Antonio Lamar Hudson v. State of Iowa ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0383
Filed June 16, 2021
ANTONIO LAMAR HUDSON,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Patrick R. Grady,
Judge.
Antonio Hudson appeals the denial of his application for postconviction
relief. AFFIRMED.
Anne K. Wilson of Viner Law Firm, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Doyle, P.J. and Mullins and May, JJ.
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MULLINS, Judge.
Antonio Hudson appeals the denial of his application for postconviction
relief (PCR). He argues the court erred in denying his claim his counsel in the
underlying criminal proceeding rendered ineffective assistance in allowing him to
plead guilty to third-degree sexual abuse, first-degree burglary, and going armed
with intent. He claims his pleas were not entered knowingly and intelligently
because “he was not fully aware of the consequences of his plea[s]” due to his
“low IQ and other disorders that would affect his decision making.”
I. Background
Hudson was criminally charged in March 2011. In May, the court ordered
that Dr. Frank Gersh conduct an evaluation of Hudson. In his ensuring report, Dr.
Gersh explained Hudson met the criteria for undifferentiated schizophrenia and
exhibited paranoid behavior. Dr. Gersh reported concerns for Hudson’s
competency to stand trial, noting “[h]e needs medical treatment of the
schizophrenia before he can present himself in court” and “instruction on
courtroom procedure, the roles of important people in the courtroom and the
important issues of the legal case against him.” Dr. Gersh recommended “further
evaluation and treatment.” The court stayed the proceedings and ordered further
evaluation and treatment.
In July, Hudson moved for a competency hearing. In response, the court
ordered him to undergo a competency evaluation. Dr. Timothy Kockler completed
a competency evaluation in November. Dr. Kockler estimated Hudson’s
“intellectual ability . . . to be in the below average to average range” and observed
his “[t]hought processes were intact and goal directed” with “no evidence of
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delusions.” Hudson’s full scale IQ score was eighty-six, which fell in the low-
average range. Dr. Kockler determined Hudson to be competent to stand trial.
A competency hearing was held in April 2012, at which Hudson withdrew
his challenge to his competency to stand trial. Ultimately, in December, Hudson
entered guilty pleas. At the plea hearing, the court discussed with Hudson the
nature of the charges and their penalties as well as the rights he would be giving
up by pleading guilty, to all of which Hudson acknowledged his understanding.
While Hudson did request some brief sidebars with his attorney, Hudson stated he
had sufficient time to discuss the matter with his counsel, and we was satisfied
with his representation. The court accepted Hudson’s guilty pleas and advised
him of his obligation to file a motion in arrest of judgment in order to challenge
them. Sentence was imposed in February 2013.
Hudson filed his PCR application in January 2015. He claimed his criminal
counsel provided ineffective assistance because Hudson “was mentally
incompetent before and after conviction.” In his pre-trial brief, Hudson argued his
pleas should be set aside due to “his low mental health, schizophrenia, the effect
of medications, and pressure and promises by defense counsel inducing him to
plead guilty.”
The matter proceeded to trial in October 2019, about a year before which
Dr. Mark Mills conducted a psychiatric assessment of Hudson. He submitted a
report shortly before trial. Based on his assessment, Dr. Mills opined, due to his
cognitive limitations, “Mr. Hudson appears to have lacked the intellectual ability to
appreciate the implications of his plea.” Dr. Mills concluded as follows:
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Overall, I believe the following: first, Mr. Hudson had a long history
of schizophrenia, repeatedly confirmed by his prison physicians and
treated with antipsychotic medication several years before he
entered his plea. Second, that Mr. Hudson has significant cognitive
limitations as revealed in his comprehensive testing with Dr. Kockler
and in his bizarre responses on his recent MMPI and his
conversation with me. Third, those cognitive limitations may reflect
the course of his schizophrenia or something preexisting (which
cannot be determined without detailed access to his school
transcripts). Finally, the combination of cognitive impairment and
significant sedation provide Mr. Hudson’s claim a credible medical
basis: he states that he could not understand what he was agreeing
to and this appears to be accurate.
