Raymond Sullins v. Iowa District Court for Polk County, and City of Des Moines and Safari II, L.L.C., Intervening ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0958
Filed November 8, 2017
RAYMOND SULLINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY,
Defendant,
and
CITY OF DES MOINES AND SAFARI II, L.L.C.,
Intervening Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joel D. Novak, Judge.
A former tenant appeals the district court’s denial of his certiorari petitions.
AFFIRMED.
Raymond W. Sullins, West Des Moines, pro se appellant.
Luke M. DeSmet, Assistant City Attorney, for intervening defendant-
appellee City of Des Moines.
David J. Hellstern of Sullivan & Ward, P.C., West Des Moines, for
intervening defendant-appellee Safari II, L.L.C.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., McDonald, J., and Scott, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2017).
2
SCOTT, Senior Judge.
Raymond Sullins appeals the district court’s denial of his certiorari
petitions, which challenged the legality of two small claims actions. He raises a
number of claims on appeal. Because we conclude the district court correctly
determined it had no jurisdiction to review the petitions for writ of certiorari
involving the district associate court, res judicata prevents Sullins from raising his
claims against the small claims courts, and the district court property denied
Sullins’s motion for a new trial, we affirm the decision of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Sullins rented a commercial space from Safari II, L.L.C., for his wood
pallet business. Safari brought a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action against
Sullins in small claims court after the City of Des Moines cited Safari, as the
property owner, for violation of the city zoning code. In the citation, the City
alleged the storage of the wood pallets on the property did not conform to the
zoning ordinance in effect for the property.1 The FED petition alleged Sullins
violated the terms of the lease agreement with Safari by being in violation of the
city ordinance. After a hearing on the FED petition on September 8, 2015, the
FED court filed a written ruling that stated: “After careful review of the lease, this
court finds that defendants[2] have violated numerous terms of the lease[;]
therefore[,] defendants shall be removed from the property.”
1
The City’s zoning violation proceeding was brought in a separate small claims action
apart from the FED proceeding against Sullins.
2
Sullins held the lease along with this son, Matthew Sulllins, who was a party to the FED
action, but Matthew is not a party to this certiorari action.
3
The ordinance violation proceeding between Safari and the City was
continued pending the resolution of the FED proceeding. On September 22,
2015, Sullins filed a petition to intervene in the ordinance violation proceeding,
asserting he was the “real party in interest as a party in possession pursuant to a
multi-year lease of the real estate premises that are the subject of this action.”
The City resisted the motion to intervene, and the court issued an order denying
the motion without a hearing on September 25, 2015. Three days later, Sullins
filed a second petition to intervene in the ordinance violation proceeding. The
following day, the court ruled the “matter had been previously ruled upon.”3
Sullins appealed both the FED decision and the denial of his petition to
intervene in the zoning ordinance proceeding to the district associate court,
which denied both appeals. In the ordinance violation appeal, the district
associate court found the interests of Safari and Sullins were the same, so Safari
could adequately protect the interests of Sullins. The court also noted, “No facts
were presented to show that Sullins did not violate the municipal ordinance.” In
the FED appeal, the district associate court ruled, “Reasonable evidence was
presented [at the FED hearing] to establish that there were violations of the
Municipal Code.” Because a violation of the municipal code is a violation of the
lease agreement, it concluded the FED court’s ruling was “legally sufficient.” The
district associate court concluded there was “a sound factual basis for the
Magistrate’s determination that [Sullins] violated the requirements of the lease
and that the FED was properly granted.”
3
On the day set for hearing on the ordinance violation proceeding, Safari and the City
filed a stipulation wherein Safari agreed the property was in violation of the zoning
ordinance and agreed to pay a $375 civil penalty and court costs.
4
Sullins sought discretionary review of the district associate court’s denial
of his appeal from the FED proceeding. The supreme court denied discretionary
review in November 2015. There is no indication in this record that Sullins
sought discretionary review of the district associate court’s denial of his appeal
from the ordinance violation proceeding.
