Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Royce D. Turner , 918 N.W.2d 130 ( 2018 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 18–0352
Filed September 14, 2018
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
ROYCE D. TURNER,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance
Commission.
The grievance commission found violations of numerous rules and
recommended respondent’s license be suspended for three months.
LICENSE SUSPENDED.
Tara van Brederode and Wendell J. Harms, Des Moines, for
complainant.
Alfredo Parrish of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble,
Gentry, Brown & Bergmann LLP, Des Moines (until withdrawal), and
then Royce D. Turner, West Des Moines, pro se, for respondent.
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WATERMAN, Justice.
Royce D. Turner, over a span of twenty months, was repeatedly
rebuked by state and federal judges for missing hearings and violating
court rules. He was found in contempt several times. Three of his
clients were arrested and two were jailed for missing hearings he
overlooked. Despite an ongoing audit, Turner continued to flout basic
requirements for client trust accounts.
The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board brought a
complaint against Turner alleging multiple violations of the Iowa Rules of
Professional Conduct. He delayed responding to the Board’s inquiries
and complaints. Our court imposed a five-month interim suspension to
protect the public. We permitted Turner’s return to practice with the
help of an experienced attorney under stipulated limitations pending
resolution of the disciplinary charges.
The parties submitted a stipulation of facts. A division of the Iowa
Supreme Court Grievance Commission found violations of numerous
rules. Noting Turner’s inexperience and attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD), the commission recommended a three-month
suspension of his license to practice law with conditions on his
reinstatement. The Board recommends a suspension of twelve to
eighteen months. Based on our de novo review, we now suspend
Turner’s license to practice law for one year from the date of this opinion
with conditions on his reinstatement.
Inexperienced sole practitioners who lack mentors and take on
cases without the requisite experience are at greater risk of making
mistakes. Any Iowa lawyer should be concerned about receiving one
rebuke from a judge. Attorneys should view a single mistake as a wake-
up call to reexamine practices or get help to avoid further missteps.
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Continuing to make the same mistakes without correcting behavior
invariably leads to more trouble, as shown here. According to the adage
commonly attributed to Will Rogers, “good judgment comes from
experience, and a lot of that comes from bad judgment.” 1 We hope
Turner gains better judgment from his bad experiences.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Turner obtained his Iowa law license in 2013 and began a solo
practice in Polk County. He suffers from ADHD and depression. Turner
receives treatment and takes medication for those conditions. This case
arises from Turner’s representation of many clients. We find the
following facts as stipulated or otherwise established in the record and
review them in the sequence alleged in the Board’s second amended
complaint.
A. Untimely Response to Complaint (Count I). On January 26,
2015, Turner received from the Board a complete copy of an ethics
complaint filed by K.D. regarding Turner’s relationship with W.B. After
Turner failed to respond, the Board mailed him a second copy by certified
mail that the postal service returned after Turner declined to retrieve it.
On May 7, at Turner’s request, the Board mailed Turner a third copy and
extended his deadline to respond to May 29. Turner still did not respond
by this extended deadline.
On July 23, the Board informed Turner by email that it would seek
a suspension of his law license due to his failure to respond. The next
day, the Board filed a certificate of noncompliance with this court stating
that Turner failed to respond and asking the court to issue a notice of
possible temporary suspension of Turner’s license. Turner replied to the
1The Official Website of Will Rogers, http://www.cmgww.com/
historic/rogers/about/miscellaneous.html (Oct. 5, 2016, 10:23 AM)
[https://perma.cc/CR3Y-LAQB.
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Board’s email, stating he had not yet received a complete copy of the
complaint. The Board sent Turner a fourth copy. Turner substantively
responded to the complaint on July 28—six months after he first received
it. Turner admits he knowingly failed to respond to the Board’s lawful
demand for information. He attributed his lack of responsiveness during
this period to his ADHD and depression.
B. The Philip and Jackson Representations (Count II). In
September 2014, Agok Philip retained Turner to represent him in four
criminal cases in Polk County. Philip made seven payments to Turner
totaling $1075, but Turner failed to deposit any of these sums in his
client trust account. Turner stipulated that he was “not completely
familiar with the trust account process” at that time. Turner initially
filed appearances in only two of Philip’s four cases, prompting judicial
inquiries into his role in the other two. He belatedly filed one appearance
only after repeated reminders by the court and even then without the
requisite certificate of service.
Russell Jackson retained Turner to represent him in two criminal
cases in Polk County scheduled for a plea hearing on December 10.
Jackson made fourteen payments to Turner totaling $1880, but none
were deposited into Turner’s client trust account. On December 9,
Turner filed motions to continue but did not bring these motions to the
assigned judge’s attention. Neither Jackson nor Turner appeared at the
scheduled plea hearing the next day. The judge denied the motions to
continue and issued warrants for Jackson’s arrest. The Polk County
Sheriff arrested Jackson for failure to appear.
On March 9, 2015, Turner received the Board’s complaint
regarding his representations of Philip and Jackson. Turner failed to
respond. On April 7, the Board sent Turner a second notice of the
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complaint by restricted certified mail. Turner failed to claim this letter.
On June 2, the Board again served the complaint by certified mail, and
Turner again failed to claim the letter. The Polk County Sheriff
personally served Turner with the complaint on July 9. Turner claimed
he had already responded to this complaint, and the Board replied that it
had not received his response. The Board extended Turner’s response
deadline to July 21 at his request, but Turner missed the extended
deadline. He substantively responded to this complaint only after the
Board filed its certificate of noncompliance with this court on July 24,
more than four months after first receiving it. Turner concedes he
knowingly failed to respond to the Board’s lawful demand for
information.
C. Bankruptcy Cases (Count III). Turner admits he “was not as
familiar as he should have been with bankruptcy cases.” On May 5,
2014, he presented paper bankruptcy petitions for seven individuals,
even though electronic filing in that forum has been mandatory since
2000. His subsequent rule violations and failure to attend hearings led
to a number of rebukes, dismissals, and other sanctions, as follows.
Turner filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case for Steve Cummings.
Turner reported that his fee was $875. The U.S. Trustee moved to
dismiss the bankruptcy action and to order Turner to refund the fees.
The court scheduled a hearing on these motions. Turner failed to attend
the hearing, and the court granted both motions. A week later, Turner
filed a second bankruptcy petition for Cummings that omitted the
required listing of creditors, schedules, and statement of financial affairs.
The U.S. Trustee moved for an order to show cause for Turner to “explain
his failure to comply with the Order of this Court, the continued
deficiencies with his filing[s] . . . , his failure to appear at hearings and his
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overall practice before the Court.” Following a hearing, the court ordered
Turner to “supply the bankruptcy schedules bearing his clients’
signatures” and to deliver “the original power of attorney documents that
were executed involving any” of the clients identified in the order by the
next day. The court extended by six days the deadline for Turner to
refund the $875 fee to Cummings. Two days after the deadline for
refunding Cummings’s fee, Turner moved to vacate the refund order.
The U.S. Trustee then filed a status report noting Turner’s
noncompliance.
Turner filed a separate Chapter 7 bankruptcy case for Laura
Cummings without her required signatures, and the court scheduled a
hearing after Turner failed to correct these omissions. Neither Turner
nor Cummings attended the hearing, and the court dismissed the case.
The court ordered Turner to attend training on the court’s electronic
filing system. Turner moved for relief from the order dismissing the case,
stating he missed the hearing due to illness. The U.S. Trustee objected
due to other problems in documents submitted by Turner. The court
scheduled a hearing on the motion. Turner also filed a motion to
reinstate the case. Neither Turner nor Cummings attended the hearing,
and the court denied Turner’s motions. Turner then filed a second
bankruptcy case but omitted the filing fee or application to pay the fee in
installments and omitted the requisite schedules, statement of financial
affairs, credit counseling certificate, and listing of creditors. The
bankruptcy trustee responded with a motion for order to show cause.
The court scheduled a hearing, which Turner failed to attend. The court
dismissed the second petition. A new lawyer took over Cummings’s case.
Turner filed a Chapter 7 petition for Kelly Willard. The U.S.
Trustee moved to compel the filing of additional and corrected documents
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and then moved to dismiss because Willard had not obtained the
requisite credit counseling. Turner objected to the motion to dismiss,
and the court scheduled a hearing. A day before the hearing, Turner
filed a motion to withdraw Willard’s petition. The court granted the
motion to dismiss.
After filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases for Walter Anhorn and
Lasandra Kearney, Turner filed reaffirmation agreements between his
clients and several creditors. The U.S. Trustee objected to the
reaffirmation agreements. Turner then moved to withdraw the
agreements. The U.S. Trustee moved to dismiss Anhorn’s case because
Anhorn had not obtained credit counseling as required. Turner objected
to the motion to dismiss and moved to withdraw Anhorn’s petition one
day before the hearing, which Turner failed to attend. The court
dismissed the case. A new lawyer took over Anhorn’s matter.
