Roxanne Harrison v. Greenfield Manor, Inc., First Comp Insurance Company ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0223
Filed November 12, 2015
ROXANNE HARRISON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
GREENFIELD MANOR, INC., FIRST
COMP INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeffrey D. Farrell,
Judge.
Claimant appeals from the order affirming the decision of the Iowa
Workers’ Compensation Commissioner. AFFIRMED.
Ryan T. Beattie of Beattie Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Sasha L. Monthei of Sheldrup Blades, Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.
The claimant Roxanne Harrison challenges the decision of the Iowa
Workers’ Compensation Commissioner. On April 6, 2009, Harrison was injured
when she slipped on a patch of ice in the parking lot of her employer Greenfield
Manor. On January 18, 2011, Harrison claimed she was injured while working at
a subsequent employer, West Bridge Care and Rehabilitation. She filed workers’
compensation claims related to both injuries, and the claims were consolidated
for hearing. Initially, the agency determined Harrison had not suffered an
industrial disability. Harrison sought judicial review of that determination. The
district court remanded the matter because the parties had stipulated the 2009
injury resulted in a permanent injury and the commissioner should have thus
determined industrial disability and permanency benefits. On remand, the
agency found the claimant suffered a five percent industrial disability and was
entitled to twenty-five weeks of permanency benefits. The district court affirmed
the agency’s decision, and Harrison timely filed this appeal.
On appeal, Harrison appears to contend the agency’s decision is not
supported by substantial evidence and, for the same reason, is irrational,
illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. “On appeal, we apply the standards of [Iowa
Code] chapter 17A [(2013)] to determine whether we reach the same conclusions
as the district court. If we reach the same conclusions, we affirm; otherwise we
may reverse.” See Mike Brooks, Inc. v. House, 843 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa
2014). “The administrative process presupposes judgment calls are to be left to
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the agency. Nearly all disputes are won or lost there.” Sellers v. Emp’t Appeal
Bd., 531 N.W.2d 645, 646 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted).
The legislature has “vested the commissioner with the discretion to make
factual determinations.” Mike Brooks, Inc, 843 N.W.2d at 889. Our court is
bound by these factual determinations “if they are supported by ‘substantial
evidence in the record before the court when the record is viewed as a whole.’”
Id. (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as “the quantity and
quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and
reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences
resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of
great importance.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1). “Evidence is not insubstantial
merely because different conclusions may be drawn from the evidence.” Cedar
Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Pease, 807 N.W.2d 839, 845 (Iowa 2011) (citations
omitted). Our court may consider evidence as substantial even if we may have
found a different conclusion than the fact finder. See id. at 845.
An industrial disability determination presents a mixed question of law and
fact. See Larson Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Thorson, 763 N.W.2d 842, 856 (Iowa 2009).
“The commissioner has a duty to state the evidence relied upon and detail the
reasons for any conclusions.” Myers v. F.C.A. Servs., Inc., 592 N.W.2d 354, 356
(Iowa 1999). “[W]e may reverse the Commissioner’s application of the law to the
facts only if it is irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” Lakeside Casino v.
Blue, 743 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Iowa 2007) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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“Industrial disability . . . measures the extent to which the injury impairs the
employee in the ability to earn wages.” Bearce v. FMC Corp., 465 N.W.2d 531,
535 (Iowa 1991). The focus of an industrial disability is “on the ability of the
worker to be gainfully employed,” not on “what the worker can or cannot do.”
Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. Nelson, 544 N.W.2d 258, 266 (Iowa 1995). In this
case, the agency considered all of the relevant factors in making its industrial
disability determination. The commissioner found Harrison is deconditioned and
obese. Nonetheless, the commissioner found Harrison has the capacity to work.
She currently babysits a child. She has no work restrictions. The commissioner
further found and concluded:
As noted by Dr. Boarini and others, claimant suffered an extremely
minor injury and there is no physical abnormality resulting from her
stipulated injury other than myofascial pain. Such pain may result
in a small hindrance to claimant, but it cannot reasonably be found
on remand that her pain complaints have resulted in a significantly
adverse impact on claimant’s ability to compete for employment in
the competitive labor market.
The commissioner’s determination was supported by the opinion of two
independent physicians. While there may be evidence in the record contrary to
the agency’s findings and conclusions, “evidence is not insubstantial merely
because it would have supported contrary inferences.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Caselman, 657 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Iowa 2003). “On appeal, our task ‘is not to
determine whether the evidence supports a different finding; rather, our task is to
determine whether substantial evidence . . . supports the findings actually
made.’” Mike Brooks, Inc., 843 N.W.2d at 889 (quoting Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 807 N.W.2d at 845).
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We reject the claimant’s argument that the employer is judicially estopped
from denying the scope and extent of the claimant’s injury or disability because
its stipulation as to causation in alternate care proceedings. The doctrine is
simply inapplicable here. See NID, Inc. v. Monahan, No. 14-0292, 2015 WL
1332332, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2015) (“An employer may properly admit
to an injury arising out of and in the course of employment while still contesting
liability for all of the consequences and any disability claimed to result from such
injury.”).
We conclude the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence
and is not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s decision on judicial review.
AFFIRMED.