State of Iowa v. Jacob Lee Goble ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 22–1507
Submitted January 23, 2024—Filed March 29, 2024
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
JACOB LEE GOBLE,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, Shawn R.
Showers, Judge.
The defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision that
rejected his claim that the sentencing court relied on an improper factor by
mentioning parole. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Waterman, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Mansfield,
McDonald, and Oxley, JJ., joined. McDermott, J., filed a special concurrence.
May, J., filed a special concurrence, in which Christensen, C.J., joined.
Christopher A. Clausen of Clausen Law Office, Ames, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke and Anagha Dixit,
Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
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WATERMAN, Justice.
In this appeal, we must decide whether the district court relied on an
improper factor when it mentioned parole while sentencing the defendant to
prison. The defendant, a recidivist drug offender, pleaded guilty to a class “D”
felony and was sentenced to an indeterminate prison sentence of up to five years.
In explaining the reasons for this sentence, the district court emphasized the
defendant’s need for a structured setting for his rehabilitation and, in that
context, noted he would “be paroled at some point.” The defendant appealed,
contending that the court considered an improper factor—parole—in sentencing
him. We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed his
sentence, noting that Iowa’s truth-in-sentencing statute, Iowa Code § 901.5(9)(b)
(2021), requires public disclosure of his parole eligibility. We granted the
defendant’s application for further review.
On our review, we hold that the district court did not rely on an improper
sentencing factor by mentioning parole as affecting the defendant’s actual time
served in the context of his need for rehabilitation and protection of the
community. The district court did nothing to circumvent the parole board’s
discretion in determining his release date. The district court’s reference to parole
is authorized by statute. Accordingly, we affirm his sentence and the decision of
the court of appeals.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On April 26, 2022, Jacob Lee Goble pleaded guilty to possession of a
controlled substance, third or subsequent offense, a class “D” felony, in violation
of Iowa Code section 124.401(5). In his written guilty plea, he admitted to
knowingly and intentionally possessing methamphetamine.
In August, the district court held a sentencing hearing. The State
recommended sentencing Goble to a five-year prison term based on his “long
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criminal history,” “history of unstable housing and unstable employment,” and
the presentence investigation report’s recommendation for incarceration. Goble’s
counsel recommended a five-year suspended sentence and placement “on
probation to the Department of Corrections or halfway house.” Goble’s counsel
pointed to his successful completion of treatment “a few times in the last five
years,” his current job and housing situation, and his need for treatment while
on probation.
The district court agreed with the State, based on “what will provide
maximum opportunity for [Goble’s] rehabilitation and at the same time protect
the community from further offenses by [Goble],” and sentenced him to an
indeterminate term of incarceration of up to five years. The district court
mentioned parole once in explaining the reasons for Goble’s sentence:
And generally when I sentence an individual, I go straight to
Iowa Code Section 907.5 to determine -- if I’m determining whether
prison or probation is appropriate, and that code section lists your
age as being a consideration. You’re 30 years old. You’re relatively
young, but you’re still old enough to know better.
Your prior record of convictions and your prior record of
deferments of judgment, if any, and the Court notes at pages -- there
were 5 pages of the 17 pages of the PSI that are just your criminal
history.
Your employment circumstances, which I do think you’re
employable and you seem to have a willingness to work, which I
would say is a mitigating factor, but you don’t have a job right now
because you’ve been incarcerated here.
Your substance abuse seems to be one of your biggest
problems, but you have had opportunity to be in treatment before
and to varying degrees of success.
I also consider the nature of the offense committed, which is
a class D felony. There’s no victims that got harmed in this, but
based on the factors that I have to consider, and the fact that you’re
not requesting a more intense program, like a drug court, the best
thing for your rehabilitation is to send you to Oakdale, for them to
classify you, and then for you to be -- I don’t know if they’re going to
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send you to a different facility or keep you at Oakdale because you’ve
done so much time in county jail.
It’s a five-year sentence and it’s a drug charge, so you’re not
going to do a lot of time, but you will be paroled at some point and
you’re going to have to make a decision at that point, am I going to
keep doing this or am I going to turn my life around, because the only
thing -- you need to go to counseling, you need to go to treatment,
you need to go to meetings, you need to have people there to ensure
that you’re not using, and if I just put you on probation, I’m not a
betting man, but I am almost 100 percent sure that we would be
back in on a revocation within a matter of weeks, or at least months,
based on your previous -- I’m just -- the best indicator of the future
is what’s in the past, so I’m going to sentence you to the term not to
exceed five years and not suspend the sentence. IMCC is the
reception center, and the Washington County sheriff will deliver you,
or their designee, to IMCC. You get credit for all time served on this
charge.
(Emphasis added.)
Goble appealed, arguing that the district court considered an improper
sentencing factor by referring to parole as reducing “how long [he] would spend
in custody.” The State argued that the sentencing court’s comment, in context,
was permissible to “encourage Goble down the path of rehabilitation” and that
Iowa’s sentencing statutes allow for discussion of parole.
We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed Goble’s
sentence, stating:
Goble failed to demonstrate that the [sentencing] court relied
on an improper factor at sentencing. Pronouncing that a defendant’s
term of incarceration may be reduced by earned time or that the
defendant may be eligible for parole is required by statute. Iowa Code
§ 901.5(9)(a)–(b). “Sentencing courts are not prohibited from
referring to the possible effects of parole practices on the time that
a defendant will actually serve.” State v. Jason, No. 14–1162, 2015
WL 6510334, at *12 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2015). The district court
did not improperly consider Goble’s parole eligibility when
formulating Goble’s sentence.
