State of Iowa v. Diamond S. Wilson ( 2016 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 16-0156
    Filed October 26, 2016
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    DIAMOND S. WILSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Lars G.
    Anderson, Judge.
    Defendant appeals the denial of his motion for new trial. AFFIRMED.
    Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia Reynolds, Assistant
    Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee.
    Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.
    2
    MCDONALD, Judge.
    Following jury trial, Diamond Wilson was convicted of intimidation with a
    dangerous weapon, carrying weapons, and unlawful possession of a firearm, in
    violation of Iowa Code sections 708.6, 724.4, and 724.26 (2015). On appeal, he
    contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial
    on the ground the verdict was contrary to the evidence.
    Our review in this case is limited. “A court may grant a new trial where a
    verdict rendered by a jury is contrary to law or evidence.” State v. Nitcher, 
    720 N.W.2d 547
    , 559 (Iowa 2006). Contrary to the evidence means contrary to the
    weight of the evidence. See State v. Reeves, 
    670 N.W.2d 199
    , 201 (Iowa 2003).
    “The district court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for new trial.” 
    Id. at 202
    . Our review is limited to the question of whether the district court abused its
    discretion in denying the motion and not a decision on the merits of whether the
    verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. See 
    id. at 203
    . To establish an
    abuse of discretion, the defendant must show the district court exercised its
    discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly
    unreasonable. See 
    id. at 202
    . Trial courts should exercise the discretion to grant
    a new trial “carefully and sparingly.” State v. Ellis, 
    578 N.W.2d 655
    , 659 (Iowa
    1998).
    The victim testified Wilson confronted her after Wilson came to believe the
    victim had been cheating during a card game they were playing at Wilson’s
    girlfriend’s apartment. Wilson pulled a handgun and pointed it at the victim and
    told her he was going to kill her. The victim testified Wilson’s girlfriend intervened
    and pushed Wilson and then the handgun fired. Wilson fled the scene prior to
    3
    law enforcement arriving. The victim testified Wilson called her several days
    later and offered her several thousand dollars to tell the police Wilson was not
    the shooter. The victim’s testimony was corroborated by forensic evidence. The
    investigating officers found a bullet hole in the floor where Wilson had been
    standing during the confrontation, a bullet jacket, and a fresh dent in the
    ductwork beneath the floor consistent with the trajectory of the bullet.
    Wilson argues the verdict was contrary to the evidence because the victim
    was not credible and because no handgun was ever recovered. The credibility
    determination was for the jury, and recovery of the handgun was not necessary
    to prove the elements of the offenses. Under the circumstances, we cannot
    conclude the district court’s denial of Wilson’s motion was unreasonable. See
    United States v. Ashworth, 
    836 F.2d 260
    , 266 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating appellate
    court neither sits to judge credibility of witnesses nor to reweigh the evidence;
    rather appellate court is limited to examining the evidence produced at trial to
    determine whether the district court’s determination that the evidence does or
    does not preponderate heavily against the verdict is a clear and manifest abuse
    of discretion).
    AFFIRMED.