Darin Godfrey v. State of Iowa ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-0819
Filed May 15, 2019
DARIN GODFREY,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Nancy S. Tabor,
Judge.
Darin Godfrey appeals the summary dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Eric D. Tindal of Keegan Tindal & Mason, Iowa City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Doyle, JJ. Tabor, J.,
takes no part.
2
DOYLE, Judge.
Darin Godfrey appeals the summary dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief (PCR). Godfrey alleges his PCR trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to challenge Iowa Code section 692A.126 (2017) on equal protection
and procedural due process grounds and for failing to request the trial court take
judicial notice of his underlying criminal file. For the reasons stated below, we
affirm the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In July 1993, Godfrey pled guilty to kidnapping in the second degree,
robbery in the first degree, and willful injury. An additional charge of sex abuse in
the first degree was subsequently dismissed by the State. In August 1993, the
district court sentenced Godfrey to consecutive sentences, amounting to a total of
sixty years in prison. Godfrey is currently incarcerated, with a tentative discharge
date in August 2021.
In 2017, Godfrey filed a pro se application for PCR, arguing that in his
original criminal trial the district court did not determine there was a sexual
component to his crimes and, therefore, he cannot be required to register as a sex
offender under Iowa Code section 692A.126.1 Later, Godfrey’s PCR trial counsel
filed a recast application, asserting that the requirement to register as a sex
1
Some time prior to Godfrey’s application, the Iowa Department of Public Safety (DPS)
advised the Iowa Department of Corrections (DOC) of its informal finding that Godfrey will
likely be required to register as a sex offender upon his release from incarceration,
however, there was no formal determination made by the DPS. It is not clear from the
record when the informal finding was given to the DOC, if it was in writing or oral, or how
and when Godfrey learned of it.
3
offender violates Godfrey’s right to due process and amounts to an illegal
sentence.
The State moved for summary disposition based on a showing that Godfrey
is currently incarcerated, no formal determination was issued by the DPS or DOC
regarding his requirement to register as a sex offender, and he failed to pursue
and exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his petition in district court.
In support of its motion, the State filed an affidavit from a Public Service Supervisor
for the DPS that stated Godfrey is incarcerated with the DOC and “is not presently
registered as a sex offender in Iowa, nor is he required to do so while incarcerated.”
The affidavit went on to state that if the DPS made a formal determination
regarding his registration status, Godfrey may use the administrative process
provided in Iowa Code section 692A.116 and then he may challenge the agency’s
formal decision through a petition for judicial review pursuant to Iowa Code section
17A.19. Godfrey resisted the motion. The district court granted the State’s motion,
concluding that Godfrey “must wait until there is a formal determination [that
Godfrey must register as a sex offender] and the administrative process has been
exhausted before he can seek judicial review.”
II. Standard of Review.
“Generally, we review a grant of a motion to dismiss a PCR petition for
correction of errors at law.” Allison v. State, 914 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa 2018).
However, if the claim is ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, our review is de
novo. See Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa 2018). Additionally, if the
asserted claims are constitutional in nature, our review is de novo. See Lamasters
v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012).
4
III. Discussion.
On appeal, Godfrey makes claims of ineffective assistance of his PCR trial
counsel. First, Godfrey alleges his PCR trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge Iowa Code section 692A.1262 on equal protection and procedural due
process grounds. Currently, Godfrey is incarcerated and the DPS has not issued
a formal determination, pursuant to Iowa Code section 692A.126(2)(b), 3 requiring
him to register as a sex offender when he is released from prison. Accordingly,
Godfrey’s claims on appeal are not yet ripe for adjudication.
“A case is ripe for adjudication when it presents an actual, present
controversy, as opposed to one that is merely hypothetical or speculative.” State
v. Tripp, 776 N.W.2d 855, 859 (Iowa 2010). The intent of the ripeness doctrine is
“to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and
also to protect [administrative] agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way
by the challenging parties.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–149
(1967), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105
(1977); see also Barker v. Iowa Dep’t Pub. Safety, 922 N.W.2d 581, 590 (Iowa
2019).
2
Iowa Code section 692A.126(2)(a)(1) requires a person convicted of kidnapping in the
second degree prior to July 1, 2009 to register as a sex offender “if the department makes
a determination that the offense was sexually motivated.”
3
Iowa Code section 692A.126(2)(b) specifies that the determination “shall be issued in
writing and shall include a summary of the information and evidence considered in making
the determination that the offense was sexually motivated.”
5
Iowa Code section 692A.116(1) gives the DPS exclusive authority to
“determine whether the offense for which the offender has been convicted requires
the offender to register.” See State v. Bullock, 638 N.W.2d 728, 735 (Iowa 2002).
“Until the Department has made a decision on the defendant’s term of registration,
there is no concrete controversy. Any adjudication by the district court prior to an
administrative decision and a request for judicial review of that decision is
premature.” Id.; see also Murray v. State, No. 17-1770, 2018 WL 4361053, at *2
(Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2018). “If a claim is not ripe for adjudication, a court is
without jurisdiction to hear the claim and must dismiss it.” State v. Steenhoek, No.
17-1727, 2018 WL 4635696, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2018) (quoting Iowa
Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe Cty., 555 N.W.2d 418, 432 (Iowa 1996)). Furthermore,
Godfrey has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to Iowa Code
section 692A.116 and section 17A.19. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s
finding that “since the DPS has not yet made a formal determination . . . judicial
review is not proper at this time.”
Second, Godfrey alleges his PCR trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
request the trial court take judicial notice of his underlying criminal file. The district
court stated in its order granting summary disposition that it reviewed “the file and
underlying criminal case.” Accordingly, Godfrey’s second allegation is without
merit.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s ruling dismissing
Godfrey’s PCR application.
AFFIRMED.