Goble applied for further review, and we granted his application.
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II. Standard of Review.
“Our review of a sentence imposed in a criminal case is for correction of
errors at law.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “We will not
reverse the decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some
defect in the sentencing procedure.” Id. “A sentencing court’s decision to impose
a specific sentence that falls within the statutory limits ‘is cloaked with a strong
presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion
or the consideration of inappropriate matters.’ ” State v. Boldon, 954 N.W.2d 62,
73 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724).
“Nevertheless, ‘[i]f a court in determining a sentence uses any improper
consideration, resentencing of the defendant is required . . . even if it was merely
a “secondary consideration.” ’ ” Id. (alteration and omission in original) (quoting
State v. Grandberry, 619 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 2000) (en banc)). The defendant
“must overcome the presumption in favor of the sentence by affirmatively
demonstrating the court relied on an improper factor.” State v. Damme, 944
N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020).
III. Analysis.
We must decide whether the sentencing court relied on an improper factor
when it stated:
It’s a five-year sentence and it’s a drug charge, so you’re not going
to do a lot of time, but you will be paroled at some point and you’re
going to have to make a decision at that point, am I going to keep
doing this or am I going to turn my life around . . . .
(Emphasis added.) Goble quotes the foregoing passage in arguing that the
sentencing court improperly considered parole as a factor in imposing his prison
sentence. The State counters, and the court of appeals agreed, that sentencing
courts may properly mention parole eligibility as affecting the duration of a
prison sentence. We agree that the district court’s reference to parole was proper
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as bearing on the time Goble may serve in prison, which was relevant to the
court’s goal of rehabilitation and protection of the community.
As the State notes, the district court mentioned parole in the context of
encouraging rehabilitation and protecting the community. The court’s mention
of parole came in its discussion that prison would help Goble “turn [his] life
around”:
[Y]ou need to go to counseling, you need to go to treatment, you need
to go to meetings, you need to have people there to ensure that
you’re not using, and if I just put you on probation, I’m not a betting
man, but I am almost 100 percent sure that we would be back in on
a revocation within a matter of weeks, or at least months, based on
your previous -- I’m just -- the best indicator of the future is what’s
in the past, so I’m going to sentence you to the term not to exceed
five years and not suspend the sentence.
Parole would reduce the time Goble would have in a controlled prison setting to
combat his apparent methamphetamine addiction. We see nothing improper
about mentioning parole in this context.
In State v. Formaro, we explained why the sentencing court is afforded
discretion in crafting a defendant’s sentence to further goals, including
rehabilitation of the offender and protection of the community:
In applying the abuse of discretion standard to sentencing
decisions, it is important to consider the societal goals of sentencing
criminal offenders, which focus on rehabilitation of the offender and
the protection of the community from further offenses. It is equally
important to consider the host of factors that weigh in on the often
arduous task of sentencing a criminal offender, including the nature
of the offense, the attending circumstances, the age, character and
propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform. Furthermore,
before deferring judgment or suspending sentence, the court must
additionally consider the defendant’s prior record of convictions or
deferred judgments, employment status, family circumstances, and
any other relevant factors, as well as which of the sentencing options
would satisfy the societal goals of sentencing. The application of
these goals and factors to an individual case, of course, will not
always lead to the same sentence. Yet, this does not mean the choice
of one particular sentencing option over another constitutes error.
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Instead, it explains the discretionary nature of judging and the
source of the respect afforded by the appellate process.
638 N.W.2d at 724–25 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The district court gave valid reasons for declining to suspend Goble’s
prison sentence and did not rely on an improper factor by mentioning parole
eligibility as affecting the time Goble could be incarcerated in a controlled setting
to assist his rehabilitation and protect the community. As the court of appeals
noted, Iowa’s truth-in-sentencing law requires disclosure of parole eligibility. The
sentencing court, by statute, “shall publicly announce . . . [t]hat the defendant
may be eligible for parole before the sentence is discharged.” Iowa Code
§ 901.5(9)(b). The district court’s reference to parole in sentencing Goble was
required by this legislation.1 Goble’s challenge to his sentence fails.
Another statute confirms that district courts are not divorced from
considering parole at the time of sentencing. To the contrary, Iowa judges are
directed to furnish the parole board itself with a statement of the judge’s
recommendation relating to parole. Iowa Code section 901.9, entitled
“Information for parole board,” provides:
At the time of committing a defendant to the custody of the
director of the Iowa department of corrections for incarceration, the
trial judge and prosecuting attorney shall, and the defense attorney
may, furnish the board of parole with a full statement of their
recommendations relating to release or parole.
This statute provides a mechanism for the sentencing court to offer input directly
to the parole board.2 Sentencing courts can and should be mindful of parole.
1Indeed, for certain offenses, the sentencing court determines the date the offender
becomes eligible for parole within the range prescribed by the legislature. See, e.g., Iowa Code
§ 901.11.
