State of Iowa v. T.J.W. ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 22–0805
Submitted October 10, 2023—Filed February 9, 2024
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
T.J.W.,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Christine Dalton,
District Associate Judge.
The defendant appeals a restitution order for pecuniary damages entered
after the court had already dismissed and expunged all charges on completion
of a deferred judgment. WRIT OF CERTIORARI GRANTED; WRIT SUSTAINED.
McDermott, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices
joined.
Martha J. Lucey (argued), State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout (argued), Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
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MCDERMOTT, Justice.
This case requires us to consider the point at which a criminal defendant
becomes free from a court’s further compulsions. A defendant with the initials
T.J.W. (whom we’ll refer to as “T.J.”) pleaded guilty to criminal mischief. The
court granted a deferred judgment and imposed a term of probation. Several
months later, the court determined that T.J. had completed all the terms of the
deferred judgment, so it entered an order dismissing and expunging the charge.
Yet later that day, the court filed an order setting a hearing on restitution, and
two months later ordered T.J. to pay over $6,000 in restitution to the victim. T.J.
appeals, arguing that the court lacked the power to enter the restitution order
after she had completed the deferred judgment and the court had dismissed and
expunged the charge against her.
I.
In August 2021, T.J. pleaded guilty to criminal mischief in the fourth de-
gree, a serious misdemeanor, after she vandalized two cars. The court granted a
deferred judgment. As part of T.J.’s deferred judgment, the court placed her on
unsupervised probation for one year. It also ordered T.J. to pay a $315 civil pen-
alty (referred to as “category A” restitution) but stated that pecuniary damages
were unknown at the time and that “[a] hearing will be set to determine [the] full
amount of restitution to be imposed as a condition of probation.” Although the
order didn’t include “category B” restitution (which includes, for instance, court
costs and court-appointed attorney fees, but not pecuniary damages, see Iowa
Code § 910.1(2) (2021)), it stated that T.J. had the reasonable ability to pay $100
in category B restitution. The order set a review hearing on the deferred judgment
for February 2022.
In September 2021, the court set a hearing for October 28 to determine
the amount of restitution. That hearing was continued to December 9. The record
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is silent about whether a restitution hearing actually occurred on December 9
or, if it didn’t, why it didn’t. Regardless, the court entered no restitution order at
that time.
On the morning of February 15, 2022, the court held its previously sched-
uled deferred judgment review hearing. We have no transcript from the hearing.
The court thereafter entered an order that stated:
Defendant has completed all terms and conditions of the
[d]eferred [j]udgment. It is hereby ordered that the charge(s) should
now be dismissed and expunged. All dismissed related charges shall
now also be expunged. Defendant is hereby advised that the case
will not be expunged until all monies owing have been paid in full.
(Emphasis omitted.) This order was filed at 1:32 p.m.
A little over two hours later, at 3:39 p.m., the court filed a separate order
scheduling a restitution hearing for March 24. That hearing was held as sched-
uled. On April 8, the court entered an order imposing $6,067.44 in restitution to
a victim named in the order. T.J. filed a notice of appeal challenging the restitu-
tion order.
II.
Defendants do not have a right of appeal from a restitution order imposed
as part of a deferred judgment. State v. Patterson, 984 N.W.2d 449, 454 (Iowa
2023). We thus ordered the parties to brief whether another vehicle—certiorari
or discretionary review—offers the appropriate means of appellate review in this
case. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.108 (permitting an appeal to “proceed as though the
proper form of review had been requested” when initiated incorrectly by a notice
of appeal). Both parties agree that certiorari review is the proper path. In State
v. Patterson, we observed that the legislature’s recent amendments to Iowa’s res-
titution laws include special provisions relating to appellate review of restitution
orders. 984 N.W.2d at 454–55. Iowa Code § 910.3(10) describes how a court is
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to determine restitution and how a defendant may challenge restitution orders,
stating that “[a] permanent restitution order entered after the time of sentencing
shall only be challenged pursuant to section 910.7.”
The April 8 restitution order at issue in this appeal—entered after dismis-
sal and expungement of the only criminal charge in the case—necessarily was
entered “after the time of sentencing,” id., since sentencing can’t occur after a
charge has been dismissed and expunged. So we turn to Iowa Code § 910.7(5),
which states that “[a]ppellate review of a district court ruling under this section
shall be by writ of certiorari.” A writ of certiorari is thus the appropriate form of
appellate review for T.J.’s challenge to the restitution order in this case. See Pat-
terson, 984 N.W.2d at 454–55.
III.
T.J. argues that the court lacked both subject matter jurisdiction and au-
thority to impose the restitution order after the court had dismissed and ex-
punged the charge, rendering the restitution order void. The State, conversely,
argues that the court had jurisdiction because the dismissal and expungement
order by its terms did not take effect until “all monies owing ha[d] been paid in
full.” The State further argues that the court had authority because authority
may be waived, and T.J. failed to challenge the court’s authority to order resti-
tution at the hearing, thus waiving the claim.
