State of Iowa v. Joel Enrique Herrarte Jr. ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1394
Filed September 12, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOEL ENRIQUE HERRARTE JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Shawn R. Showers,
Judge.
The defendant appeals his convictions and sentences for kidnapping in the
third degree, assault while participating in a felony, and willful injury causing bodily
injury. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kelli A. Huser, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
Joel Herrarte Jr. was originally charged by trial information with kidnapping
in the second degree (count I), assault while participating in a felony (count II), and
willful injury causing bodily injury (count III). After a trial to the bench, the court
found Herrarte guilty of counts II and III. The court acquitted Herrarte of second-
degree kidnapping but found Herrarte guilty of the “lesser-included” offense of
third-degree kidnapping. Herrarte was sentenced to a ten-year sentence for
kidnapping in the third degree, a five-year sentence for count II, and a five-year
sentence for count III. The court ordered Herrarte to serve the three sentences
consecutively. He appeals.
I. Kidnapping Conviction.
Herrarte maintains the district court erred in its determination that third-
degree kidnapping is a lesser-included offense of second-degree kidnapping. He
asserts that we must vacate his conviction for third-degree kidnapping because of
the error.
Herrarte did not preserve error on this issue. He did not object to the court’s
reliance on kidnapping in the third degree as a lesser-included offense. See State
v. Taggart, 430 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Iowa 1988) (“Failure to timely object to an
instruction not only waives the right to assert error on appeal, but also ‘the
instruction, right or wrong, becomes the law of the case.’” (citation omitted)). And
in fact, he argued in his closing argument, “If the arguments advanced by the State
and the defendant both have merit then clearly reasonable doubt does exist and
the defendant should only be found guilty of the lesser included offense of
kidnapping in the third degree.” (altered for readability). See State v. Sage, 162
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N.W.2d 502, 504 (Iowa 1968) (“A party to a criminal proceeding cannot assume
inconsistent positions in the trial and appellate courts and, as a general rule, will
not be permitted to allege an error in which he himself acquiesced, or which was
committed or invited by him.” (citation omitted)).
However, Herrarte can and does raise the claim under the ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel framework, as such “claims are not bound by traditional
error-preservation rules.” See State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa
2006). Rather, they “are an exception to normal error-preservation rules and the
‘law of the case’ doctrine.” Id.To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, Herrarte has the burden to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) his trial counsel failed to
perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Id. His claim fails if he is
unable to prove either element. Id.The State is adamant Herrarte’s counsel made a strategic decision to urge
the court to that kidnapping in the third degree (based on the intent to seriously
injure the victim) was a lesser-included crime of kidnapping in the second degree
(based on the intent to hold the victim for ransom). Compare Iowa Code
§§ 710.1(3), 710.4 (2016), with Iowa Code § 710.3(1). The State asserts it was a
reasonable tactical decision not to seek outright acquittal on the kidnapping charge
when the kidnapping evidence was so strong. It is possible counsel made a
strategic choice to pursue an incorrect legal argument regarding the lesser-
included offense, but “we cannot automatically assume every alleged misstep was
a reasonable strategy simply because some lawyer, somewhere, somehow, under
some circumstances at some time would have done such a thing.” Ondayog, 722
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N.W.2d at 786. Based on the record before us, we cannot ascertain what
motivated counsel’s argument.
When the record leaves a question as to whether an action—or inaction—
by counsel was a matter of strategy, we preserve the claim for possible
postconviction relief. See State v. Thorndike, 860 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Iowa 2015)
(“We prefer to reserve such questions for postconviction proceedings so the
defendant’s trial counsel can defend against the charge.” (citation omitted)). Thus,
we preserve Herrarte’s claim for possible postconviction-relief proceedings. See
State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Iowa 2010) (“If . . . the court determines
the claim cannot be addressed on appeal, the court must preserve it for a
postconviction-relief proceeding, regardless of the court’s view of the potential
viability of the claim.”).
II. Sentencing.
Herrarte maintains the trial court abused its discretion during sentencing;
he claims the court considered an improper factor when deciding his sentence,
namely his acquittal for kidnapping in the second degree.
We review the sentence imposed for correction of errors at law. State v.
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “We will not reverse the decision of
the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing
procedure.” Id. “If a district court improperly considers unprosecuted and
unproven additional charges, we will remand the case for resentencing.” Id. at
725.
Here, the district court stated:
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Mr. Herrarte, I’ve considered all the sentencing options
provided for in Chapters 901 and 907 of the Iowa Code, and my
judgment relative to sentence is based on what would provide
maximum opportunity for your rehabilitation and at the same time
protect the community from further offenses by you and others.
In trying to decide what’s the best sentence for you, Mr.
Herrarte, I’ve considered your prior criminal record, the nature of the
offense committed, the contents in the presentence investigation, the
victim impact statement, and generally, I’m trying to figure out—your
attorney talks about the life that you were involved in prior to being
arrested on this charge, and what I would like to do is try to impress
on you that what you did and the life you were living, there’s no future
in it. And what happened to [A.W.], in spite of her character flaws
and her being involved in this lifestyle as well, is not an excuse. She
was held against her will, beaten badly, and treated less than human,
and the court has to consider that when deciding what sentence to
give you.
The good news for you is you avoided being convicted of a
more serious kidnapping charge, so you’ll be getting out and paroling
significantly sooner than you could have been had you been
convicted as charged by the State, but I am going to sentence you
to all these counts consecutive based on the separate nature of each
offense and based on the harm to the victim, and I think it’s going to
be best for your rehabilitation when you get out to recognize the
seriousness of what you did. You’re a smart guy, and you have a
high ability to be rehabilitated, and my hope is that this is the
beginning of a new life for you. But you also have to make amends
for what you did to [A.W.].
The court then sentenced Herrarte to a total term of incarceration of twenty years.
We acknowledge the court mentioned the charge Herrarte was acquitted of
and the sentence he could have received if he was convicted as charged, but the
court did not impose a harsher sentence because of the acquittal. Mere mention
of the charge in this context is not enough to overcome the presumption in the
sentence’s favor. See State v. Jose, 636 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Iowa 2001) (“To
overcome the presumption, a defendant must affirmatively show that the district
court relied on improper evidence such an unproven offenses.”). Especially here,
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where the court was the factfinder in the trial and was responsible for acquitting
Herrarte of the greater offense.
Because the district court did not rely on an improper factor when
sentencing Herrarte, we affirm his sentences.
III. Conclusion.
Herrarte failed to preserve error regarding whether third-degree kidnapping
is a lesser-included offense of kidnapping in the second degree, and we do not
consider it. The record is not adequate to decide his alternative argument, raised
under the ineffective-assistance framework, so we preserve it to allow for further
development of the record in postconviction-relief proceedings. Because the
district court did not rely on an improper factor during sentencing, we affirm
Herrarte’s sentences.
AFFIRMED.