State of Iowa v. Brian Sean Moran ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-2164
Filed October 26, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BRIAN SEAN MORAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, James B. Malloy,
District Associate Judge.
The defendant appeals his conviction for driving while barred.
AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.
Following a trial on the minutes of testimony, Brian Moran was convicted
of driving while barred, in violation of Iowa Code sections 321.560 and 321.561
(2015), and sentenced to two days’ incarceration in the county jail. He appeals
his conviction, contending the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence obtained after an allegedly illegal traffic stop.
We review claims of constitutional violations de novo in light of the totality
of the circumstances. See State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 626 (Iowa 2001).
In doing so, we examine the entire record, including evidence presented at the
suppression hearing. See State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 145 (Iowa 2003).
Although our review is de novo, we do afford the decision of the district court
deference for policy reasons. See State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Iowa
2001); In re P.C., No. 16-0893, 2016 WL 4379580, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 17,
2016) (stating appellate courts should exercise “de novo review with deference”
in “recognition of the appellate court’s limited function of maintaining the
uniformity of legal doctrine; recognition of the district court’s more intimate
knowledge of and familiarity with the parties, the lawyers, and the facts of a case;
and recognition there are often undercurrents in a case—not of record and
available for appellate review—the district court does and should take into
account when making a decision”).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. The “textual touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
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reasonableness.” State v. Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 529 (Iowa 2004). The Fourth
Amendment is applicable to state actors by incorporation via the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). The Fourth
Amendment is implicated when an officer seizes a person. See State v.
Reinders, 690 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Iowa 2004). During traffic stops, temporary
detention constitutes a seizure of persons and therefore must be reasonable
under the circumstances. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10
(1996).
It is the State’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the
legality of the traffic stop. See State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa
2004). To determine if the traffic stop was constitutionally reasonable, we look to
the “totality of the circumstances confronting a police officer, including all
information available to the officer at the time the decision to stop is made.”
State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 642 (Iowa 2002) (citing United States v. Arvizu,
534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). This is an objective test. See id. at 641–42. A mere
hunch will not suffice, but the officer may make the traffic stop based on
“considerably less” evidence than that required to establish probable cause. See
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 642 (“The
evidence justifying the stop need not rise to the level of probable cause.”). If the
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop, then the
stop violated the defendant’s rights and “all evidence flowing from the stop is
inadmissible.” Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 206.
After eleven o’clock at night, an off-duty police officer serving the cities of
Boone and Ogden, who resides in Ogden, contacted an on-duty police officer in
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Ogden to report an incident. A motorist had driven a Buick slowly down the
street, pulled into the officer’s front yard—the grass and not the paved
driveway—and shined the vehicle’s headlights into the officer’s bedroom window
for approximately fifteen seconds. The vehicle slowly drove away but then
returned maintaining a slow rate of speed. The officer thought it might have been
a threat or an act of harassment because of his status as a police officer. The
Ogden officer responded quickly, located a vehicle matching the description in
the area, and executed a stop of the vehicle to investigate further. The off-duty
officer drove to the location of the traffic stop and confirmed it was the same
vehicle he had observed. We now know the driver of the vehicle was Moran.
The Ogden officer requested Moran’s license and learned Moran was driving
while barred. The Ogden officer arrested Moran.
We conclude the traffic stop was justified. “The purpose of an
investigatory stop is to allow a police officer to confirm or dispel suspicions of
criminal activity through reasonable questioning.” Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 641.
The conduct reported was sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion the
driver was impaired or may have intended to harass the officer within the
meaning of Iowa Code section 708.7. See State v. Reynolds, 670 N.W.2d 405,
410 (Iowa 2003) (“The closeness of the defendant’s vehicle to the victim’s car
and home satisfies the physical proximity alternative of the personal contact
requirement.”). Moran argues there was an innocent explanation for his
conduct—he was lost and turned around. That may well have been true, but it is
largely immaterial to the motion to suppress.
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[P]olice officers are not required to rule out the possibility of
innocent behavior before initiating a brief stop. . . . [S]uspicious
conduct by its very nature is ambiguous, and the principle function
of the investigative stop is to quickly resolve that ambiguity.
Therefore, if any reasonable inference of wrongful conduct can be
objectively discerned, notwithstanding the existence of other
innocent inferences that could be drawn, the officers have the right
to temporarily detain the individual for the purpose of inquiry.
Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 643 (quoting State v. Anderson, 454 N.W.2d 763, 766
(Wis. 1990).
Moran contends the off-duty officer’s description of the vehicle was
insufficient to identify Moran’s vehicle. We disagree. Moran’s vehicle matched
the make of the vehicle the off-duty officer observed. The officers testified the
stop was executed in a small town in a low traffic area at night when there would
be few cars on the road. See, e.g., State v. Williams, No. 15-1110, 2016 WL
3002749, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2016) (concluding description of the make
and color of the vehicle was sufficient to identify the vehicle for purposes of traffic
stop). The stop was executed in temporal proximity of the telephone call,
increasing the likelihood the stopped car was the observed car.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err in denying the
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. We affirm the conviction.
AFFIRMED.