2We view the duty imposed under section 901.9 to be directory, not mandatory. Cf. Save
Our Stadiums v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 982 N.W.2d 139, 148–49 (Iowa 2022)
(describing the difference between directory and mandatory duties).
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Our cases, however, caution against manipulating sentences to
circumvent the parole board’s exclusive authority to decide the offender’s date of
release. See generally Bomgaars v. State, 967 N.W.2d 41, 55 (Iowa 2021)
(discussing the interplay between judicial sentencing authority and parole board
discretion). We have said that “a sentencing court may not impose ‘consecutive
sentences to thwart a perceived risk of early parole.’ ” State v. Bentley, 757
N.W.2d 257, 266 (Iowa 2008) (quoting State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329, 335
(Iowa 1992)). But that is not what happened here. The district court sentenced
Goble to one indeterminate five-year sentence; consecutive sentences are not at
issue in this case.
More broadly, we have held that it is impermissible for the district court
to impose a longer prison sentence for the purpose of delaying the defendant’s
release on parole. State v. Remmers, 259 N.W.2d 779, 784–85 (Iowa 1977) (en
banc). In State v. Remmers, the defendant was convicted of second-degree
murder. Id. at 780. At that time, Iowa law gave the district court discretion to
select a sentence between ten years to life imprisonment for that crime. See id.
at 786 (LeGrand, J., dissenting). At sentencing, the district court considered
statistics showing the actual time served before release on parole increased with
longer sentences. Id. at 781 (majority opinion). The district court imposed a
longer sentence based on “what the track record reveals.” Id. Remmers argued
that the district court “attempt[ed] to influence parole possibilities by imposing
a lengthier sentence than might otherwise be appropriate,” which “conflicts with
the sentencing structure established by the legislature and invades the
prerogative of the board of parole.” Id. at 783. We agreed, and concluded that the
district court relied on an improper factor:
The trial court’s expression of dissatisfaction with parole
practices and its acknowledged reliance upon a perceived correlation
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between the length of sentence and likelihood of parole demonstrate
that the length of sentence here was based in part upon a desire to
assure defendant would serve a longer period before parole than he
would if a shorter sentence were imposed.
Id. at 784. We held that “the exclusive prerogative to determine defendant’s
minimum sentence rested in the board of parole by reason of its sole authority
to make parole decisions.” Id. at 785. We emphasized that “[t]he judicial
sentencing decision is not an appropriate means for attempting to circumvent
this principle.” Id. We concluded that “[b]y basing the length of sentence in part
on a desire to lengthen the minimum sentence defendant would serve, the trial
court in this case sought to pass judgment on an issue foreclosed to the court
and to prevent the proper body from deciding the issue at the proper time.” Id.Justice May’s thoughtful special concurrence contends that Remmers and
its progeny should be overruled as wrongly decided and causing confusion in
Iowa sentencing practices. But no party to this appeal argued for overruling
Remmers or its progeny. “We do not ordinarily overrule our precedent
sua sponte.” Goodwin v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 936 N.W.2d 634, 645 n.4 (Iowa 2019)
(quoting Est. of McFarlin v. State, 881 N.W.2d 51, 59 (Iowa 2016)); see also Feld v.
Borkowski, 790 N.W.2d 72, 78 n.4 (Iowa 2010) (“[W]e do not create issues or
unnecessarily overturn existing law sua sponte when the parties have not
advocated for such a change.”).
In any event, Remmers is distinguishable and does not control the outcome
of this appeal. As the court of appeals previously recognized, under Remmers, it
is “improper for the district court to formulate a particular sentence to avoid an
early release under the parole system,” and the district court must “not try to
‘circumvent’ the parole system by selecting a sentence that would deprive the
parole board of discretion it would otherwise have.” State v. Mohr, No. 10–0284,
2010 WL 4483991, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2010). But it was not improper
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to discuss the defendant’s likely release on parole when imposing a ten-year
sentence for burglary. Id. at *5–6.
The district court in Remmers had the discretion to choose from a range of
years for the prison term, and it deliberately chose a longer sentence to delay the
defendant’s ultimate release on parole. 259 N.W.2d at 783–84. That is not what
happened here. The district court’s choice was limited to imposing a five-year
indeterminate sentence with immediate parole eligibility or suspending that
sentence and placing Goble on probation. The court did not impose a longer
sentence to circumvent the parole board’s discretion.
Goble’s application for further review cites only two cases for the
proposition that sentencing courts are prohibited from considering “the likely
amount of time to be served prior to release”: Boldon, 954 N.W.2d 62, and State v.
Bowen, No. 22–0278, 2022 WL 16985663 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2022). Neither
case compels reversal of Goble’s sentence.
Boldon addressed consideration of the defendant’s juvenile offense history,
not consideration of parole. 954 N.W.2d at 73–74. While Boldon reiterated that
consideration of an improper factor requires resentencing, the defendant must
first establish that the sentencing court relied on an improper factor, which
Goble has failed to do. See id. at 73.
Bowen, an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, reversed a prison
sentence imposed in a probation revocation proceeding after the district court
revoked the defendant’s deferred judgment. 2022 WL 16985663, at *1, *3. The
appellate court noted that the district court could have jailed Bowen for contempt
for his probation violation for a determinate term up to six months without a
possibility of parole instead of imposing a prison sentence with immediate parole
eligibility. Id. at *2. The court of appeals concluded that the sentencing court’s
colloquy with counsel about Bowen’s immediate eligibility for parole and likely
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early release violated “the rule against considering timing of parole in choosing
a sentence.” Id. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the sentence and
revocation of the deferred judgment and remanded the case for a “new probation-
revocation disposition determination . . . by a different judge.” Id. at *3. The State
did not apply for further review.
