State of Iowa v. Clyde Arrington ( 2016 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 16-0584
    Filed October 26, 2016
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    CLYDE ARRINGTON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Paul L. Macek (guilty
    plea) and Joel W. Barrows (sentencing), Judges.
    Clyde Arrington appeals his conviction and sentence following his guilty
    plea to one charge of failure to comply with the sex offender registry as a second
    or subsequent offender. AFFIRMED.
    Eric D. Tindal of Nidey Erdahl Tindal & Fisher, P.L.C., Williamsburg, for
    appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee.
    Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
    2
    DOYLE, Judge.
    Clyde Arrington pled guilty to one charge of failure to comply with the sex
    offender registry as a second or subsequent offender. He challenges his plea,
    arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He also argues the district
    court abused its discretion both in denying his motion to continue the sentencing
    hearing and in sentencing him to incarceration.        After reviewing Arrington’s
    claims and finding they lack merit, we affirm.
    I. Factual Basis for the Guilty Plea.
    Arrington challenges his conviction on appeal, arguing his trial counsel
    was ineffective in allowing him to plead guilty without a factual basis. Arrington
    failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment, which bars the direct appeal of his
    conviction unless the failure resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel. See
    State v. Straw, 
    709 N.W.2d 128
    , 132-33 (Iowa 2006).
    To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Arrington must
    show his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that failure resulted
    in prejudice. See Rhoades v. State, 
    848 N.W.2d 22
    , 28 (Iowa 2014). If counsel
    permits a defendant to plead guilty and waives the defendant’s right to file a
    motion in arrest of judgment when no factual basis supports the defendant’s
    guilty plea, counsel has breached an essential duty, and we presume prejudice.
    See 
    id. at 29
    .
    Although Arrington argues there is no factual basis to support the element
    that he knew or reasonably should have known of his duty to register as a sex
    offender, see Iowa Code § 692A.111(1) (2013), we disagree. When asked at the
    3
    plea hearing to state what he had done to commit the crime to which he was
    pleading guilty, Arrington stated:
    I was required to register with the Scott County Sheriff’s
    Department on a certain date, by a certain date, and I neglected to
    do that, and I just didn’t register. My dates were messed up in my
    head, so I am guilty of that. I mean, I didn’t register as I was
    supposed to. I just . . . didn’t do it, so I’m guilty.
    He admitted he had been previously convicted of failing to register.
    On appeal, Arrington notes the convictions that required him to register
    with the sex offender registry occurred in 1987 and 1998 and that the reporting
    requirements changed in 2009. He argues there is no evidence he knew of the
    change in reporting requirements, claiming his statements at the plea hearing
    only show his confusion about the registration requirements. Though Arrington
    does express confusion over “dates,” there is nothing to suggest he was
    confused about the reporting requirements. Rather, the minutes of evidence
    show Arrington was informed of the reporting requirements when he registered in
    June 2014, and he failed to register thereafter. Cf. State v. Krugle, No. 02-0083,
    
    2002 WL 31883017
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2002) (finding Krugle’s prior
    registrations established he knew of his obligations under chapter 692A).
    Because the record provides a factual basis for Arrington’s guilty plea, counsel
    was not ineffective in allowing Arrington to plead guilty. We affirm Arrington’s
    conviction of failure to comply with the sex offender registry as a second or
    subsequent offender.
    II. Denial of Motion to Continue Sentencing.
    Arrington next argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
    motion to continue the sentencing hearing. See State v. Artzer, 
    609 N.W.2d 526
    ,
    4
    531 (Iowa 2000) (applying the abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing a denial
    of a motion to continue sentencing on the basis that “the symmetry afforded the
    trial process precludes unnecessary delay in sentencing”). With regard to this
    issue, our supreme court has stated:
    A trial judge is required to set a date for the pronouncement of
    judgment and imposition of sentence within a reasonable time after
    a verdict of guilty. Any post-trial motions must be heard within thirty
    days after they are filed, absent good cause. The process does not
    contemplate unnecessary delay between the verdict of guilty and
    the entry of judgment and sentence.
    See 
    id.
     (citations omitted).
    The district court accepted Arrington’s guilty plea on September 30, 2015,
    and it scheduled a sentencing hearing for December 17, 2015. It appears that
    because Arrington and the State were in the process of negotiating an
    agreement for Arrington to cooperate with law enforcement, the sentencing
    hearing was continued until March 3, 2016, so that the details of that agreement
    could be presented at sentencing.       Then, on February 16, 2016, Arrington’s
    counsel withdrew from his representation, and Arrington was appointed new
    counsel the same day. Arrington’s new counsel requested a continuance of the
    sentencing hearing to allow counsel “time to prepare for sentencing,” which the
    State resisted, noting the case had been pending for almost a year and a half,
    and five months had passed since Arrington pled guilty. The State argued, “The
    only preparation necessary for [sentencing] would be for counsel to review the
    [presentence investigation (PSI) report] and meet with his client, a task which
    shouldn’t take more than a week to accomplish,” and the district court denied the
    motion.    On appeal, Arrington claims additional time was needed before
    5
    sentencing to allow his new counsel to consider filing a motion in arrest of
    judgment. However, Arrington was well beyond the forty-five day deadline for
    filing a motion in arrest of judgment when his new counsel was appointed. See
    Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(b) (“The motion must be made not later than [forty-five]
    days after plea of guilty.”). On the facts before us, we find no abuse of discretion.
    Therefore, we affirm the denial of Arrington’s motion to continue the sentencing
    hearing.
    III. Sentence.
    Finally, Arrington challenges the sentence imposed on his conviction,
    arguing the court failed to provide sufficient reasons for sentencing him to a term
    of incarceration.
    Sentencing decisions carry a strong presumption in their favor. See State
    v. Johnson, 
    513 N.W.2d 717
    , 719 (Iowa 1994). Therefore, we will uphold the
    court’s sentence absent an abuse of discretion or defect in the sentencing
    proceeding. See State v. Thompson, 
    856 N.W.2d 915
    , 918 (Iowa 2014). In
    order to review the exercise of its discretion, the sentencing court must state on
    the record its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed. See 
    id.
     at 919 (citing
    Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d)). Each sentencing decision must be made on an
    individual basis, and no single factor alone is determinative.”       Johnson, 
    513 N.W.2d at 719
    .
    In sentencing Arrington to incarceration, the court cited Arrington’s
    “significant criminal history,” his “numerous previous failures on supervision,” and
    the recommendation in the PSI report. The reasons set forth are sufficient to
    allow us to review the sentence and determine the court acted within its
    6
    discretion in sentencing Arrington to a term of no more than five years in prison.
    Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm Arrington’s sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-0584

Filed Date: 10/26/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/26/2016