State of Iowa v. Dean David Geary ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1163
Filed May 15, 2019
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DEAN DAVID GEARY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Patrice
Eichman, District Associate Judge.
Dean Geary appeals from judgment and sentence entered upon his plea of
guilty to assault causing bodily injury or mental illness. SENTENCE VACATED
AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
Jonathon Muñoz of Nidey, Erdahl, Fisher, Pilkington & Meier PLC, Cedar
Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, C.J., Bower, J., and Gamble, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
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GAMBLE, Senior Judge.
Dean Geary appeals from judgment and sentence entered upon his written
plea of guilty to assault causing bodily injury or mental illness, in violation of Iowa
Code section 708.2(2) (2018).1 Geary contends his written plea should be set
aside for failure to substantially comply with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure
2.8(2)(d)—he argues the district court failed to him inform him of the consequences
of his plea. However, Geary’s written guilty plea complied with the required
advisory concerning the need to file a motion in arrest of judgment in order to
challenge his plea. See Iowa Rs. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(d), 2.24(3)(a). Geary filed no
motion in arrest of judgment and, thus, waived his right to challenge the guilty
plea.2 See State v. Barnes, 652 N.W.2d 466, 467–68 (Iowa 2002).
Geary also asserts the court abused its discretion in failing to properly
consider statutory factors in sentencing him. We review the district court’s
sentencing decision imposing a sentence within the statutory limitations for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 2015). “In
exercising discretion, the district court must ‘weigh all pertinent matters in
determining a proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the attending
circumstances, the defendant’s age, character, and propensities or chances for
reform.’” Id. (citation omitted). The district court must provide the reasons for its
sentencing decision on the record so that “a reviewing court will be able to assess
whether there has been an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 407. “[A] ‘terse and succinct’
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Geary waived formal reporting of the proceedings.
2
Geary raises no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Any such complaints may be
raised in postconviction-relief proceedings.
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statement may be sufficient, ‘so long as the brevity of the court’s statement does
not prevent review of the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion.’” Id. at
408 (citation omitted).
When a defendant waives the reporting of the sentencing hearing, we look
to the sufficiency of the district court’s written sentencing order. See State v.
Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 921 (Iowa 2014). The use of computerized
sentencing forms is not improper so long as we are able to discern whether the
court properly exercised its discretion. See id. (“In this age of word processing,
judges can use forms, such as the one available in this case, to check the boxes
indicating the reasons why a judge is imposing a certain sentence. If the choices
in the order need further explanation, the judge can do so by writing on the order
or adding to the order using a word processing program.”).
Here, the district court’s written sentencing order includes the following list
rather than a series of checked boxes:
Reasons for sentence:
Nature of offense
Plea agreement
Prior record
Employment Age
The sentencing order does not indicate the court considered the
defendant’s character, propensities, or chances for reform. Cf. Thacker, 862
N.W.2d at 405. However, there is no requirement the court recite every factor
considered. See, e.g., State v. Mathews, No. 17-0519, 2018 WL 2084831, at *2
(Iowa Ct. App. May 2, 2018) (“[T]he district court need not specifically state every
possible sentencing factor.”). Perhaps as the State argues, consideration of these
factors might be inferred. However, the brevity of the court’s sentencing order—in
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conjunction with the lack of record from the sentencing hearing—impedes
appellate review of the court’s exercise of discretion. Further, concerning the
court’s consideration of a “plea agreement,” Geary’s written guilty plea notes: “This
guilty plea is entered without any agreement with the [S]tate’s attorney in regards
to the charges against me or my sentence.” The record is devoid of any details of
a plea agreement. We are left to speculate as to whether there was a plea
agreement or what terms may have been considered by the court. See Thacker,
862 N.W.2d at 410 (vacating a sentence and remanding for resentencing where
the record failed to include the details of a plea agreement and, thus, it was unclear
if the court was merely giving effect to the parties’ plea agreement or independently
exercising its discretion); see also State v. Broughton, No. 17-0016, 2017 WL
6513969, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2017) (remanding where the court was
unable to determine whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in
sentencing). Because we are unable to determine whether the district court
properly exercised its discretion in sentencing Geary, we vacate the sentence and
remand for resentencing.
SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.