The Bowen court concluded that mere “consideration of the timing of
parole is an improper sentencing factor.” Id. at *2. We disagree. Rather, the
sentencing court may consider the timing of parole, see, e.g., Iowa Code
§§ 901.5(9)(b), .9, .11, but may not use parole as a factor to select a sentence to
circumvent the parole board’s authority. See Remmers, 259 N.W.2d at 785. The
district court in Bowen did not impose a longer sentence or consecutive
sentences to circumvent the parole board’s discretion; the parole board’s
discretion remained intact given Bowen’s immediate parole eligibility. 2022
WL 16985663, at *2.
When reviewing Goble’s sentence, the court of appeals correctly applied
our precedents. As the State v.Mohr court aptly observed, judges can and should
consider parole as possibly affecting the length of time actually served:
In short, we do not read the precedents as invalidating any
sentence where the district court refers to the possible effects of
parole on the time the defendant will actually serve. That would be
an odd rule of law, because a conscientious judge undoubtedly
thinks about those matters. The district court, when it sentenced
Mohr, concluded it would be “best for him to receive treatment in
the structured environment and the programming available at the
Department of Corrections,” and that a ten-year sentence on the
burglary charge would achieve that objective while also enabling
Mohr to be paroled when he demonstrated he had completed the
necessary counseling and treatment to the department’s
satisfaction. That was a proper sentence.
2010 WL 4483991, at *6 (citing State v. Vanover, 559 N.W.2d 618, 635 (Iowa
1997) (holding a district court’s statement comparing the amount of time the
12
defendant would likely serve, given parole considerations, under the defendant’s
sentencing proposal to the amount of time he would serve under the sentence
imposed by the court did not “interfere with [the defendant’s] parole eligibility”)).
We reach the same conclusion today. The sentencing court properly
considered Goble’s need for a structured prison setting for purposes of his
rehabilitation and protection of the community. And the sentencing court
properly considered parole as bearing on the amount of time Goble would likely
serve. Nothing about Goble’s sentence circumvents the parole board’s discretion.
Goble was, and is, immediately eligible for parole.
Goble “must overcome the presumption [of validity] in favor of the sentence
by affirmatively demonstrating the court relied on an improper factor.” Damme,
944 N.W.2d at 106. Goble has failed to show that the district court relied on an
improper factor. His challenge to his sentence fails.
IV. Disposition.
For those reasons we affirm the decision of the court of appeals and the
district court’s sentence.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.
Mansfield, McDonald, and Oxley, JJ., join this opinion. McDermott, J.,
files an opinion concurring specially. May, J., files an opinion concurring
specially, in which Christensen, C.J., joins.
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#22–1507, State v. Goble
MCDERMOTT, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the majority’s opinion except for its criticism of the court of
appeals’ reasoning in State v. Bowen, No. 22–0278, 2022 WL 16985663 (Iowa Ct.
App. Nov. 17, 2022). I’m puzzled that we’re reaching to declare disagreement
with a court of appeals decision that no one has suggested was erroneous. The
State never sought further review from our court challenging the decision. In this
case, the State doesn’t even mention—let alone criticize—Bowen in its appeal
brief. Bowen is not mandatory authority for our court to follow or distinguish. It
is, and remains, an unpublished court of appeals opinion.
In any event, a full reading of the Bowen court’s analysis shows, in my
view, that the court of appeals faithfully applied our holding in State v. Remmers,
259 N.W.2d 779, 785 (Iowa 1977) (en banc), and one of its own holdings in
State v. Thomas, 520 N.W.2d 311, 313–14 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (Cady, J.). The
court of appeals quoted at length the exchange that occurred regarding the
defendant’s sentence:
THE COURT: We had a brief off-the-record discussion before
we started. And I thought you had said 286 days in jail. Is it 284?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I’m sorry. It was 284 on Monday, Your
Honor. Two eight-six. You are right.
THE COURT: So assuming forty-two or forty-four days of
treatment, Mr. Bowen would get credit for 328 to 330 days.
[Prosecutor], if I sent Mr. Bowen are they going to turn him loose as
soon as he gets there?
PROSECUTOR: On this ten-year sentence he’s immediately
eligible for parole. I can’t tell you what department of corrections
would or when they would parole him. I mean, what I would say is
if—if you don’t mind, it’s his choice that he’s been in for 284 days.
THE COURT: I—I get all that.
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PROSECUTOR: So—but, yes, he would be—he would be
granted credit. There’s no minimum on this. So—and I—I’d have to
look it up. I—I don’t think we’re supposed to consider when his
discharge date would be. I—I think it’s just whether a prison
sentence is appropriate. I—I think that’s a lot easier said than done.
I think the reality of the matter is, yeah, he would be—he’s burned
a good bit of that prison sentence. But I—I couldn’t give you a—I
wouldn’t want to put on the record a number and it would be wrong.
But he would be—regardless of the 284 days, he would be
immediately eligible for parole. And I know they would use those 284
days for calculating his parole date.
