Maurice Walker v. State of Iowa ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1796
Filed February 6, 2019
MAURICE WALKER,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Nancy S. Tabor,
Judge.
Maurice Walker appeals from the dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Jack E. Dusthimer, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vogel, C.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Gamble, S.J.* Tabor, J.,
takes no part.
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
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GAMBLE, Senior Judge.
Maurice Walker appeals from the dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief (PCR). We affirm.
On June 5, 2005, the county attorney filed a trial information charging
Walker with two counts of murder in the first degree, in violation of Iowa Code
sections 707.1, 707.2(1) or (2) (2005), for the killing of his ex-wife and her live-in
boyfriend. Each count charged Walker with killing the victim “with malice
aforethought either express or implied and willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation or while participating in a forcible felony, namely a burglary.” By
general verdicts, the jury convicted Walker of both counts of murder in the first
degree following a 2006 trial.
On direct appeal, Walker alleged that there was insufficient evidence to
support his convictions. Specifically, Walker argued the State had failed to rebut
his alibi defense. This court upheld his conviction and affirmed the denial of his
motion for judgment of acquittal. State v. Walker, No. 06-1005, 2007 WL 2120229,
at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 25, 2007). The supreme court denied further review and
procedendo issued on September 21, 2007.
Walker timely filed a PCR application, which was amended numerous times
and finally tried in 2016. At the trial, Walker asserted twenty-one separate grounds
of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the application and
Walker appeals.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Walker must
establish by a preponderance of evidence (1) trial counsel failed in an essential
duty and (2) that constitutionally-deficient performance resulted in prejudice, i.e.,
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that the result of the trial probably would have been different. See State v. Harris,
891 N.W.2d 182, 185-86 (Iowa 2017). We conduct a de novo review of claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 525 (Iowa
2018).
On appeal, Walker contends his trial counsel breached an essential duty in
failing to object to the court’s felony-murder instruction. Walker argues State v.
Heemstra should apply and he should be granted a new criminal trial. See 721
N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa 2006) (“We now hold that, if the act causing willful injury is
the same act that causes the victim’s death, the former is merged into the murder
and therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for felony-murder purposes. In
reaching this conclusion, we agree that we should not attribute to the legislature
an intent to ‘create[ ] an ever-expanding felony murder rule’ by characterizing every
willful injury as a forcible felony for felony-murder purposes.” (citation omitted)).
In Iowa, the legislature has specified which felonies are classified as a
“forcible felony” under the felony-murder rule in Iowa Code section 702.11(1). A
forcible felony includes burglary in the first degree. Iowa Code § 702.11(1); see
State v. Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 191-93 (Iowa 2018) (discussing continuing
viability of felony-murder rule). Heemstra is inapplicable because the predicate
felony in Walker’s case was burglary in the first degree, not willful injury.
Defendants have been unsuccessful in extending the reasoning of Heemstra
where the predicate felony was not the same act that caused the victim’s death.
See Harrison, 914 N.W.2d at 192; Goosman v. State, 764 N.W.2d 539, 545 (Iowa
2009).
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In any event, Heemstra is not applicable here because the issue was not
raised during Walker’s criminal trial. See 721 N.W.2d at 558 (concluding “[t]he rule
of law announced in this case regarding the use of willful injury as a predicate
felony for felony-murder purposes shall be applicable only to the present case and
those cases not finally resolved on direct appeal in which the issue has been raised
in the district court” (emphasis added)). The fact that Walker’s trial counsel was
an experienced criminal defense attorney and Heemstra was pending on appeal
at the time of Walker’s trial is unavailing given the fact that the Iowa Supreme Court
had not yet changed the law. Prior to Heemstra, Iowa courts adhered to the
precedent of State v. Beeman, 315 N.W.2d 770, 776-77 (Iowa 1982) (stating willful
injury could serve as the predicate felony for felony murder because willful injury
is a forcible felony). Beeman was the controlling authority at the time of trial.
Walker’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the felony-murder
instruction. See State v. Snethen, 308 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Iowa 1981) (“Counsel need
not be a crystal gazer; it is not necessary to know what the law will become in the
future to provide effective assistance of counsel.”).
We also reject the contentions of Walker’s pro se supplemental appellate
brief. See Gamble v. State, 723 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Iowa 2006). Walker asserts
the PCR court erred in finding his trial counsel was not ineffective in a number of
ways. Walker claims for the first time on appeal that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to a jury instruction on first-degree burglary where
there was no charge of burglary in the trial information. Walker did not raise this
issue in the district court. He has failed to preserve error. See Meier v. Senecaut,
641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review
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that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before
we will decide them on appeal.”). Further, while there was no separate charge of
burglary, the trial court properly submitted burglary in the first degree as the
predicate felony of felony murder.
On our de novo review of the remaining issues, we agree with the district
court’s thorough and well-reasoned findings and conclusions, as modified by its
ruling on Walker’s motion for a new PCR trial. Finding no merit to Walker’s
contentions, we affirm without further opinion. See Iowa Ct. R. 21.26(a), (b), (d),
(e).
AFFIRMED.