Bridgestone Americas, Inc. and Old Republic Insurance Company v. Charles Anderson ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 22–1328
Submitted February 20, 2024—Filed March 29, 2024
BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS, INC., and OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY,
Appellants,
vs.
CHARLES ANDERSON,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty,
District Judge.
An employer appeals a district court order affirming a decision of the
workers’ compensation commissioner. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
May, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.
Alison E. Stewart (argued), Timothy W. Wegman, and Jordan R. Gehlhaar
(until withdrawal) of Peddicord Wharton, LLP, West Des Moines, for appellant.
Channing L. Dutton (argued) of Lawyer, Lawyer, Dutton, Drake & Conklin,
LLP, Urbandale, for appellee.
Terri C. Davis and Teresa B. Morio. Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, P.L.C., Cedar
Rapids, for amicus curiae The Iowa Association of Business and Industry.
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MAY, Justice.
After decades of hard manual labor, an employee reported a right shoulder
injury and a right arm injury to his employer. Then the employee pursued a
workers’ compensation action. The deputy workers’ compensation commissioner
awarded compensation, and the workers’ compensation commissioner affirmed
the award. The employer sought judicial review. The district court affirmed the
commissioner’s decision. The employer then filed this appeal. On appeal, the
employer poses three questions:
1. Was the commissioner correct in finding that the injuries are
compensable?
2. Was the commissioner correct in finding that the injuries should be
compensated as unscheduled injuries under Iowa Code section
85.34(2)(v) (2021)?
3. Was the commissioner correct in calculating compensation?
We only reach the first two questions. We conclude:
1. The injuries are compensable; but
2. The injuries are scheduled injuries under Iowa Code section
85.34(2), paragraphs (m) and (n).
In light of these conclusions, we affirm in part, we reverse in part, and we
remand for determination of compensation for the employee’s scheduled injuries.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
Charles Anderson was sixty-eight years old at the time of his workers’
compensation hearing. He has spent most of his life working for Bridgestone. His
first day of work was March 1, 1974. His last day of work was October 31, 2018.
All of Anderson’s jobs at Bridgestone involved physical work. During his
last thirty-five years at Bridgestone, Anderson worked as a tire builder. Tire
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building is particularly difficult work. The deputy commissioner summarized the
evidence this way:
Bridgestone made tires which varied in size from passenger tires to
tractor tires. However, in the 1980’s they stopped making passenger
tires and since that time, have made all heavy-duty tractor tires.
Mr. Anderson testified that a tire builder had to be strong, have
strong hands, and had to constantly fight through problems. In his
job as a tire builder, he had to use both hands and both feet at the
same time. While performing his job, he had to put both arms up
approximately 7 feet and to tear ply both directions. Some plies tore
easily; some tore really hard; it depended on the gauge or thickness
of the ply. A tire builder had to hold his hands and arms out in front
of them to tear the plies. If the ply was too thick, then the builder
had to cut the material with a hot knife, which involved the same
motion of the upper extremities, but while holding a knife.
Mr. Anderson described work that involved intense use of his hands
and upper extremities and considerable hand and finger strength.
His work also involved the use of his hands and upper extremities
away from his torso.
Anderson’s decades of labor led to an injury to his right shoulder and an
injury to his right arm. Anderson brought these injuries to Bridgestone’s
attention on October 31, 2018. That day, Anderson saw the company doctor,
Dr. Troll. Dr. Troll noted “wear and tear degenerative changes” in Anderson’s
right shoulder. After a second visit, Dr. Troll suggested that Anderson should see
his own physician.
Anderson then saw his primary care physician, Dr. Harrison. Dr. Harrison
noted that although Anderson had suffered no acute injury, Anderson’s
symptoms could be the product of an overuse injury related to his occupation.
Dr. Harrison referred Anderson to Dr. Davick, an orthopedic specialist.
Dr. Davick ordered an MRI of Anderson’s right shoulder. The imaging revealed
muscle tearing, including a near-full-thickness tear to the rotator cuff.
