In re the Marriage of Shipp ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1703
Filed February 16, 2022
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF CORINA JEAN SHIPP
AND REGINALD STEVEN SHIPP
Upon the Petition of
CORINA JEAN SHIPP,
Petitioner-Appellant,
And Concerning
REGINALD STEVEN SHIPP,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Mark Kruse,
Judge.
Corina Shipp appeals the physical care provisions of a dissolution decree.
AFFIRMED.
Andrew B. Howie and James R. Hinchliff of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud
& Weese, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant.
Reginald Steven Shipp, Iowa City, self-represented appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and May, JJ.
2
MAY, Judge.
Corina and Reginald (“Reggie”) Shipp have one daughter, C.L.S., who was
born in 2013. In 2019, Corina commenced this dissolution action. Corina and
Reggie represented themselves at trial. The district court granted joint legal
custody but placed C.L.S. in Reggie’s physical care. On appeal, Corina asks us
to switch physical care to her.1 We affirm.
In dissolution proceedings, our review is de novo. In re Marriage of
McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013). But we give weight to the fact
findings of the trial court, who is “greatly helped in making a wise decision about
the parties by listening to them and watching them in person.” In re Marriage of
Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1984) (citation omitted). We will affirm unless
the district court “failed to do substantial equity.” See Boatwright v. Lydolph, No.
18-0532, 2019 WL 719026, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2019) (citation omitted).
Neither party requests joint physical care and, in any event, we agree with
the district court that joint care would not be in the child’s best interest. See Iowa
Code § 598.41(5)(a) (2019). So our task is to determine which physical care
placement—with Reggie or with Corina—is in C.L.S.’s “best interest.” Id.§ 598.41(3). In making this decision, we consider a broad range of factors. Id.
(setting forth relevant factors); In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166-67
1 In her reply brief, Corina asks us to disregard Reggie’s appellate brief for not
complying with the Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure. We expect both
represented and non-represented litigants to adhere to our procedural rules. In re
Estate of DeTar, 572 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). We agree with Corina
that Reggie’s brief does not approach substantial compliance with the rules. For
instance, although Reggie makes numerous factual assertions, he fails to cite to
the record in violation of Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure 6.903(3) and 6.904(4).
So we grant Corina’s request and do not consider Reggie’s brief.
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(Iowa 1974) (discussing same). Our goal “is to place the child[] in the environment
most likely to bring them to health, both physically and mentally, and to social
maturity.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683,695 (Iowa 2007). We pursue
“stability and continuity with an eye toward providing the child[] with the best
environment possible for their continued development and growth.” Id. at 700. But
of course the child’s safety comes first. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Oswalt-Weiler,
No. 18-1899, 2019 WL 3317345, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 24, 2019) (“We agree
with the district court that requiring professional supervision at all visitations is an
appropriate remedy. It will enhance the children’s safety and, therefore, advance
their best interests.”).
Following our de novo review, with appropriate deference to the district
judge who has seen and heard the parties in person, we conclude placement with
Reggie is in C.L.S.’s best interest. Like the district court, we think either parent
could be a capable caregiver under the right circumstances. As the district court
found, both are “well-educated, intelligent, and well-spoken.” Both “hold positions
of significant responsibility” in education that “require positive interactions with
people of different backgrounds and ages, in particular, young people.” “Both are
able to meet the daily needs of their daughter.” And both parents “treasure their
daughter.”
At the same time, there are reasons for concern about each parent. They
have engaged in domestic violence with each other. Like the district court, we
think they share blame for this. Also, both parties have used terrible language
toward one another.
4
In many ways, then, the parents seem like equivalent candidates to serve
as C.L.S’s physical caregiver. But two considerations distinguish them. The first
is which parent has historically been C.L.S.’s main caregiver. While Reggie has
provided some of the child’s basic care, Corina has provided most of it. And since
the separation, Reggie has missed many visitations without a clear excuse.
Further, although C.L.S. has historically attended school in Burlington where
Corina lives, Reggie has now moved to Iowa City. So placing C.L.S. with Reggie
requires a change in schools. All things considered, then, we agree with Corina
that the historical caregiving arrangement points towards placing physical care with
her.2 And as the district court properly acknowledged, this factor is important when
determining which parent should have physical care. See Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at
700 (noting “the factors of continuity, stability, and approximation are entitled to
considerable weight” when deciding “which caregiver should be awarded physical
care”).
