Board initially suggested Johnson’s actions were closest
    to those in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. McCarthy, where
    we imposed a two-year suspension, but it now supports the commission
    majority’s recommendation. Johnson has not filed any statement with respect to
    sanctions.
    In determining the appropriate sanction, we give the commission’s findings
    and recommendations respectful consideration. Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d at 129. While
    we “are concerned with maintaining some degree of uniformity throughout our
    disciplinary cases,” we do not let this concern override “the particular facts in
    each case [which ultimately] drive the resulting discipline.” Barry, 
    908 N.W.2d 22
    at 227 (alteration in original) (second quoting 
    Thompson, 732
     N.W.2d at 867). To
    that end, we begin our analysis by reviewing analogous cases. We also consider
    “the nature of the violations, the need for deterrence, protection of the public,
    maintenance of the reputation of the bar as a whole, and the attorney’s fitness
    to continue practicing law, as well as any aggravating or mitigating
    circumstances.” Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d at 129 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y
    Disciplinary Bd. v. Bartley, 
    860 N.W.2d 331
    , 337 (Iowa 2015)).
    A. Review of Analogous Cases. Forging another person’s signature on a
    court document “is a ‘grave and serious breach of professional ethics.’ ” Kallsen,
    
    814 N.W.2d at 239
     (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Rickabaugh,
    
    728 N.W.2d 375
    , 382 (Iowa 2007)). As a self-regulated profession, an attorney’s
    intentional misrepresentation to a court strikes at the baseline of fundamental
    honesty on which our profession’s integrity is built. See Rickabaugh, 
    728 N.W.2d at 382
     (“The whole structure of ethical standards is derived from the paramount
    need for lawyers to be trustworthy. The court system and the public we serve are
    damaged when our officers play fast and loose with the truth.” (quoting Comm. on
    Prof’l Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Bauerle, 
    460 N.W.2d 452
    ,
    453 (Iowa 1990))).
    Discipline in cases involving forgery has ranged anywhere from public
    admonition to revocation. See Barry, 
    908 N.W.2d at
    227–28 (canvassing forgery
    cases). As those cases reveal, the level of discipline generally turns on the nature
    of the forged document, whether the violation was an isolated event or was
    coupled with prior or concurrent violations, the attorney’s remorsefulness and
    23
    acceptance of responsibility for the actions, and the consequences to others from
    the attorney’s dishonest acts.
    For example, we imposed public reprimands on an attorney with no prior
    discipline who forged a judge’s signature on an approved but unsigned order,
    see Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Newman, 
    748 N.W.2d 786
    , 787–89
    (Iowa 2008), and another attorney with a clean record who forged a client’s
    signature on an affidavit filed with the court, see Comm. on Prof’l Ethics &
    Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Roberts, 
    312 N.W.2d 556
    , 557–58 (Iowa
    1981) (en banc). But we have imposed two- and three-year suspensions in cases
    involving forgery coupled with additional violations that resulted in harm to
    others. See, e.g., McCarthy, 
    814 N.W.2d at 610
     (imposing a two-year suspension
    on   attorney   who   “neglected   the    matters   of   multiple   clients,   made
    misrepresentations to his clients about the status of their cases to cover up his
    neglect, filed a court document containing a forged signature, failed to appear at
    court proceedings, and failed to comply with orders directing him to cure
    deficiencies”); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Van Beek, 
    757 N.W.2d 639
    ,
    642, 644 (Iowa 2008) (concluding a two-year suspension for an attorney who
    “altered a will, forged the names of clients and executors to documents, falsely
    declared documents and signatures to be authentic, received attorney fees in an
    estate proceeding without a court order, failed to deposit unearned fees into her
    trust account, [and] neglected client matters” was appropriate considering “the
    multiple instances of serious misconduct and properly consider[ed] Van Beek’s
    struggle with depression and alcoholism that contributed to her misconduct”);
    24
    Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Hansel, 
    558 N.W.2d 186
    , 192 (Iowa
    1997) (imposing a three-year suspension for conduct that included knowledge of
    a forged endorsement on a client’s money order that was deposited in the