Next, Sullins filed certiorari petitions in the district court, challenging the
small claims courts’ rulings in the FED proceeding and the zoning ordinance
proceeding and also challenging the district associate court’s appeal decisions in
both of those cases. Safari defended the small claims court decisions and
district associate court decisions, and the district court permitted the City to
intervene. All matters were consolidated by the district court, and at the hearing
on the petitions, the district court permitted Sullins’s motion to amend his
petitions to include an allegation that the decisions of the lower courts should be
vacated based on irregularities. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1012(2).
The district court issued a written ruling that denied Sullins’s claims. The
district court noted it had no jurisdiction over certiorari petitions filed in reference
to district associate court decisions; those must be filed in the supreme court.
See Iowa R. App. P. 6.107. It also rejected Sullins’s claims that the district
associate court decisions should be vacated based on an irregularity.
With respect to the denial of Sullins’s motion to intervene in the zoning
ordinance violation proceeding, the district court ruled that while the case law
cited by the small claims court and the district associate court was procedurally
and factually different from Sullins’s case, the small claims court correctly denied
Sullins’s intervention petition. The district court determined the denial of
5
intervention was justified because Sullins’s interest in avoiding the city ordinance
violation was adequately represented by Safari. The district court noted Sullins
may have been entitled to intervention under the permissive intervention rules,
but the small claims court is accorded discretion when ruling on a permissive
intervention under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.407(2). Therefore, the district
court found no irregularity or illegality in the denial of Sullins’s petition to
intervene.
As to the FED action, the district court concluded the FED court did not act
illegally because it could and did independently find Sullins violated the lease.
The district court noted the FED court’s decision was “brief” but found it was
supported by substantial evidence entered at the hearing on the FED petition.
Sullins responded to the district court’s ruling by filing a motion for a new
trial. The court treated the motion as both a motion for a new trial and a motion
to enlarge and reconsider, and it largely denied the claims raised. Sullins now
appeals the district court’s denial of his certiorari petitions. Both Safari and the
City filed briefs supporting the decision of the district court.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
“A writ of certiorari lies where a lower board, tribunal, or court has
exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise has acted illegally. Illegality exists when
the court’s findings lack substantial evidentiary support, or when the court has
not properly applied the law.” State Pub. Def. v Iowa Dist. Ct., 886 N.W.2d 595,
598 (Iowa 2016) (citations omitted). Therefore, our review of the district court’s
ruling in a writ of certiorari case is for the correction of errors at law. Id.
6
We review the district court’s denial of a petition to vacate under rule
1.1012(2) for the correction of errors at law. In re Marriage of Heneman, 396
N.W.2d 797, 799 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). “The trial court has considerable
discretion in deciding whether to vacate a judgment.” Id. “[T]he trial court’s
findings of fact have the effect of a jury verdict, and those findings are binding
upon us if there is substantial evidence to support them.” Id. at 799–800.
III. Analysis.
Sullins makes a number of claims on appeal asserting in both small claims
proceedings the courts acted illegally and irregularly, the district associate court
acted illegally and irregularly in ruling on the appeals from the small claims court,
and the district court breached its independent duty “to deal with issues under the
Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct.”
A. Challenges to the District Associate Court’s Decisions.
As an initial matter, we agree with the district court that the petitions for
writ of certiorari challenging the district associate court’s appeal decisions
relating to the small claims proceedings were not properly before the district
court. Jurisdiction over writs of certiorari challenging district associate court
decisions lies in the supreme court, not the district court. See Iowa R. App. P.
6.107(1)(a) (“Any party claiming a district court judge, an associate district court
judge, an associate juvenile judge, or an associate probate judge exceeded the
judge’s jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally may commence an original
certiorari action in the supreme court by filing a petition for writ of certiorari as
provided in these rules.”). Therefore, we conclude any challenge to the illegality
7
of the district associate court’s decision was properly denied by the district court,
and we will not further address Sullins’s challenges to those decisions.
