Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Verla Jean Bartley , 860 N.W.2d 331 ( 2015 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 14–0757
Filed February 27, 2015
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Appellee,
vs.
VERLA JEAN BARTLEY,
Appellant.
Appeal from the report of the Grievance Commission of the
Supreme Court of Iowa.
The grievance commission reports an attorney violated several
court rules and rules of professional conduct and recommends
suspension. LICENSE SUSPENDED.
David L. Brown of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Charles L. Harrington and David J. Grace, Des Moines, for
appellee.
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CADY, Chief Justice.
The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board charged
attorney Verla Jean Bartley with violating the rules of professional
conduct based on neglect, misrepresentations, and trust account and fee
violations in the representation of the executors in two separate estates.
After reviewing a written stipulation entered into by the parties, the
Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa found Bartley
violated several rules and recommended a 180-day suspension.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Verla Jean Bartley was admitted to the Iowa bar in 1961. She rose
to prominence in the profession over the years and was active in the
state bar association. She has no prior disciplinary record. In 2002, she
began practicing as “of counsel” with an Iowa City law firm and retired
from the active practice of law in 2014.
The events leading to this disciplinary action against Bartley
involved her conduct in serving as the attorney for the executors in two
estate proceedings. In 2001, Bartley opened the Shepherd estate. She
completed most of the work for the estate in a timely manner. She billed
and collected fees for her work on the estate in late 2006. The fees were
not approved by the district court at that time and were deposited
directly into the firm’s business account rather than the trust account.
In February 2008, the final report for the estate was filed and the
previously paid fees were approved, but the estate did not close at that
time because, according to Bartley, the Iowa Department of Revenue had
not issued the “Certificate of Acquittance from Income Tax.” The court
granted multiple extensions of time to file the certificate from the time of
the final report through June 2013 without resolution. In reality, Bartley
was unable to close the estate due to tax difficulties, including unfiled
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returns and an unpaid creditor claim that remained outstanding until
late 2013. In the course of trying to close the estate and then to
resolving the tax returns and creditor-claim problems, Bartley made
numerous misrepresentations to the court and members of her law firm
regarding her actions. The misrepresentations included creating a false
check purportedly paying the creditor claim, creating a letter from the
bank indicating the false check was processed, and knowingly
misrepresenting the status of the estate’s tax returns to the court. The
interlocutory reports to the court on the status of the estate also
contained false information.
In 2005, Bartley opened the Gergis estate. Again, Bartley
completed the majority of the estate in a timely manner. In 2005, 2007,
and 2008, the estate’s executor paid Bartley a total of $65,000 in fees
from the estate for her services. The court did not approve the fees at the
time any of the payments were made. The fees represented an amount
that was approximately half of the maximum ordinary statutory fee. The
fees paid in 2005 and 2008 were deposited directly into the firm’s
business account; and the 2007 fee, though initially deposited into the
firm’s trust account, was immediately transferred to the business
account. The estate included a charitable trust and could not be closed
until the necessary tax clearances from the Internal Revenue Service
were received. The final clearance was not issued until March 14, 2013.
On June 24, 2013, the court approved the final report. In the report, the
court approved the fees previously collected by Bartley in 2005, 2007,
and 2008. No additional fees were requested under an agreement with
the executor.
The Shepherd estate was open under Bartley’s direction from
March 2001 through 2013, over twelve years, including over five years
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after the final report was filed with the court. The Gergis estate was
opened in May 2005 and closed in June 2013, just over eight years later.
The court granted numerous extensions in both estates.
In November 2012, the court informed a partner in Bartley’s law
firm of its concerns regarding her conduct in the Shepherd and Gergis
estates. The partner discussed the problems with Bartley. This
discussion prompted Bartley to send a letter to the Board dated
January 23, 2013, to self-report her neglect on a tax matter for the
Shepherd estate, her conduct in collecting fees from the Gergis estate
without a court order, and her neglect in handling the tax matters in the
Gergis estate.
On April 29, 2013, a formal complaint was filed with the
commission. The Board amended the complaint once in October after
reviewing case files and a second time at the end of November in
response to a letter from a partner in Bartley’s law office documenting
ongoing violations that had occurred subsequent to Bartley’s self-report.