Dr. Davick performed surgery on Anderson’s right shoulder in February 2019. It
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was Dr. Davick’s opinion that Anderson’s shoulder injury had been caused by
his work as a tire builder.
Anderson continued to have numbness and tingling in his right hand. So
Dr. Davick referred Anderson to Dr. Rodgers, who is also an orthopedic
specialist. In October 2019, Rodgers performed a carpal tunnel release and ulnar
nerve transposition on Anderson’s right arm.
Anderson brought a workers’ compensation action against Bridgestone.
Anderson alleged injuries to his “right arm and shoulder.” He stated that his
injury date was “10/31/18.”
Anderson’s attorney sent him to Dr. Stoken. In a written report, Dr. Stoken
tied Anderson’s injuries to his employment.
An arbitration hearing was held in 2021. The deputy concluded that
Anderson had suffered compensable permanent injuries to his right arm and
right shoulder. The deputy also concluded that Anderson’s injuries should be
treated as unscheduled injuries under Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(v) and that
Anderson’s compensation should be calculated based on his loss of future
earning capacity. Specifically, the deputy found that Anderson had sustained a
fifty percent loss of future earning capacity. The deputy awarded compensation
on that basis.
Bridgestone appealed to the commissioner. The commissioner affirmed the
deputy’s arbitration decision in its entirety.
Bridgestone then filed a petition for judicial review in the district court.
The district court affirmed the commissioner’s appeal decision.
Bridgestone then appealed to this court. We retained the appeal. Iowa R.
App. P. 6.1101(2); Iowa Ct. R. 21.21.
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II. Analysis.
A. Issues on Appeal. As mentioned, Bridgestone raises three issues on
appeal. First, Bridgestone contends that there was insufficient evidence to
support the commission’s finding that Anderson’s injuries were caused by his
employment and, therefore, compensable. Second, Bridgestone contends that
the commission erred in concluding that Anderson’s injuries should be
compensated as unscheduled injuries rather than scheduled injuries. Third,
Bridgestone contends that the commission’s award was excessive. We address
the issues in turn although, as mentioned, we only reach the first two.
B. Causal Relationship. The first issue is whether the commissioner erred
in determining that Anderson’s injuries were compensable. As to this issue, we
see no grounds to reverse the commissioner’s determinations.
Under our workers’ compensation statute, employers must pay
compensation to employees for “personal injuries . . . arising out of and in the
course of the employment.” Iowa Code § 85.3(1). This causal inquiry presents
questions of fact that are “vested in the discretion of the” commissioner.
Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Pease, 807 N.W.2d 839, 844–45 (Iowa 2011).
We affirm the commissioner’s factual findings if they are supported by
substantial evidence. Mid Am. Constr. LLC v. Sandlin, 2 N.W.3d 838, 846 (Iowa
2024). Note that evidence may be substantial even if “different conclusions may
be drawn from the evidence” and, indeed, even if “we may have drawn a different
conclusion as fact finder.” Pease, 807 N.W.2d at 845; accord Sandlin, 2 N.W.3d
at 846. “Our task, therefore, is not to determine whether the evidence supports
a different finding; rather, our task is to determine whether substantial evidence,
viewing the record as a whole, supports the findings actually made.” Pease,
807 N.W.2d at 845.
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Following our review of the record as a whole, we conclude that substantial
evidence supports the commissioner’s findings here. Dr. Troll, Dr. Harrison,
Dr. Stoken, and Dr. Davick all tied Anderson’s shoulder injury to Anderson’s
employment. And Dr. Stoken’s report can be interpreted as tying both injuries
to Anderson’s employment. These expert opinions provided substantial evidence
to support the commissioner’s finding that Anderson’s injuries were caused by
his employment.
Bridgestone points to inconsistencies in Anderson’s comments to treaters
and also in Anderson’s testimony. But “credibility determinations in workers’
compensation claims are within the domain of the commissioner as trier of fact.”
