State of Iowa v. Benjamin Elliott Lane ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1449
Filed December 9, 2015
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN ELLIOTT LANE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Todd A. Geer,
Judge.
Defendant appeals his convictions for first-degree burglary and second-
degree sexual abuse. AFFIRMED.
Benjamin Bergmann of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble, Gentry,
Brown & Bergmann, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik and Heather Ann
Mapes, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins and Bower, JJ.
2
BOWER, Judge.
Defendant Benjamin Lane appeals his convictions for first-degree burglary
and second-degree sexual abuse. Lane claims the district court improperly
denied his motion to suppress and there was insufficient evidence to support the
convictions. We find the district court properly denied Lane’s motion to suppress
based on his claims (1) he was denied his rights under Iowa Code section 804.20
(2013) because he was not permitted to see his mother; (2) he did not knowingly
and intelligently waive his Miranda rights; and (3) he did not knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently consent to a search of his person. We also find there
was sufficient evidence in the record to show (1) Lane broke into the residence;
(2) he did not have permission or authority to enter the residence; (3) he was
armed with a dangerous weapon; and (4) while committing sexual abuse he used
or threatened to use force creating a substantial risk of death or serious injury.
We affirm his convictions.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Lane was a tenant at a house in Cedar Falls, Iowa, where the tenants
shared common areas, but each had a private bedroom. Prior to September
2013, Lane left that residence and moved in with his parents. Although he was
to give the key to the house back to the owners when he moved out, he did not
do so. After Lane moved out, J.C. became a tenant at the house. She was not
acquainted with Lane.
On September 26, 2013, one of the tenants, Jayden Johnson, invited
Lane over to the house. Lane and Johnson spent several hours playing
3
computer games in the common area of the house. Lane left at about 1:00 a.m.
on September 27, 2013, and Johnson then locked the front door.
J.C. testified that in the early morning hours of September 27, 2013, a
man wearing a ski mask and dark clothing opened the door to her bedroom and
came in. The intruder displayed a knife and said, “If you scream, I’ll kill you.” He
put the knife against her arm and stated he would cut her throat. He put duct
tape over her mouth, took off her clothing, and slapped her breasts repeatedly.
He put his finger and hand in her vagina and a finger in her anus. He placed a
hand on her neck in a choking fashion. When the man left, J.C. looked out her
window and saw the taillights of a Ford Mustang. She remembered she had
seen a Ford Mustang parked outside the house earlier in the day.
J.C. asked one of her roommates to call 911. She informed Johnson she
believed the intruder had been his friend, who he identified as Lane. J.C. was
bleeding quite profusely as a result of the assault. She was taken by ambulance
to the hospital, where she required surgery to repair her injuries.
Officers went to the home of Lane’s parents on the morning of September
27, 2013, requesting Lane come to the Cedar Falls Police Department to be
interviewed. Lane’s mother, Pamela Lane, drove him to the police station. Lane
was taken to an interview room, where he was informed he was free to leave at
any time, and he retained possession of his cell phone throughout the interview.
He initially denied going back to the house after playing computer games. The
officers observed dried blood on Lane’s knee. He consented to a search of his
person, including a sample of the dried blood.
4
When officers requested consent to search his vehicle, Lane stated he felt
like he was being forced, but agreed. The car was registered to Pamela and he
said, “Go talk to my mom.” Pamela told officers they would need a search
warrant, so officers began the process to obtain search warrants for Lane’s
person, the car, and his house. At that time Lane was told he was in custody and
no longer free to leave. The officers informed Lane of his Miranda rights. He
was left alone in the interview room.
Lane told an officer he wanted to speak to his mother. He was informed
Pamela had gone home. Although he was still in possession of his cell phone,
he did not attempt to call her, nor did he ask the officers if he could call his
mother from a police telephone. A few seconds later, he summoned an officer
and said, “I did it.” He gave a detailed confession to the offenses. Lane told the
officers of the location of the knife, ski mask, duct tape, and clothing he had been
wearing. He stated he entered the residence with a key he had retained.
The officers obtained search warrants for Lane’s person, vehicle, and
home. They took a new sample of the blood on Lane’s knee. In searching
Lane’s home, the officers found the items used in the offenses in the areas
where Lane said they would be located. J.C.’s blood was found on the knife, the
duct tape, Lane’s pants, his sock, and his knee.
Lane was charged with burglary in the first degree, in violation of Iowa
Code section 713.3, and sexual abuse in the second degree, in violation of
section 709.3. Lane filed a motion to suppress, claiming (1) he was denied his
rights under section 804.20 because he was not permitted to see his mother; (2)
5
he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights; and (3) he did not
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently consent to a search of his person.
After a hearing, the district court denied the motion to suppress. The court
found Lane had not been denied his rights under section 804.20. The court
determined the Miranda warning was properly administered, and Lane
understood and acknowledged those rights. The court additionally concluded
Lane voluntarily consented to a search of his person.
Lane requested a bench trial. The district court found Lane guilty of first-
degree burglary and second-degree sexual abuse. The court specifically found,
“J.C.’s testimony was highly credible.” The court found the knife used by Lane
was a dangerous weapon because he actually used it in such a manner as to
indicate he intended to inflict death or serious injury upon another person, and
the knife was clearly capable of inflicting death when used as intended. The
court also found Lane broke into the residence, even though he used a key,
because he did not have the right or privilege to enter the home at that time, and
his use of the key was unauthorized. Furthermore, he did not have permission or
authority to enter J.C.’s bedroom.