    attorney’s personal account); Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
    Clauss, 
    530 N.W.2d 453
    , 454–55 (Iowa 1995) (imposing a three-year suspension
    on a lawyer with a past disciplinary record who, among other violations, forged
    and falsely notarized his wife’s signature on a return of service for an original
    notice). We revoked one attorney’s license for a number of violations, including
    forging an executor’s signature on a report and inventory and filing it with the
    court when the executor refused to sign the inventory because it was incorrect.
    Rickabaugh, 
    728 N.W.2d at 378, 382
    . In that case, William Rickabaugh’s Iowa
    law license had previously been suspended for three years based on “very serious
    ethical misconduct, most notably the fabrication of documents and the forgery
    of a judge’s signature in an attempt to persuade a client he had filed a lawsuit
    and obtained a judgment.” 
    Id.
     When it came to light that he had also forged the
    executor’s signature in addition to his forgery of a judge’s signature, we
    concluded revocation was warranted because his “pattern of deceit reveal[ed] a
    serious character flaw which makes him unfit to practice law.” 
    Id.
    We have imposed one-year suspensions in two other cases involving
    forgery of a client’s signature specifically related to a guilty plea. In Kallsen, we
    suspended an attorney’s license for one year when the attorney instructed his
    client’s fiancé to forge his client’s signature on a guilty plea to an OWI (first
    offense) charge. 814 N.W.2d at 237, 240. The resulting sentence required the
    25
    client to spend a week in jail, and the client had to initiate a PCR suit to have
    the plea and conviction set aside. Id. at 237. The consequence to Kallsen’s client
    of spending seven days in jail weighed heavily in our suspension but was
    mitigated by Kallsen’s decisions to refund the client’s fee and to voluntarily cease
    practicing law. Id. at 240.
    Kieffer-Garrison also received a one-year suspension for forging her client’s
    signature on a written arraignment and not-guilty plea form when she was
    unable to obtain her client’s signature. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
    Kieffer-Garrison, 
    951 N.W.2d 29
    , 33–35 (Iowa 2020). After unsuccessfully
    attempting to contact her client by mail to obtain his signature on the form,
    Kieffer-Garrison took it upon herself to sign the client’s name and submit it to
    the court as though her client had signed it. Id. at 34. After the client informed
    the court of the discrepancy and the court confronted Kieffer-Garrison, she
    doubled down—“falsely t[elling] the court that she received [the client’s] written
    arraignment form in the mail with what she believed was [his] signature and filed
    it.” Id. at 34–35. We compared Kieffer-Garrison’s case to Kallsen: although “the
    consequences of [Kieffer-Garrison’s] misconduct on her client were not as severe
    as the seven-day jail sentence that the client suffered in Kallsen,” we found “the
    circumstances in [Kieffer-Garrison’s] case [were] still just as troubling” in light
    of Kieffer-Garrison’s lengthier history of misconduct that also involved
    dishonesty. Id. at 39.
    In cases “[w]hen multiple instances of neglect are involved and combine
    with other violations or cause significant harm to the clients, we have imposed a
    26
    longer period of suspension”—in some cases, ranging between two and three
    years. Johnson, 
    792 N.W.2d at 682
     (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
    v. Carpenter, 
    781 N.W.2d 263
    , 270 (Iowa 2010)) (collecting cases). Finally, “our
    sanctions for attorneys who charge and collect unreasonable fees range from
    sixty days to two years.” Noel, 
    923 N.W.2d at
    588–89.
    B. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. Johnson has not presented any
    mitigating factors, and we are hard-pressed to find any on the record. See
    Johnson, 
    792 N.W.2d at
    682–83 (considering no mitigating factors where
    attorney presented none by failing to “respond[] in any way to the board”).
    Despite the Board’s assertion that there are none, the commission found it
    relevant that Johnson admitted wrongdoing by stipulating to all of the facts and
    violations in the complaint save for those regarding Lowery’s guilty plea.
    Although    “an   attorney’s   acceptance   or   acknowledgment     of   some
    wrongdoing constitutes a mitigating circumstance,” Barry, 
    908 N.W.2d at 231
    ,
    failure to cooperate with the Board’s investigation is an aggravating factor, see
    Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Wenger,
    