In Kearney’s case, Turner filed a motion to dismiss, stating that
Kearney did not qualify under Chapter 7 and planned to file under
Chapter 11. After a hearing that Turner failed to attend, Kearney
appeared and stated she had not authorized Turner to file the motion to
dismiss. The court ordered the motion to dismiss withdrawn and
ordered Turner to refund $800 to Kearney that month. The court
dismissed Kearney’s case after she failed to meet its deadline to obtain
new counsel.
Turner filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases for Fred Leaming and
Rick Andreas. The U.S. Trustee moved to dismiss both cases and sought
refunds of fees paid to Turner and an order directing Turner to pay the
fees associated with refiling each case. The court dismissed both cases.
Turner then moved to reinstate the cases. He also filed a second
bankruptcy petition in each case. Following a hearing, the court ordered
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Turner to refund $497.50 to Leaming. Turner did not comply, so the
U.S. Trustee moved for an order to show cause and to dismiss Leaming’s
second case. The bankruptcy trustee also moved for order to show
cause, in part because Turner failed to appear for the meeting of
creditors and provided no verified, justifiable excuse for his absence.
After a hearing, which Turner failed to attend, the court dismissed
Leaming’s second case. The court entered judgment in favor of Leaming
and against Turner for $497.50. In Andreas’s second case, the court
ordered Turner to “address the deficiencies discussed on the record and
[to] take all steps necessary to ensure that he is able to represent clients
in bankruptcy cases in this forum in a competent fashion.” Andreas
received his discharge in bankruptcy a few months later.
On December 5, 2014, the bankruptcy court judge filed an order
for Turner to show cause regarding cases he filed for Cummings, Willard,
Anhorn, and Kearney. The court identified multiple problems, including
that Turner filed documents that violated electronic filing rules, lacked
required information and signatures, contained inaccurate information,
or lacked his client’s authorization. The court also noted Turner failed to
appear at four court hearings, failed to abide by court orders to produce
records and refund fees, and may have made misrepresentations to the
court. The judge determined that Turner’s conduct violated Bankruptcy
Rule 9011(b), which states,
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating) a petition, pleading, written
motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party
is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
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(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions therein are warranted by existing law or
by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions
have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery[.]
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(b). The judge concluded that sanctions were
warranted and ordered Turner to complete four hours of legal ethics
education and four hours of legal education on the “operation and
management of a law office.” The court entered judgments against
Turner in favor of these clients. At the time of the commission’s hearing,
Turner had not satisfied the judgments.
D. The Lindemann Representation (Count IV). Lowell
Lindemann retained Turner to represent him in a criminal case in Polk
County. Lindemann made nine payments to Turner totaling $2190.
Turner failed to deposit any of those payments into his client trust
account. Turner admits he “was unaware of the rule that unearned fees
had to be deposited into his trust account.” Turner failed to appear for
the pretrial conference and status hearing. Three days before the next
pretrial conference, Turner filed a motion to continue. The court denied
the motion. Turner and Lindemann failed to appear at the pretrial
conference, and the judge issued a warrant for Lindemann’s arrest.
Lindemann was arrested and had to post a $5000 cash-only bond to be
released from jail. Turner filed a motion to suppress but did not attend
the hearing on the motion, so the court deemed the motion withdrawn.
The court accepted Lindemann’s guilty plea two days later and scheduled
his sentencing hearing. Turner failed to attend Lindemann’s sentencing
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hearing. Lindemann waived representation by counsel and proceeded
with the sentencing pro se.
E. The Guisinger Representation (Count V). In May 2015, Todd
Guisinger retained Turner to represent him in a Polk County criminal
case (third offense operating while intoxicated (OWI)). Turner’s fee
agreement with Guisinger stated, “Attorney Appearance fee shall be
$600. Payments of $130 shall be paid on 5/30/15, after the receipt of
attorney appearance fee, every Friday . . . for the duration of the
proceedings.” This fee agreement did not set a cap on the fees or
establish a flat fee. Guisinger made thirteen payments to Turner totaling
$2190, but Turner deposited none of the payments into his client trust
account because “he was fully unaware of the rule that unearned fees
had to be deposited into his trust account.”
The court rescheduled the pretrial conference three times at
Turner’s request due to his “scheduling conflicts.” The court then
appointed a public defender to represent Guisinger, who had terminated
Turner as his lawyer. When asked to provide an accounting of the
services provided to Guisinger, Turner responded that he “would not be
able to provide invoices because [he] rendered services to [Guisinger] on a
flat fee as opposed to rendering services on an hourly basis.”
F. The Kemp Representation (Count VI). Mark Kemp retained
Turner in March 2015 to represent him in a Polk County criminal case.
Kemp made twenty-six payments by October totaling $3505. Turner did
not deposit any payments from Kemp into his client trust account
because he was “unaware of the rules.” Turner filed a motion to
suppress fifteen days late and a motion for depositions at state expense
thirty-eight days late. The state resisted both motions as untimely. The
court denied the motion to suppress as untimely, noting Turner “made
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no argument to justify the late filing.” After Turner failed to appear for a
change of plea hearing, the court appointed a public defender to
represent Kemp.
G. Contempt in Mahaska County (Count VII). Turner tried a
case in Mahaska County, which the judge submitted to the jury late
afternoon. The next day, the jury reported it was deadlocked. Because
the judge was unable to contact Turner, she declared a mistrial and
rescheduled the jury trial for a few months later. The judge conducted a
hearing in which Turner participated by phone. The judge found Turner
in contempt of court and ordered him to complete forty hours of
community service in Mahaska County and to pay the costs. At the
compliance hearing ten days later, the judge found Turner in contempt of
court for not complying with the previous order. The court ordered
Turner to serve thirty days in jail with the opportunity to purge this
contempt by completing the previously ordered community service within
two months. Turner complied by completing the community service, and
the judge dismissed the contempt action at his cost. At the time of the
commission’s hearing, Turner had not paid the costs.
H. The Robinson and Dean Representations (Count VIII).
Jordan Robinson retained Turner to represent him in a criminal case in
Story County. They failed to attend a pretrial conference, and the court
issued a bench warrant for Robinson’s arrest. The next day, Turner filed
a motion to recall the warrant. The sole reason he gave for filing the
motion was “[t]hat the Court submitted a bench warrant.” The court
found no good cause existed to recall the warrant and denied the motion.
The sheriff arrested Robinson, who was then released without bond.
Turner failed to appear for the second day of Robinson’s jury trial. The
court declared a mistrial and rescheduled the trial.
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Jordan Dean retained Turner to represent him in a criminal case
in Story County. Turner and Dean failed to attend the arraignment, and
Turner neglected to file a written arraignment. The court issued a bench
warrant for Dean’s arrest. Turner then filed a motion to recall the bench
warrant and later filed a written arraignment and plea of not guilty. The
court canceled the arrest warrant.
I. Contempt in Story County (Count IX). The district court
entered an order, requiring Turner to “show cause, if any, why he should
not be found in contempt for having failed to appear” for the second day
of Robinson’s jury trial in March 2016. Turner moved to continue the
hearing, which the court denied. Turner failed to appear, and the court
ordered a warrant for Turner’s arrest. Turner was arrested and released
on bond. Another judge found Turner in contempt. The court ordered
Turner to pay the jury costs of $1920.75 and a $500 fine. The order
provided that the payments were due immediately and would be
considered delinquent if not paid within thirty days. At the time of the
commission’s hearing, Turner had not yet made these payments.
J. The Ramsey Representation (Count X). In January 2016,
Brian Ramsey retained Turner to represent him in a Polk County
criminal case. The fee agreement between Turner and Ramsey stated,
Attorney’s retainer shall be $1000 and will vest with Turner
Law Office immediately upon receipt. The rate for
representation shall be $1000. Client shall pay $2,000 total.
$500 of the rate for representation shall vest 2/5/1[6]. The
remaining $500 shall vest 2/12/16.
Ramsey pled guilty to second offense OWI. His plea agreement stated
that Ramsey would serve his sentence at the Fort Des Moines
Correctional Facility, but noted the court was not bound by the
agreement and could impose the maximum sentence. The court
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sentenced Ramsey to prison for up to two years and set the appeal bond
at $2000, cash only. On April 29, 2016, Turner moved for an order
“Pro Nunc Tunc,” asking the court to strike the sentencing order “due to
all parties involved misunderstanding [Ramsey’s] eligibility for the
Fort[] Des Moines Program.” The motion asked that Ramsey be released
and “that a new pretrial conference be set to determine the direction of
[Ramsey’s] proceedings accordingly.” The court scheduled a hearing on
this motion for May 13. On May 2, Turner filed a notice of appeal.
On May 13, the district court denied Turner’s motion, stating,
“After discussing this matter, in the absence of [Turner], the record
establishes that the case has been appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court.
