State of Iowa v. Lawrence George Canady, III ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 22–0397
Submitted February 20, 2024—Filed March 22, 2024
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
LAWRENCE GEORGE CANADY, III,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Patrick H. Tott,
Chief Judge.
The State seeks further review of a court of appeals decision reversing the
defendant’s criminal convictions and remanding for a new trial based on errors
in the admission of evidence. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED;
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices
joined.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender
(argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven (argued), Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Bridget E. Lavender and Emerson Sykes, New York, New York, for amicus
curiae American Civil Liberties Union Foundation.
2
Rita Bettis Austen, Des Moines, for amicus curiae ACLU of Iowa
Foundation Inc.
3
MANSFIELD, Justice.
I. Introduction.
A fatal nighttime shooting captured on video sets the stage for this case.
The defendant wasn’t the shooter, but he was beating the decedent with his fists
while another person delivered two fatal shots at close range. The defendant was
convicted of voluntary manslaughter as an aider and abettor, willful injury
causing bodily injury as a principal, and assault causing bodily injury. He now
appeals.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the district court committed several
errors, including when it admitted a brief cell phone video recorded on the other
individual’s phone about four days before the fatal shooting. The video shows
the defendant and the other person doing a rap song voiceover with a recorded
song in the background. At one point, the defendant and the other person sing
the lyrics, “Respect . . . you gotta earn,” followed by two names, one of which
appears to be the same as the decedent’s nickname, followed by the words, “They
got hit.”
The court of appeals concluded that the district court erred in admitting
this video as well as a Snapchat photo. It reversed and remanded for a new trial.
On further review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting this evidence, and that the defendant’s other assignments of error
are also without merit. Therefore, we vacate the court of appeals decision and
affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence.
II. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Martez Harrison and Lawrence Canady had been friends for three or four
years. The pair had a history of physical altercations, but they had always made
up and never used weapons against each other. Harrison went by the nickname
“Tez” or “Tezzo.”
4
On the night of April 30–May 1, 2021, around 10:00 p.m., Harrison came
to Uncle Dave’s Bar in Sioux City for a party. His fiancée, Jessica Goodman,
dropped him off and planned to pick him up when the bar closed around
2:00 a.m. Those plans changed when a commotion broke out in front of the bar
after midnight.
A group of four young people, led by Canady, were trying to enter the bar
through its only entrance (in front). Two of the three others were male friends of
Canady, Dwight Evans and J.H, and the third, N.R., was Canady’s girlfriend.1
The bar’s bouncer was not allowing any of them inside.
Amanda Anderson, the bartender that evening at Uncle Dave’s, went out
to assist. Canady was very angry and yelling. He wanted to come into the bar to
“beat somebody up” who had “bashed his sister over the head with a beer bottle.”
Canady also said he had a gun. When Canady spotted Harrison inside the bar,
he called to him: “I’m going to see you out here. I’m waiting for you.”
After leaving Canady’s group waiting in front, Anderson reentered the bar
and spoke to Harrison. She told him that Canady claimed to have a gun, and
she urged Harrison not to go outside. Harrison said he would get a ride. Harrison
called Goodman and asked her to pick him up early because “L and them” were
“outside trying to jump him.” Goodman knew that “L” was Canady’s nickname.
Goodman arrived and parked outside the front door of the bar. As she got
out of the car, Canady’s group surrounded her. Canady told Goodman “to go get
[her] baby daddy out of the bar.” Canady commented that Harrison “should never
slap Mariah with a bottle.” Meanwhile, Canady leaned to Evans, touched him on
the chest, and told him to “go ahead and get that.” Goodman heard Canady’s
statement to Evans and responded, “[S]o we’re gun playing now? That’s what
1According to Goodman, Canady and Evans considered each other best friends.
5
we’re really doing? We’re playing with guns?” Evans walked a short distance from
the group and stood by some garbage cans.
Harrison, having now realized what was happening outside, emerged from
the bar. Canady attempted to land a blow on Harrison but missed and struck
Goodman in the face. N.R. sprayed mace at Goodman. Canady and Harrison and
N.R. and Goodman began fighting. These events were captured on a nearby
surveillance camera.
Canady moved to the middle of the street and Harrison moved with him.
After Canady had knocked Harrison flat on the ground and was still punching
him, Evans approached both men from behind and shot Harrison twice at close
range in the abdomen. Canady remained on top of Harrison after the first shot
and continued to punch him in the face. Even after the second shot, Canady
continued to assault Harrison, hitting him and kicking him in the face
repeatedly. Canady, Evans, J.H., and N.R. then fled the scene. Harrison was
immediately taken to the hospital where he died from his gunshot wounds.