    469 N.W.2d 678
    , 680 (Iowa 1991) (en banc). On balance, then, we find Johnson’s
    admission to most—but not the most serious—of the alleged violations and
    conduct to be of little, if any, mitigating value. The mitigating value in accepting
    or acknowledging wrongdoing typically comes from the concomitant acceptance
    of responsibility for that wrongdoing. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
    Conduct v. Lyzenga, 
    619 N.W.2d 327
    , 329, 331–32 (Iowa 2000) (en banc)
    (agreeing with the sentiment of the commission, which found that despite
    27
    attorney’s acknowledgment of wrongdoing, she “had not acknowledged personal
    responsibility for her” actions (emphasis added)). Simply acknowledging that one
    broke a rule without making any effort to own up to it—for example, by making
    efforts to set things right, see, e.g., Noel, 
    923 N.W.2d at
    590–91; Kallsen,
    
    814 N.W.2d at 240
    , by participating in the administration of justice, or by even
    simply showing some level of remorse, see, e.g., Barry 
    908 N.W.2d at
    231—is as
    likely to reflect a flagrant disregard for the authority behind that rule as it is to
    show an acceptance of responsibility, see Kieffer-Garrison, 951 N.W.2d at 35, 40
    (considering attorney’s actions of entering into stipulation of facts together with
    her lack of “remorse for [her] misconduct” as an aggravating factor); Lyzenga,
    619 N.W.2d at 333 (“Also disturbing to us is Lyzenga’s apparent disinterest in
    these proceedings. . . . This lack of interest not only mocks the disciplinary
    process but casts serious doubt on her true commitment and dedication to
    rectify her past conduct and adhere to the highest standards of professional
    conduct in the future.”).
    Indeed, as the commission noted, Johnson’s wholesale failure to
    participate in these proceedings “casts serious doubt on any commitment to a
    future practice of law.” The commission’s sentiments are bolstered by the fact
    that at the time this complaint was filed, Johnson’s law license had already been
    under suspension for three months for his failure to comply with a client security
    commission audit of his lawyer trust account. See Iowa Ct. R. 39.10(3). There is
    no indication in the record that Johnson ever made an attempt to comply with
    the obligations that suspension imposed or otherwise sought to lift it. See id.
    28
    r. 39.8(3) (providing fifteen- and thirty-day windows for compliance with certain
    obligations as conditions precedent to an application for readmission). Simply
    put—aside from his brief answer to the complaint and appearance at the
    scheduling conference in this matter (ten months ago)—we are left with the
    impression, like one of Johnson’s former clients, that Johnson has “apparently
    fallen off the face of the earth.”2
    Johnson’s current violations and his suspension related to the audit of his
    trust fund are not the only instances of discipline in his relatively short tenure
    as an Iowa attorney. In 2019, Johnson received a public reprimand for failing to
    act diligently in representing a client pursuing a PCR appeal, causing the client’s
    appeal to be dismissed. And even that was “not [his] first time neglecting an
    appeal,” as shown by the private reprimand he received earlier that same year.
    This prior history of discipline—particularly Johnson’s prior history of failing to
    act diligently in representing appointed clients—is a significant aggravating
    factor. See Johnson, 
    792 N.W.2d at 682
     (noting, in disciplinary case three years
    after attorney’s admission to practice law in Iowa, his having “demonstrated in a
    short period of time a pattern of repeated callousness and indifference to his
    client[s’] matters”); see also Kieffer-Garrison, 951 N.W.2d at 40 (“We consider [an
    attorney’s] pattern of misconduct, multiple rules violations, and history of
    disciplinary action as aggravating factors.”); Marzen, 949 N.W.2d at 244 (“If the
    2InJanuary 2023, this court sent Johnson a copy, by regular mail, of our order setting
    his case for nonoral submission in February. On January 25, that letter was marked as
    undeliverable and, as the post office was unable to forward it to another address, it was returned
    to us.
    29
    prior disciplinary action was based on the same or similar conduct, ‘[t]his factor
    is even stronger.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
    Bd. v. Goedken, 
    939 N.W.2d 97
    , 108 (Iowa 2020))).
    “We [also] consider harm to the client as an aggravating factor.” Iowa Sup.
    Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Turner, 
    918 N.W.2d 130
    , 154 (Iowa 2018). Although
    the harm to Lowery was not as great as the harm suffered by the client in
    Kallsen—who had to spend a week in jail as a result of the attorney’s forgery—
    we still find Lowery was harmed by the fact that he was required to expend
    further time and expense in litigation to have his conviction reversed.
    Finally, the nature of Johnson’s violations—particularly in forging his
    client’s signature on a guilty plea—and their scope—involving six different
    clients—are themselves aggravating factors. See Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d at 132 (“The
    nature of [an attorney’s] violations is also an aggravating factor.”); Barry,
    