II. Board Complaint.
The Board charged Bartley with multiple violations of the rules of
professional responsibility, Iowa court rules, and statutes. Count I
included all the violations resulting from her actions with the Shepherd
estate. She was charged with violations of Iowa Code section 633.198
(2013) (court determination of probate fees); Iowa Court Rules 7.2
(probate fees) and 45.7 (advance fee deposit requirement); Iowa Rules of
Professional Conduct 32:1.3 (2014) (reasonable diligence), 32:1.5(a)
(payment of fees), 32:1.15 (trust account), 32:3.3(a)(1) (candor with
tribunal), 32:8.4(c) (dishonest, fraudulent, or deceitful conduct), and
32:8.4(d) (prejudice to the administration of justice); and for actions
predating the 2005 rules change, Iowa Code of Professional
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Responsibility for Lawyers rules DR 1–102(A)(5) (prejudice to
administration of justice), DR 1–102(A)(6) (fitness to practice law), and
DR 6–101(A) (failure to act competently). Count II, concerning the Gergis
estate, charged violations of Iowa Code section 633.198; Iowa Court
Rules 7.2 and 45.7; and Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.3,
32:1.5(a), 32:1.15, and 32:8.4(d).
Bartley and the Board entered into a written stipulation rather
than proceeding to an evidentiary hearing before the commission. As to
the Shepherd estate, she agreed she failed to perform her responsibilities
with reasonable diligence, made misrepresentations to the court and her
law firm regarding tax matters and creditor claims, received attorney fees
without court approval, and either did not deposit those fees in the trust
account or withdrew them prematurely. In the Gergis estate, Bartley
stipulated that she failed to exercise reasonable diligence and
preparation, received attorney fees without court approval, failed to
deposit fees into the trust account, and prematurely withdrew fees from
the trust account. The Board and Bartley also stipulated to a
recommended sanction of a sixty-day suspension from the practice of
law. 1 The commission accepted the stipulated violations. However, it
concluded the number and nature of the violations warranted more than
a sixty-day suspension and recommended the court suspend Bartley for
180 days with a supervision condition upon reinstatement.
III. Scope of Review.
“ ‘We review attorney disciplinary matters de novo.’ ” Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carter, 847 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Iowa
2014) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lemanski, 841
1Anadditional factual stipulation in the agreement was Bartley’s “retire[ment]
from the active practice of law as of January 1, 2014.”
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N.W.2d 131, 133 (Iowa 2013)); see also Iowa Ct. R. 35.11(1) (“Upon
submission, the supreme court shall proceed to review de novo . . . .”).
Attorney misconduct must be proven by a convincing preponderance of
the evidence. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Clarity, 838
N.W.2d 648, 651 (Iowa 2013). “We respectfully consider the
commission’s findings and recommendations, but they do not bind us.”
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wheeler, 824 N.W.2d 505, 509
(Iowa 2012). Although stipulations of fact are binding on the parties,
stipulations to violations and sanctions are not binding on us. Clarity,
838 N.W.2d at 651.
IV. Violations.
Bartley’s conduct falls into three general categories of violations of
the rules of professional conduct: neglect, fee-payment violations, and
misrepresentation. We will discuss each category separately.
A. Neglect. Neglect “involves an attorney’s failure to perform
obligations assumed for the client, or a conscious disregard for the
responsibilities a lawyer owes to a client.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Thomas, 794 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Iowa 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). One duty of an attorney for an executor is to
close the estate in a timely manner. Generally, estates must be closed
within three years unless otherwise ordered by the court. Iowa Code
§ 633.473. In the Shepherd estate, Bartley failed to timely file tax
returns and neglected to settle an outstanding debt for a period of over
twelve years. Likewise, her neglect delayed the closing of the Gergis
estate for five years. Although the court extended the time to close the
estates in both cases and some extension of the statutory period may
have been necessary for the proper administration of the estates, the
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record shows very little work was done to close the estates once the bulk
of the estates was settled and the fees collected.
Bartley’s conduct in the Shepherd estate, particularly from 2008
onward, clearly violated the requirement of Iowa Rule of Professional
Conduct 32:1.3 that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.” Accord Iowa Code of Prof’l
Responsibility DR 6–101(A)(2)–(3) (“A lawyer shall not . . . [h]andle a legal
matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances [or] [n]eglect a
client’s legal matter.”). The five-year delay in the closing of the Shepherd
estate after the filing of and approval by the court of the final report
“amounted to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d 96, 103
(Iowa 2012); see also Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(d) (2014) (“It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . .”); Iowa Code of Prof’l
Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(5)–(6) (“A lawyer shall not . . . [e]ngage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice [or] [e]ngage in
any other conduct that adversely reflects on the fitness to practice law.”).