Sullins further alleges that for a multitude of reasons the district
associate’s decisions were “irregular” under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure
1.1012(2) and those decisions should be vacated. For a court decision to be
vacated on the grounds that it is “irregular,” Sullins must show he suffered an
adverse ruling “because of some action or inaction on the part of the court or
some court personnel” and that action or inaction was “contrary to some
prescribed rule, mode of procedure, or court practice involving the conduct of a
lawsuit.” See Costello v. McFadden, 553 N.W.2d 607, 612 (Iowa 1996). In
addition, Sullins “must not have caused, been a party to, or had prior knowledge
of the breach of the rule, the mode of procedure, or the practice of the court.”
See id. Except with respect to Sullins’s claim that the district associate court
failed to follow proper procedure when faced with Sullins’s recusal motion, none
of Sullins’s claims against the district associate court allege the court or court
personnel took action or failed to take action in contravention to a “prescribed
rule, mode of procedure, or court practice involving the conduct of a lawsuit.”
See id. Thus, the district court was correct to deny Sullins’s claims of irregularity.
The district court was also correct to deny Sullins’s claim that the district
associate court’s decision must be vacated based on the failure of the district
associate judge to follow proper procedure in addressing Sullins’s many recusal
motions. The court stated:
[T]here were no grounds for recusal that would demonstrate [the
district associate judge] erred in denying Sullins’[s] recusal motion.
Sullins’[s] criticism of [the district associate judge’s] interpretation of
8
the controlling law does not warrant recusal. [The district associate
judge] found no reason to recuse himself and such a decision is
entrusted to his judgment. The record indicates no reasons
warranting [the district associate judge’s] recusal.
We agree with the district court’s evaluation of Sullins’s claim and find no error at
law.
B. Challenges to the FED and Ordinance Violation Proceedings.
Next, Sullins claims the district court erred in rejecting his petitions for writ
of certiorari and petitions to vacate based on claims of illegality and irregularity
with respect to the small claims FED and ordinance violation proceedings.
However, we conclude the district court correctly denied Sullins’s petitions
because all the claims raised by Sullins were previously raised before the district
associate court in the appeals from the small claims proceedings and are now
barred by res judicata. See Bennett v. MC No. 619, Inc., 586 N.W.2d 512, 516
(Iowa 1998) (“Res judicata is a generic term that includes claim preclusion and
issue preclusion.”).
The claims that the district associate court specifically addressed in its
appeal decision are barred by issue preclusion.4 See Hunter v. City of Des
Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1981) (noting the four prerequisites to issue
preclusions are “(1) the issue concluded must be identical; (2) the issue must
have been raised and litigated in the prior action; (3) the issue must have been
material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action; and (4) the
4
In its appellate brief, the City acknowledges that the district court did not dismiss
Sullins’s claims based on the doctrine of issue preclusion, but it notes that the defense of
issue preclusion was raised before the district court, and as such, we may rely on that
defense on appeal. See Johnston Equip. Corp. of Iowa v. Indus. Indem., 489 N.W.2d
13, 17 (Iowa 1992) (“Our cases are legion which hold that a trial court may be affirmed
on grounds upon which it does not rely.”).
9
determination made of the issue in the prior action must have been necessary
and essential to the resulting judgment”). In his petitions for writ of certiorari from
the small claims decisions, Sullins raised issues identical to the ones made in his
appeal to the district associate court, and the district associate court specifically
ruled on the those issues in denying his appeal. Sullins cannot raise the issues
again hoping for a different result.
The claims that Sullins raised in the appeal to the district associate court
that were not specifically addressed by the court in its ruling are barred by claim
preclusion.5 Pavone v. Kirke, 807 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Iowa 2011) (noting the
doctrine of claim preclusion holds “a valid and final judgment on a claim bars a
second action on the adjudicated claim or any part thereof” and “claim preclusion
will apply ‘not only to matters actually determined in an earlier action but to all
relevant matters that could have been determined’” (citation omitted)). The
elements of claim preclusion in this case have been met—“(1) the parties in the
first and second action are the same,” “(2) there was a final judgment on the
merits in the first action,” and “(3) the claim in the second suit could have been
fully and fairly adjudicated in the prior case.” Id. at 836.