    908 N.W.2d at 233
     (“We emphasize ‘[w]hat should dictate the sanction in this
    case is the nature, number, and seriousness of the ethical violations[.]’ ”
    (alterations in original) (quoting Hansel, 
    558 N.W.2d at 192
    )). “[F]undamental
    honesty is the base line and mandatory requirement to serve in the legal
    profession,” and Johnson’s “forgery of [his client’s] signature constitute[s] [a]
    serious breach[] of th[at] fundamental concept[].” Barry, 
    908 N.W.2d at 233
    (quoting Bauerle, 460 N.W.2d at 453). Where attorneys “blatant[ly] disregard
    [this] duty,” there is “no place for [them]” in the legal profession. Rickabaugh,
    
    728 N.W.2d at 382
     (second quoting Wenger, 
    469 N.W.2d at 679
    ). Absent
    30
    mitigating factors, other jurisdictions have imposed disbarment in cases
    involving intentional forgery.3
    It is particularly troubling that Johnson forged a plea of guilty—even after
    his client told him he would not sign. The client is the master of his own fate,
    and an attorney who cannot be troubled to seek or follow the client’s direction
    should not be practicing law. Attorneys are granted substantial latitude in
    deciding how to best prosecute or defend a case on their client’s behalf, see
    16 Gregory C. Sisk & Mark S. Cady, Iowa Practice Series: Lawyer and Judicial
    Ethics § 5:2(b) author’s cmt., at 164–65 (2022 ed., 2022), but certain decisions
    are always retained by the client. In criminal cases that list is fairly short, and
    3See, e.g., The Fla. Bar v. Gross, 
    896 So. 2d 742
    , 745–47 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam)
    (disbarring attorney for several egregious acts of misconduct but noting that some of those acts
    would have been independently sufficient to warrant disbarment, including “the forgery of a
    client’s signature on a written plea of guilt”); People v. Marmon, 
    903 P.2d 651
    , 652 (Colo. 1995)
    (en banc) (per curiam) (disbarring attorney who “forged three court documents to conceal his
    neglect of an adoption case”); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Barnett, 
    102 A.3d 310
    , 320–21
    (Md. 2014) (disbarring attorney who “forged [a client’s] signature on an Affidavit of Indigency[,]
    . . . submitted the false document to the circuit court[,] . . . failed to notify [the client] of [court]
    dates, or otherwise communicate with her for at least ten months,” withdrew the client’s court
    filings without her consent, and during the subsequent investigation, “intentionally misled Bar
    Counsel”), abrogated by Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Collins, 
    270 A.3d 917
    , 945–46 (Md.
    2022) (recognizing that seminal Maryland case, Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Vanderlinde,
    