In addition, the record shows Bartley failed to file her reports in a timely
fashion during the last several years the estate was open and received
numerous delinquency notices from the court.
Likewise, Bartley failed to take constructive action to resolve the
tax issues in the Gergis estate for several years after completing most of
the other work in the estate. She also failed to file timely reports after
receiving delinquency notices. Yet, when a firm partner confronted
Bartley with her delay in closing the estate, she was able to complete the
work and close the estate within a matter of months. We conclude
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Bartley did not act with reasonable diligence and promptness in the
Gergis estate, violating Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.3.
B. Fee Payment. Iowa Code section 633.197 describes the
maximum ordinary fee for an executor or personal representative, and
section 633.198 requires that probate attorney fees be determined by the
court using the same calculation. See Iowa Code § 633.197–.198.
Although Bartley calculated her fees within the statutory parameters, see
id. § 633.197, the statute requires the fees to be set by the court, not the
attorney or personal representative, see id. § 633.198. Furthermore, the
statute does not contemplate court approval after the fee has been paid.
See id.
Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(c) requires any fees paid
in advance to be deposited in a client trust account until earned or
expenses incurred. See also Iowa Ct. R. 45.7 (same). Deposit slips
clearly show the payment made for the Shepherd estate and two of the
three payments for the Gergis estate were never deposited into her firm’s
client trust account, but instead were deposited directly into the firm
business account. A probate attorney may be paid one-half of the fees
after the filing of state inheritance and federal estate tax returns, but the
remainder is not to be paid until the final report is filed unless otherwise
ordered by the court. Id. r. 7.2(4). As no fees were approved by the court
until 2008 for the Shepherd estate and 2013 for the Gergis estate, all
four payments should have been held in the client trust account until
approved. We find Bartley violated rule 32:1.15(c) by failing to deposit
the client payments into the client trust account.
Probate fees received prematurely are prejudicial to the
administration of justice. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Ackerman, 786 N.W.2d 491, 496–97 (Iowa 2010) (“Iowa Court Rule 7.2(4)
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was enacted to promote the efficient administration of estates to ensure
that the work was done prior to an attorney being paid.”). “An attorney
who takes the entire fee in violation of rule 7.2(4) commits a violation of
rule 32:1.5(a).” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morris, 847
N.W.2d 428, 433 (Iowa 2014). Bartley took full payment for her services
on both estates several years before filing the final reports or receiving
court orders for the fees. A subsequent approval of the fees by the court
does not excuse the violation. Id. By taking fees years before court
approval, Bartley violated Iowa Court Rule 7.2(4), Iowa Rule of
Professional Conduct 32:1.5(a), and rule 32:8.4(d) in both the Shepherd
estate and the Gergis estate.
C. Misrepresentation. A lawyer has a duty to be truthful to the
court on any fact or law, to offer no false evidence, and to correct any
material false statements made to the court. Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct
32:3.3(a); id. r. 32:8.4(c) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation[.]”). Further, misrepresentations to the court can be
inherently prejudicial to the administration of justice by depriving the
court of information necessary to make decisions fairly. See Iowa R.
Prof’l Conduct 32:3.3 cmt. 12 (“Lawyers have a special obligation to
protect a tribunal against . . . fraudulent conduct that undermines the
integrity of the adjudicative process . . . .”). “[H]onesty is crucial to the
judicial process and the administration of justice . . . .” Iowa Supreme
Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Daggett, 653 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa
2002); cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Fields, 790 N.W.2d
791, 796 (Iowa 2010) (finding misrepresentations to clients and court
violated rules on prejudice to the administration of justice). However,
when an attorney violates a specific rule like 32:3.3, the same conduct
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cannot be used to find a violation of a general rule like 32:8.4(c). Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hearity, 812 N.W.2d 614, 621 (Iowa
2012).
Bartley made a series of knowing misrepresentations to her law
firm and the court about the completed status of tax returns for the
Shepherd estate and made a number of misrepresentations to the court
over a period of years concerning tax issues, the status of creditor
claims, and the progress of the Shepherd estate in the interlocutory
reports filed periodically. Bartley continued to make misrepresentations
even after she was under investigation by the Board. Further, she
fraudulently prepared documents to aid in her deceit to both the court
and her firm. We find these last deliberate misrepresentations to be
violations of rule 32:3.3, and the misrepresentations in the interlocutory
reports to be violations of rule 32:8.4(c).