Since the case is . . . pending appeal, this Court no longer has
jurisdiction of this matter.” The order noted that Turner arrived at the
hearing forty-five minutes late.
On May 18, Turner and Ramsey entered into a second fee
agreement. Turner agreed to “represent [Ramsey’s] interests . . . whereby
the following will be filed[:] withdraw of appeal, motion to vacate
judgment, and motion to suppress.” The agreement provided that a flat
fee of $500 would “vest with [Turner] immediately upon receipt.”
Because Turner failed to file the combined certificate and to pay
the filing fee, the appellate clerk sent Turner a “Notice of Default and
Assessment of Penalty” on June 1. Turner did not cure the default, so
we dismissed Ramsey’s appeal. Turner then filed a motion to reconsider
the district court’s judgment, and the district court scheduled a hearing
for July 18. On that date, the appellate clerk issued procedendo. The
district court established a briefing schedule and scheduled a hearing for
August 8. Ramsey and Turner then entered into a third fee agreement
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providing that Turner would represent Ramsey for the sentencing
hearing for a flat fee of $750.
After the hearing on August 8, the district court denied Ramsey’s
motion to reconsider the sentence, noting “the court is not bound by any
determination of counsel by any plea negotiations.” The court stated, “I
know that I did not promise you that you would be going to the
Fort Des Moines facility.” The court explained, “I just don’t believe that
that was an understanding at the time, that you would not be going to
prison if you couldn’t get into the Fort Des Moines.”
K. The Dondo Representation (Count XI). Comfort Dondo
retained Turner to represent her in a Polk County criminal case in
January 2016. Turner filed three consecutive motions to continue the
pretrial conference. The court granted the first two but denied the third.
The court ordered Dondo and Turner to personally appear on March 21.
Turner failed to appear. After waiting an hour and twenty-five minutes,
the court made a record with Dondo and the prosecutor. The court set a
hearing on the state’s oral motion for sanctions against Turner based on
his failure to appear. Turner requested a continuance to retain counsel.
The court continued the sanctions hearing. At the rescheduled hearing
on sanctions, the court found Turner in contempt, noting,
Turner violated his obligation to appear or to inform the
court he would not be appearing. To date, he has not
presented any adequate excuse for failing to do so. This
dereliction of duty constitutes a willful neglect or violation of
duty and a violation of the process of the court. It was a
volitional act done by one who should reasonably be aware
that his conduct is wrongful. [Turner’s] nonappearance
resulted in obstruction of the administration of justice.
Further, it is obvious similar conduct has occurred in several
cases and jurisdictions in the past.
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The court ordered Turner “to implement a docket-control system to track
key deadlines and obligations” and fined him $250. Turner had not paid
this fine at the time of the commission’s hearing.
L. Client Trust Account Audit (Count XII). In his 2014 Client
Security Commission Combined Statement and Questionnaire, Turner
falsely answered “yes” to these questions, “Do you keep all funds of
clients for matters involving the practice of law in Iowa in separate
interest-bearing trust accounts located in Iowa?” and “Are all retainers
. . . deposited in your trust account?” Turner asserts he misread the
questions without deliberately intending to mislead the Client Security
Commission.
In his 2015 questionnaire, Turner answered “NA” (“Not applicable”)
to those questions, as well as questions such as, “Are reconciliations of
your trust account balances with bank statement balances and
individual client ledger balances performed monthly?” While Turner had
opened a client trust account at U.S. Bank in September 2014, Turner’s
questionnaire failed to identify any financial institution in which he
maintained such an account.
In August 2015, Charles Brinkmeyer began an audit of Turner’s
client trust account. Brinkmeyer introduced himself as a Client Security
Commission auditor and requested a meeting. Because Turner asked for
a list of topics to be discussed at the meeting, Brinkmeyer sent a more
detailed message about the audit process. They agreed on a time to
meet, yet at their initial meeting, Turner provided minimal responses to
Brinkmeyer and argued he had received inadequate notice. Turner
identified his client trust account at U.S. Bank, but the Office of
Professional Regulation had no records that this account was an Interest
on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA).
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Turner told Brinkmeyer that he issued notices and accountings to
clients when he withdrew funds from the client trust account and that he
maintained a client ledger. He produced a spreadsheet as his client
ledger. This was his only record of client payments and expenses.
Turner and Brinkmeyer agreed to meet again in September.
Brinkmeyer agreed to send Turner a written request for records he
wanted to review and sent this request on August 18. The same email
also reminded Turner of their next meeting.
On August 27, the Client Security Commission issued a Notice of
Delinquency to Turner. The notice alleged that Turner failed to cooperate
with the audit and that he failed to comply with requests for information
needed to complete the audit.
Turner and Brinkmeyer met again on September 14 at Turner’s
office. Turner stated that he had to leave soon to attend a court hearing
in Carroll County that started in an hour and a half. Turner explained
that he had not put the meeting on his calendar and had been unable to
reschedule the hearing. Turner printed a spreadsheet for Brinkmeyer to
review that began on January 1, 2015, even though Brinkmeyer
requested records beginning in September 2013.
The following day, Turner wrote to the assistant director for the
Supreme Court Boards and Commissions. He stated, “Provided the type
of work I do for clients the money I receive vests immediately where I
have no reason to place money in a trust account.” Turner later wrote to
Brinkmeyer, noting,
The vast majority of cases I’ve taken since the beginning of
my practice involved an agreement that provided the money I
received from payments vested with me immediately thus
making the need for me to hold money in my attorney trust
account not required. However, from this experience I have
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learned the proper way to account for my funds in an
instance where such an agreement is not in place.
The Client Security Commission issued another Notice of Delinquency to
Turner alleging that he failed to comply with requests for information.
Turner filed an affidavit on December 17, in which he stated that
when he began his law practice, he opened a client trust account at
Wells Fargo Bank but no longer had access to those account records. He
also stated that he opened his current client trust account at U.S. Bank
in September 2014. He acknowledged that he did not create or maintain
any three-way reconciliations from September 2013 to September 2015
because he believed that under his fee agreements, he did not need to
deposit client funds in a client trust account. For the same reason, he
did not create or maintain client subaccount ledgers from March through
September 2015. Turner’s affidavit also stated that he did not create or
maintain retainer agreements, invoices, accountings, or notices for
several of his clients, nor did he create or maintain a receipt book.
On May 13, 2016, Turner responded to Brinkmeyer’s document
request regarding eight clients by stating, in part,
I collect an appearance fee to begin working on someone’s
case then begin collecting weekly installments for the flat
rate I’m charging in a given case. I don’t charge by the hour.
I don’t accept money that I haven’t earned.
The Client Security Commission issued Turner another Notice of
Delinquency on July 15. The same month, the Board opened its
investigation into Turner’s compliance with the client trust account
rules. Turner responded to the Board’s notice of investigation on
August 31. He reported that some of the documents requested by the
Client Security Commission did not exist and acknowledged that his
recordkeeping practices could have been “better.” He asserted that he
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had not intentionally destroyed any records. Turner also reported that
he used flat fee agreements. He stated that he “perform[ed] work on [the
clients’] respective cases each week, and at the end of each week,
payment for [his] services would be due.” He denied commingling client
funds with his funds, relying on court rule 45.10 (flat fee) for the
proposition that he only had to deposit advance payments into the client
trust account. He then explained that his clients never made advance
payments:
[W]hen my clients pay me, it is for work that I have already
provided. Therefore, the funds are placed into my own
account because those funds have been earned. My only
qualm, however, concerns my failure to maintain a complete
accounting of records.
Turner further explained that he
did not provide the Commission with copies of the monthly
three-way trust account reconciliations or client sub-account
ledgers because [he] did not create or maintain such records.
[He] did not believe it was necessary to create the
reconciliations because [he] never received advance fees and
expense payment that would require [him] to deposit certain
funds into the client trust account. . . . Because [he] earned
the weekly payments from [his] clients, those payments did
not need to be deposited in the trust account. . . . Per [his]
agreements with each client, all funds received in those
weekly payments served as compensation for the services
[he] rendered in the previous week, and [he] would deduct
each payment from the total quoted price for [his] legal
services.
In his 2016 Combined Statement and Questionnaire, Turner
answered “NA” to several questions, including “Do you keep all funds of
clients for matters involving the practice of law in Iowa in separate
interest-bearing trust accounts located in Iowa?” and “Are all
retainers . . . deposited in your trust account?” On December 6, 2016,
the Client Security Commission issued a Notice of Delinquency alleging
that Turner failed to comply with requests for information.
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During the audit, Turner provided documentation to Brinkmeyer
about some of Turner’s clients. This documentation showed that
Turner’s fee agreements did not establish a flat fee or set a cap on what
the client’s fees would be. For example, the fee agreement for Travon
Lackland stated, “Attorney’s retainer fee is $400. Remaining fee shall be
$150 a week for the duration of the proceedings.”
