In the Interest of E.T., A.T., J.T., and S.T., Minor Children ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1637
Filed March 3, 2021
IN THE INTEREST OF E.T., A.T., JT., and S.T.,
Minor Children,
T.T., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Union County, Monty Franklin,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Shireen L. Carter of Shireen Carter Law Office, PLC, Norwalk, for appellant
mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Meredith L. Lamberti, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Adam Stone, Urbandale, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
2
BOWER, Chief Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights pursuant to Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f), (k), and (l) (2020). She contends termination
of her parental rights is not in the children’s best interests, a permissive factor
exists to avoid termination, and there is insufficient evidence to support termination
under paragraphs “k” and “l.”1 Discerning no reason to reverse the juvenile court’s
ruling, we affirm.
We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re A.M.,
843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2020). We give weight to the juvenile court’s findings
of fact, especially in assessing the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound
by them. Id.Termination of parental rights under [Iowa Code] chapter 232
follows a three-step analysis. First, the court must determine if a
ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been
established. If a ground for termination is established, the court
must, secondly, apply the best-interest framework set out in section
232.116(2) to decide if the grounds for termination should result in a
termination of parental rights. Third, if the statutory best-interest
framework supports termination of parental rights, the court must
consider if any statutory exceptions set out in section 232.116(3)
should serve to preclude termination of parental rights.
In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706–07 (Iowa 2010) (internal citations omitted). “On
appeal, we may affirm the juvenile court’s termination order on any ground that we
find supported by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 707.
Grounds for termination. The mother has four children: E.T., born in 2008;
A.T., born in 2010; J.T., born in 2014; and S.T., born in 2016. This is not the first
juvenile court proceedings involving this family. E.T. and A.T. were removed from
1 The father’s parental rights were also terminated. He did not appeal.
3
their parents’ custody in 2012 due to the parents’ neglect and use of illegal
substances. The children spent three months in foster care in 2012, and an
additional nine months with their paternal grandparents in 2013. The children were
returned to the parents and the juvenile proceedings were closed. In 2017, the
family participated in voluntary services offered by the department of human
services (DHS). Then, the four children were removed from the parents’ care in
September 2018 after the mother was arrested for selling methamphetamine from
the family home.
The mother only contests termination under sections 232.116(1)(k) and (l).
Because she does not challenge termination under sections 232.116(1)(d), (e),
and (h), we need not address the first step of the three-step analysis. See In re
P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (“Because the father does not dispute the
existence of the grounds under sections 232.116(1)(d), (h), and (i), we do not have
to discuss this step.”).
Best interests of the children. The mother argues termination of her
parental rights is not in the children’s best interests because at the time of the trial,
she was compliant with DHS’s recommendations and participating in services as
requested. She also notes the children are not together and DHS had not
adequately considered her mother’s request to be considered a placement. The
mother argues it is not in the children’s best interests “to have the legal sibling
relationship terminated.” In addition, the mother notes the foster care review board
did not recommend terminating the mother’s rights.
The statutory best-interest analysis requires that we give primary
consideration to “the child[ren]’s safety, . . . the best placement for furthering the
4
long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and . . . the physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). For a
child who has been placed with a foster family, we consider whether the child has
been integrated into the foster family, and whether the foster family is able and
willing to adopt the child. Id. § 232.116(2)(b); see D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 708.
This family has been affected by the parents’ drug use and instability for too
long. At the time of trial, the children had been out of parental custody for almost
twice the statutory one-year limit. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(3) (“The child
has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least
twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and
any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.”). “Once the limitation
period lapses, termination proceedings must be viewed with a sense of urgency.”
In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000).
The mother’s efforts came six months after the December 30, 2019
permanency-review hearing and after the goal of the proceedings had been
changed from reunification to termination and adoption. We also note her efforts
come after two notices of probation violation and a scheduled probation revocation
proceeding. Her probation officer testified she intended to recommend the
mother’s probation be revoked and she serve time in prison. While we encourage
the mother to pursue her recent efforts toward substance-abuse and mental-health
treatment, such eleventh-hour efforts are not sufficient. See id. (“A parent cannot
wait until the eve of termination, after the statutory time periods for reunification
have expired, to begin to express an interest in parenting.”). We note, too, that the
5
children’s guardian ad litem recommended termination of the mother’s parental
rights.
E.T. and A.T. have been in the paternal grandparents’ custody and care
since the removal. They are comfortable and secure in that placement. J.T. and
S.T. had been placed with the paternal grandparents as well, but the grandparents
were unable to provide for the needs of all the children after a time,2 so the younger
two were moved to a foster family. Later, J.T.’s behavioral challenges required a
separate placement. S.T.’s special needs are being met in her current placement,
as are J.T.’s.3 All four children’s placements are preadoptive. The caregivers have
been amenable and cooperative with sibling visits. The children are in need of
permanency. We conclude termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the
children’s best interests.
Permissive factors to avoid termination. Section 232.116(3) provides that
“[t]he court need not terminate the relationship between the parent and child” under
certain circumstances. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a), (c) (providing permissive
factors that may weigh against termination, including a “relative has legal custody
of the child” and “termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to
the closeness of the parent-child relationship”). “‘The factors weighing against
termination in section 232.116(3) are permissive, not mandatory,’ and the court
2 S.T. is described as “globally” developmentally delayed and requires special
treatments for a number of issues; she has autism, hearing loss, visual impairment,
and remains pre-verbal. J.T. exhibits behavioral issues that require consistency
and therapy. Both E.T. and A.T. are involved in ongoing mental-health therapy.
3 The State notes that during the course of these juvenile court proceedings, the
mother has had the opportunity to attend all of the children’s medical appointments
and has not attended any of them. Nor has she consistently communicated with
the children’s physicians, therapist, teachers, or other service providers.
6
may use its discretion, ‘based on the unique circumstances of each case and the
best interests of the child, whether to apply the factors in this section to save the
parent-child relationship.’” A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113 (citations omitted). Like the
juvenile court, we are not persuaded this is such a case. We therefore affirm the
termination of the mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.