Id. at 847. Moreover, “[m]edical causation ‘is essentially within the domain of
expert testimony’ ” and “[u]ltimately, . . . the determination of whether to accept
or reject an expert opinion is within the ‘peculiar province’ of the commissioner.”
Id. at 845 (first quoting Dunlavey v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 853
(Iowa 1995); and then quoting Deaver v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 170 N.W.2d 455,
464 (Iowa 1969)). And here, at least, we see no grounds to second guess the
commissioner’s reliance on the expert opinions mentioned above.
Substantial evidence supports the commissioner’s findings of causation
and, therefore, compensability. The district court was correct to affirm those
findings.
C. Scheduled or Unscheduled. We now address the central issue in this
case: Was the commissioner correct in concluding that the injuries should be
compensated as unscheduled injuries under Iowa Code section 85.34(2),
paragraph (v)? Or should the commissioner have ruled that they are scheduled
injuries under Iowa Code section 85.34(2), paragraphs (m) and (n)?
1. Standard of review. Before diving into the merits, though, we note that
special standard-of-review issues arise when we consider an agency’s
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interpretation of a statute. If the legislature has clearly vested an agency with
interpretive authority over a provision of law, we defer to the agency’s
interpretation. Id. § 17A.19(10)(l). In those cases, we will reverse only if the
agency’s interpretation is “irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” Id. But if
the legislature has not clearly vested an agency with interpretive authority, then
our review of the agency’s interpretation is for errors at law. Id. § 17A.19(10)(c).
We have concluded that the legislature did not vest the workers’
compensation commissioner with interpretive authority over chapter 85
generally. P.M. Lattner Mfg. Co. v. Rife, 2 N.W.3d 859, 865 (Iowa 2024). And this
case does not involve the interpretation of terms uniquely within the subject
matter expertise of the agency. See Iowa Ins. Inst. v. Core Grp. of the Iowa Ass’n
for Just., 867 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Iowa 2015). So we review the commissioner’s
interpretation of section 85.34 for correction of errors at law. P.M. Lattner,
2 N.W.3d at 865. We do not “defer[] to the agency’s interpretation.” Id. (quoting
Brewer-Strong v. HNI Corp., 913 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Iowa 2018)).
2. Overview. Now we turn to the statute itself. Section 85.34(2) governs
compensation for permanent partial disabilities. Iowa Code § 85.34(2). The
method and extent of compensation depends in large part on whether the
employee’s injury is considered “scheduled” or “unscheduled.” Chavez v.
MS Tech. LLC, 972 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Iowa 2022). The scheduled injuries are
those described or referred to in paragraphs (a) through (u) of section 85.34(2).
Id. The unscheduled injuries are governed by paragraph (v) of section 85.34(2).
Id. An injury is unscheduled if it is an injury “other than those . . . described or
referred to in paragraphs ‘a’ through ‘u’ ” of section 85.34(2). Iowa Code
§ 85.34(2)(v) (emphasis added).
The distinction between scheduled and unscheduled injuries can make a
difference in how the employee is compensated. See Chavez, 972 N.W.2d at
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666–67. Scheduled injuries are generally compensated based on functional
impairment, that is, the extent to which a body part’s function has been
impaired. Id. at 669. For example, paragraph (a) of section 85.34(2) addresses
the first scheduled disability, “the loss of a thumb.” Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(a). More
specifically, paragraph (a) calls for “sixty weeks” of compensation “[f]or the loss
of a thumb.” Id. So, “[i]f an employee suffered a work injury resulting in a 10%
functional impairment to the thumb, the employee would be entitled to six weeks’
compensation (10% of sixty weeks).” Loew v. Menard, Inc., 2 N.W.3d 880, 884
(Iowa 2024). The other paragraphs of the schedule require similar calculations
for other scheduled injuries, such as “loss of a hand” (190 weeks), “loss of an
eye” (140 weeks), and so on. Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(a)–(u).
