State of Iowa v. Charles Lee Schrage ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1094
Filed October 26, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHARLES LEE SCHRAGE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Butler County, Peter B. Newell,
District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals his convictions and sentences for possession of
controlled substances. AFFIRMED.
Andrew C. Abbott of Abbott Law Office, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Tabor, J., and Goodhue, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
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TABOR, Judge.
Charles Schrage contends the State failed to prove he had actual or
constructive possession of methamphetamine and marijuana found under a
riding lawn mower being repaired by his brother Dennis Schrage. Charles also
argues the district court failed to give adequate reasons for his prison sentence.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find
substantial evidence supporting the jury’s guilty verdicts. On the sentencing
issue, we find the district court articulated succinct, yet sufficient, reasons for
selecting its particular sentence in compliance with Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.23(3)(d). Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
Two Waterloo police investigators and the Parkersburg police chief
converged on the Schrage residence one afternoon in late May 2013 to execute
an arrest warrant for Dennis. The local police chief arrived first and saw Charles
standing in the driveway facing him. As the chief approached, Charles started to
walk away. The chief ordered Charles to show his hands and repeated, “Charlie,
Charlie, stop.” But Charles kept walking toward his brother, Dennis, who was
kneeling near a riding lawnmower in the yard.
When Charles reached his brother, Investigator Brice Lippert saw him
“reach over to Dennis Schrage with his left hand, and then . . . saw Dennis
Schrage cup something and then take it and put it underneath the deck of the
riding lawn mower.” Lippert recalled the hand-off was one motion and took just a
matter of seconds: “[A]s soon as he got it, just took it; went right underneath the
deck.” Lippert could not see what Charles handed to Dennis.
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The officers then seized both Dennis and Charles. The police chief looked
under the mower and found a brass pipe; a prescription bottle containing
marijuana; and a small silver container, about the size of a tube of lip balm,
containing methamphetamine. The items looked clean, as if they had not been
on the ground for long. Charles said “he was giving Dennis his phone and that’s
what [Lippert] witnessed.” Charles’s explanation did not make sense to the
investigators because Charles had his cell phone on his belt, and Dennis had his
cell phone in his shirt pocket. In letters from prison, Dennis told his brother he
would take the blame for all of the items found under the mower and “you had my
phone that you handed me, is a lot better story.”
The State charged Charles with possession of methamphetamine, third
offense, a class “D” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2013),
and possession of marijuana, second offense, an aggravated misdemeanor, in
violation of section 124.401(5). The State presented its case to a jury in April
2015. The three officers testified, as did Dennis Schrage. Dennis, who was not
scheduled to be released from prison until 2054, testified the controlled
substances under the mower belonged to him. Dennis said he was “greasy up to
[his] elbows” from working on the mower, and Charles was just handing Dennis’s
phone back to him when investigators approached the scene. The jury
deliberated for twenty-eight minutes before returning guilty verdicts.
At the sentencing hearing, Charles told the court he went to his brother’s
house to grill and help put a belt on the lawn mower: “[T]here was drugs found
underneath the lawn mower. I was not seen carrying or had on me.” The court
responded: “[T]he jury didn’t agree with you, and I think the evidence is contrary
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to what you’ve stated here in court. I think you have been pretty consistent in not
accepting responsibility for your actions in these matters.” The court rejected a
recommendation in the presentence investigation report for suspended
sentences and imposed indeterminate prison terms of five years and two years to
run concurrently. Charles appeals his convictions and sentences.
II. Scope and Standards of Review
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for legal error.
See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; see also State v. Rohm, 609 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa
2000). If the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we uphold it.
See Rohm, 609 N.W.2d at 509. The word “substantial” describes evidence from
which a reasonable fact finder could determine a defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. We review the facts in the light most favorable to the
verdict and consider not only evidence bolstering the verdict, “but all reasonable
inferences which could be derived from the evidence.” See id.We likewise review the imposition of sentence for correction of legal error.
See State v. Hennings, 791 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Iowa 2010). We will reverse the
district court only if we find an abuse of discretion or some defect in the
sentencing procedure. See id. Our rules of criminal procedure require the
sentencing court to state on the record its reason for a particular sentence. See
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d). The rule does not require detailed reasons for the
sentence imposed, but the court must provide “at least a cursory explanation” to
allow appellate review of its discretionary action. See State v. Barnes, 791
N.W.2d 817, 827 (Iowa 2010).