THE COURT: [Defense counsel], do you have any idea of what
the turnaround time is right now?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I do not. I believe the
discharge at the time that it was incurred actually had the—the one-
third and the court would have to affirmatively waive the mandatory
minimum on it. Or else you have I think it’s a twenty-month
minimum by the time they applied good time. But I—I didn’t do the
research on that. I know that you can waive it. In terms of how long
he would remain in, the guidance that I’ve been getting has been for
a five, plan on doing one. And for a ten, plan on doing two.
THE COURT: So—
DEFENSE COUNSEL: But that is widely varied between
people. I’ve had people go on tens and get out in four months. I’ve
had people go on tens and discharge it at four and a half years.
THE COURT: Okay. I—I think there’s credit for time served. I
don’t think that time served in jail or treatment, which sometimes
counts, counts as earned time or good time.
Bowen, 2022 WL 16985663, at *1–2 (alterations in original). The sentencing
judge proceeded to revoke Bowen’s deferred judgment and sentence him to
prison. Id. at *2.
The state in Bowen argued that the fixed minimum term for the crime of
conviction left the district court without a way to obstruct any decision by the
board of parole or department of corrections. Id. The court of appeals rejected
this argument, noting that the sentencing judge had other sentencing options
available beyond sending Bowen to prison, including continuing probation while
holding Bowen in contempt—which would have permitted incarcerating Bowen
15
for a determinate term, circumventing any release decision by the board of parole
or department of corrections. Id. The prosecutor suggested to the sentencing
judge during their exchange: “I—I don’t think we’re supposed to consider when
his discharge date would be. I—I think it’s just whether a prison sentence is
appropriate.” Id. at *1. After further discussions attempting to predict the
defendant’s parole date, the judge asked defense counsel: “[D]o you have any
idea of what the turnaround time is right now?” Id. at *2. After some
equivocation, defense counsel eventually responded, “In terms of how long he
would remain in, the guidance that I’ve been getting has been for a five, plan on
doing one. And for a ten, plan on doing two.” Id.The court of appeals concluded that the exchange between the sentencing
judge and the lawyers, in light of the court’s sentencing options, established that
the judge relied on an improper sentencing factor by considering the timing of
parole. Id. at *3. This left the court of appeals, as we said in Remmers, with “no
way of knowing what sentence would have been pronounced here without
consideration of the parole question.” 259 N.W.2d at 785. Unlike the majority, I
conclude that the Bowen court’s analysis lines up with our precedents.
The facts of Bowen are readily distinguishable from this case, in which the
district court merely mentioned parole in a discussion about how Goble would
need to decide for himself whether he would take action to turn his life around.
The majority’s criticism of Bowen notwithstanding, I respectfully concur in the
majority’s conclusion and the rest of its analysis to affirm the sentence in this
case.
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#22–1507, State v. Goble
MAY, Justice (concurring specially).
I appreciate the majority’s thoughtful opinion as well as Justice
McDermott’s thoughtful special concurrence. Like Justice McDermott, I join the
majority’s decision to affirm the court of appeals and the district court. I write
separately to raise five concerns about State v. Remmers, its rule, its progeny,
and our approach to them. 259 N.W.2d 779 (Iowa 1977) (en banc). In particular:
1. I question whether Remmers was correctly decided.
2. I question the validity of the Remmers rule, that is, the rule that it is
improper for sentencing judges to consider when or how the parole
board might exercise its authority (although, as will be discussed, the
precise boundaries of the Remmers rule are not especially clear).
3. I question whether the Remmers rule is compatible with the modern
statutory sentencing scheme, which often requires the sentencing
judge to decide whether or when a defendant will be eligible for parole.
See, e.g., Iowa Code § 901.11 (2021); id. § 902.12.
4. I worry that the Remmers rule breeds confusion, including confusion in
the case before us.
5. I worry that the Remmers rule is hard to square with the realities of
sentencing in the district court.
In light of these concerns, I respectfully suggest that we should overrule
Remmers and its progeny at the earliest appropriate opportunity.
1. Was Remmers Correctly Decided? I start with Remmers itself. In
Remmers, the district court sentenced a defendant who had been convicted of
second-degree murder. 259 N.W.2d at 780. The governing statute gave the
district court discretion to set a maximum prison term between ten years and
life imprisonment. Id. at 786 (LeGrand, J., dissenting) (citing Iowa Code § 690.317
(1975)). The district court chose a maximum sentence of seventy years. Id. at
781 (majority opinion). The district court gave several reasons for this choice. Id.at 781–82. Among other things, the district court noted that the parole board
often released defendants after short periods of incarceration. Id. The district
court hoped, though, that setting a long maximum sentence would result in the
defendant remaining incarcerated for a long period of time before being released
by the parole board. Id. at 782. A long period of incarceration, the court hoped,
would provide sufficient time for the defendant’s “maturation and ‘burn-out’ of
his aggressiveness.” Id. In other words, the court hoped that a long period of
incarceration would sufficiently rehabilitate the defendant so that he could be
released without “present[ing] a threat to society.” Id.In a 5–4 decision, our court vacated the sentence. Id. at 785–86. We
concluded that the district court had impermissibly attempted to “circumvent”
the parole board’s exclusive authority to select the date of the defendant’s release
and, indeed, had “sought to . . . prevent” the parole board from making that
decision “at the proper time” in the future. Id. at 785.