Police stopped a white vehicle that had been reported leaving the scene
and found Canady, J.H., and N.R. in it. Canady denied he was involved and tried
to throw the officers off track by telling them they needed to be looking for a
Chrysler 300 rather than the Chevrolet Aveo they had stopped.
Evans, on foot, sought help from a group of local residents, telling them
that he was looking for his wallet and cell phone. One of them discovered a
revolver nearby and called the police. That revolver turned out to be the weapon
that had been used to kill Harrison. Evans was arrested about a block from
where the gun had been found.
On July 1, Canady was charged by trial information with murder in the
first degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.2(1)(a), 703.1, and 703.2
(2021); willful injury causing bodily injury, in violation of Iowa Code section
6
708.4(1), 703.1, and 703.2; and assault causing bodily injury, in violation of
Iowa Code section 708.2(2).2
The case proceeded to a jury trial. The State’s theory was that Canady
decided to take revenge on Harrison after learning on April 30 that Harrison had
supposedly hit the girlfriend of Austin Rockwood in the face with a bottle.
Rockwood and Canady were close friends. Over Canady’s objection, the State
entered into evidence a recording of an April 30 phone call between Rockwood
and Canady. Rockwood made the call while detained at the Woodbury County
Jail. During the call, Rockwood informed Canady that “Tezzo” had hit
Rockwood’s girlfriend Mariah with a bottle. Canady responded that he would put
Harrison “on his fucking neck” and pick him up “and slam him dead on his
fucking head.” The pair then verbally agreed that it was “tax time.”
Also over Canady’s objection, the State offered into evidence a thirty-
second cell phone rap video, recorded on April 26 and extracted from Evans’s
cell phone, to show that Canady may have had an intent to harm Harrison even
before the jail phone call. The video lasts approximately thirty seconds and
shows Canady and Evans together doing a voiceover with a rap song playing in
the background. At one point, Canady and Evans rap the words, “Respect . . .
you gotta earn,” followed by two names, one of which sounds like “Tezzo,”
followed by the words, “They got hit.” The video contains other lyrics about
violence and also shows Canady and Evans rapping “gang, gang, gang,” Canady
displaying tattoos on his hand, and Evans fanning out cash in his hands.
Additionally, the district court over objection allowed the State to introduce
a Snapchat photo posted by Evans.3 The photo, posted on April 30 at around
2Evans was charged and tried separately.
3The Snapchat photo was posted as a “story,” which meant that it could be viewed for
twenty-four hours by anyone on Evans’s “friends” list, which included Canady and Goodman.
7
7:30 p.m., showed Evans and J.H. together standing face forward and J.H.
gesturing toward an object in Evans’s waistband that could be a revolver. The
caption read, “We bussing but don’t think shit sweat.” The caption included a
gun emoji. Goodman testified that she pulled up this photo on Evans’s Snapchat
account at around 3:30 a.m. on May 1 when she was waiting at the hospital
where Harrison had been taken.
While on the stand, Goodman also gave her interpretation of some of the
expressions used in the jail phone call and the Snapchat photo. Here too, Canady
mostly lodged timely objections. Goodman testified that “tax time,” as heard in
the jail call, meant “taking him for everything he gots; as in his pockets,
everything, fighting him, whatever it takes at this point. That’s what tax season
means.” Concerning the caption in the Snapchat photo, Goodman stated, “I’m
pretty sure he meant sweet. But, basically, [it means] they got the guns and
they’re not sweating shit.” She elaborated a moment later: “[I]t means that they
got guns and they’re going to shoot whoever. . . . They’re not scared of anything.”
Canady did not dispute at trial that he had physically assaulted Harrison
outside the bar. His defense was that he did not anticipate Evans shooting
Harrison. Canady’s defense, in other words, was that he did not intend for
anyone to kill Harrison that night and wanted only to fight him.
The jury ultimately acquitted Canady of murder, but found him guilty of a
lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, see Iowa Code § 707.4, willful
injury causing bodily injury, and assault causing bodily injury. Canady was
sentenced to ten years, five years, and one year imprisonment respectively, the
terms to be served consecutive to each other.
Canady appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals.