Turner’s fee agreement for Billy McKinney provided for an
“appearance fee”:
Attorney appearance fee of $750 shall be paid to Turner Law
Office PLLC US Bank Account. $175 will be paid each
Friday to Turner Law Office PLLC US Bank Account following
the receipt of appearance fee starting 5/1/15 until the
completion of the case.
This fee agreement provided for payment to Turner’s operating account,
not a client trust account.
Turner’s fee agreements with Nakeisha Brown and Calvin Lacey
similarly failed to establish a flat fee or set a cap on fees. Turner did not
deposit any payments from Lackland, McKinney, Brown, or Lacey into
his client trust account. His fee agreement with Tabatha Carlson stated,
“Appearance (start) fee shall be $650. Attorney fee shall be $1900.
Payments of $300 shall be paid bi-weekly beginning 10/18/2016 until
outstanding balance is paid. All payments vest upon receipt. . . .”
Brinkmeyer’s April 24, 2017 report noted that while Turner’s
records for 2015 disclosed that he received over $92,000 in client fees, he
deposited only $1376 into his client trust account. Based on the records
Turner provided, the auditor concluded Turner had not prepared or
retained any form of check register, client ledgers, client invoices, notices
and accountings prepared contemporaneously with withdrawal of funds
from the client trust account, or other records required under court
20
rules. With regard to his client trust account, Turner had not prepared
monthly triple reconciliations, maintained records to show the source of
deposits, retained records for electronic transfers, or retained bank
statements. Turner also had withdrawn cash from the client trust
account on at least two occasions. Some of Turner’s fee agreements
required weekly payments to Turner regardless of what services he
provided or directed payments to Turner’s operating account, rather than
his client trust account.
Turner responded to the audit report on May 19. He reported that
he failed to maintain complete records as required by the court rules. He
stated, “While imperfect, [his] system of accounting was not careless with
client funds.” He acknowledged he provided “factually incorrect
information” on his yearly questionnaires. He stated he did not intend to
“stymie” the auditor but was operating with only one laptop and therefore
had difficulty getting information to the auditor in a timely fashion.
M. Disciplinary Proceedings. We suspended Turner’s law license
on the Board’s motion on December 28, 2016, pursuant to Iowa Court
Rule 34.14 (interim suspension for threat of harm). On March 6, 2017,
the Board filed its complaint against Turner with the commission,
alleging numerous violations of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct.
Turner and the Board entered into a joint stipulation to allow Turner to
have his license conditionally reinstated. After a hearing, we reinstated
his license on May 17 and ordered Turner to “comply with all conditions
imposed by the joint stipulation,” including that Turner limit his practice
to criminal law and family law with no more than eight clients at a time
and further restricting his criminal representation to defendants charged
with Class D felonies or misdemeanors. These limitations have remained
in place.
21
On November 8, 2017, the Board filed a second amended
complaint. The parties submitted a joint stipulation, which the
commission accepted on November 13. The commission held a hearing
on the issue of sanctions the same day, and the parties submitted
posthearing briefs. The commission issued its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations on February 26, 2018. The
commission found Turner violated the rules as charged in the Board’s
second amended complaint and recommended we impose an additional
three-month suspension with several conditions for reinstatement.
While acknowledging the “seriousness of the offenses,” the commission
relied in mitigation on Turner’s “relative lack of experience in the practice
of law” and his “medical conditions and mental health issues.”
II. Scope of Review.
“We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo.” Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Silich, 872 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Iowa
2015). “The Board must prove attorney misconduct by a convincing
preponderance of the evidence, a burden greater than a preponderance of
the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morse, 887 N.W.2d 131, 138 (Iowa
2016) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weiland, 862
N.W.2d 627, 634–35 (Iowa 2015)). While we give the commission’s
findings and recommendations respectful consideration, we are not
bound by them. Id.Stipulations of fact are binding on the parties, but we are not
bound by stipulations of violations or sanctions. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Clarity, 838 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Iowa 2013). Instead, we
review the stipulation and record to determine whether a violation
occurred and what sanction is appropriate. Id.22
III. Ethical Violations.
The parties stipulated to the foregoing facts and to Turner’s
violation of several rules. Upon our de novo review, we conclude Turner
violated multiple disciplinary rules.
A. Neglect. While “[o]ur rules of professional responsibility no
longer expressly refer[ence] . . . neglect, . . . we continue to sanction
neglect through several rules. Silich, 872 N.W.2d at 188. “We have
recognized that rules 32:1.3 (diligence), 32:1.4 (client communication),
and 32:3.2 (expediting litigation) all sanction neglect.” Id. at 188–89. We
address each rule separately.
1. Due diligence. Rule 32:1.3 states, “A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Iowa R.
Prof’l Conduct 32:1.3. The commission found Turner violated this rule.
“When an attorney ‘fails to appear at scheduled court proceedings, does
not make the proper filings, or is slow to act on matters,’ he or she
violates rule 32:1.3.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weiland,
885 N.W.2d 198, 208 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Kingery, 871 N.W.2d 109, 117 (Iowa 2015)). Turner
repeatedly failed to attend hearings. Three of his clients were arrested
for failing to appear. Turner missed deadlines for filing a motion to
suppress and a motion for depositions at state expense. Rule 32:1.3 is
also violated when an attorney’s neglect results in the client’s loss of a
right to appeal. Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 658. Turner failed to cure his
defaults in the Ramsey appeal, resulting in its dismissal. We conclude
Turner violated rule 32:1.3.
2. Client communication. Rule 32:1.4(a)(1) requires attorneys to
“promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect
23
to which the client’s informed consent . . . is required.” Iowa R. Prof’l
Conduct 32:1.4(a)(1). Comment 2 states,
If these rules require that a particular decision about the
representation be made by the client, paragraph (a)(1)
requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure
the client’s consent prior to taking action unless prior
discussions with the client have resolved what action the
client wants the lawyer to take.
Id. r. 32:1.4 cmt. 2. Turner without his client’s authorization moved to
dismiss her Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. We agree with the commission’s
determination that Turner violated rule 32:1.4(a)(1).
Rule 32:1.4 also requires an attorney to “reasonably consult with
the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be
accomplished.” Id. r. 32:1.4(a)(2). The commission found Turner
violated this rule with his bankruptcy clients. In several cases, Turner
had to file a second bankruptcy petition after the first was dismissed
because Turner violated pleading requirements or his client had not
obtained the required prepetition credit counseling. In sanctioning
Turner, a bankruptcy judge noted that Turner’s clients reported that he
did not communicate information to them, and the clients were unaware
that Turner would not represent them at hearings. We find that Turner
violated rule 32:1.4(a)(2).
The commission also found Turner violated subparagraph 3, which
requires an attorney to “keep the client reasonably informed about the
status of the matter.” Id. r. 32:1.4(a)(3). This includes keeping the client
reasonably informed about “significant developments affecting the timing
or the substance of the representation.” Id. r. 32:1.4 cmt. 3. We have
held an attorney violated this rule by failing to inform clients of court
dates resulting in their arrests for failure to appear. See Clarity, 838
24
N.W.2d at 657. Turner failed to inform several clients of court hearings,
which resulted in the arrest of three clients, two of whom were jailed.
We have also found an attorney violated this rule by failing to
inform clients of upcoming court dates in civil cases. See Weiland, 885
N.W.2d at 209 (noting that the attorney did not inform his client of an
upcoming pretrial conference for a divorce case). Turner failed to
communicate with a bankruptcy client regarding a hearing, and after
Turner and his client failed to attend, the judge dismissed the case.
Turner and his client then missed the subsequent hearing on the
motions for relief from dismissal and for reinstatement of the case. The
court therefore denied both motions. We determine that Turner violated
rule 32:1.4(a)(3).
Additionally, an attorney “shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(b). An
attorney violates this rule by failing to explain an alternative course of
action that is reasonably necessary to permit the client to make an
informed decision on the matter. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Ta-Yu Yang, 821 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Iowa 2012). We find that
Turner did not communicate with a bankruptcy client “to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit [her] to make informed decisions” such
as whether it would be proper to file a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 case.
Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(b).
Additionally, the misunderstanding with regard to Ramsey’s plea
agreement evinces a lack of communication on Turner’s part that
prevented Ramsey from making informed decisions. The court sentenced
Ramsey to prison and rejected the contention there was an
25
understanding he would avoid prison. We conclude Turner violated rule
32:1.4(b).
3. Expediting litigation. An attorney “shall make reasonable efforts
to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.” Id.r. 32:3.2. The commission found Turner violated this rule. We have held
an attorney’s failure to meet deadlines violates this rule. Iowa Supreme
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Conroy, 845 N.W.2d 59, 65 (Iowa 2014).