I respectfully submit that these conclusions were incorrect. The district
court in Remmers did nothing that limited the parole board’s power, discretion,
or authority in any way. See id. at 782. Under the governing statutes, the district
court was authorized to establish the defendant’s maximum sentence, a term
that the defendant could serve if parole did not occur. See id.; Iowa Code § 690.3(1975). And that is all that the district court did. Remmers, 259 N.W.2d at 782.
The district court did not order a mandatory minimum sentence. Id. Nor did the
district court order any other limitation on whether or when the defendant could
be paroled. Id. Indeed, the district court had no authority to limit the parole
board’s power—with one exception: If the court had ordered a life sentence, the
court would have wholly precluded the possibility of parole. See Iowa Code §
18247.5. But the court did not order a life sentence. Remmers, 259 N.W.2d at 781–
82. As a result, the power to grant or deny parole remained wholly in the parole
board. See Iowa Code § 247.5 (describing the power of the board of parole). And
that power appears to have been limitless. See id. Indeed, the Remmers majority
verified that the parole board’s power was limitless—that the parole board could
release the defendant on the very same “day he entered the prison.” 259 N.W.2d
at 783. And so, like the dissenters in Remmers, I see nothing improper in the
district court’s consideration of how the parole board might exercise its limitless
power. See id. at 786 (LeGrand, J., dissenting).
2. Is the Remmers Rule Valid? I turn now to the general rule that has been
distilled from Remmers, that is, the rule that it is impermissible for sentencing
courts to consider the likely timing of parole (although, as mentioned,
formulations of the rule vary). See, e.g., Bomgaars v. State, 967 N.W.2d 41, 55
(Iowa 2021) (citing Remmers for the proposition that sentencing courts may not
“consider[] the Board’s parole practices”); State v. Thomas, 520 N.W.2d 311, 314
(Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (holding that “the prospect of early release under the parole
system” was “an improper sentencing consideration”).
I question whether the Remmers rule is valid. Sentencing is wholly a
creature of statute. Our statutes require the sentencing judge to choose a
sentence that will “provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the
defendant” as well as “protection of the community from further offenses by the
defendant and others.” Iowa Code § 901.5 (2021). In making that choice, the
judge is expected to consider a “host of factors . . . including the nature of the
offense, the attending circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the
offender, and the chances of reform.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724–25
(Iowa 2002). It is wholly natural and proper for that “host of factors” to include
some estimate—however tentative—of how long a defendant might be
19
incarcerated prior to parole release. See id. Indeed, a defendant’s likely period of
incarceration is directly relevant to core sentencing questions like, “How would
a prison sentence protect the community?” and, “How would a prison sentence
impact the defendant’s rehabilitation?” To the extent that the Remmers rule
prohibits considerations like these, the rule imposes artificial and improper
restraints on the sentencing process.
It is true, of course, that our law prohibits the sentencing judge from
considering some factors. See, e.g., State v. Pappas, 337 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Iowa
1983). But those impermissible factors generally involve matters whose
consideration would be unfair to the defendant. See id. For instance, because it
would be unfair to penalize defendants for exercising the right to a jury trial, we
usually prohibit sentencing judges from “taking into account” a defendant’s
refusal to plead guilty. State v. Nichols, 247 N.W.2d 249, 254–56 (Iowa 1976).
But the Remmers rule seems to be based more on concern for the parole board’s
authority than on worries about fairness. See Remmers, 259 N.W.2d at 785
(majority opinion). In any event, I see nothing unfair about allowing a sentencing
judge to consider how long a defendant will likely spend in prison before being
released. Indeed, as I will discuss more below, it could be unfair to a defendant
if the judge doesn’t consider the likely timing of parole release. And yet that is
what the Remmers rule seems to require.
3. The Remmers Rule and the Modern Sentencing Scheme. I also worry
about whether the Remmers rule makes sense given the many situations in
which the district court’s choices can properly limit the parole board’s power.
See, e.g., Iowa Code § 901.11. The court can make those choices because the
legislature has vested the court with clear statutory authority to limit the parole
board’s power. Here are some examples:
20
• In several important categories of felony cases (e.g., robbery in the first
degree), the sentencing court is required to select a mandatory minimum
term of incarceration. See id. § 901.11; id. § 902.12. Any choice that the
court makes will directly limit the parole board’s power by postponing
the defendant’s eligibility for parole. See id. § 901.11; id. § 902.12. See
generally State v. Martin, 2 N.W.3d 271, 273–76 (Iowa 2024) (discussing
the sentencing process under section 901.11).
• In some felony drug cases, the court has discretion to decide whether to
impose a mandatory minimum sentence. See Iowa Code § 901.10. In
other words, the court must decide whether or not to limit the parole
board’s power. See id.; see also State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225
(Iowa 1996) (per curiam) (discussing Iowa Code section 901.10).
• In aggravated misdemeanor cases, the court generally has two options
when selecting a term of confinement: (1) the court may impose an
indeterminate term in prison, and thereby empower the parole board to
immediately release the defendant; or (2) the court may impose a
determinate term in jail, and thereby preclude the parole board from
taking any action. See Iowa Code § 903.1(2). See generally State v.