V. Sanction.
In determining what sanctions should be imposed, we consider the
nature of the violations, the need for deterrence, protection of the public,
maintenance of the reputation of the bar as a whole, and the attorney’s
fitness to continue practicing law, as well as any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. Wheeler, 824 N.W.2d at 511.
Bartley and the Board stipulated to a sixty-day suspension of her
license to practice law. The commission decided not to follow the
stipulation and recommended instead a suspension of Bartley’s license
for 180 days, as well as a requirement that a practicing attorney in good
standing act as a supervisor of Bartley’s cases following the suspension.
There is no standard sanction for a particular type of case, but instead
the sanction depends on the particular circumstances of the case.
Morris, 847 N.W.2d at 435.
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Our sanctions in neglect cases generally range from a public
reprimand to a six-month suspension. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Humphrey, 812 N.W.2d 659, 666–67 (Iowa 2012)
(noting that when neglect is the primary violation, public reprimand is
often the sanction chosen). “We consider any harm to the client caused
by the neglect in determining the proper sanction.” Thomas, 794 N.W.2d
at 294. We also consider whether the neglect was an isolated case or if
there were multiple instances of neglect. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d 860, 868–69 (Iowa 2010). Neglect
compounded by other offenses can result in suspensions for
“ ‘substantial lengths of time.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Dolezal, 841 N.W.2d 114, 127 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Hearity, 812
N.W.2d at 622).
“We expect honesty in all aspects of the practice of law.” Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGinness, 844 N.W.2d 456, 465
(Iowa 2014). When an attorney is found to have made
misrepresentations to the court and his or her law firm, sanctions often
result in “ ‘a lengthy suspension.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics
& Conduct v. Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d 288, 294 (Iowa 2002) (quoting Iowa
Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Stein, 603 N.W.2d 574, 576
(Iowa 1999)). We have found that misrepresentation is “a serious breach
of professional ethics, warranting a more serious sanction than neglect.”
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Gottschalk, 729 N.W.2d 812,
821 (Iowa 2007). Depending on the severity of the misrepresentations,
we have imposed sanctions ranging from reprimand to license revocation.
See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Taylor, 814 N.W.2d 259,
266, 269 (Iowa 2012) (misrepresenting progress of work and neglect
resulted in a public reprimand); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
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v. Hall, 728 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Iowa 2007) (“Dishonesty, deceit, and
misrepresentation by a lawyer are abhorrent concepts to the legal
profession, and can give rise to the full spectrum of sanctions, including
revocation.”).
Ethical violations involving fees and trust account violations have
resulted in sanctions ranging from a public reprimand to license
revocation. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Parrish, 801
N.W.2d 580, 588 (Iowa 2011). Fees taken early in probate matters, if
otherwise earned, normally result in a public reprimand. Iowa Supreme
Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Smith, 569 N.W.2d 499, 502–03 (Iowa
1997). License revocation is the result when the violations rise to the
level of misappropriation of a client’s funds. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Plumb, 766 N.W.2d 626, 634 (Iowa 2009). Multiple
violations not resulting in misappropriation will often result in license
suspension. Parrish, 801 N.W.2d at 588.
The combination of the three violations has resulted in a wide
range of suspensions. See, e.g., Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d at 111
(imposing a sixty-day suspension for neglect, knowing
misrepresentations to the court, and early receipt of fees); Iowa Supreme
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wagner, 768 N.W.2d 279, 287–88 (Iowa 2009)
(suspending license for six months for neglect, misrepresentations, and
taking unearned fees on probate estates); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Casey, 761 N.W.2d 53, 62–63 (Iowa 2009) (imposing a
three-month suspension for neglect, misrepresentation, and premature
taking of probate fees); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Van Beek, 757 N.W.2d 639, 643–44 (Iowa 2008) (suspending license for
two years for multiple misrepresentations, including alteration of a will,
collecting probate fee without court approval, trust account violations,
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and neglect of client matters); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Humphrey, 738 N.W.2d 617, 620–21 (Iowa 2007) (imposing a minimum
six-month suspension for neglect and misrepresentations on six estates
and premature fee taken on three estates); Gottschalk, 729 N.W.2d at
821 (suspending license for one year for neglect resulting in client harm
and misrepresentations); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Walker, 712 N.W.2d 683, 684–86 (Iowa 2006) (neglecting three estates, a
deed issue, and misrepresentations resulted in a six-month suspension).
