In Re the Marriage of Joan Blaser Baenziger and Gregory Paul Baenziger Upon the Petition of Joan Blaser Baenziger, and Concerning Gregory Paul Baenziger ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0457
Filed October 26, 2016
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JOAN BLASER BAENZIGER
AND GREGORY PAUL BAENZIGER
Upon the Petition of
JOAN BLASER BAENZIGER,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
GREGORY PAUL BAENZIGER,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg,
Judge.
Gregory Paul Baenziger appeals various economic provisions of the
decree dissolving his marriage to Joan Blaser Baenziger. AFFIRMED AS
MODIFIED.
Alexander E. Wonio of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Catherine C. Dietz-Kilen and Jaclyn M. Zimmerman of Harrison & Dietz-
Kilen, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Tabor, J., and Scott, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
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SCOTT, Senior Judge.
Gregory Paul Baenziger appeals various economic provisions of the
decree dissolving his marriage to Joan Blaser Baenziger. We affirm as modified.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Gregory and Joan were married in 1999 and have no children together.
Prior to the marriage, the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement.1 In that
agreement, the parties established they would keep their respective debts and
assets brought into the marriage but also provided for the distribution of assets
and debts incurred during the marriage.
Both parties are well-educated; however, at the time of trial, Joan was
unemployed and Gregory, then age sixty-one, was employed but facing a
furlough from the position where he was earning $110,000 per year plus
bonuses. Joan, who was fifty-nine at the time of trial, suffers from numerous
physical and mental-health conditions that affect her ability to secure
employment. At the time of trial, Joan was planning to undergo surgery for her
hip problems, which required a double hip replacement. The parties have
considerable debt and few assets.
In April 2014, Joan filed a petition for dissolution. Trial commenced in
November 2014. In February 2015, the district court entered its decree, which, in
relevant part, awarded Joan one-half of any earnings from the books Gregory
authored during the marriage, alimony for twenty-five months in the amount of
$1800 per month, and $18,000 in attorney fees. Gregory appeals.
1
The parties entered into a marital agreement in May 2005, although the provisions of
that agreement are not at issue.
3
II. Standard and Scope of Review
We review cases tried in equity, such as dissolution cases, de novo. Iowa
R. App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2015). We
give weight to the factual findings of the district court, especially when
considering the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them. Iowa R.
App. P. 6.904(3)(g). Prior cases, though helpful, have little precedential value
because we must base our decision primarily on the particular circumstances of
the parties presently before us. In re Marriage of Weidner, 338 N.W.2d 351, 356
(Iowa 1983). We accord the trial court considerable latitude in making factual
determinations and will disturb the ruling only when there has been a failure to do
equity. Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 406.
III. Analysis
Gregory challenges three economic provisions of the dissolution decree:
(1) the district court’s equal division of any earnings made on the books Gregory
authored during the marriage, (2) the district court’s award of alimony to Joan,
and (3) the district court’s award to Joan of approximately one-half—or
$18,000—of her attorney fees. We address each in turn.
A. Book Earnings
“Iowa case law has long held prenuptial agreements are favored in the
law.” In re Marriage of Applegate, 567 N.W.2d 671, 673 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
Where, as here, the parties have executed a premarital agreement, “in the
absence of fraud, mistake, or undue influence, the contract is binding.” Id.Gregory contends the district court’s award of one-half of any earnings made on
4
the books he authored is contrary to the terms of the prenuptial agreement. We
agree.
Paragraph nine of the prenuptial agreement provides, in relevant part:
9. The earnings and accumulations resulting from Joan’s
and Gregory’s respective individual property and . . . work, together
with all property acquired or income derived therefrom, shall be the
individual property of the party to whom the earnings and income
are attributable as long as the asset is held or owned by one party.
The books at issue—which Gregory alleges are incomplete, not well
received, and of no current value—were the product of Gregory’s work. On our
de novo review, we determine he is entitled to the proceeds of those books, if
any, per the terms of the prenuptial agreement.2
B. Alimony
Gregory appeals the district court’s award to Joan of twenty-five months of
alimony in the amount of $1800 per month.3 Gregory claims the award is
inappropriate based on his ability to pay and, alternatively, is excessive in
duration.