    773 A.2d 463
    , 488 (Md. 2001), relied on by Barnett court and others for the proposition that
    disbarment should ordinarily be the sanction for misconduct involving intentional dishonesty
    was not consistently followed in all cases and therefore “no longer exclusively sets the standard
    for imposition of the sanction in cases involving intentional dishonesty,” rather, “cases involving
    dishonesty and knowingly made false statements will be assessed on an individual basis to
    determine whether the misconduct at issue gives rise to deployment of the standard set forth in
    Vanderlinde”); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Guarnero, 
    93 P.3d 166
    , 168–70, 173 (Wash.
    2004) (en banc) (affirming disciplinary hearing officer’s determination that disbarment was
    warranted for attorney’s forging a client’s signature on a declaration and passing it off as genuine
    to the court and opposing counsel). But see In re Disciplinary Action Against Aitken,
    
    787 N.W.2d 152
    , 155–56, 162–64 (Minn. 2010) (per curiam) (imposing ninety-day suspension
    and two-year probationary period where attorney forged a client’s signature on a guilty plea and
    failed to cooperate with the subsequent disciplinary investigation); In re Disciplinary Action
    Against Stensland, 
    799 N.W.2d 341
    , 343, 348 (N.D. 2011) (per curiam) (imposing one-year
    suspension, restitution, and court costs on attorney for misconduct, including forging client’s
    signature on a guilty plea).
    31
    whether to plead guilty is right at the top. See Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.2(a)
    (“[T]he lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the
    lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial, and whether the
    client will testify.”). Even in the absence of rule 32:1.2(a)’s explicit direction, an
    attorney’s fundamental duty to act scrupulously and in his client’s stated
    interests is at its zenith when his client’s liberty is at stake, as it is during the
    plea-bargaining process. We have recently reiterated the United States Supreme
    Court’s declaration “that plea-bargaining ‘is the criminal justice system.’ ” State
    v. Patten, 
    981 N.W.2d 126
    , 127–28 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Sothman v. State,
    