Turner missed deadlines and failed to file the proper documents,
resulting in delays and dismissals. We conclude Turner violated rule
32:3.2.
B. Trust Account Violations. The commission found Turner
violated multiple provisions of rule 32:1.15, which governs the
safeguarding of client property, as well as directs that client trust
accounts are governed by chapter 45. He professed his unfamiliarity
with these rules, but ignorance is no excuse. These rules play a vital role
in safeguarding client funds, as underscored by Turner’s failure to
comply with court orders to refund fees to several bankruptcy clients.
These rules also ensure a paper trail for cash payments that helps
prevent underreporting income to avoid taxes. See Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Santiago, 869 N.W.2d 172, 179 (Iowa 2015) (“The
failure to deposit cash retainers potentially facilitates income tax
avoidance.”).
The commission found Turner violated rule 32:1.15(a), which
states,
A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that
is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a
representation separate from the lawyer’s own property.
Funds shall be kept in a separate account. Other property
shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded.
Complete records of such account funds and other property
26
shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a
period of six years after termination of the representation.
Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(a). Turner often failed to deposit client
funds in a separate account and kept incomplete records. We conclude
that Turner violated rule 32:1.15(a).
The commission found Turner violated rule 32:1.15(c), which
requires an attorney to “deposit into a client trust account legal fees and
expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer
only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.” Id. r. 32:1.15(c). We have
held that a failure to deposit cash retainers in the trust account violates
this rule. See Santiago, 869 N.W.2d at 179. We also have held that an
attorney violates this rule by “prematurely depositing” advance fees into
an operating account. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Lubinus, 869 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Iowa 2015). Turner failed to deposit the
retainer or “appearance fee” in his trust account in his representation of
several clients. Turner used a fee agreement that provided for payments
into his operating account instead of a client trust account. His fee
agreements, which provide for payments that “vest upon receipt,”
demonstrate an attempt to avoid the requirement of depositing advance
fees into a trust account and the prohibition against withdrawing fees
before they are earned. Cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Sullins, 648 N.W.2d 127, 134 (Iowa 2002) (“[S]imply labeling
the initial funds as ‘non-refundable, flat fees’ does not save [an attorney]
from his obligation to deposit them into trust accounts.”). We conclude
Turner violated 32:1.15(c).
The commission also found Turner violated rule 32:1.15(f) by
failing to comply with court rules governing client trust accounts. Rule
32:1.15(f) states, “All client trust accounts shall be governed by chapter
27
45 of the Iowa Court Rules.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(f). Because
we find violations of chapter 45, Turner’s conduct violated rule 32:1.15(f).
Rule 45.1 requires funds received by an attorney “arising out of the
practice of law” to “be deposited in one or more identifiable interest-
bearing trust accounts.” Iowa Ct. R. 45.1. Turner frequently failed to
deposit many payments he received from clients into a client trust
account. We conclude Turner violated rule 45.1.
“Rule 32:1.15 incorporates Iowa Court Rule 45.7, which directs a
lawyer as to how to handle a retainer.” Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 655
(quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McCarthy, 814 N.W.2d
596, 607 (Iowa 2012)). Rule 45.7 requires an attorney to “deposit
advance fee and expense payments from a client into the trust account”
and limits the attorney to withdrawing these payments “only as the fee is
earned or the expense is incurred.” Iowa Ct. R. 45.7(3). The rule also
requires a lawyer who accepts “advance fee or expense payments” to
“notify the client in writing of the time, amount, and purpose of any
withdrawal of the fee or expense” and provide a complete accounting. Id.r. 45.7(4). This notice must be transmitted to the client “no later than
the date of the withdrawal.” Id. In numerous cases, Turner failed to
deposit retainer fees into a client trust account. Additionally, in each of
the three fee agreements between Turner and Ramsey, Turner required
advance payments but did not notify Ramsey of any withdrawals. We
agree that Turner violated rules 45.7(3) and 45.7(4).
Rule 45.2(3) sets forth in detail the types of financial records
attorneys are required to maintain for client trust accounts and billing.
See Iowa Ct. R. 45.2(3). Rule 45.2(3)(a) requires an attorney to “maintain
current financial records” and retain various “records for a period of six
years after termination of the representation.” Id. r. 45.2(3)(a). The rule
28
also provides that “[r]eceipts must be deposited [in client trust accounts]
intact and records of deposit should be sufficiently detailed to identify
each item.” Id. r. 45.2(3)(b)(2). Withdrawals from a client trust account
must “be made only by check payable to a named payee and not to cash,
or by authorized bank transfer.” Id. r. 45.2(3)(b)(3). Records required by
rule 45.2(3) can be maintained electronically, but the records still must
comply with the rules. Id. r. 45.2(3)(c).
Turner retained copies of retainer agreements as required by rule
45.2(3)(a)(3), but failed to provide Brinkmeyer with the other records he
was required to retain. Turner failed to keep adequate check registers,
client ledgers, client invoices, and notices and accountings prepared
contemporaneously with the withdrawal of funds from the client trust
account. Turner failed to prepare triple reconciliations of the client trust
account on a monthly basis, nor did he maintain records to show the
source of client trust account deposits. Turner did not retain client trust
account bank statements or records for electronic transfers. For several
clients, Turner failed to deposit receipts in his client trust account or
follow the specific requirements for withdrawing money from his trust
account. We agree that Turner violated rule 45.2(3). 2
Additionally, an attorney “may not charge a nonrefundable special
retainer or withdraw unearned fees.” Id. r. 45.9(2). A special retainer is
a fee “charged for the performance of contemplated services rather than
for the lawyer’s availability” that is “paid in advance of performance of
those services.” Id. r. 45.9(1). We have held that “it is unethical for a
lawyer to enter into a nonrefundable advance-fee contract except in a
case involving a general retainer.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
2The commission concluded that Turner violated these specific provisions: rule
45.2(3)(a)(1)–(2), (4)–(10); rule 45.2(3)(b)(2)–(3); and rule 45.2(3)(c). We agree.
29
Bd. v. Vilmont, 812 N.W.2d 677, 679 (Iowa 2012). Turner’s fee agreement
with Carlson provided for an “appearance (start) fee” of $650 and noted
that “[a]ll payments vest upon receipt.” Turner violated rule 45.9(2) by
charging what was in essence a nonrefundable special retainer.
Under rule 45.10(2), “[i]f the client makes an advance payment of a
flat fee prior to performance of the services, the lawyer must deposit the
fee into the trust account.” Iowa Ct. R. 45.10(2). While the “lawyer and
client may agree as to when, how, and in what proportion the lawyer may
withdraw funds from an advance fee payment of a flat fee,” their
agreement “must reasonably protect the client’s right to a refund of
unearned fees if the lawyer fails to complete the service or the client
discharges the lawyer.” Id. r. 45.10(3). “In no event may the lawyer
withdraw unearned fees.” Id. Turner’s initial fee agreement with Ramsey
provided for a flat fee of $2000, with $1000 to be paid up front. The
agreement also provided that the flat fee would “vest” with Turner
immediately upon receipt. Turner neglected to deposit this advance
payment into his client trust account. We conclude Turner violated rule
45.10(2) and rule 45.10(3).
C. Other Violations. The commission found Turner violated
several other rules.
1. Competence. Rule 32:1.1 states, “A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.1. To
establish that an attorney’s conduct amounts to incompetence, the
Board must show “the attorney did not possess the requisite legal
knowledge and skill to handle the case.” Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 64
30
(quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Thomas, 794 N.W.2d
290, 293 n.2 (Iowa 2011)).
The commission determined Turner violated rule 32:1.1
representing clients in bankruptcy proceedings. He presented paper
bankruptcy petitions, even though electronic filing has been mandated
since 2000. Turner frequently filed petitions without the requisite
schedules, statement of affairs, and list of creditors. Turner lacked the
requisite legal knowledge to handle his clients’ bankruptcy cases. We
determine he violated rule 32:1.1.
2. Unreasonable fees. Rule 32:1.5(a) provides that an attorney
“shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee
or an unreasonable amount for expenses, or violate any restrictions
imposed by law.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.5(a). The rule lists factors
to be considered in determining if a fee is reasonable, including “the time
and labor required.” See id. Comment 1 to the rule notes that “[a] fee
that is otherwise reasonable may be subject to legal limitations.” Id.r. 32:1.5 cmt. 1. We have found that an attorney violated this rule by
withdrawing advance fees before they had been earned, noting that
“[t]aking fees in advance of earning them is illegal.” Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Parrish, 801 N.W.2d 580, 586 (Iowa 2011)
(quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. D’Angelo, 619
N.W.2d 333, 337 (Iowa 2000)); cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d 169, 181 (Iowa 2013) (concluding attorney
collected an unreasonable fee in violation of this rule by failing to deduct
fees the client previously paid, as was required by their later agreement).