Nicoletto, 862 N.W.2d 621, 624–25 (Iowa 2015) (discussing possible
sentences for aggravated misdemeanors).
• In many felony cases, the court has two main options: (1) the court may
send the defendant to prison, where the parole board will usually have
immediate power to act; or (2) the court may order a period of probation,
during which the parole board will have no power to act. See Iowa Code
§ 907.3. Indeed, in the case before us now, the district court had to
choose between probation and prison. The district court chose prison—
in part because the court expected the parole board to release Goble
21
quickly. But if the court had chosen probation instead, then the parole
board would have no power to act. See id. § 907.8(2)(b) (“Jurisdiction
over [persons on probation] shall remain with the sentencing court.”);
State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 628 (Iowa 2008) (describing the
difference between probation and parole).
• Likewise, if a defendant violates probation, the court often has the
choice to either (1) revoke probation and send the defendant to prison—
which, again, would usually empower the parole board to act
immediately; or (2) keep the defendant on probation—which, again,
would preclude action by the parole board. See id. § 908.11(4); State v.
Covel, 925 N.W.2d 183, 187–88 (Iowa 2019) (discussing the analysis “for
revocation decisions”).
As these examples show, our sentencing judges are regularly required to
make choices that directly impact—and sometimes eliminate—the parole board’s
power to act. It is natural and appropriate, then, for our sentencing judges to
consider how the parole board exercises its power. It is also natural and
appropriate for the sentencing judge to sometimes choose options that limit or
eliminate the parole board’s power because the judge believes that parole release
would frustrate legitimate sentencing goals, including the statutorily mandated
goals of encouraging rehabilitation and protecting the community. See Iowa Code
§ 901.5. To the extent that the Remmers rule prohibits those kinds of sentencing
approaches, it is contrary to the legislature’s statutory scheme. See id.; Remmers
259 N.W.2d at 785. It places artificial, improper limitations on the discretion that
has been vested in the sentencing court by our legislature. See Iowa Code §
901.5. And, as mentioned, those limitations can be prejudicial to the rights of
defendants. For instance, in the case before us, Goble argued that probation was
the best choice because—if he were sent to prison—the parole board would let
22
him out so quickly that he wouldn’t receive drug treatment. Here’s what Goble’s
counsel said:
[B]eing on probation will give [Goble] a chance to work and get
treatment, [but] more than likely, if he goes to prison, he’ll never
even see treatment. He won’t be in there long enough [to make it
through the lengthy] . . . wait list for treatment.
(Emphasis added.)
This is not an uncommon argument for defendants to make. And yet, one
could argue that the Remmers rule prohibits consideration of this argument.
After all, if the Remmers rule prohibits sentencing judges from considering the
“prospect of early release under the parole system,” doesn’t the Remmers rule
prohibit sentencing judges from considering whether “the prospect of early
[parole] release” weighs in favor of granting probation? Thomas, 520 N.W.2d at
314. I think, though, that defense lawyers would be pretty confused if a judge
raised that concern.
4. Remmers Leads to Confusion. The Remmers rule can be confusing in
other ways, too. Consider the varied—and sometimes contradictory—statements
that our courts have made about the rule. In the case before us now, the court
of appeals said that “[s]entencing courts are not prohibited from referring to the
possible effects of parole practices on the time that a defendant will actually
serve.” (Quoting State v. Jason, No. 14–1162, 2015 WL 6510334, at *12 (Iowa Ct.
App. Oct. 28, 2015) (per curiam).) That same statement appears in at least three
other court of appeals opinions. State v. Oliver, No. 22–0905, 2023 WL 7014089,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2023); Jason, 2015 WL 6510334, at *12; State v.
Clark, No. 11–0240, 2011 WL 3480967, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2011). In
State v. Bowen, though, the court of appeals said that “[c]onsideration of the
timing of parole is an improper sentencing factor.” No. 22–0278, 2022 WL
16985663, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2022). Likewise, we have sometimes said
23
that sentencing judges must not “consider[] the Board’s parole practices.”
Bomgaars, 967 N.W.2d at 55. Other times, we have suggested that the
prohibition might extend only to “considering the effect a sentence will have on
a defendant’s parole date.” State v. Bentley, 757 N.W.2d 257, 266 (Iowa 2008)
(emphasis added). And other times, we have suggested that the prohibition
extends only to certain purposes for choosing a sentence, e.g., the “use of
consecutive sentences to thwart a perceived risk of early parole.” State v. Hulbert,
481 N.W.2d 329, 335 (Iowa 1992) (emphasis added).
These variations in wording may seem too subtle to worry about. But
consider the sentencing judge. The sentencing judge must explain the reasons
for the sentence. See State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 405–07 (Iowa 2015). And
that explanation can only come through words. But if the judge uses words that
suggest reliance on an improper consideration, then the judge’s sentence will be
vacated, and the sentencing process will have to be repeated. See, e.g., Nichols,
247 N.W.2d at 256. So it is crucial for sentencing judges to have a clear
understanding of what words they can say and what words they cannot. Yet, as
these examples show, it is not always clear what the Remmers rule prohibits and
what it permits. That lack of clarity can yield confusion for the bench and bar.