Unscheduled injuries are sometimes compensated differently. Id.§ 85.34(2)(v). Compensation for unscheduled injuries depends in part on
whether the employee returns to work after the injury. Id. If the employee returns
to work at the same or greater pay, then the functional impairment method still
applies. Id.; accord Chavez, 972 N.W.2d at 666–67. But if the employee does not
return to work at the same or greater pay, then a different method applies. Iowa
Code § 85.34(2)(v). In those cases, compensation is based on the employee’s loss
of earning capacity. Loew, 2 N.W.3d at 884. The loss-of-earning-capacity
calculation requires the commissioner to consider not only the employee’s
functional impairment but also the employee’s “age, education, work experience,
and adaptability to retraining, to the extent any of these factors affect the
employee’s prospects for relocation in the job market.” Id. (quoting Sherman v.
Pella Corp., 576 N.W.2d 312, 321 (Iowa 1998)). A reduction in an employee’s
earning capacity is sometimes called “industrial disability.” Id.
3. Application. With this background in mind, we now consider whether
Anderson’s shoulder injury and arm injury should have been treated as
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scheduled or unscheduled injuries under Iowa Code section 85.34(2). This is, of
course, essentially a question of statutory interpretation. And we note that both
Anderson and Bridgestone have asked us to interpret the workers’ compensation
statute according to its plain language. These requests are consistent with our
duty. “We are required to use the plain language of the statute when construing”
the workers’ compensation statute. Warren Props. v. Stewart, 864 N.W.2d 307,
315 (Iowa 2015); accord, e.g., Walker v. Mlakar, 489 N.W.2d 401, 405 (Iowa 1992)
(en banc) (“To require a coemployee to have actual knowledge of a hazard before
exposing him or her to tort liability is more consistent with the plain language of
section 85.20.”). To be sure, our cases acknowledge legislative purposes as well,
including the purpose of helping workers. Sandlin, 2 N.W.3d at 850. Even so, we
do not have “leave to ignore the plain language of the statute.” Hoyt v. Wendling
Quarries, No. 14–0800, 2015 WL 576174, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015).
Following our study of the plain language of section 85.34, we conclude
that the commissioner erred by concluding that Anderson suffered an
unscheduled injury. As mentioned, an injury can be unscheduled only if it fits
in paragraph (v). Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(v). And by its plain terms, paragraph (v)
can only apply to injuries “other than those . . . described or referred to in
paragraphs ‘a’ through ‘u.’ ” Id. (emphasis added). But Anderson’s injuries are
not “other than those . . . described or referred to in paragraphs ‘a’ through ‘u.’ ”
Id. (emphasis added). Anderson’s injuries are to his shoulder and arm. Both are
“described or referred to” in the schedule composed of “paragraphs ‘a’ through
‘u.’ ” Id. § 85.34(2). Specifically, Anderson’s shoulder injury is “described or
referred to” in paragraph (n), which states: “n. For the loss of a shoulder, weekly
compensation during [a percentage of] four hundred weeks.” Id. § 85.34(2)(n).
And Anderson’s arm injury is “described or referred to” in paragraph (m), which
states: “m. The loss of two-thirds of that part of an arm between the shoulder
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joint and the elbow joint shall equal the loss of an arm and the compensation
therefor shall be weekly compensation during [a percentage of] two hundred fifty
weeks.” Id. § 85.34(2)(m). Because Anderson’s injuries are “described or referred
to” in scheduled paragraphs (m) and (n), paragraph (v) does not apply. Id.
§ 85.34(2). The injuries are scheduled, not unscheduled.
4. Counterarguments. We have considered all of Anderson’s
counterarguments. Three of them deserve discussion here, namely:
(1) Anderson’s argument concerning the statute’s use of the singular and plural,
(2) Anderson’s argument concerning paragraph (t), and (3) Anderson’s argument
that our interpretation affords no meaning to paragraph (v).
a. Singular vs. plural. We begin with Anderson’s point about the singular
and the plural. Anderson notes that paragraph (n) describes compensation for “a
shoulder”—singular—and paragraph (m) describes compensation for “an arm”—
also singular. Id. § 85.34(2)(m), (n). From this, Anderson infers that the schedule
cannot apply to him because his injuries include both “a shoulder” and “an arm.”