But other important concerns weigh against placement with Corina. Cf. id.
at 697 (noting “[t]here may be circumstances, of course, that outweigh
considerations of stability, continuity, and approximation” when determining
whether joint physical care is appropriate). Like the district court, we are
particularly concerned with Corina’s relationship with a person who goes by the
street name “D.” The record shows that D plays a significant role in an organization
2We also note that when C.L.S. spends time with Corina, she can also spend time
with Corina’s son, C.L.S.’s half-brother. See In re Marriage of Orte, 389 N.W.2d
373, 374 (Iowa 1986).
5
that traffics large quantities of narcotics and employs lethal violence.3 By way of
example, the record shows that D’s brother, who is also involved in the
organization, confessed to a 2019 murder. The victim suffered six bullet wounds,
two in the back of the head. The murder occurred at a residence where law
enforcement agents recovered “approximately 11 pounds of methamphetamine”
plus “indicia or paperwork with [D’s] name on it.” D’s brother called D immediately
after the killing. Corina was with D when he received the call. Corina has been
called as a prosecution witness to testify about the phone call.
In her appellate brief, though, Corina minimizes her relationship with D and
claims it has no relevance to the physical-care issue. Yet, Corina has
acknowledged that—prior to his incarceration—D spent the night at her home
“most nights.” And, Corina testified, D “was a father figure for” her children.
According to Corina, her children “adore him, respect him. He made [Corina and
her children] smile again.” Corina also testified that C.L.S. “wished” that D was
“her dad.”
Even so, Corina suggests, she and her children are separated from D’s
criminal activities. For instance, she testified that, “even though [D] did commit
that crime of trafficking drugs,” she “never saw drugs” and there “weren’t drugs
3 We have relied, in part, on a transcript from a federal criminal proceeding. At the
trial in this dissolution case, the transcript was admitted without objection. Even
so, we have considered Corina’s point—which she raises for the first time on
appeal—that the transcript includes layers of hearsay. All things considered, we
believe the transcript is sufficiently reliable to serve as support for the findings
contained in this opinion. “When evidence is received without objection, it
becomes part of the evidence in the case, and is usable as proof to the extent of
its rational persuasive power.” In re Marriage of Schneckloth, 320 N.W.2d 535,
538 (Iowa 1982).
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around [her] children.” But sometimes D’s criminal activities directly impacted
Corina’s home. In November 2019, law enforcement agents executed a search
warrant at a location they believed to be D’s residence. Agents did not find D—
but they did find D’s mother. She told officers that D “was likely at his girlfriend
Corina Shipp’s residence.” Based on their prior investigations of D, agents knew
where Corina lived. Officers went to Corina’s home and “set up around the
residence.” Agents “were present at” Corina’s “residence for multiple hours trying
to negotiate” D’s surrender. Eventually, agents “utilized tactical deployments to
clear” Corina’s residence. They found a backdoor open—and concluded D had
escaped before their entry.
But three days later, D surrendered to authorities. And now it appears D
will serve between five and forty years on federal charges. So, Corina suggests,
her relationship with D is just a “past relationship.” But in her trial testimony, Corina
said her “place in [D’s] life right now is just to be a support for him.” When asked
if she “currently right now” visited D “in prison,” she responded “yes” but clarified
she actually visited D in Muscatine jail. When asked how often she went, she said
“once or twice a week,” “sometimes less,” although she claimed she hadn’t “been
for a month or so.” When asked how much money she puts on his books, 4 she
claimed she hadn’t put her own money on his books; rather, she claimed, she had
“only put money his mom’s given [her] to take up there.” In any event, Corina
4 “Putting money” on an inmate’s “books” means depositing money in an account
so the inmate can purchase commissary items or make phone calls while
incarcerated.
7
admitted taking C.L.S. to the Muscatine County jail when she put money on D’s
books. But C.L.S. couldn’t actually visit D. Rather, C.L.S. waited in the lobby.
Like the district court, we think these facts are deeply disturbing. They raise
real worries about Corina’s judgment. And they raise troubling questions about
the safety of Corina’s home. So, like the district court, we conclude C.L.S. should
not be placed in Corina’s care.
As already explained, we have not overlooked the substantial advantages
of Corina’s home, including her historical role as caregiver, her proximity to
C.L.S.’s historical school, and the opportunity for C.L.S. to live with her half-sibling.
With a different record, these advantages might well have led us to place C.L.S.
with Corina. As explained, though, in light of the disturbing record evidence
concerning D and his associates (not nearly all of which is repeated in this opinion),
as well as Corina’s continued relationship with D and his associates (e.g., putting
D’s mother’s money on D’s books), we cannot conclude that placement with Corina
is in C.L.S.’s best interest.
AFFIRMED.