However, Dr. Mills went on to acknowledge Dr. Kockler’s 2011 evaluation was
“clearly a competent assessment.” And Dr. Mills testified cognitive decline is a
routine part of schizophrenia as the years pass following diagnosis. He agreed the
cognitive limitations Hudson exhibited relative to the 2018 assessment may not
have been exhibited to Dr. Kockler in 2011. He also agreed the report following
Dr. Kockler’s testing simply suggested “some mild issues.”
Medical documentation concerning his condition when he was sent to the
medical classification center following the imposition of sentence notes Hudson
was “currently very healthy and his only current problems are schizophrenia and
asthma,” and he reported his medications for those issues “are working well for
him.” Hudson’s mother testified Hudson’s criminal attorney advised her pleading
guilty was Hudson’s best option. Hudson testified to the same, adding his attorney
advised him he would out of prison within five years if he pled guilty, but he would
serve eighty-eight years if he went to trial. Hudson’s criminal attorney testified
Hudson initially expressed concerns about his competency, counsel pursued the
issue, but it turned out to be a non-issue. Counsel testified he never advised
Hudson he would only serve only five more years if he pled guilty. He stated, “I
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never would have stated a specific expectation . . . because, quite frankly, outside
of the correctional system I don’t think anyone can give an accurate estimation of
how long people are going to serve.” Counsel had no concerns regarding
Hudson’s understanding of the charges or proceedings.
Following trial, the district court concluded, among other things, Hudson
failed to establish he would have been found incompetent if his attorney pursued
the issue further. The court therefore denied Hudson’s ineffective-assistance claim
and dismissed his PCR application. Hudson appeals.
II. Standard of Review
Appellate review of PCR proceedings is typically for correction of errors at
law, but where claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are forwarded, our
review is de novo. See Diaz v. State, 896 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Iowa 2017). Because
Hudson’s claim concerns the effectiveness of trial counsel, he must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) his counsel failed to perform an essential
duty and (2) prejudice resulted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984); State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Iowa 2018). We “may consider
either the prejudice prong or breach of duty first, and failure to find either one will
preclude relief.” State v. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State
v. Lopez, 872 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2015)).
III. Analysis
Hudson argues counsel was ineffective in allowing him to plead guilty,
claiming his pleas were not entered knowingly and intelligently because “he was
not fully aware of the consequences of his plea[s].” Hudson first asserts the fact
that he had off-the-record discussions with his counsel at the plea hearing
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indicates he was not aware of the consequences of his plea. But our review of the
record discloses the purpose of those discussions was for counsel to clear up
questions Hudson had, and those discussions served their purpose. Hudson next
argues his plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently because of his “low IQ
and other disorders that would affect his decision making”; he claims he was
mentally incompetent, so his plea could not be knowing and intelligent.
The mere presence of mental illness does not equate to incompetency.
Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 270 (Iowa 1991). The claim that Hudson was
mentally incompetent at the time of his plea is directly contradicted by the record
of the plea proceeding. When such is the case, “the applicant bears a special
burden that the record is inadequate.” Arnold v. State, 540 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Iowa
1995). Upon our de novo review, we conclude Hudson did not meet this burden.
First, we find Dr. Kockler’s opinion as to Hudson’s functioning more reliable than
Dr. Mills’s opinion, especially so in light of the fact that Dr. Mills’s assessment was
completed several years after the plea was entered, his testimony that cognitive
decline is a routine part of schizophrenia as the years pass following diagnosis,
and his agreement the cognitive limitations Hudson exhibited relative to the 2018
assessment may not have been exhibited to Dr. Kockler in 2011. At the plea
hearing, Hudson did not exhibit any irrational behavior or demeanor that suggested
a competency problem, and the court and parties had received a medical opinion
that Hudson was competent. Cf. Jones, 479 N.W.2d at 265 (discussing factors on
the issue of competency to stand trial). So we agree with the district court that
counsel performed effectively and no prejudice resulted.
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We affirm the denial of Hudson’s PCR application.
AFFIRMED.