Canady’s appeal primarily raises a series of evidentiary issues. He argues that
the district court erred in admitting the jail call from Rockwood, the cell phone
8
rap video, and the Snapchat photo. He also maintains that Goodman’s
interpretations of slang lacked the proper foundation and amounted to improper
expert testimony. Canady further contends that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his voluntary manslaughter conviction, the voluntary manslaughter and
willful injury convictions should have merged, and the district court abused its
discretion in considering the minutes of testimony during sentencing and in
imposing consecutive sentences.
The court of appeals found merit to two of these arguments, and therefore
reversed and remanded for a new trial. Specifically, the court determined that
the cell phone rap video should have been excluded under Iowa Rule of
Evidence 5.403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. In the court of appeals’ view, “the evidence actually
introduced at trial was devoid of anything suggesting Canady had the motive or
intent to kill Harrison before he received the phone call from Rock[wood] on
April 30.” Given that the video had been made on April 26, the court concluded
that it had “little to no probative value.” On the other hand, the risk of unfair
prejudice was high because the video “shows Canady rapping along to lyrics
involving violent imagery” and “may have suggested to the jury that Canady was
a member of a gang.”
In addition, the court of appeals concluded that the Snapchat photo
should have been excluded because it was not relevant and posed a high risk of
unfair prejudice. As the court of appeals explained, “Canady is not in the photo,
and there is no evidence he was ever even aware of its existence.” On the other
hand, the photo, especially with the benefit of Goodman’s interpretation,
conveyed a message that the group owned guns and was willing to use them.
We granted the State’s application for further review.
9
III. Standard of Review.
“We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.
Rulings on the admissibility of hearsay evidence are reviewed for correction of
errors at law.” State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 476 (Iowa 2013) (citation
omitted). “We review sufficiency of the evidence claims for correction of errors at
law.” State v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Iowa 2022). Finally, “[w]e review
the district court’s sentence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d
269, 272 (Iowa 2016) (quoting State v. Barnes, 791 N.W.2d 817, 827 (Iowa 2010)).
IV. Legal Analysis.
A. Admission of the Recorded Jail Phone Call. Canady contends that
the district court erred in admitting the recording of the phone call placed by
Rockwood from the Woodbury County Jail. He claims that the State failed to
establish proper foundation for the recording and that the call was inadmissible
hearsay.
At trial, the State used a belt-and-suspenders approach to lay foundation
for admission of the recording. A sergeant from the Woodbury County Jail
testified as to the process used by the jail for recording calls. He also testified
that Rockwood placed the call in question and to the actual phone number that
Rockwood dialed. Later, a detective testified that this particular phone number
belonged to Canady. Additionally, Goodman testified that she knew both
Rockwood and Canady, had spoken to both on the phone in the past, and would
be able to identify their voices in a recording. After listening to the recorded call
at trial, she confirmed that the pair were speaking to each other. All this was
more than enough to lay foundation for admission of the recorded call. See Iowa
R. Evid. 5.901(a), (b)(5)–(6) (requiring the proponent to “produce evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is”
and listing as examples opinions identifying a person’s voice and evidence that
10
a phone call was made to the number assigned to the person if circumstances
show the person answering was the one called).
Nor was there a hearsay problem. Canady’s statements on the call were
party admissions. See id. r. 5.801(d)(2)(A). Rockwood’s statements also fell
outside the hearsay rule. Most were not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted. See id. r. 5.801(c)(2). For example, it didn’t matter whether Harrison
had actually hit Rockwood’s girlfriend with a bottle. Other statements were
adoptive admissions. See id. r. 5.801(d)(2)(B). To illustrate, after Rockwood said
it was “tax time,” Canady agreed it was “tax time.” No error occurred in the
admission of the recorded phone call.
B. Admission of the Cell Phone Rap Video. Canady urges that the cell
phone rap video should have been excluded under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403.
“Courts should use rule 5.403 sparingly since it allows for relevant evidence to
be excluded.” State v. Buelow, 951 N.W.2d 879, 889 (Iowa 2020). We first
consider the potential relevance of the video. “Iowa has adopted a broad view of
relevancy,” and it “is a legal question lying within the broad discretion of the trial
court.” State v. Thompson, 954 N.W.2d 402, 407 (Iowa 2021) (first quoting State
v. Scott, 619 N.W.2d 371, 375 (Iowa 2000) (en banc); then quoting State v. Tracy,
482 N.W.2d 675, 680–81 (Iowa 1992) (en banc)).
The State argues that the video was relevant because it showed Canady
may have had an intent and motive to kill Harrison that predated the jail phone
call with Rockwood on April 30. In the video, Canady and Evans together rap
lines about a “Tezzo” getting “hit.” As the prosecution put it in closing argument,
“[O]ut of all the rap songs on YouTube, Lawrence Canady chose that rap song
that talked about killing Tezzo.”