In awarding alimony, a court considers the factors set forth in Iowa Code
section 598.21A (2013). See id. Here, the district court provided the following
reasoning for the award:
The Court further finds that since the marriage has lasted
more than ten years, pursuant to the prenuptial agreement entered
on April 27, 1999, [Joan] is entitled to spousal support. The Court
reaches this conclusion based upon the length of the marriage, the
health of each party, the ability of each party to obtain employment,
the contributions of each party to the marriage, and the division of
2
Joan requests that this court affirm the district court’s division of any earnings from the
books as a form of reimbursement alimony. There is no indication the district court
intended this division as such an award, and we decline to do so.
3
Gregory was also ordered to pay spousal support during the pendency of the petition.
5
the assets and liabilities of the parties. The Court observes that
[Joan] suffers from physical and mental health disabilities which
require medical attention and could, along with her age, . . . affect
her ability to obtain employment in the future. However, the Court
believes that after there has been a rehabilitation period for [Joan]
from her surgeries for both of her hips and time for adjustment after
the marriage, that she does have the opportunity to obtain
employment.
On our de novo review, we agree. While Gregory was facing a furlough at
the time of trial, he was gainfully employed and earning considerably more than
the record supported Joan could earn, despite her continued efforts to secure
employment. There was no indication Gregory had any health limitations or
other restrictions on his ability to obtain alternative employment.4 This situation
contrasted that of Joan, who was facing separate surgeries on each of her hips in
December 2014 and March or April 2015, in addition to her other physical and
mental-health related limitations.
At Gregory’s request, Joan was evaluated by a vocational case manager.
The evaluator determined Joan’s mental-health related issues would impact her
ability to obtain employment, her age would put her at a disadvantage for being
considered in a tenured track professor position—for which the evaluator
determined her chances were “bleak,” her outlook for securing a job as an
adjunct professor was also “somewhat limited,” and her best chances of securing
employment would be as a grant writer. The evaluator concluded Joan “w[ould]
likely not be suited for competitive employment until such time as the dissolution
of marriage process has been finalized and a short period of adjustment has
elapsed.” See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1) (a), (b), (e), (f) (listing as factors “[t]he
4
The company also assured Gregory it would reinstate his compensation and benefits
when the undetermined period of furlough expired.
6
length of the marriage,” “[t]he age and physical and emotional health of the
parties,” “[t]he earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance,” and “[t]he
feasibility of the party seeking maintenance becoming self-supporting at a
standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage,
and the length of time necessary to achieve this goal”). On our de novo review,
we affirm the district court’s award of alimony.
C. Trial Attorney Fees
“An award of attorney fees lies within the discretion of the trial court.”
Applegate, 567 N.W.2d at 675. Thus, to overturn the district court’s decision,
Gregory must show the district court abused its discretion. Id. Gregory argues,
because he was facing a furlough and has minimal assets and considerable
debt, the award was not fair or reasonable. Here, the district court considered
the circumstances of the parties and their respective abilities to pay. See id.(“Whether attorney fees should be awarded depends on the respective abilities of
the parties to pay the fees and the fees must be fair and reasonable.”). We
cannot say the district court abused its discretion in awarding Joan approximately
one-half of her attorney fees; therefore, we affirm.
D. Appellate Attorney Fees
Joan requests appellate attorney fees. “Appellate attorney fees are not a
matter of right, but rather rest in this court’s discretion.” In re Marriage of Okland,
699 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa 2005). “[I]n determining whether to award attorney
fees,” we consider “the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the
other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” Id. (citation omitted).
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Having considered these factors, we decline Joan’s request for attorney fees on
appeal.
IV. Conclusion
We modify the dissolution decree to award Gregory the proceeds, if any,
from the books he authored during the marriage. We otherwise affirm the decree
as entered by the district court.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.