Bartley has a number of mitigating factors in her favor in our
consideration of sanctions. First, she has no prior disciplinary history
during fifty-three years of practice. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Bieber, 824 N.W.2d 514, 527 (Iowa 2012) (recognizing
lack of prior discipline as an important mitigating factor). No substantial
harm was done to the clients in either estate, and they are supportive of
the legal work Bartley performed for them. See McGinness, 844 N.W.2d
at 467 (noting lack of harm to client as a mitigating factor). We also
recognize the substantial service that Bartley has devoted to the Iowa
State Bar Association and the leadership she has provided over the
years. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Iversen, 723 N.W.2d
806, 811 (Iowa 2006) (finding devoted service to the profession a
mitigating factor). Additionally, Bartley retired from the active practice of
law as of January 1, 2014.
Bartley self-reported to the Board, which is normally a mitigating
factor. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Thompson, 732
N.W.2d 865, 868–69 (Iowa 2007) (finding attorney’s recognition of
wrongdoing is a mitigating factor). However, this mitigation is lessened
somewhat when the self-reporting is at least in part motivated by
knowledge that the law firm would otherwise be reporting the violation.
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See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Henrichsen, 825 N.W.2d
525, 530 (Iowa 2013) (noting that self-reporting could be motivated by a
desire to avoid a report by others). Further, the postreport
misrepresentations to the court and Bartley’s law office were reported by
a partner of the firm rather than Bartley.
Aggravating factors are also present in this case. One factor is
Bartley is an experienced attorney. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Dunahoo, 730 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Iowa 2007) (finding
substantial experience is an aggravating factor). This experience should
have guided her away from the violations that occurred in this case.
Additionally, multiple violations of disciplinary rules generally support
enhanced sanctions. See Parrish, 801 N.W.2d at 588 (recognizing the
possibility for enhanced sanctions for multiple violations). We have said
multiple instances of neglect and other companion violations can be
“[s]ignificant aggravating factors.” Id. Moreover, misrepresentations
made to a court exacerbate the breach of professional ethics. See Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797 N.W.2d 591, 606 (Iowa
2011) (finding misrepresentation to be both a violation itself and to
aggravate other violations). Further, Bartley continued to make
misrepresentations to the court and her law firm of increasing magnitude
even after notice of her violations and her self-report.
We also observe that the misrepresentation was not only the most
serious unethical conduct engaged in by Bartley, but measured against a
career that spanned more than half a century, it appeared to be the most
uncharacteristic. Bartley consciously engaged in the misrepresentation
to cover up her neglect and, in the process, only elevated the seriousness
of her conduct and the degree of sanctions we are responsible to impose.
We have observed this result in other lawyer discipline cases, and it is
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one that all lawyers who face the prospect of discipline would be better
off avoiding. See McGinness, 844 N.W.2d at 458–59, 465 (describing
increasingly fraudulent conduct resulting in escalating attempts to cover
up a relatively minor initial violation); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. McCann, 712 N.W.2d 89, 95 (Iowa 2006) (“A lawyer violates our
disciplinary rules when the lawyer lies to cover up misconduct.”); Iowa
Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Stein, 586 N.W.2d 523, 526
(Iowa 1998) (“[T]he numerous misrepresentations made by Stein to cover
up [his] neglect warrant a serious sanction.”).
Considering all the relevant facts and circumstances, we agree
with the recommendation of the commission that Bartley should receive
a six-month suspension. We give careful consideration to our
commission’s recommendations. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Liles, 808 N.W.2d 203, 206 (Iowa 2012) (“[A]lthough we are not
bound by the commission’s recommended discipline, we give its
recommendation our respectful consideration.”). A six-month
suspension fairly balances the circumstances, as well as the mitigating
and aggravating factors, and properly considers the goals behind the
imposition of sanctions. The sanction also falls within the range imposed
on attorneys in other cases of similar conduct.
We conclude Bartley shall be suspended from the practice law in
this state with no possibility of reinstatement for a period of six months.
She shall comply with all the requirements associated with a suspension.
The costs of this proceeding are taxed against Bartley pursuant to Iowa
Court Rule 35.27(1).
LICENSE SUSPENDED.