We disagree. To begin with, when we interpret statutes, we usually don’t
put too much weight on the use of “a” or “an” or to other uses of the singular or
plural. Id. § 4.1(17) (“Unless otherwise specifically provided by law the singular
includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular.”); see Little v. Davis,
974 N.W.2d 70, 75–76 (Iowa 2022) (applying Iowa Code section 4.1(17)); Porter
v. Harden, 891 N.W.2d 420, 426 (Iowa 2017) (observing that Iowa Code section
4.1(17) “should caution us against reading too much into the presence of the
words ‘a’ or ‘an’ in a statute depending on the context”); Sexton v. Lauman,
57 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Iowa 1953) (construing a singular term in a statute to
extend to the plural).
Moreover, the singular/plural distinction is not especially relevant here.
This is not a case of plural shoulder injuries or plural arm injuries. Rather,
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Anderson suffered injuries to “a shoulder” and “an arm.” Iowa Code
§ 85.34(2)(m), (n). So it makes sense to compensate Anderson under the
scheduled provisions for “a shoulder” and “an arm.” Id.This view is supported by the narrow scope of paragraph (v), the provision
for unscheduled injuries. Paragraph (v) does not say that it applies unless a
patient’s injuries fit into only one of the paragraphs identified as (a), (b), (c), etc.
Id. § 85.34(2)(v). Rather, according to its plain text, paragraph (v) only applies to
injuries “other than those . . . described or referred to in paragraphs ‘a’ through
‘u.’ ” Id. And, as explained, Anderson’s injuries are “described or referred to in
paragraphs ‘a’ through ‘u.’ ” Id. (emphasis added). They are “described or referred
to” in paragraphs (n) and (m), both of which are part of the schedule composed
of “paragraphs ‘a’ through ‘u.’ ” Id. § 85.34(2). So paragraph (v) does not apply.
b. Paragraph (t). We turn now to Anderson’s arguments concerning
paragraph (t). Paragraph (t) states in relevant part:
t. The loss of both arms, or both hands, or both feet, or both
legs, or both eyes, or any two thereof, caused by a single accident,
shall equal five hundred weeks and shall be compensated as such
....
Id. § 85.34(2)(t).
Anderson notes that paragraph (t) describes certain losses of multiple body
parts: “both arms,” “both hands,” and so on. Id. Anderson further notes that
“shoulder” is not mentioned in paragraph (t). Id. From this, Anderson infers that
the legislature excluded two-body-part losses from the schedule if one of those
body parts is a shoulder.
We disagree. To begin with, it is worth noting that paragraph (t) isn’t
relevant to Anderson. By its plain terms, paragraph (t) applies to some situations
in which multiple injuries are “caused by a single accident.” Id. That isn’t what
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happened to Anderson. His injuries are the result of decades of work-related
wear and tear.1
That aside, we think Anderson reads too much into paragraph (t). The most
natural reading of paragraph (t) is that it provides special compensation—500
weeks—for workers who suffer certain specified combinations of injuries in a
single accident. Id. But nothing in paragraph (t) precludes workers who suffer
other combinations of injuries from being compensated under other scheduled
paragraphs. See id. For example, paragraph (e) makes the loss of the fourth
finger—the “little finger”—a scheduled injury that requires twenty weeks of
compensation. Id. § 85.34(2)(e). If an employee lost both little fingers—in a single
accident or otherwise—the employee would be compensated for each little finger
under paragraph (e). Id. In other words, there would be two scheduled injuries.
There would not be an unscheduled injury. Because little fingers are “described
or referred to” in the schedule composed of “paragraphs ‘a’ through ‘u,’ ” the
worker who lost both little fingers would not fall into paragraph (v). Id. § 85.34(2).