We begin with the question of jurisdiction. The Iowa Constitution grants
courts “jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters arising in their respective dis-
tricts, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law.” Iowa Const. art. V, § 6.
The Iowa Code grants district associate judges jurisdiction in cases involving
“indictable misdemeanors, class ‘D’ felony violations, and other felony arraign-
ments.” Iowa Code § 602.6306(2). All orders entered in this matter—involving a
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misdemeanor charge—were entered by the district associate court. Lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. State v.
Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482 (Iowa 1993).
An order is void if the court lacked jurisdiction when the order was entered.
See Ronnfeldt v. Shelby Cnty. Chris A. Myrtue Mem’l Hosp., 984 N.W.2d 418, 429
(Iowa 2023). A court can lose jurisdiction over a matter in multiple ways. An
appeal, for instance, terminates a district court’s jurisdiction over the merits of
a controversy. State v. Mallett, 677 N.W.2d 775, 776 (Iowa 2004); cf. State v.
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 727 (Iowa 2002) (explaining that jurisdiction remains
after an appeal only for collateral matters between the parties that are
themselves separately appealable as final judgments). Jurisdiction of an
appellate court similarly ceases when the court issues procedendo. In re M.T.,
714 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Iowa 2006). A plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal in a civil case
ordinarily deprives the court of jurisdiction “in the sense that it eliminates a live
case or controversy for the court to exercise authority over.” Ronnfeldt, 984
N.W.2d at 424.
In general, “a district court loses jurisdiction over a matter once a final
judgment is rendered.” State v. Olsen, 794 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Iowa 2011). “Final
judgment in a criminal case means sentence.” State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141,
146 (Iowa 2003) (quoting State v. Coughlin, 200 N.W.2d 525, 526 (Iowa 1972)).
The law grants courts continuing jurisdiction to act after a sentence has com-
menced, but only in a limited number of circumstances. E.g., Iowa Code
§ 901C.2(1)(a)(1) (permitting courts on application by a defendant to expunge a
record after a not-guilty verdict or dismissal); id. § 902.4 (permitting courts to
reconsider an incarcerated felon’s sentence in limited situations); id. § 910.7(2)
(permitting courts to modify an existing plan of restitution after sentencing in
limited situations).
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In this case, our focus is not on the timing of a sentence but on the effect
of the dismissal and expungement after a deferred judgment. A deferred judg-
ment is a sentencing option where the court defers adjudicating guilt and im-
posing a sentence and instead places the defendant on probation. Id. §§ 907.1(1),
907.3(1)(a). As a condition of probation, a court may order the defendant to pay
restitution and other financial obligations in the case. Id. § 907.8(1). A defendant
who successfully completes the probation is discharged with no judgment or
sentence entered or imposed, and the court’s criminal record in the case is ex-
punged. Id. §§ 907.3(1)(c), 907.9(4)(b).
The State focuses on the language of the February 15 order, characterizing
the court’s dismissal and expungement of the criminal charge as conditional in
nature, occurring only if T.J. first paid all restitution. But parsing the key para-
graph in the order leads us to a different conclusion. The first sentence states:
“Defendant has completed all terms and conditions of the [d]eferred [j]udgment.”
This completed “all terms and conditions” language necessarily includes any
term or condition of the deferred judgment that would require payment of resti-
tution. (Emphasis added.) The second sentence states: “It is hereby ordered that
the charge(s) should now be dismissed and expunged.” (Emphasis omitted.) The
timing of the dismissal and expungement is explicit: “now.” The language does
not signal that some future, as-yet-unmet condition must still be satisfied. The
third sentence states: “All dismissed related charges shall now also be ex-
punged.” (Emphasis omitted.) This sentence addresses the expungement—not
dismissal—of any related charges that might have been dismissed already (there
were none) and again provides the timing (“now”) for their expungement.
The final sentence, which is the one the State spotlights, states:
“Defendant is hereby advised that the case will not be expunged until all monies
owing have been paid in full.” Under the State’s reading, this sentence conflicts
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with the second sentence about the timing of the expungement—“now” vs. when
“all monies owing have been paid in full”—and potentially conflicts with the first
sentence about whether “all terms and conditions of the [d]eferred [j]udgment”
have been satisfied. But the fourth sentence mentions only expungement, not
dismissal. So even if we were to find that the fourth sentence conflicted with and
prevailed over the others, only expungement is conditioned on payment.
Dismissal is unmentioned and unaffected. The order did not, in other words,
condition dismissal of the charge against T.J. on any further action by her or
anyone else. And in any event, no pecuniary damages set forth in the restitution
order entered on April 8 were “owing” under any court order on February 15, so
those damages would not delay the expungement.
