In Re the Marriage of Brandon Kleve and Daphnie Kleve Upon the Petition of Brandon Kleve, and Concerning Daphnie Kleve ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0607
Filed October 26, 2016
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF BRANDON KLEVE
AND DAPHNIE KLEVE
Upon the Petition of
BRANDON KLEVE,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
DAPHNIE KLEVE,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Christopher C. Foy,
Judge.
Daphnie Kleve appeals from the custody provisions of the decree
dissolving her marriage to Brandon Kleve. AFFIRMED.
Rebecca A. Feiereisen of Arenson Law Group, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for
appellant.
Judith O'Donohoe of Elwood, O'Donohoe, Braun & White, L.L.P., Charles
City, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
2
DOYLE, Judge.
This appeal concerns the child custody provisions of the decree dissolving
the marriage of Brandon Kleve and Daphnie Kleve, which grants Brandon
physical care of the parties’ children. Daphnie contests the finding that granting
Brandon physical care is in their children’s best interests. She seeks physical
care of both children or, in the alternative, requests a split physical care
arrangement. Because the children’s best interests are served by placing them
with the same parent and Brandon is better able to minister to their needs, we
affirm.
The facts, briefly stated, are as follows: Daphnie and Brandon met in Utah
in 2012 and married the following year. They moved from Utah to Charles City in
June 2014, shortly after their son was born. After separating in October 2014,
Daphnie—without consulting with or informing Brandon—moved back to Utah
with their son. Brandon obtained a temporary injunction in November 2014 that
required Daphnie to return their son to Iowa, and their son has lived with Brandon
since that time. The parties’ daughter, who was born in April 2015,1 remained
with Daphnie in Utah. Following trial, the district court entered its decree,
granting Brandon physical care of both children.
On appeal, Daphnie first argues “[t]he district court misstated the
undisputed facts of the case such that the decree cannot stand.” However, we
are not bound by the district court’s factual findings. See In re Marriage of
Rhinehart, 704 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Iowa 2005). Instead, our de novo review
1
The results of a DNA test show the probability that Brandon is the father of the parties’
daughter is 99.999999%.
3
requires us to examine the entire record and decide any issues properly before
us anew. See id. We do give the district court’s findings weight, and we are
especially deferential with regard to determinations of witness credibility. See In
re Marriage of Murphy, 592 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Iowa 1999).
With regard to witness credibility here, the district court stated:
The court has no illusions that either party was completely
forthcoming when describing what he or she perceived to be the
faults or shortcomings of the other party or when responding to the
unfavorable allegations made about him or her. Generally
speaking, however, the court found the testimony of Daphnie on
these matters to be less credible than that of Brandon. The
allegations made by Daphnie about being physically and sexually
abused by Brandon have no other support in the record and are
inconsistent with information she previously gave to certain health
care providers. Similarly, testimony Daphnie gave at trial regarding
various aspects of her medical and mental health history was
contradicted by information contained in her medical records.
When presented with conflicting testimony from the parties, the
court generally accepted the testimony of Brandon as more
accurate and reliable.
Because the district court had the ability to observe the witnesses’ demeanor, we
keep its credibility findings in mind as we turn to the custody question. See id.We begin with Daphnie’s request for split physical care of the children. In
the event she is not granted physical care of both children, Daphnie requests that
Brandon continue as their son’s physical caretaker while she continues to
provide for their daughter’s physical care. As the district court noted, there is a
presumption in Iowa against such custody arrangements because they deprive
children of the benefit of associating with one another. See In re Marriage of
Will, 489 N.W.2d 394, 398 (Iowa 1992). Although this rule is not without its
exceptions, there must be “[g]ood and compelling reasons” to depart from it. See
id.4
Daphnie claims that a compelling reason exists here because the children
had no real relationship at the time of the parties’ dissolution. Although the
children had not yet developed a bond at that time, these children are quite
young and will be able to develop a bond. The development of a sibling bond will
benefit the children for the rest of their lives. Placing them together suits their
long-term best interests.
We must then determine in which parent’s care to place both children.
Our fundamental concern is placing the children with the parent who will best
minister to the children’s long-range best interests. See In re Marriage of Winter,
223 N.W.2d 165, 166 (Iowa 1974). In making this determination, we look at the
list of factors set forth in Iowa Code section 598.41(3) (2013), as well as those
articulated in Winter. See In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 696 (Iowa
2007).
Upon our de novo review, we agree Brandon is better able to minister to
the children’s long-term needs. We share the district court’s concerns about both
parties’ stability and willingness to support the children’s relationship with the
other parent. However, we agree the scale ultimately tips in Brandon’s favor
given his proximity to family, his less-precarious housing arrangement, and what
the district court described as Daphnie’s “poor judgment” and “lack[ of] insight
regarding her need for mental health treatment.” Accordingly, we affirm the
custody provisions of the decree, which grants Brandon physical care of both
children. See Iowa Ct. R. 21.26(1)(d), (e).
AFFIRMED.