Canady questions the relevance of the video by noting that the original
song was a well-known rap song that already included a reference to a
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“Teso/Tezzo.”4 He also points out that there was no other evidence that Canady
formed an intent to harm Harrison prior to April 30.
Canady’s arguments may diminish the relevance of the video, but they do
not undermine it. Evidence that Canady and Evans harbored animosity toward
Harrison on April 26 wasn’t necessarily inconsistent with, and indeed could have
bolstered, the State’s primary theory that they decided to go forward with killing
Harrison a few days later after the jail call with Rockwood. On the April 30 phone
call, Canady was very quick to agree with Rockwood that “tax time” had arrived,
as if there might be some other motive to harm Harrison lurking in the
background. After all, it wasn’t Canady’s girlfriend who had been hit with a
bottle.
Moreover, the fact that the original song referred to a “Tezzo” wasn’t
brought to the district court’s attention when it ruled on the objection. See
State v. Morrison, 323 N.W.2d 254, 256 (Iowa 1982) (defining an abuse of
discretion as “one clearly against the logic and effect of facts and circumstances
before the court” (emphasis added) (quoting Best v. Yerkes, 77 N.W.2d 23, 32
(Iowa 1956))). Even if it had been, the State was entitled to argue that Canady
and Evans decided to select that song for their short rap because it referenced a
“Tezzo.”
Of course, even if relevant, the cell phone video would still be inadmissible
“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair
prejudice.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. “Weighing probative value against prejudicial
effect ‘is not an exact science,’ so ‘we give a great deal of leeway to the trial judge
who must make this judgment call.’ ” State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 807 (Iowa
2021) (quoting Thompson, 954 N.W.2d at 408).
4During Canady’s defense, the underlying video came into evidence. Canady proved that
the video referred to a “Teso” and that it had had approximately 650,000 views.
12
Canady and amicus American Civil Liberties Union argue that injecting
rap music into a criminal trial can be highly prejudicial. They contend, for
example, that jurors are more likely to treat a defendant’s recital of rap lyrics
literally and to associate rap music with criminal activity.
Other courts considering these risks have insisted on evidence tying the
rap music to the specific circumstances of the charged crime. See, e.g., United
States v. Sims, 11 F.4th 315, 323 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The general conclusion from
courts that have considered this type of evidence is that explicit rap videos are
probative and outweigh substantial prejudice when the defendant performs the
song, describes events closely related to the crime charged, and the evidence is
not cumulative.”); United States v. Pierce, 785 F.3d 832, 836, 840–41 (2d Cir.
2015) (holding that a rap video was properly admitted when the defendant was
charged with gang-related crimes and rapped in the video about his gang
association); United States v. Wiley, 610 F. Supp. 3d 440, 446 (D. Conn. 2022)
(“[S]tatements or images with offense-specific content tending to corroborate the
Government’s other evidence . . . will be admitted.”); Bey-Cousin v. Powell, 570
F. Supp. 3d 251, 255 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (setting forth “a presumption that artistic
expression is not factual,” and allowing “the proponent of evidence [to overcome
the presumption by] offer[ing] some preliminary indicia that the artistic
expression is a truthful narrative”); Wilson v. State, 883 S.E.2d 802, 813 (Ga.
2023) (“The video shows the defendants boasting about making money in a
violent drug trade, but they were charged with robbing a drug dealer shortly
before the video was made. This is not a question of evidence that could inflame
the passion of the jury for a reason that is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of
the defendant.”); Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 86–87 (Ky. 2006)
(determining that a video showing the defendant rapping about killing his wife
was admissible because he was on trial for her murder); Holmes v. State, 306
13
P.3d 415, 420 (Nev. 2013) (finding the probative value of rap lyrics was not
substantially outweighed by a risk of unfair prejudice where “only a single stanza
from [the defendant-authored rap] was admitted against [the defendant]—and
the stanza that was admitted relayed facts quite similar to the crime charged”).