True, Iowa’s restitution statute grants the district court continued juris-
diction after sentencing to modify a restitution order. Id. § 910.7(2); State v. Jose,
636 N.W.2d 38, 46 (Iowa 2001). But that power exists only to modify a previously
entered restitution plan, and only within a specified period:
At any time during the period of probation, parole, or incarceration,
the offender, the prosecuting attorney, or the office or individual who
prepared the offender’s restitution plan may petition the court on
any matter related to the plan of restitution or restitution plan of
payment and the court shall grant a hearing if on the face of the
petition it appears that a hearing is warranted.
. . . After a petition has been filed, the court, at any time prior
to the expiration of the offender’s sentence, . . . may modify the plan
of restitution or the restitution plan of payment, or both, and may
extend the period of time for the completion of restitution.
Iowa Code § 910.7(1)–(2) (emphasis added). The April 8 restitution order was not
a modification of a prior plan of restitution. What’s more, by that time nearly two
months had passed since the court declared that T.J. “has completed all terms
and conditions of the [d]eferred [j]udgment” and dismissed and expunged the
charge against her. The April 8 order was thus entered neither “during the period
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of probation” nor “prior to the expiration of [her] sentence.” Id. As a result,
§ 910.7 offers no basis for giving the court jurisdiction to enter the order under
its restitution-modification powers.
The State urges that if we find that the court could not order restitution
after it dismissed the charge, we nonetheless affirm because the court’s failure
to order restitution in a timely manner amounts to an illegal sentence. See State
v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 871 (Iowa 2009) (describing an illegal sentence to
include “claims that the sentence is outside the statutory bounds”). The alleged
illegality stems from Iowa Code § 910.2(1)(a), which states that “[i]n all criminal
cases in which” a defendant pleads guilty “the sentencing court shall order that
pecuniary damages be paid by each offender to the victims of the offender’s crim-
inal activities, and that all other restitution be paid to the clerk of court.” (Em-
phasis added.) The State argues that the court acted illegally by failing to order
restitution despite T.J.’s guilty plea.
But the burden of establishing entitlement to criminal restitution rests
with the State. See State v. Shears, 920 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Iowa 2018). The resti-
tution statute provides that “[t]he prosecuting attorney shall prepare a statement
of pecuniary damages” and “provide the statement to the presentence investiga-
tor or submit the statement to the court at the time of sentencing.” Iowa Code
§ 910.3(1). An order for restitution “must rest on a causal connection between
the established criminal act and the injuries to the victim” proved under a pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence standard. State v. Holmberg, 449 N.W.2d 376, 377
(Iowa 1989).
The State timely filed a statement of pecuniary damages on February 8, a
week before the court’s hearing to review the deferred judgment. But the State
offers no evidence and makes no claim that it objected or otherwise expressed
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its lack of consent, either in writing or orally at the hearing, to the court’s dis-
missal of the charge without first having ordered restitution for pecuniary dam-
ages. The court’s August 19, 2021 deferred judgment order stated that “[p]ecu-
niary damages to the victim(s) are unknown at this time” and that “[a] hearing
will be set to determine [the] full amount of restitution to be imposed as a con-
dition of probation.” When the court dismissed and expunged all charges on
February 15, 2022, no “permanent restitution order setting out the amount of
restitution . . . and the persons to whom restitution must be paid” had been
entered. Iowa Code § 910.3(8). On this record, we find the State’s argument that
the court acted illegally under § 910.2(1)(a) unavailing.
T.J. argues—persuasively, in our view—that a dismissal and expungement
of a criminal charge after successful completion of probation under a deferred
judgment should be treated no differently than other situations where a
defendant is discharged from probation. Iowa Code § 907.9(4)(a) states that “[a]
person who has been discharged from probation shall no longer be held to
answer for the person’s offense.” A dismissed charge after a deferred judgment,
like a completed term of probation, signals the end of a court’s power to impose
further obligations on a defendant. “There must be a time when the court’s
jurisdiction over defendant’s person by way of punishment ceases.” Smith v. Dist.
Ct., 109 N.W. 1085, 1087 (Iowa 1906). In this case, the court completely disposed
of the criminal matter before it, not by a judgment of conviction but by judgment
of dismissal of the criminal charge. If a court unconditionally dismisses all
pending charges, there’s no need for sentencing or any other action by the court
before the judgment becomes final. That finality terminates the court’s
jurisdiction in the matter. See id. (“With the satisfaction of the record in the
manner indicated by the statute the entire matter becomes a part of the
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irrevocable past, and beyond the power of the court to add to or detract
therefrom.”).
Stated simply, no statutory or constitutional provision empowers the dis-
trict court to retain jurisdiction to order restitution after dismissing and expung-
ing criminal charges. The court in this case lacked jurisdiction to enter the April
8 restitution order after it dismissed and expunged the lone charge in the trial
information and, as a result, the order is void. We thus grant the writ of certiorari
and vacate the restitution order.
WRIT OF CERTIORARI GRANTED; WRIT SUSTAINED.