The parties have been the same in each of the filings: Sullins, Safari, and
the City. The appeal decision issued by district associate court was the final
adjudication of the small claims proceedings. While the district associate court
5
While our supreme court left unanswered the question of whether a court can raise
claim preclusion sua sponte, see In re Marriage of Ginsberg, 750 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Iowa
2008), we are persuaded such action is permitted, and in this case necessary. Doing so
allows the appellate court to “protect itself from litigation by a party who has already had
his right finally determined in the district court,” and allows us to give due respect to “the
considered judgments of the district court arrived at after a fair hearing and upon due
consideration.” Bechtold v. City of Rosemount, 104 F.3d 1062, 1068 (8th Cir. 1997).
10
did not specifically rule on some of the claims Sullins raised, Sullins did not file a
posttrial motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(4), asking the district
associate court to decide those claims. Instead, in the FED proceeding Sullins
filed a petition for discretionary review with the supreme court, which was denied.
That action taken by the supreme court made the small claims FED proceeding
final. In the ordinance violation proceeding, it does not appear Sullins filed a
posttrial motion or a petition for discretionary review, and the time for doing so
has long since passed, so the district associate court’s decision is the final ruling
on that matter as well.
In the district associate court appeal, Sullins had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate his claims of error surrounding the small claims proceedings. Sullins
not only had the opportunity to litigate the claims but also did in fact raise the
same claims he asserts now in the appeal from his petitions for writ of certiorari.
The remedy he seeks in this appeal is the same remedy he sought in the appeal
action in front of the district associate court—the reversal of the small claims
rulings to allow him to remain in the rental property and permit him the
opportunity to prove he was not in violation of the city ordinance.
[A] party must try all issues growing out of the claim at one time and
not in separate actions. An adjudication in a prior action between
the same parties on the same claim is final as to all issues that
could have been presented to the court for determination. Simply
put, a party is not entitled to a “second bite” simply by alleging a
new theory of recovery for the same wrong.
Id. (citation omitted). Sullins should not now get a second bite at the apple
through a petition for writ of certiorari to obtain a ruling on claims previously
raised before the district associate court in the appeal from the small claims
11
proceedings. See id. (“A second claim is likely to be barred by claim preclusion
where the ‘acts complained of, and the recovery demanded are the same or
where the same evidence will support both actions.’” (citation omitted)).
We thus conclude the claims Sullins raises on appeal attacking the small
claims proceedings are barred by both issue preclusion and claim preclusion.
C. Challenges to the District Court’s Writ of Certiorari Proceeding.
Finally, Sullins also raises challenges to the district court’s decision
denying his motion for a new trial. He claims the district court committed error
and proceeded in an irregular manner by “breaching [its] sua sponte and
independent duty to deal with issues under the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct.”
In addressing this claim in the motion for a new trial, the district court held:
The court conducted numerous hearings on the writ petitions and
the procedural matters surrounding the petitions. The parties
submitted written briefs, replies, and motions. The record
contained the parties’ filings along with transcripts of the hearings
before the magistrates and on appeal. The court applied the law,
read the record, and considered the parties arguments without
irregularity. If an irregularity did occur, though none have been
specifically alleged, the irregularity did not prevent Sullins from
obtaining a fair trial.
The court also again found that the FED small claims court did not exceed its
proper jurisdiction or otherwise act illegally. Therefore, there was no reason for
the district court to find the magistrate in the small claims proceeding violated the
judicial code of conduct. We find no error at law or abuse of discretion in the
district court denial of Sullins’s motion for a new trial. See Channon v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 859 (Iowa 2001) (“The scope of our review of
a district court’s ruling on a motion for new trial depends on the grounds raised in
the motion. ‘To the extent the motion is based on a discretionary ground, we
12
review it for an abuse of discretion. But if the motion is based on a legal
question, our review is on error.’” (citations omitted)).
We affirm the district court’s decision.
AFFIRMED.