Courts have concluded that rap music evidence should be excluded when
the link to the defendant or charged crime is attenuated. See, e.g., United
States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 493 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding the probative value
of a rap video to be low when the defendant was not in the video and there was
no evidence that he wrote the lyrics or he shared the views expressed in the
video); United States v. Johnson, 469 F. Supp. 3d 193, 221–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(excluding rap evidence because “the Government ha[d] not demonstrated that
the lyrics contain any direct references to the [defendant’s supposed gang] or to
gang activity” where the defendant was charged with various gang-related
crimes); Hannah v. State, 23 A.3d 192, 195–96, 201–02 (Md. 2011) (holding that
rap lyrics “were probative of no issue other than the issue of whether [the
defendant] has a propensity for violence,” when the defendant’s lyrics focused on
gun violence in general rather than the specific shooting at issue);
Commonwealth v. Gray, 978 N.E.2d 543, 559–62 (Mass. 2012) (deciding that a
rap video should have been excluded when offered to prove the defendant’s gang
membership and “[t]he lyrics show[ed] no connection to the defendant that would
suggest they were biographical or otherwise indicative of his own motive or intent
at the time of the shooting”); State v. Skinner, 95 A.3d 236, 252 (N.J. 2014)
(“[A]bsent such a strong nexus to defendant’s charged crime, his fictional
expressive writings are not properly evidential.”); State v. Cheeseboro, 552 S.E.2d
300, 313 (S.C. 2001) (finding that rap lyrics should not have been admitted
because “[u]nlike [other evidence at trial that] contain[ed] identifying details of
the crimes committed, these lyrics contain[ed] only general references glorifying
14
violence”); In re Pers. Restraint of Quintero, 541 P.3d 1007, 1033–34 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2024) (“Because neither rap lyric has a strong factual nexus to the Walnut
Street murders, their prejudicial effect substantially outweighed their probative
value.”).
Here, any prejudice from the video must be viewed in the context of this
particular case. It wasn’t disputed at Canady’s trial that Canady beat up
Harrison while Evans fatally shot him. All of that was captured on video. The
issue was whether Canady knew or intended that Evans would kill Harrison. In
that regard, Canady’s counsel emphasized at closing argument that Harrison
was Canady’s friend and that they had had physical altercations before and
always made up their differences. He pointed out that Harrison and Evans were
not friends. Counsel also characterized the events as Canady and Harrison “got
into a fistfight on the street and . . . out of nowhere [Evans] approaches them
and . . . just shoots [Harrison].” Thus, the State’s case came down to showing
that Canady and Evans were collaborating that night against Harrison.
When the case is viewed through this prism, which is the one the trial
judge correctly applied, the prejudicial effect of the video goes down and its
probative value goes up. The tendency to infer that someone committed a
particular act of violence because that person rapped about acts of violence is
less of a concern when the acts of violence and who committed them are
undisputed. At the same time, the joint conduct and statements on the video
were helpful to rebut the notion that Evans acted alone in shooting “Tezzo”
without Canady’s knowledge or approval.
Likewise, while “gang, gang, gang” in other contexts could certainly be
highly prejudicial, here the State didn’t try to use any whiff of gang involvement
15
to prove motive or responsibility for these acts of violence.5 This case was more
straightforward because the acts and who committed them were recorded on
video. What mattered to the State was simply that the video showed the
defendant and the shooter jointly voicing a threat to “Tezzo.”
Finally, as the State notes, Canady was acquitted of murder. The jury
rejected both the State’s aiding and abetting and its joint criminal conduct
theories against Canady. Instead, Canady was convicted only of voluntary
manslaughter, on the basis that he aided and abetted the fatal shooting, but the
shooting occurred under sudden passion resulting from serious provocation.
That verdict suggests that the jury put aside any inference of advance planning
from the cell phone video. Rather, the jury must have determined that Canady
and Evans acted in concert outside the bar—a relatively straightforward
inference to make from the surveillance video, Anderson’s testimony, and
Goodman’s testimony—but that the situation was provoked by Harrison and
there was no advance plan to kill or harm him. We hold the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the cell phone video.
C. Admission of the Snapchat Photo. Canady argues that the Snapchat
photo should not have been admitted because it was hearsay and any probative
value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Before
trial, the court reserved ruling on whether the Snapchat photo would be
admissible.6
5Nor did Canady ask for those words to be redacted. See State v. Fontenot, 958 N.W.2d
549, 563 (Iowa 2021) (discussing the defendant’s failure to request redactions from an otherwise
admissible exhibit).