    967 N.W.2d 512
    , 540 (Iowa 2021) (McDermott, J., dissenting)). That process—
    and thus, by extension, the criminal justice system—cannot function if attorneys
    cannot be trusted to faithfully represent their clients’ interests.4 See Missouri v.
    Frye, 
    566 U.S. 134
    , 144 (2012) (“In order that [the] benefits [of plea bargaining]
    can be realized, however, criminal defendants require effective counsel during
    plea negotiations.”).
    C. Appropriate Sanction. Unlike the attorneys in Kieffer-Garrison and
    Kallsen, Johnson’s misconduct ranged across six different representations,
    involved an extensive pattern of client neglect—which itself was a continuation
    4During   the COVID-19 pandemic, we extended the availability of written guilty pleas to
    class “D” felonies. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Ongoing Provisions for
    Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court Services 2–3 (Apr. 17, 2020). That practice will soon
    become permanent for nonforcible class “D” felonies. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Supervisory Order, In the
    Matter of Adopting Revised Chapter 2 Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure (Oct. 14, 2022), proposed
    rule 2.8(4). If we are going to allow criminal defendants to use a written guilty plea for more
    serious crimes subjecting them to significant jailtime, we must be able to trust that attorneys
    are doing their utmost to protect their clients’ interests.
    32
    of his prior history of discipline—and included dishonesty not only in forging
    Lowery’s guilty plea but also in submitting a false time and expense claim to the
    SPD. Thus, we agree with the Board that a one-year suspension would be
    inadequate and that a suspension within the two-to-three-year range is more
    appropriate. See, e.g., McCarthy, 
    814 N.W.2d at
    610–11 (imposing a two-year
    suspension for a variety of misconduct, including filing a forged document);
    Rickabaugh, 
    728 N.W.2d at 378, 382
     (revoking attorney’s license for forging and
    filing a probate matter after having previously suspending the same attorney’s
    license for three years for forging a judge’s signature to convince a client he had
    received a judgment he had not).
    As we noted above, the level of discipline in cases involving forgery
    generally turns on the nature and circumstances of the forgery, whether the
    violation was an isolated event or was coupled with prior or concurrent
    violations, the attorney’s remorsefulness and acceptance of responsibility for the
    actions, and the consequences to others from the attorney’s dishonest acts. Here,
    Johnson’s forgery of Lowery’s guilty plea is accompanied by a litany of other
    violations, including him billing the SPD for services not rendered, to say nothing
    of his prior disciplinary history. He has expressed no remorse for his actions and
    although he admitted most of the violations in the complaint, he denied having
    forged Lowery’s signature on the guilty plea and then stopped cooperating in the
    disciplinary process or otherwise explaining his actions. Finally, although
    Lowery did not spend any time in jail as a result of the forged guilty plea (unlike
    the client in Kallsen), he was still required to initiate a PCR petition and engage
    33
    in further litigation with the State in order to undo Johnson’s forgery. In other
    words, the court was not able to simply hit the reset button as it did in
    Kieffer-Garrison. And Johnson’s five other clients were subject to, at a minimum,
    protracted litigation as a result of his dilatory practices.
    Given the lack of mitigating factors in this case, the nature and scope of
    Johnson’s violations, and the troubling pattern of callous disregard Johnson has
    displayed for his clients and the profession, we agree with the majority in the
    commission that a lengthy suspension of at least three years is warranted. “More
    than anything, [Johnson’s] obvious indifferent attitude toward our disciplinary
    system and basic professional norms . . . weigh[s] heavily in the sanctions scale.”
    Kieffer-Garrison, 951 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
    v. Parrish, 
    925 N.W.2d 163
    , 182 (Iowa 2019)). In this case, that weight overbears
    “[a]ny inclination on our part to temper the sanction imposed.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd.
    of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Palmer, 
    563 N.W.2d 634
    , 635 (Iowa 1997) (per
    curiam).
    V. Conclusion.
    We hereby suspend Johnson’s license to practice law in Iowa indefinitely,
    with no possibility of reinstatement for three years from the date of this opinion.
    This suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. Iowa Ct. R. 34.23(3).
    We further direct Johnson to comply with the requirements set forth in Iowa
    Court Rule 34.24 and assess the costs of the instant disciplinary action to him,
    see Iowa Ct. R. 36.24(1).
    LICENSE SUSPENDED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-2003

Filed Date: 3/31/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/31/2023

Authorities (31)

Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Roberts , 1981 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1081 ( 1981 )

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Moonen , 2005 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 156 ( 2005 )

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Brian ... , 2013 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 54 ( 2013 )

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Michael J.... , 2015 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 31 ( 2015 )

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Sean ... , 908 N.W.2d 217 ( 2018 )

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Royce D. ... , 918 N.W.2d 130 ( 2018 )

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Newman , 2008 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 61 ( 2008 )

Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v.... , 1995 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 72 ( 1995 )

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Alexandra ... , 2015 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 96 ( 2015 )

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Sandra ... , 912 N.W.2d 150 ( 2018 )

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Brian ... , 2013 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 109 ( 2013 )

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Richard R.... , 2011 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 19 ( 2011 )

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board Vs. Anthony ... , 2010 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 147 ( 2010 )

Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v.... , 2004 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 195 ( 2004 )

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Pamela ... , 2017 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 5 ( 2017 )

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Kim ... , 2017 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 85 ( 2017 )

The Florida Bar v. Gross , 30 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 133 ( 2005 )

Missouri v. Frye , 132 S. Ct. 1399 ( 2012 )

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Verla ... , 2015 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 20 ( 2015 )

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Jeffrey K.... , 2014 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 27 ( 2014 )

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