Indeed, I worry that the Remmers rule is causing confusion in the case
before us now. The majority suggests that it was acceptable for the sentencing
court to consider parole timing because the court’s purpose was to encourage
“rehabilitation and protection of the community,” a phrase that appears several
times in the majority opinion. Yet those are the required goals for every sentence
entered in an Iowa court. Iowa Code § 901.5. Indeed, those two goals—
rehabilitation of the defendant and protection of the community—were reasons
that the district court gave in Remmers. 259 N.W.2d at 782, 785. Even so, we
24
vacated the sentence in Remmers. Id. at 785. Does that mean we must vacate
Goble’s prison sentence as well?
The majority also suggests that it is proper for the sentencing court to
consider parole prospects unless those considerations lead the court to impose
a longer sentence. But cf. Thomas, 520 N.W.2d at 314 (holding that the district
court’s consideration of parole prospects was improper even though the court
ordered jail instead of prison). But consider the facts before us. The district court
considered Goble’s parole prospects when choosing between probation and
prison. And then the court decided on prison. Almost by definition, though,
prison involves longer imprisonment than probation, which (of course) is an
alternative to imprisonment. Plus the court cited Goble’s parole prospects when
explaining the court’s reasons for the prison sentence. I am not sure how this
differs from Remmers, where we vacated a sentence because the district court
cited parole prospects when explaining its reasons for a longer sentence. 259
N.W.2d at 785–86.
The majority suggests that Remmers is distinguishable because “[n]othing
about Goble’s sentence circumvents the parole board’s discretion” because
“Goble was, and is, immediately eligible for parole.” As explained, though, the
same was true in Remmers. 259 N.W.2d at 783. Indeed, the Remmers majority
verified that the defendant “would be eligible for parole the day he entered the
prison.” Id. This, again, makes it hard to distinguish between Goble’s situation,
where we are affirming the sentence, and the Remmers situation, where we
vacated the sentence. See id.
The majority also suggests that Remmers only prohibits the sentencing
court from “formulat[ing] a particular sentence to avoid an early release under
the parole system.” As discussed, though, there are many occasions in which a
sentencing court may properly formulate a sentence to avoid early parole release.
25
For instance, the sentencing court here might have properly accepted Goble’s
suggestion that probation was better than prison because a prison sentence
would lead to early parole release.
Along similar lines, the majority suggests that Remmers only prohibits the
sentencing court from improperly “ ‘circumvent[ing]’ the parole system by
selecting a sentence that would deprive the parole board of discretion it would
otherwise have.” This assumes that district courts can impose improper limits on
the parole board’s discretion. That is an incorrect assumption. So long as the
district court enters a legal sentence, any limits that the court might impose on
the parole board’s discretion—such as mandatory minimums or choosing jail
rather than prison—are wholly proper. They are wholly proper because the
legislature has authorized them. See Iowa Code § 901.5. But see Thomas, 520
N.W.2d at 314 (holding that the district court erred by choosing jail over prison
“because of the prospect of early release under the parole system”).
5. Remmers and the Realities of Sentencing. In addition to its other
shortcomings, the Remmers rule does not reflect the realities of sentencing in the
district court. To be clear, I do not doubt that our judges make every effort to
comply with the Remmers rule by filtering parole prospects out of their
sentencing calculations. As the Remmers dissent noted, though, our judges are
well aware that their sentences “are seldom, if ever, served to their completion.”
259 N.W.2d at 786 (LeGrand, J., dissenting). Indeed, every time a judge
sentences a defendant for a felony or aggravated misdemeanor, the judge must
“publicly announce” that “the defendant may be eligible for parole before the
sentence is discharged.” Iowa Code § 901.5(9)(b); see also id. § 901.9 (requiring
the judge to “furnish the board of parole with a full statement of . . .
recommendations relating to release or parole”).
26
Plus the department of corrections provides sentencing judges with email
notifications when defendants are actually released from prison. This flow of
notifications provides judges with frequent insights into the parole board’s
practices.
It is also interesting that, in Remmers, presentence investigators provided
the district court with statistical data showing actual parole dates for offenders
who had been convicted of the same offense (second-degree murder) as the
Remmers defendant. 259 N.W.2d at 781 (majority opinion). I imagine that even
better statistical assistance could be available in 2024 than in 1976, when the
Remmers defendant was sentenced. See id. at 780–81.
In any event, I see little benefit in prohibiting judges from using their
understandings of the parole system to help them craft better sentences. This
prohibition seems especially odd because prosecutors and defense lawyers (and
experienced defendants) are well aware of the parole process and, indeed, they
sometimes base decisions on their expectations about parole board behavior.
See, e.g., Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 517–18 (Iowa 2021) (quoting a letter
from a defense attorney in which the attorney advised a client that—although
child endangerment resulting in death “is punishable by a penalty of up to 50
years of incarceration in prison”—“a Legislative Services Study” showed that
“typical individuals . . . serve on average 4.6 years on this type of sentence”
(emphasis omitted)).
6. Conclusion. Our sentencing judges bear “an awesome and lonely
responsibility.” Pappas, 337 N.W.2d at 493. Their work is crucial to the proper
functioning of our criminal justice system. We should do what we can to support
their work. At least, we should try to relieve them of unnecessary, unnatural,
and improper burdens. The Remmers prohibition is an unnecessary, unnatural,
27
and improper burden on our sentencing judges. We should remove that burden
at the earliest appropriate opportunity.
Christensen, C.J., joins this special concurrence.