6At the same time, the district court ruled that a number of other social media posts or
texts would not be admissible. These included a “death rap” modified by Evans at 8:13 p.m. on
April 30 that mentioned “someone gonna die” and indicated that “L” (Canady) was a participant,
photos showing Evans posing alone with the revolver used to kill Harrison, and a post by a
relative of Canady offering that revolver for sale about twelve hours before the killing.
16
The moment for that determination came in the midst of Goodman’s
testimony. The State made an offer of proof out of the presence of the jury.
Goodman testified that Canady and Evans both had Snapchat accounts and that
she was Snapchat “friends” with both of them. While at the hospital waiting for
the doctors attending to Harrison, Goodman pulled up the photo from Evans’s
account showing Evans posing with J.H. while J.H. was pointing to an object in
Evans’s waistband. The photo also contained a gun emoji and the caption read,
“We bussing but don’t think shit sweat.” A timestamp indicated that the video
had been posted approximately six hours before Evans shot Harrison. Goodman
also testified that when she accessed Canady’s Snapchat account, she learned
that he had been using Snapchat that evening. The district court ruled that the
Snapchat photo could come into evidence.
The district court allowed the Snapchat photo into evidence on the ground
it was the statement of a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. See
Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(d)(2)(E) (providing that “[a]n opposing party’s statement” is
not hearsay if it “is offered against an opposing party and . . . [w]as made by the
party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy”). It reasoned
that the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy
to harm Harrison existed by the time the photo was posted, after the Rockwood
phone call. We do not address this determination because we conclude that the
Snapchat photo was admissible anyway either as nonhearsay or as “[a]
statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind (such as motive, intent,
or plan).” Id. r. 5.803(3).
Putting aside the caption and the gun emoji, the photo itself appeared to
show Evans posing with a gun. This image wasn’t hearsay because it wasn’t a
statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See id. r. 5.801(c)(2).
17
Meanwhile, the caption and the gun emoji were, in effect, a statement of
intent or willingness to use a gun. See id. r. 5.803(3) (providing that “[a]
statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind” is “not excluded by the
rule against hearsay”); State v. Thompson, 982 N.W.2d 116, 119, 121–24 (Iowa
2022) (holding a victim’s statements on social media that she feared the
defendant admissible under the state-of-mind exception). So they weren’t
inadmissible hearsay, either.
And in any event, the point of the exhibit as a whole was not to show that
Evans had a gun and was willing to use it. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(c)(2). After
all, his use of a gun was not disputed at trial. The point of the exhibit was to
show that Canady would have known Evans had a gun and was willing to use it.
See id. So again, we do not view the Snapchat photo as hearsay. See id.Of course, the Snapchat photo would still need to be relevant, id. r. 5.401,
and its ultimate admission would be subject to rule 5.403 balancing. We agree
with the State that it passed those screens. Canady and Evans were best friends
and both of them were active on Snapchat that night. Thus, a jury could infer
that Canady saw the Snapchat photo and thus would have been aware that
Evans had a gun and was ready and willing to use it. This would tend to rebut
Canady’s defense that he did not know Evans had a revolver or planned to use
it.
Additionally, there was little risk of unfair prejudice. See id. r. 5.403.
Canady was free to argue—and did argue—that the State failed to connect him
to the photo. As his attorney said in closing, “There’s no social media post or
photo showing [Canady] with a gun or [Canady and Evans] and the gun, you
know, even after all this forensic examination of their phones . . . .” Furthermore,
as noted, the evidence at trial was undisputed that Evans did in fact shoot and
kill Harrison a few hours after the Snapchat photo was posted. Thus, there was
18
no risk that jurors would give an unduly literal interpretation to a posting that
was not meant to be taken that way. For these reasons, we conclude there was
no error in the admission of the Snapchat photo.
D. Admission of Goodman’s Testimony on the Meaning of Various
Slang Phrases. Canady maintains that Goodman’s testimony on the meaning of
“tax time” from the jail phone call, and “[w]e bussing but don’t think shit sweat”
from the Snapchat photo, should not have been permitted. He contends it was
opinion testimony that lacked a proper foundation.
While we agree with Canady that the meaning of these terms may have
been beyond the ken of the average juror, that does not mean it was error for
Goodman to define them. Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.701 allows lay witnesses to
offer opinions based on their own perceptions if helpful to a jury. Iowa Rule of
Evidence 5.702 provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
Goodman knew Canady, Rockwood, and Evans. She knew Rockwood “very
well,” having taken care of him for a year and a half. Regarding “tax season” and
“tax time,” she testified based on her knowledge that Canady and Rockwood
meant “taking him for everything he gots . . . whatever it takes.” Goodman also
testified, initially without objection, that the caption on the Evans Snapchat
photo meant “they got the guns and they’re not sweating shit.” Later, over
objection, she testified that it meant to her that “they got guns and they’re going
to shoot whoever. . . . They’re not scared of anything.”