31
Several of Turner’s fee agreements for individual cases did not
establish a flat fee, 3 retainer agreement, 4 or set a cap on the clients’ fees.
Instead, these fee agreements provided for weekly or biweekly payments
until the completion of the case, regardless of whether Turner worked on
the case each week. One fee agreement provided for payment to Turner’s
operating account, not a client trust account. Another agreement stated
that “[a]ll payments vest upon receipt” regardless of whether Turner
actually worked on that case and contrary to his obligation to return
unearned fees. See Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.5 cmt. 4 (“A lawyer may
require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned
portion.”). We conclude that Turner violated rule 32:1.5(a).
3. Frivolous claims and contentions. Rule 32:3.1 states in relevant
part,
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis
3“Aflat fee is a fee for all services a lawyer must perform to complete the agreed
task.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Said, 869 N.W.2d 185, 192 (Iowa
2015). “If the flat fee is paid in advance, the fee must be deposited into the trust
account.” Id.4We have distinguished between general and special retainers. Iowa Supreme
Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Apland, 577 N.W.2d 50, 54–56 (Iowa 1998). A
general retainer
is a fee for agreeing to make legal services available when needed during
a specified time period. In form it is an option contract; the fee is earned
by the attorney when paid since the attorney is entitled to the money
regardless of whether he actually performs any services for the client.
Id. at 54 (quoting Lester Brickman, The Advance Fee Payment Dilemma: Should
Payments Be Deposited to the Client Trust Account or to the General Office Account, 10
Cardozo L. Rev. 647, 649 n.13 (1989)). In contrast, a special retainer
covers payment of funds for a specific service. If the client and attorney
agree that the attorney shall receive the special retainer payment in
advance of performing the services, then the payment is commonly
referred to as an “advance fee payment.”
Id. at 55 (citation omitted). “[L]awyers must deposit all advance fee payments into a
client trust account.” Id. at 56.
32
in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which
includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.
Id. r. 32:3.1. The commission found Turner violated this rule. In
applying rule 32:3.1, we have “identified the alleged offending conduct
and analyzed whether there was legal authority to support the attorney
engaging in this conduct.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d 466, 485 (Iowa 2014). A bankruptcy judge
determined that Turner violated Bankruptcy Rule 9011(b)(2), which
governs pleading requirements and prohibits baseless or frivolous
pleadings. We likewise determine that Turner violated our rule 32:3.1 in
those bankruptcy court filings.
4. Candor toward the tribunal. Rule 32:3.3 requires attorney
candor toward the tribunal. The commission concluded that Turner
violated rule 32:3.3(a)(1), which prohibits a lawyer from knowingly
making “a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.” Iowa R. Prof’l
Conduct 32:3.3(a)(1). “[T]he word ‘knowingly’ in the context of this rule
requires actual knowledge, and we may infer an attorney’s knowledge
from the circumstances.” Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d at 475. The bankruptcy
judge who sanctioned Turner noted that, in response to the motions to
dismiss two cases in which Turner’s clients had not completed the
required prepetition credit counseling, Turner filed objections alleging
that the credit counseling had been obtained prior to his clients’ filings.
The judge noted that this “was obviously untrue based upon the date
contained on the certificate of credit counseling.” Turner also filed
inaccurate “Rule 2016(b) statements” regarding the fees paid by his
bankruptcy clients; he later made statements to the court that
contradicted his Rule 2016(b) statements. In a criminal case, Turner
misrepresented to the judge that he had already filed an appearance in
33
his client’s case, though neither the clerk of court nor opposing counsel
had received Turner’s appearance. We conclude that Turner violated
rule 32:3.3(a)(1).
5. Demand for information from the Board. Rule 32:8.1(b) prohibits
an attorney from “knowingly fail[ing] to respond to a lawful demand for
information from . . . [a] disciplinary authority.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct
32:8.1(b). We expect attorneys to “be responsive to the Board’s
inquiries.” Silich, 872 N.W.2d at 191. We can infer an attorney’s
knowing failure to respond to the demand for information when there is
proof the attorney received the Board’s inquiries but still did not provide
the information sought. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Nelson, 838 N.W.2d 528, 540 (Iowa 2013). The commission found
Turner violated this rule by failing to respond to the Board’s complaints.
We agree. The Board sent Turner multiple notices of complaints and
either had to reach him via email or by having the sheriff serve the notice
on him. Turner did not respond until the Board filed its certificate of
noncompliance. We determine Turner violated rule 32:8.1(b).
6. Misconduct. The commission concluded Turner violated rule
32:8.4(c), which provides that it is professional misconduct for an
attorney to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). We view violations
of this rule as “serious in nature because ‘[h]onesty is necessary for the
legal profession to function.’ ” Weiland, 885 N.W.2d at 211 (alteration in
original) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Haskovec,
869 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Iowa 2015)).
We have held an attorney engaged in conduct involving dishonesty
by falsely answering the Client Security Commission questionnaires.
See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Vandel, 889 N.W.2d
34659, 669 (Iowa 2017) (noting attorney falsely represented that she
deposited all retainers into her client trust account and performed
monthly reconciliations of the client trust account balance); Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morris, 847 N.W.2d 428, 435 (Iowa
2014) (concluding attorney violated rule 32:8.4(c) by falsely stating in his
2010 questionnaire that he regularly reconciled his client trust account).
Turner falsely represented that he kept all client funds in a separate
trust account and deposited all retainers in the account in his 2014
Combined Statement and Questionnaire. In his 2015 and 2016
questionnaires, he responded “NA” to these questions and others, such
as whether he performed monthly reconciliations of the client trust
account balance. Turner later acknowledged that he provided “factually
incorrect information” on the questionnaires.
Additionally, when Turner met with Brinkmeyer, Turner stated
that he issued notices and accountings to clients when he withdrew
funds from the client trust account and that he maintained a client
ledger, but in a subsequent affidavit, Turner admitted he did not do so
for some clients. In response to the Board’s investigation, Turner falsely
reported that he used flat fee agreements when the agreements actually
required ongoing weekly payments, not a flat fee. He also falsely stated
that his clients “never made advance payments.” Brinkmeyer’s audit
report concluded that Turner had not prepared or retained client ledgers
and that several of Turner’s fee agreements provided for an “appearance
fee” that Turner falsely claimed as earned immediately before he provided
services. We conclude Turner violated rule 32:8.4(c).
7. Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The
commission found Turner violated rule 32:8.4(d), which states, “It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is
35
prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct
32:8.4(d). To violate this rule, an attorney’s conduct “must hamper ‘the
efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary systems upon
which the courts rely’ by violating the well-understood norms and
conventions of the practice of law.” Silich, 872 N.W.2d at 191 (quoting
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797 N.W.2d 591, 605
(Iowa 2011)). “There is no typical form of conduct that prejudices the
administration of justice.” Weiland, 862 N.W.2d at 637 (quoting Parrish,
801 N.W.2d at 587).
“Conduct that wastes judicial resources violates this rule.” Silich,
872 N.W.2d at 191. Neglect of an appeal resulting in its dismissal
constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, as does
“[i]gnoring deadlines and orders, which results in default notices from
the clerk of court.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Knopf, 793
N.W.2d 525, 530 (Iowa 2011). “An attorney’s failure to timely cooperate
with disciplinary authorities is prejudicial to the administration of
justice, violating not only rule 32:8.1 but also rule 32:8.4(d).” Silich, 872
N.W.2d at 191 (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Hedgecoth, 862 N.W.2d 354, 363 (Iowa 2015)).
Turner failed to attend multiple hearings and arrived late for
others, and he failed to timely file various motions. He made improper
filings in bankruptcy court, delaying the proceedings. Turner was found
in contempt of court in three Iowa counties. He did not cure a default in
one client’s appeal, which the clerk then dismissed. We determine that
Turner violated rule 32:8.4(d).
8. Investigations and audits by the Client Security Commission.
The commission found Turner violated rule 39.10(3)(a), which requires
an attorney to “[c]ooperate fully with the director [of the Client Security
36
Commission] in any investigation, audit, or verification of any funds,
securities, or property held in trust by that lawyer.” Iowa Ct. R.
39.10(3)(a). Additionally, the commission found Turner violated the rules
requiring an attorney to “[a]nswer all questions posed by the director that
relate to any investigation, audit, or verification, unless claiming the
privilege against self-incrimination” and to “[r]etain complete records of
all trust fund transactions for a period of not less than six years following
completion of the matter to which they relate, in accordance with” rules
32:1.15 and 45.2(3). Id. r. 39.10(3)(b), (c).
Turner failed to provide some records requested in Brinkmeyer’s
audit and was slow to produce other records. The Client Security
Commission issued five notices of delinquency to Turner during its audit.
