In the Interest of J.G., Minor Child ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1892
Filed February 5, 2020
IN THE INTEREST OF J.G.,
Minor Child,
L.B., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Monty Franklin, District
Associate Judge.
A father appeals the juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to
his child. AFFIRMED.
Shireen L. Carter of Shireen Carter Law Office, PLC, Norwalk, for appellant
father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Jenna Lain of The Law Office of Jenna K. Lain, Corydon, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Mullins and Ahlers, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
The district court terminated a father’s parental rights to his child pursuant
to several statutory grounds. On appeal, the father “concedes that the statutory
grounds are met pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) but maintains that
termination of his parental rights is not in the child’s best interest.” See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2) (2019). He also argues the department failed to make reasonable
efforts to reunify him with the child. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa
2000).
The department of human services became involved with the family after
receiving reports of sexual abuse, physical abuse, and neglect of several children
in the mother’s home. The mother listed a man outside the home as the putative
father of the child involved in this proceeding. The department scheduled paternity
testing, which confirmed him as the biological father.
Prior to the child’s birth in 2015, the father spent six and one-half years in
prison for sexually abusing two teens. He was required to register as a sex
offender. When he was established as the father of this child, the department
caseworker asked him to provide documentation that he completed mental-health
services “to address his perpetrating behaviors.” The father did not comply with
the request. He also failed to complete a mental-health evaluation requested by
the department.
The father had no interaction with the child for the first two years of her life.
He only had two visits with her before the permanency hearing, and he left ten
minutes into the second visit. Although he completed nine visits after the
permanency hearing, the goal by this time had shifted from reunification to
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termination. Because the father was a virtual stranger to his child, we conclude
her best interests would not have been served by transferring her to his custody.
The father argues that the department is at fault for the minimal contacts
with his daughter. He notes that he asked the agency to schedule visits at a
location midway between the child’s foster home in Des Moines and his home in
Kalona, Iowa, but the department refused to accommodate him.
The father’s request was considered by the district court, which ruled,
“[U]ntil [the father] shows consistent participation in visits with [the child] the
location of the visits will be at the discretion of the department and what is
determined to be the best interests of the child.” The order was filed approximately
sixteen months before the termination hearing.
As noted, the father only belatedly attended visits on a regular basis. His
late compliance, however, did not absolve the department of its reasonable efforts
obligation. See In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 528 (Iowa 2019) (“We think the
reasonable efforts obligation runs until the juvenile court has entered a final written
order of termination.”). Even if the father “waited [to consistently visit the child]
until the goal was no longer reunification with a parent,” and even if his decision to
do so was based “on his own selfish reasons,” as the department reported, the
agency retained its reasonable-efforts obligation through the date of decision.
Once the father began to exercise visits consistently, the department was required
to reassess his request for a closer visitation site. The department’s summary
rejection of the request was not justified by his late compliance.
That said, the department continued to pursue its case permanency plan
and continued to provide services, including visits in Des Moines. See id. (“[The
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department’s] obligation to provide reasonable efforts until a final written
termination order does not necessarily require [the department] to provide
reasonable efforts toward reunification . . . . Where it is inappropriate to return a
child to the family home, the legislature specified that ‘reasonable efforts shall
include the efforts made in a timely manner to finalize a permanency plan for the
child.’” (citing Iowa Code § 232.102(10)(a))). We conclude the agency’s provision
of other services satisfied its reasonable-efforts mandate.
We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights to his child.
AFFIRMED.