In our view, this testimony was proper lay testimony. Goodman wasn’t
testifying as an outside expert; rather, as someone who personally knew the
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speakers, she was testifying as to what she believed they meant by certain slang
terms. See id. r. 5.701; see also United States v. Smith, 640 F.3d 358, 365 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.) (stating that the line between expert and lay testimony
in this regard should be drawn between “knowledge derived from previous
professional experience” and personal knowledge); United States v. Saulter, 60
F.3d 270, 276 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a drug dealer who was a member of
the same organization could offer his interpretation of terms used in recorded
conversations because “Rule 701 does not require that the witness actually have
participated in the recorded conversations. We believe it sufficient that the
witness has personal knowledge of the subject discussed and the persons
involved”). The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Goodman’s
interpretations of Canady’s, Rockwood’s, and Evans’s statements.
E. Sufficiency of the Evidence for the Voluntary Manslaughter
Conviction. Canady asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a
guilty verdict on the voluntary manslaughter charge. When considering the
sufficiency of the evidence, the question is “whether, taken in the light most
favorable to the State, the finding of guilt is supported by substantial evidence
in the record.” Crawford, 974 N.W.2d at 516 (quoting State v. Kelso-Christy, 911
N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 2018)).
Canady contends the evidence does not establish the element that he aided
and abetted Evans in the shooting of Harrison. We disagree. The jury was
instructed:
“Aid and abet” means to knowingly approve and agree to the
commission of a crime, either by active participation in it or by
knowingly advising or encouraging the act in some way before or
when it is committed. Conduct following the crime may be
considered only as it may tend to prove the defendant’s earlier
participation. Mere nearness to, or presence at, the scene of the
crime, without more evidence, is not “aiding and abetting.” Likewise,
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mere knowledge of the crime is not enough to prove “aiding and
abetting.”
Canady told Rockwood on April 30 that he would “slam [Harrison] dead on
his fucking head.” That night, Canady and his friends arrived at Uncle Dave’s
Bar looking for Harrison. Canady was the leader and the spokesperson for the
group. Canady told the bartender he had a gun and told Harrison he was waiting
outside for him. Later Canady directed Evans to “just go ahead and get that”—a
statement that Goodman took as a reference to retrieving a gun. Soon, Canady
got into a physical altercation with Harrison and seemingly drew him out into
the street. When Evans fired the first shot at Harrison, Canady did not react and
continued to beat Harrison as Evans fired the second shot. Before leaving the
scene, Canady proceeded to kick Harrison as he lay on the street suffering from
two gunshot wounds.
Based on the foregoing, a jury could readily find that Canady aided and
abetted Evans’s shooting of Harrison.
F. Merger Issue. Canady argues that the sentencing court should have
merged the voluntary manslaughter and the willful injury causing bodily injury
convictions. For willful injury causing bodily injury, the State had to prove that
Canady “punched and kicked Martez Harrison,” that Canady “specifically
intended to cause a bodily injury to Martez Harrison,” and that Canady “caused
a bodily injury to Martez Harrison.” For voluntary manslaughter, the State had
to prove that Canady “aided and abetted Dwight Evans in shooting Martez
Harrison with a gun,” that “Harrison died as a result of being shot,” and that
“[t]he shooting was done solely by reason of sudden, violent and irresistible
passion resulting from serious provocation.”
We agree with the State that the offenses do not merge. The State cites
State v. Ceretti, 871 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 2015). That case involved a fatal stabbing.
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Id. at 89. The defendant was originally charged with first-degree murder but
accepted an agreement to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter, attempted
murder, and willful injury causing serious injury. Id. at 89–90. He appealed,
arguing that the three convictions should merge. Id. at 91.
We observed that “the elements plainly do not align” among the three
charges. Id. at 92. We specifically noted that “willful injury requires a specific
intent to injure, whereas voluntary manslaughter does not require any specific
intent.” Id. Ultimately, we vacated the plea agreement, but only because the
voluntary manslaughter and the attempted murder convictions could not coexist
under a variant of the one-homicide rule. Id. at 96–98.