Brinkmeyer’s audit concluded Turner had not maintained records to
show the source of deposits to the client trust account, retained bank
statements or records for electronic transfer, or prepared or retained
notices and accountings prepared contemporaneously with withdrawal of
funds from the client trust account. Turner acknowledged that he failed
to maintain records as required by the Iowa Court Rules. Turner also
admitted that “he provided factually incorrect information” on the
questionnaires. We conclude Turner violated rules 39.10(3)(a), (b), and
(c).
IV. Sanction.
We must determine the appropriate sanction. Over a prolonged
period, Turner violated multiple disciplinary rules involving trust account
requirements, dishonesty, and incompetence, resulting in client harm as
well as wasted court time. His pattern of misconduct continued despite
an ongoing audit of his trust accounts and repeated judicial sanctions,
including several rulings finding him in contempt. The commission,
37
considering his inexperience and ADHD as mitigating factors,5
recommended that we suspend Turner’s law license for three months,
with his reinstatement subject to his completion of ten hours of
continuing legal education (CLE) on legal ethics and law practice
management and therapy with a licensed mental health professional who
attests to Turner’s fitness to practice law. The Board urges us to impose
a suspension of twelve to eighteen months with those same conditions on
his reinstatement. Turner asks that we impose no new suspension and
lift the restrictions imposed in his prior stipulation.
“We give the commission’s recommendation respectful
consideration, but may impose a greater or lesser sanction.” Morse, 887
N.W.2d at 143. We weigh several factors, including
[t]he nature of the violations, the attorney’s fitness to
continue in the practice of law, the protection of society from
those unfit to practice law, the need to uphold public
confidence in the justice system, deterrence, maintenance of
the reputation of the bar as a whole, and any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.
Id. (quoting Silich, 872 N.W.2d at 192). We seek consistency with our
prior cases. Silich, 872 N.W.2d at 192. However, “[t]here is no standard
sanction for particular types of misconduct,” and we “craft an
appropriate sanction in light of each case’s unique circumstances.” Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hearity, 812 N.W.2d 614, 622 (Iowa
2012) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles, 808
N.W.2d 431, 441 (Iowa 2012)).
Turner’s trust account violations alone would warrant a
suspension, perhaps of several months. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
5We give no weight to the commission’s reference to Turner’s community service
because the only community service we found in the record was court-ordered as a
sanction for his contempt.
38
Disciplinary Bd. v. Powell, 830 N.W.2d 355, 358–59 (Iowa 2013)
(collecting cases and imposing a three-month suspension for “improperly
removing client funds from a trust account and failing to deposit advance
fees into the trust account”). Turner’s ignorance of the rules governing
trust accounts cannot excuse his flagrant long-standing violations.
Moreover, we have increased the length of suspension when trust
account violations are accompanied by misrepresentations, neglect, or
other violations. See, e.g., Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 655–63 (imposing one-
year suspension when experienced attorney violated trust account rules,
neglected clients matters, and charged an unreasonable fee); Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dunahoo, 799 N.W.2d 524, 531–35
(Iowa 2011) (one-year suspension for neglect, trust account violations,
and misrepresentations); see also Morse, 887 N.W.2d at 145 (noting that
“suspensions of several months” were imposed for trust account and
accounting violations that “were compounded by severe neglect,
misrepresentation, or failure to cooperate” (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cross, 861 N.W.2d 211, 225 (Iowa 2015))).
Turner made misrepresentations to the court, which “constitutes a
serious breach of professional ethics, warranting a more severe sanction
than neglect.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Gottschalk, 729
N.W.2d 812, 821 (Iowa 2007); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. McGinness, 844 N.W.2d 456, 466–67 (Iowa 2014)
(imposing a six-month suspension for misrepresentations when the
attorney persisted in perpetuating his lie over discovery in a civil case);
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wagner, 768 N.W.2d 279, 288–
89 (Iowa 2009) (concluding attorney’s “misrepresentations to the court
and to his clients also weigh in favor of a more severe sanction” and
imposing a six-month suspension for neglect, misrepresentations, trust
39
account violations, and failure to respond to the board). “Dishonesty,
deceit, and misrepresentation by a lawyer are abhorrent concepts to the
legal profession[] and can give rise to the full spectrum of sanctions,
including revocation.” Morris, 847 N.W.2d at 437 (quoting Iowa Supreme
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hall, 728 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Iowa 2007))
(imposing six-month suspension when attorney violated trust account
rules and “engaged in dishonesty in representing that he regularly
reconciled his trust account”).
We have imposed suspensions of varying lengths for engaging in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice when compounded by
additional violations. See, e.g., Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d at 488 (imposing
sixty-day suspension for pressing frivolous claims, knowingly disobeying
court orders, and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cunningham, 812
N.W.2d 541, 554 (Iowa 2012) (imposing eighteen-month suspension on
attorney who “committed numerous ethical violations involving neglect of
client matters, misrepresentation, and conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Iowa 2012) (imposing sixty-day
suspension for neglect, conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice, and misrepresentation); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Ireland, 748 N.W.2d 498, 502–03 (Iowa 2008) (per curiam) (imposing
six-month suspension for neglect and failure to cooperate with the board,
which also constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice).
We must consider Turner’s other violations. He made frivolous
filings in bankruptcy court. We have “suspended lawyers from the
practice of law for filing frivolous matters, although these cases have
40
been accompanied by other unethical conduct.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Daniels, 838 N.W.2d 672, 679 (Iowa 2013); see also
Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Hohnbaum, 554
N.W.2d 550, 552 (Iowa 1996) (imposing three-month suspension for
making misleading statements and persisting in a “patently frivolous”
position). “We have imposed suspensions ranging from sixty days to two
years for violations of the rule prohibiting excessive” or unreasonable
fees. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Laing, 832 N.W.2d 366,
374 (Iowa 2013) (collecting cases). “Sanctions for an attorney’s violation
of a court order vary in light of the accompanying misconduct.” Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowers, 823 N.W.2d 1, 16–17 (Iowa
2012) (imposing ninety-day suspension when attorney was found in
contempt, made unauthorized ex parte contact with a party he knew was
represented by counsel, and “attempted to extort a $100,000 donation to
a charity in his wife’s name”).
We consider harm to the client as an aggravating factor. Morse,
887 N.W.2d at 144. Turner’s misconduct harmed several of his clients:
three of his clients were arrested and two were jailed because he missed
hearings, and several clients had to retain other counsel. See Kingery,
871 N.W.2d at 122, 125 (noting that “[a]rrests and jail time certainly
constitute harm” and imposing sixty-day suspension); Clarity, 838
N.W.2d at 660, 663 (imposing one-year disciplinary suspension and
concluding that “[t]he serious harm [Clarity’s] clients suffered as a result
of his misconduct is . . . aggravating: three clients were arrested and
jailed, an appeal was dismissed with prejudice, clients had to retain
other counsel, and retainers were not returned”).
“A pattern of misconduct is an aggravating factor.” Boles, 808
N.W.2d at 442. We have a pattern of misconduct here. Turner
41
habitually failed to deposit payments from clients into his client trust
account as required. “[M]ultiple violations of disciplinary rules generally
support enhanced sanctions.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Bartley, 860 N.W.2d 331, 339 (Iowa 2015). Turner violated multiple
rules of professional conduct.
We have held an attorney’s failure to learn from an earlier audit is
an aggravating factor. See Santiago, 869 N.W.2d at 174, 183 (noting that
while the auditor completing the 2011 audit of attorney’s records helped
the attorney comply with the trust account requirements, the attorney
“failed to take the lessons to heart” and committed additional trust
account violations in 2013). We consider as an aggravating factor
Turner’s failure to learn during his twenty-month audit and take prompt
corrective measures in response to the auditor’s ongoing input.
An attorney’s “[f]ailure to respond to and cooperate with the
Board’s investigation is also an aggravating factor.” Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dolezal, 841 N.W.2d 114, 128 (Iowa 2013)
(quoting Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d at 551). Turner repeatedly delayed
responding to the Board’s investigations until the Board sent additional
copies of the complaint. We have recognized as aggravating factors
efforts to stall a Client Security Commission audit and failure to
cooperate with the auditor. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d 689, 700 (Iowa 2014). Turner was uncooperative at
times during Brinkmeyer’s audit.
Apart from his interim suspension in these proceedings, our court
has not previously disciplined Turner. has not been previously
disciplined by our court. Prior discipline can be an aggravating factor
but not when it is intertwined with the current case. Powell, 830 N.W.2d
at 359. We therefore do not consider Turner’s twenty-week interim
42
suspension as an aggravating factor because that suspension arose from
the same conduct that forms the basis for this decision. Rather, “an
interim suspension for conduct involved in a case can be considered as a
mitigating factor in determining the length and adequacy of a suspension
as a sanction in the case.” Id.; see also Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 662
(noting the difference between disability suspensions and disciplinary
suspensions and explaining we “can consider an interim suspension
arising from the same conduct when calibrating the disciplinary
suspension”).