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III. Analysis
A. Substantial Evidence
The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Charles
knowingly or intentionally possessed marijuana and methamphetamine and knew
the substances he possessed were marijuana and methamphetamine. On
appeal, he contends the State failed to show that he had “actual or constructive
possession of the illegal substances.”
Possession means the exercise of dominion and control over contraband.
State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 160 (Iowa 2013). To obtain a conviction, the
State may show the defendant had either actual or constructive possession of
the items. Id. at 160–61. Actual possession requires locating the contraband on
the defendant’s person or substantial evidence allowing the fact finder to
conclude the defendant had the contraband on his person at one time. State v.
Thomas, 847 N.W.2d 438, 442 (Iowa 2014). The State can show actual
possession by direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d
775, 784 (Iowa 2010).
Constructive possession allows a fact finder to infer the defendant’s
possession of the contraband from its location or other circumstances. Thomas,
847 N.W.2d at 443. When officers find drugs in a location not under the
exclusive control of the defendant, the State must offer additional evidence to
establish possession. Id. The additional proof can include incriminating
statements or actions by the accused, fingerprints on the drug packaging, and
any other circumstances linking the accused to the drugs. See State v. Cashen,
666 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Iowa 2003).
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Charles complains the jury failed to follow its instructions regarding
possession because Dennis took sole responsibility for knowing the drugs were
under the mower, Investigator Lippert could not positively identify what was
transferred between Charles and Dennis, and “no fingerprinting was conducted”
on the containers holding the illegal substances.
The State argues strong circumstantial evidence showed Charles actually
possessed the drugs before handing them to his brother. We agree. See
Thomas, 847 N.W.2d at 444, 447 (upholding possession conviction where drugs
were found in close proximity to the defendant; defendant had taken actions most
logically explained by his efforts to “get the drugs off his person; and when
apprehended, the defendant made false statements and engaged in
misdirection”). Initially, we find it significant Charles ignored the commands of
the police chief and made a beeline to his brother’s location. See State v. Dewitt,
811 N.W.2d 460, 476 (Iowa 2012) (pointing to conduct consistent with guilt when
Dewitt tried to “break away and flee” as police approached). Next, Charles and
Dennis have both admitted making a hand-to-hand exchange. Although Lippert
did not see what items were exchanged, the Schrages’ explanation that they
were passing a cell phone “did not make sense.” Lippert testified to seeing one
motion of Dennis receiving something from Charles and stashing what he
received under the mower’s deck. And both of the brothers’ cell phones
remained in their possession. The jury was free to discount Dennis’s testimony
regarding the exchange of his cell phone, especially given the contents of his
letter to Charles, suggesting they revise their story, and the fact Dennis was
already serving a long prison term and would have little to lose in taking the
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blame for drugs possessed by his brother. See State v. Blair, 347 N.W.2d 416,
420 (Iowa 1984) (describing function of the jury as “plac[ing] credibility where it
belongs”).
Similar to Thomas, the most logical explanation for what the investigators
saw was that Charles was motivated to get rid of the drugs upon seeing law
enforcement, passed them to his brother, and his brother placed them under the
mower where the investigators soon discovered them. See 847 N.W.2d at 444.
On this record, we decline to disturb the jury’s guilty verdicts.
B. Sentencing Reasons
On appeal, Charles contends the sentencing judge did not give adequate
reasons for ordering incarceration. The district court offered Charles the
following rationale for declining to suspend his sentences:
[Y]ou have been to prison three times. You’re facing a felony
offense here . . . . I think that the State’s recommendation for
incarceration is appropriate. And again, you have not accepted
responsibility for what you did. You have a lengthy criminal history.
You have been unsuccessful on probation in the past. I think that a
prison sentence is merited.
The question is whether the succinct nature of the court’s statement of
reasons handicaps our review of its sentencing discretion. We conclude the
court’s reasons were sufficient to explain its motivation for imposing
incarceration. See State v. Carberry, 501 N.W.2d 473, 478 (Iowa 1993)
(upholding sentences despite “extremely terse” statement by the court); see also
State v. Victor, 310 N.W.2d 201, 205 (Iowa 1981) (finding it clear from court’s
brief statement what prompted the sentence). A sentencing court is not required
to specifically mention all potentially mitigating circumstances. See State v.
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Russian, 441 N.W.2d 374, 375 (Iowa 1989). We find no abuse of discretion in
the sentencing court’s compliance with rule 2.23(3)(d).
AFFIRMED.