This is an easier case for nonmerger than Ceretti because the voluntary
manslaughter count involved the defendant’s alleged aiding and abetting of
another person’s shooting of the victim, and the willful injury count involved the
defendant’s own alleged beating of the victim.
The defendant argues that his criminal conduct constituted a single
“continuous act,” with no “break in the action,” citing State v. Velez, 829 N.W.2d
572, 581–84 (Iowa 2013). But in Velez we were analyzing whether the defendant
could be convicted of “multiple violations of the same statute.” Id. at 581. That
isn’t the situation here. Here we have two different statutes, so the key question
to be answered is whether the elements of the offenses overlap.
The defendant also invokes State v. Walker, 610 N.W.2d 524 (Iowa 2000)
(en banc). There we held that the defendant, who had beaten and kicked the
decedent to death, could be convicted of both voluntary manslaughter and willful
injury. Id. at 526–27. We gave the following explanation for that outcome:
“Because the record establishes more than one assault, the court was authorized
to impose more than one sentence.” Id. at 527. Canady argues that Walker
dictates a different outcome here because there was only one assault. Even if the
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explanation in Walker were still good law after Ceretti, the present case is
different because Canady was convicted of aiding and abetting Evans’s shooting
and committing his own willful injury as a principal.
G. Minutes of Testimony Referred to at Sentencing. Prior to actually
pronouncing sentence, the district court stated,
Before determining the appropriate sentence to impose in
these matters, the Court has considered all of the information
presented to it. It gives great consideration to the victim impact
statements presented here today, as well as all the information
contained in the court file, the minutes of testimony, the evidence
that was presented during the jury trial in this particular case. The
Court has considered all available sentencing options to it under
applicable law.
Canady seizes on the reference to “minutes of testimony” and argues that
resentencing is required because the court considered an improper sentencing
factor. See State v. Lovell, 857 N.W.2d 241, 242–43 (Iowa 2014) (per curiam).
“Information contained in the minutes of testimony is not a permissible
sentencing consideration if unproven.” Id. at 243. Of course, Canady is correct
that his case went to trial and the minutes themselves were not admitted to by
the defendant or put into evidence. However, it is the defendant’s burden to
affirmatively demonstrate that the sentencing court relied on an improper factor.
State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020). We conclude the defendant
has not met that burden.
In this case, the district court did not stop after making the statement
quoted above. It went on to pronounce sentence and then provided the following
explanation:
The Court finds that the foregoing sentences imposed would
provide for the maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the
defendant and also significantly to protect the community from
further offenses by the defendant and others. The Court has
considered the defendant’s age, the defendant’s prior record, which
is extensive in light of the fact that he’s only 21 years of age, the
23
nature of the offenses committed, the fact that force and a weapon
was involved in the commission of these crimes, and the Court,
again, orders that the foregoing sentences be ordered to be served
consecutively based upon the separate and serious nature of the
offenses as well as the fact that the offenses in FECR112015 were
committed while the defendant was on parole -- or excuse me,
probation in File FECR105921.
The court’s explanation is complete in itself and does not mention an
improper factor. We are not persuaded that the district court considered any
unproven facts in the minutes of testimony. We trust that sentencing courts will
“filter out” any improper or irrelevant material in victim-impact statements
absent clear evidence to the contrary. State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 764 (Iowa
1998). Likewise, despite what appears to have been a verbal slip of the tongue,
we trust that the district court, which did a thorough and careful job of presiding
over this trial, filtered out anything in the minutes of testimony that wasn’t
actually proved at trial.
H. Consecutive Sentences. Canady contends that the district court gave
inadequate reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. See Hill, 878 N.W.2d at
274–75 (holding that the sentencing court must state reasons for imposing
consecutive sentences, but the reasons can be the same as the reasons for the
underlying sentence). We disagree. The court stated that it was imposing
consecutive sentences “based upon the separate and serious nature of the
offenses as well as the fact that the offenses in FECR112015 were committed
while the defendant was on . . . probation.” This was an adequate explanation.
V. Conclusion.
For the reasons stated, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and
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affirm Canady’s convictions and sentence.7
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.
7We deny Canady’s motion to strike the State’s notice of additional authorities as allegedly
containing improper “argument.” See Iowa R. App. P. 6.908(5) (“No further argument may be
included in the notice.”). The State’s notice of authorities was filed in response to the amicus
brief. Both parties had previously been given leave to file a response to the amicus brief. The
State apparently chose to file its response in the form of a list of eight authorities, with either a
quotation or a descriptive parenthetical for each authority.