Likewise, because Anderson’s shoulder and arm injuries are “described or
referred to” in the schedule composed of “paragraphs ‘a’ through ‘u,’ ” Anderson’s
injuries cannot fall into paragraph (v). Id. A different interpretation would ignore
the words of paragraph (v), which narrowly limit its scope to injuries that aren’t
“described” or even “referred to” on the schedule. Id. § 85.34(2)(v). We cannot
ignore those narrow limits. As Anderson reminds us in his brief:
1Although Anderson’s brief sometimes suggests that a single accident caused both
injuries, the record does not support that view. Indeed, in other parts of his brief, Anderson
admits the gradual nature of both injuries. For instance, on page twenty-five, Anderson
emphasizes “the causal connection between thirty-five years of tire building and [his] injuries.”
On page twenty-one, footnote four, Anderson notes that his 2018 right carpal tunnel injury was
the result of gradual, work-related wear and tear. Similarly, on page twenty-seven, footnote
seven, Anderson notes that “[f]rom the record it is apparent there was not a single trauma which
produced the shoulder complaint.”
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The role of this court is to apply the words “of a statute as written.”
“[W]e may not—under the guise of statutory construction—enlarge
or otherwise change the terms of a statute as the legislature adopted
it.” For us to interpret the statute to achieve some policy objective
found nowhere in the statute’s language . . . invades a sphere
reserved for the legislature.
(Alteration and omission in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting In re
Marshall, 805 N.W.2d 145, 160 (Iowa 2011); and then quoting State v. Miller, 590
N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1999)).
c. But does paragraph (v) retain any effect? Finally, we have considered
Anderson’s concern that our interpretation would leave paragraph (v) without
meaning. And, of course, it is true that we must give meaning to “every word” in
a statute. E.g., Maguire v. Fulton, 179 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Iowa 1970). “None
should be ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes
it to . . . have no consequence.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012).
We think our interpretation honors these requirements. Our interpretation
does not strip paragraph (v) of meaning. Rather, we have clarified its meaning by
highlighting its outer boundaries. As explained, paragraph (v) does not apply to
injuries “described or referred to” in the schedule composed of “paragraphs ‘a’
through ‘u.’ ” Iowa Code § 85.34(2). And so, paragraph (v) generally doesn’t apply
to injuries to fingers, arms, hands, shoulders, or other parts “described or
referred to” in the schedule. Id. Conversely, though, paragraph (v) certainly does
apply to injuries that aren’t “described or referred to” in the schedule. Id. For
instance, because back injuries aren’t “described or referred to” in the schedule,
back injuries are compensated under paragraph (v). Id. The same applies to neck
injuries, rib injuries, brain injuries, and so on. Id. Because they aren’t “described
or referred to” in the schedule, they are compensated under paragraph (v). Id.Moreover, under our case law, “when there is injury to some scheduled member
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and also to parts of the body not included in the schedule, the resulting disability
is compensated on the basis of an unscheduled injury.” Mortimer v. Fruehauf
Corp., 502 N.W.2d 12, 16 (Iowa 1993). This is true regardless of “whether the
spill over effects for the scheduled injury are physical or mental.” Id. at 17. Either
way, the unscheduled injury requires compensation under paragraph (v). So
paragraph (v) continues to do important work.
III. Disposition.
The district court was correct to affirm the commissioner’s finding that
Anderson’s right shoulder injury and right arm injury are compensable. We
affirm that ruling of the district court.
The district court erred in affirming the commissioner’s finding that
Anderson’s right shoulder and right arm injuries should be compensated as
unscheduled injuries. We reverse that ruling of the district court.
Because we conclude that the commissioner erred in treating Anderson’s
injuries as unscheduled, we also conclude that the commissioner erred in
awarding compensation based on Anderson’s loss of earning capacity. Likewise,
the district court erred in affirming the award of compensation. We reverse that
ruling of the district court. We remand to the district court for entry of an order
remanding to the commissioner for further proceedings to determine
compensation for Anderson’s scheduled injuries.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.