In the Interest of Z.S., Minor Child ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0004
Filed May 12, 2021
IN THE INTEREST Z.S.,
Minor Child,
J.S., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Korie Talkington,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Timothy J. Tupper of Tupper Law Firm, Davenport, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Rebecca Ruggero, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
child.
Considered by Bower, C.J., Doyle, J., and Gamble, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2021).
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GAMBLE, Senior Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, Z.S. 1
On appeal, she argues termination is not in the child’s best interest and seeks
additional time to work toward reunification. We affirm.
I. Scope and Standard of Review
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40
(Iowa 2010). “We give weight to the factual determinations of the juvenile court
but we are not bound by them. Grounds for termination must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. Our primary concern is the best interests of the child.”
In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006) (citations omitted).
We use a three-step process to review the termination of a parent’s rights.
In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). First, we determine whether a
ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been established. See id. at
472–73. If a ground for termination has been established, then we consider
“whether the best-interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2) supports the
termination of parental rights.” Id. at 473 (citation omitted). Then we consider
“whether any exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude termination of
parental rights.” Id. (quoting In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 220 (Iowa 2016)).
“However, if a parent does not challenge a step in our analysis, we need not
address it.” In re J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9,
2020). Following our three-step process, we consider any additional claims
1 The court also terminated the rights of Z.S.’s other mother. She does not appeal.
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brought by the parent. See In re T.P., No. 19-0162, 2019 WL 3317346, at *2 (Iowa
Ct. App. July 24, 2019).
II. Discussion
A. Statutory Grounds
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f), and (l) (2020). And the mother does not
challenge the statutory grounds authorizing termination. So we move to the next
step in our analysis.
B. Best Interest
The mother does challenge the juvenile court’s determination that
termination is in Z.S.’s best interest. In determining Z.S.’s best interest, we “give
primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the
long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs of the child.” See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting
Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of
permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under
section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be
able to provide a stable home for the child.” Id. at 41.
We agree with the juvenile court that Z.S.’s best interest requires
termination. We look to the past for clues of what we may expect in the future. Cf.
In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997). The past shows the mother’s
unresolved substance-abuse issues have negatively impacted Z.S. For example,
shortly after removal, when he was just five years old, Z.S.’s hair stat test was
positive for methamphetamine. Over the life of this nineteen-month-long case, the
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mother either tested positive or admitted to methamphetamine use seven times.
And as recently as October 2020, the mother admitted to daily methamphetamine
use. Her longest period of sobriety lasted just ninety days, and she has not
successfully completed a substance-abuse treatment program. The mother has
also struggled with her mental health. She is homeless and admits to breaking
into garages to get out of the elements when it is cold outside. So when looking
to the mother’s past to predict her future, we envision a future filled with substance
abuse, instability, and uncertainty, which is not conducive to caring for a child.
Z.S. deserves more stability and certainty than the mother can provide. His
therapist reports that he is “worn out from the experience of being unsure which
direction his life will be. He is tired of being a kite without a string.” It is clear from
the record that Z.S. desperately needs permanency. This can be achieved through
termination. See In re S.J., No. 20-1430, 2021 WL 811162, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Mar. 3, 2021) (“[The child] deserves stability, permanency, and predictability, which
she can only get through termination.”). Moreover, he is integrated into his foster
family; he has his own bedroom and positive relationships extending to the foster
family’s extended family. “He has expressed several times that he loves it there.”
And the foster family is interested in serving as long-term caregivers for Z.S. See
Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b).
So we conclude termination is in Z.S.’s best interest and move to our next
step.
C. Exceptions to Termination
We consider whether section 232.116(3) should be applied to preclude
termination. “[T]he parent resisting termination bears the burden to establish an
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exception to termination” under section 232.116(3). A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476.
Even if the parent proves an exception, we are not required to apply the exception.
In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014). We exercise our discretion, “based
on the unique circumstances of each case and the best interests of the child,” to
determine whether the parent-child relationship should be saved. Id. (citation
omitted).
In arguing termination is not in Z.S.’s best interest, the mother points to her
strong bond with Z.S. We interpret this as the mother attempting to invoke section
232.116(3)(c), which permits the court to preclude termination when “[t]here is
clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the
child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child bond.” But we think the
mother overstates her current bond with Z.S.
The record shows the bond between mother and child has deteriorated over
time. Z.S. has penned notes expressing his anger and sadness at his mother’s
inability to take the steps necessary for reunification. He experiences anxiety
before and after visits with the mother. And Z.S. expressed to his therapist that
“[h]e does not understand why he should give up his play time with his friends to
visit [the mother], when she is not giving anything up to get him back.” When the
mother exercises visitation with Z.S., visits are sometimes terminated because the
mother berates Z.S. until he begins to cry and has to be escorted to another room.
At times, he then states he does not want to visit with the mother anymore. This
conduct is not indicative of a strong, healthy parent-child bond. Therefore, we find
the mother’s bond with Z.S. is not so strong to preclude termination and decline to
apply this permissible exception.
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D. Additional Time
At the conclusion of her recitation of relevant facts, the mother requests
additional time to work toward reunification. The juvenile court may defer
termination for a period of six months if it is able to “enumerate the specific factors,
conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the
determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no
longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa Code
§ 232.104(2)(b). In doing so, the juvenile court essentially must “predict what the
future holds for [the mother].” See In re A.M., No. 20-1378, 2021 WL 377103, at
*3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2021).
The mother claims her progress was hindered by necessary modifications
to services and visitation due to the COVID-19 pandemic. But she claims “[s]he
has continued to make attempts at treatment and as services re-open in the post-
Covid world, [she] believes she will be able to successfully reunify.” We disagree.
As we have stated before, “Life is unpredictable. Parents must adapt to unplanned
situations and overcome unexpected challenges. We will not delay permanency
for the child[], [under these facts,] simply because of unexpected changes in
services offered to the mother.” In re E.A., No. 20-0849, 2020 WL 4498164, at *2
(Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2020). And like in E.A., this case began long before the
pandemic; Z.S. was removed from the mother’s care back in May 2019, well before
COVID-19 began to impact services. See id.Yet the mother made little progress during that time. This not a
parent whose hard work placed her on the threshold of reunification
only to be thwarted by a once-in-a-lifetime event. This is a parent
who was given ample time to gain the skills necessary for
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reunifications but simply failed to progress, pandemic or no
pandemic.
Id. So we do not grant the mother any additional time to work toward reunification.
III. Conclusion
Termination is in Z.S.’s best interest. The parent-child bond is not so strong
to preclude termination. And the mother should not be given additional time to
work toward reunification. Therefore, we affirm the termination of the mother’s
parental rights.
AFFIRMED.