We consider lengthy experience as an aggravating factor. See, e.g.,
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Smith, 904 N.W.2d 154, 161
(Iowa 2017) (“The only aggravating factor here is Smith’s lengthy
experience as an attorney.”); Morris, 847 N.W.2d at 436 (considering a
“seasoned” attorney’s twenty-five years of practice as an aggravating
factor); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360,
381 (Iowa 2005) (noting that an attorney with almost thirty years of
experience “should have known better” than to violate conflict-of-interest
rules). Turner is inexperienced. Even before we adopted the rules of
professional conduct, we considered inexperience to be a mitigating
factor. See In re Disbarment of DeCaro, 220 Iowa 176, 185, 162 N.W.
132, 137 (1935) (“What we might say or do with an attorney of larger
experience, mature years, is not necessarily what would be just to this
young man.”). Other courts have regarded inexperience as a mitigating
factor. See, e.g., Ligon v. Tapp, 519 S.W.3d 315, 323 (Ark. 2017)
(recognizing “inexperience in the practice of law” as a mitigating factor);
State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Kerr, 291 P.3d 198, 199 (Okla. 2012)
(viewing fact that attorney had not been licensed a full year as a
mitigating factor).
43
Nevertheless, Turner repeatedly missed court hearings and made
misrepresentations to the court. Lawyers of any level of experience
would understand that such actions are deplorable. See, e.g., In re
Cleland, 2 P.3d 700, 705 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) (considering inexperience
as a mitigating factor but noting “inexperience does not go far . . . to
excuse or to mitigate dishonesty, misrepresentation, or
misappropriation” because “[l]ittle experience in the practice of law is
necessary to appreciate such actual wrongdoing”); In re Powell, 76 N.E.3d
130, 135 n.3 (Ind. 2017) (per curiam) (noting inexperience will generally
not be a mitigating factor in cases involving dishonesty or
misappropriation); In re Disciplinary Action Against Klotz, 909 N.W.2d
327, 339 (Minn. 2018) (per curiam) (recognizing “that limited years in
practice can mitigate misconduct that is related to an attorney’s
inexperience” but explaining that “inexperience does not mitigate acts of
dishonesty” (quoting In re Disciplinary Action Against Michael, 836
N.W.2d 753, 767 (Minn. 2013))); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Scott, 579
S.E.2d 550, 556 (W. Va. 2003) (viewing inexperience as a mitigating
factor but emphasizing that the attorney’s inexperience had nothing to
do “with his pattern of lying and the falsification of documents”).
Turner received multiple warnings from Iowa district court judges
and the federal bankruptcy court through orders to show cause,
sanctions, and rulings finding him in contempt. Brinkmeyer’s ongoing
audit should have led Turner to quickly resolve the problems with his
bookkeeping practices, yet he failed to do so. Turner disregarded many
wake-up calls to clean up his act.
We consider mitigating factors as well. Turner suffers from
depression and ADHD. He argues that his ADHD explains his violations.
He submitted the report of a forensic psychiatrist, Dr. William Logan,
44
who confirmed the diagnoses of ADHD and depression. Dr. Logan’s
report stated,
Turner’s difficulties with his law practice are related
primarily to his longstanding Attention Deficit Disorder
causing problems with focus, concentration and task
organization. It is recommended he have monthly therapy
for both depressive symptoms and his Attention Deficit
problems and continue to take medication. Problems seem
to occur when he was receiving medication at any quarterly
intervals or was without medication and did not make time
to talk about daily difficulties with time, scheduling and case
load management. With the proposed modifications,
including consultation with a mo[r]e experienced attorney on
a regular basis, it is likely that future similar difficulties will
be avoided.
We have recognized that “[p]ersonal illnesses, such as depression or
attention deficit disorder, do not excuse a lawyer’s misconduct but can
be mitigating factors.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Curtis,
749 N.W.2d 694, 703 (Iowa 2008). The key for mitigation is that the
lawyer proactively seeks treatment to address the condition and avoid
reoccurrence of the misconduct. See Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 661 (“To be
considered in mitigation, the alcoholism must have contributed to the
ethical misconduct, and the lawyer must undertake rehabilitative efforts
to control his addiction.”); see also Dolezal, 841 N.W.2d at 129 (noting
that when an attorney receives treatment for an illness, “his efforts to get
healthy must be considered in fashioning an appropriate sanction”
(quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Fields, 790 N.W.2d
791, 800 (Iowa 2010))). Because Turner attends counseling sessions and
takes medication, we consider his depression and ADHD in mitigation.
Another mitigating factor is acceptance of responsibility and
acknowledgment of wrongdoing. See, e.g., Kingery, 871 N.W.2d at 122
(considering an attorney’s “sincere acceptance of responsibility as a
mitigating factor”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
45
Tofflemire, 689 N.W.2d 83, 93 (Iowa 2004) (considering “the attorney’s
recognition of some wrongdoing” as a mitigating factor). To his credit,
Turner, while represented by counsel, stipulated to the violations and
underlying facts before the commission hearing. We weigh this
mitigating factor against his prior delays in responding to the Board and
his spotty cooperation with the auditor. But, we note a lack of contrition
in Turner’s statement filed pro se shortly before submission of his case to
our court.
We have considered efforts to correct and prevent billing and
accounting problems as a mitigating circumstance. See Parrish, 801
N.W.2d at 589. Turner took business classes and worked with an
experienced lawyer to mentor him with regard to trust account
compliance and client management. He also reports relying on his
girlfriend, an accountant, for assistance. Additionally, Turner has
limited his caseload to eight clients in the areas of family law and
nonfelony criminal law. Cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
West, 901 N.W.2d 519, 528 (Iowa 2017) (considering “[v]oluntary
remedial efforts to limit an attorney’s practice to areas of competence” to
be a mitigating factor). Since his interim suspension was lifted with
stipulated conditions in May 2017, Turner has served a smaller number
of clients without any new complaints.
On balance, noting that Turner has already served a twenty-week
interim suspension for these violations, we hold a one-year disciplinary
suspension to run from the date of this opinion is appropriate. Prior to
reinstatement, Turner must provide an evaluation from a licensed mental
health professional verifying his fitness to practice law. See Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kennedy, 837 N.W.2d 659, 678
(Iowa 2013) (imposing a similar requirement).
46
We note that Turner has not yet paid court-ordered sanctions,
fines, and costs and owes the following amounts (plus interest, if
applicable):
Fred Leaming $497.50
Steve Cummings $875.00
Laura Cummings $875.00
Kelly Willard $1000.00
Walter Anhorn $1000.00
Lasandra Kearney $800.00
Mahaska County court costs $260.00
Story County jury costs $1920.75
Story County fine $500.00
Polk County fine $250.00
Total $7978.25
Prior to reinstatement, Turner must provide proof he has paid off all of
the foregoing sums. See, e.g., Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 653, 663
(conditioning reinstatement on attorney satisfying judgment a client
obtained against him in small claims court); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 792 N.W.2d 674, 683 (Iowa 2010) (requiring
attorney to provide proof of compliance with bankruptcy court order to
return money to clients); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Joy,
728 N.W.2d 806, 810–11, 816–17 (Iowa 2007) (conditioning
reinstatement on attorney satisfying judgment and reimbursing tax
clients for penalty).
Turner also must complete five hours of CLE on law firm
management and five hours of CLE on ethics. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ryan, 863 N.W.2d 20, 33 (Iowa 2015)
(requiring “proof of completion of two hours of ethics CLE and two hours
of trust account CLE” before reinstatement); Parrish, 801 N.W.2d at 590
(requiring attorney to attend “continuing education with respect to
billing, timekeeping practices, and client trust accounts, and to submit
proof of his attendance to the court prior to reinstatement”).
47
While we encourage Turner to seek guidance from a licensed Iowa
attorney mentor, we decline to require such supervision going forward.
See Hedgecoth, 862 N.W.2d at 366–67, 367 n.2 (declining to impose a
supervision requirement); cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Powell, 901 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Iowa 2017) (emphasizing that “[a]t some
point, public protection and the reputation of the profession justify the
revocation of a license to practice law” and noting that attorney who
engaged in a “pattern of unethical conduct . . . over the last decade” was
“approaching this point”).
V. Disposition.
We suspend Turner’s license to practice law with no possibility of
reinstatement for one year from the filing of this opinion. This
suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. See Iowa Ct. R.
34.23(3). Turner must comply with the notification requirements of Iowa
Court Rule 34.24. At the conclusion of the suspension, Turner will be
required to file a written application for reinstatement consistent with
this opinion, providing proof of his completion of the prescribed CLE and
an expert opinion from a mental health professional regarding his fitness
to practice law. See id. r. 34.23(1). Turner must also provide proof he
has satisfied the court-ordered payments listed above. Costs of this
action are taxed to Turner pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 36.24.
LICENSE SUSPENDED.
All justices concur except Hecht and Christensen, JJ., who take no
part.