In the Interest of W.S., Minor Child ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0264
Filed June 16, 2021
IN THE INTEREST OF W.S.,
Minor Child,
D.S., Father,
Appellant,
R.P., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Thomas J. Straka,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their respective
parental rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Gina L. Kramer of Reynolds & Kenline, L.L.P., Dubuque, for appellant
father.
Benjamin Hamel of Iowa Legal Aid, Dubuque, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Meredith L. Lamberti, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Bridget Goldbeck, Dubuque, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Gamble, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2021).
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GAMBLE, Senior Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their respective
parental rights to their child, W.S. The parents argue termination is not in W.S.’s
best interest and request additional time to work toward reunification.
I. Scope and Standard of Review
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40
(Iowa 2010). “We give weight to the factual determinations of the juvenile court
but we are not bound by them. Grounds for termination must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. Our primary concern is the best interests of the child.”
In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006) (citations omitted).
We typically use a three-step process to review the termination of a parent’s
rights. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). First, we determine whether
a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been established. See id.at 472–73. If a ground for termination has been established, then we consider
“whether the best-interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2) supports the
termination of parental rights.” Id. at 473 (citation omitted). Then we consider
“whether any exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude termination of
parental rights.” Id. (quoting In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 220 (Iowa 2016)).
“However, if a parent does not challenge a step in our analysis, we need not
address it.” In re J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9,
2020). Following our three-step process, we consider any additional claims
brought by the parent. See In re T.P., No. 19-0162, 2019 WL 3317346, at *2 (Iowa
Ct. App. July 24, 2019).
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II. Discussion
A. Statutory Grounds
The juvenile court terminated the parents’ parental rights, pursuant to Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(h) and (l) (2021), after the parents stipulated to the
statutory grounds. Neither parent attempts to challenge the statutory grounds
authorizing termination on appeal. So we move to the next step in our analysis.
See In re Z.S., No. 21-0004, 2021 WL 1906363, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 12,
2021).
B. Best Interest
The parents challenge the juvenile court’s determination that termination of
their respective parental rights is in W.S.’s best interest.1 In considering the best
interest of W.S., we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best
placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the
physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” See P.L., 778
N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). “It is well-settled law that we
cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for
termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be
a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” Id. at 41.
1 To the extent the father attempts to challenge the best-interest determination with
respect to the mother’s parental rights, he does not have standing. See In re D.G.,
704 N.W.2d 454, 460 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (requiring parents advance their own
claims on appeal and separate from the other parent); see also In re J.P., No. 19-
1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *2 n.4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).
The mother’s own best-interest argument is couched within her argument
for additional time to work toward reunification.
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We agree with the juvenile court that W.S.’s best interest requires
termination. Both parents point to their bond with W.S. as evidence that
termination is not in W.S.’s best interest. But safety is a “defining element[]” of our
best-interest analysis. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J.,
specially concurring); see Iowa Code § 232.116(2) (noting “the court shall give
primary consideration to the child’s safety”). Both parents have a history of
methamphetamine use. “A parent’s methamphetamine use, in itself, creates a
dangerous environment for children.” J.P., 2020 WL 110425, at *2. That truth was
borne out when W.S. tested positive for methamphetamine at the beginning of this
case. And we anticipate the parents’ drug use will continue. In fact, at the
termination hearing, the father admitted to using methamphetamine a little over a
week prior. He is not in any substance-abuse treatment program to mitigate
concerns of continued use moving forward. And the mother’s two most recent
sweat patch tests were positive for methamphetamine.2 The parents’ continued
methamphetamine use creates a safety risk to W.S.
So termination of their parental rights is in W.S.’s best interest.3 We move
to our next step.
2 We note the mother denies recent methamphetamine use and claims her sweat
patch tests were positive due to methamphetamine use by others around her.
Even if this is true, it demonstrates the mother continues to interact with
methamphetamine users, which increases the likelihood of her relapse. Moreover,
the mother conceded had W.S. been in her care, W.S. likely also would have tested
positive for methamphetamine.
3 The mother also argues against termination because it would “prevent [the
mother] from having one final opportunity to establish that the child could be safely
placed with her.” To the extent she attempts to present this argument as a best-
interest argument, she misses the mark. When making a best-interest
assessment, we do not look to what would be most beneficial to the parent.
Instead, we look at whether termination would be the most beneficial option for the
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C. Exceptions to Termination
For our third step, we consider whether we should apply any of the Iowa
Code section 232.116(3) exceptions to preclude termination. Neither parent asks
us to apply an exception to termination. So we do not consider this step and
instead move on to the parents’ final claim.
D. Additional Time
Finally, the parents request additional time to work toward reunification.4
The juvenile court may defer termination for a period of six months if it is able to
“enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which
comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from
the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.”
Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). In doing so, the juvenile court essentially must “predict
what the future holds for [each parent].” See In re A.M., No. 20-1378, 2021 WL
377103, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2021).
We first address the father’s future prospects. As noted, the father
continues to abuse methamphetamine and is not involved in any substance-abuse
treatment. The father also is not in any mental-health counseling. And although
this family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS)
in part due to domestic violence, the father has missed several domestic abuse
classes. He also testified that he would live with the mother if permitted by DHS
child. Here, termination would be the most beneficial option for the child because
the parents present safety risks.
4 Again, to the extent the father attempts to advocate on behalf of the mother, he
does not have standing. See D.G., 704 N.W.2d at 460; see also J.P., 2020 WL
110425, at *2 n.4.
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and their probation officers, leaving us to anticipate future instances of the father
perpetrating domestic violence against the mother. So we cannot point to any
specific factor, condition, or expected behavioral change that would occur within
six months to obviate the need for removal and allow for reunification.
With respect to the mother’s prospects, we reach the same conclusion. The
mother has been diagnosed with “schizoaffective disorder, anxiety, and
depression.” Yet, the mother’s mental-health counseling only began about a
month before the termination hearing. As previously discussed, the mother has
also struggled with methamphetamine use. She attended inpatient treatment in
October 2020, though she had to leave due to “an altercation with a roommate.”
Since then, her two most recent sweat patch tests were positive for
methamphetamine. And, as noted, there is a history of domestic violence between
the mother and father. But the mother hasn’t received any domestic violence
counseling. Equally as concerning, the mother admitted she would live with the
father if her probation officer and DHS hadn’t objected. So when looking six
months’ into the future, we anticipate the mother will continue to struggle with
methamphetamine use and lack necessary insight into her domestically abusive
relationship with the father. In short, we do not believe the conditions requiring
removal would be eliminated in six months’ time.
So we agree with the juvenile court and do not grant additional time to either
parent.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.