Lane was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five
years on each offense, to be served consecutively. He now appeals.
II. Motion to Suppress
A. Lane contends the district court should have granted his motion to
suppress his statements to officers because he was denied his right under
section 804.20 to consult a family member. He asserts that when he asked to
6
see his mother officers should have done more to facilitate his request. He
states that rather than merely stating his mother was no longer at the police
station, the officer should have taken some affirmative action to ensure he was
able to speak to his mother. He states the officer should have informed him he
could call her. He also points out it would not have taken her long to return to the
station, where he could see her as he requested.
Section 804.20 provides:
Any peace officer or other person having custody of any
person arrested or restrained of the person’s liberty for any reason
whatever, shall permit that person, without unnecessary delay after
arrival at the place of detention, to call, consult, and see a member
of the person’s family or an attorney of the person’s choice, or both.
We first determine whether a defendant has invoked his rights under section
804.20. State v. Hicks, 791 N.W.2d 89, 94 (Iowa 2010). We then consider
whether the defendant was afforded the rights guaranteed by section 804.20. Id.
We review the district court’s ruling for the correction of errors at law. State v.
Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d 667, 671 (Iowa 2005).
Lane asked an officer, “Can I see my mom, please?” This invoked his
rights under section 804.20. “[O]nce section 804.20 is invoked the peace officer
must provide the detainee ‘with a reasonable opportunity’ to contact a family
member or attorney.” Hicks, 791 N.W.2d at 96 (citation omitted). “We hold that
once section 804.20 is invoked, the detaining officer must direct the detainee to
the phone and invite the detainee to place his call or obtain the phone number
from the detainee and place the phone call himself.” Id. at 97. On appeal, the
State concedes that in order to fulfill the requirements of section 804.20, the
7
officer should have advised Lane of his right to call his mother or given him an
opportunity to see her.
In general, if a defendant’s rights pursuant to section 804.20 have been
violated, evidence obtained as a result of the violation should be excluded. See
State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Iowa 1978). However, if a defendant’s
statement “was spontaneous, the statement should be admitted into evidence
because the exclusion of such statements is not implicated by a violation of Iowa
Code section 804.20.” Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d at 675. When a defendant’s
statement is spontaneous, the Vietor exclusionary rule does not apply. Id.; see
also State v. Garrity, 765 N.W.2d 592, 597 (Iowa 2009) (“The exclusionary rule
extends to . . . non-spontaneous statements obtained after unnecessary delay in
allowing the person the statutory right to consult with an attorney or family
member.”).
The district court found, “It is also important to note that it was the
defendant who initiated the contact with law enforcement to give his confession
and that his confession was given spontaneously and voluntarily rather than as a
result of law enforcement questioning.” We find no error in the court’s conclusion
Lane’s statements were given spontaneously. Lane was alone in the interview
room when he indicated he wanted to speak to an officer. The officer did not ask
him any questions at that time. Lane told the officer, “I did it” and gave a detailed
confession to the offenses. Because Lane’s statements were spontaneous, the
exclusionary rule does not apply. See Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d at 675. We
8
conclude the district court properly denied Lane’s motion to suppress based on
his claims under section 804.20.
B. Lane asserts the district court should have granted his motion to
suppress because the waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent. He claims the waiver was not valid because he was particularly
vulnerable to the influence of law enforcement and the waiver was obtained
under intimidating circumstances.1
The State has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. State v.
Harris, 741 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2007).
To determine whether a suspect’s waiver of his or her Miranda
rights was knowing and intelligent, we must inquire if the suspect
knew that he or she did not have to speak to the police without
counsel and understood that statements provided to the police
could be used against him or her.
State v. Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d 244, 252 (Iowa 2009). Our review on this
constitutional issue is de novo. State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Iowa
2014). “[W]e give deference to the factual findings of the district court due to its
opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, but are not bound by such
findings.” State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 377 (Iowa 2007).
An officer verbally informed Lane of his Miranda rights at the time he was
told he was no longer free to leave the police station. The officer stated, “Do you
1
Lane also claims he should have been given a written waiver form. There is no
requirement a defendant be given a written waiver form. “Miranda warnings may be
orally transmitted to a subject in custody and the waiver of rights attendant thereto may
be oral or may be inferred from the facts.” State v. Bowers, 656 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Iowa
2002).
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understand?” and Lane replied, “Yep.” Lane was then left alone in the interview
room for a period of time. He was not questioned by the officers after he was
informed of his rights. After a period of time, Lane asked to speak to his mother.
Shortly after that he told an officer “I did it” and gave a detailed confession to the
offenses.
At the suppression hearing, Pamela testified Lane “struggled a lot in
school,” needing speech therapy and occupational therapy. He was a high
school graduate. Pamela stated Lane was nonassertive and nonconfrontational.
Lane was twenty-one years old at the time, just ten days away from turning
twenty-two. He had no previous criminal record, except for a speeding ticket.
The district court determined:
Defendant’s Miranda warning was properly administered. There is
nothing in the record to suggest that defendant did not understand
his rights. Defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation.
Rather, defendant subsequently confessed without prompting by
law enforcement in any way. Defendant’s statements were “freely
volunteered without compelling influences.”
(Citation omitted.)
We agree with the district court’s conclusion. Lane’s statements were not
due to the influence of officers, nor were they obtained under intimidating
circumstances, because Lane was alone in a room, not subject to interrogation,
approached an officer, and made incriminating statements. We determine the
district court properly denied Lane’s motion to suppress on this issue.
C. Lane claims he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
consent to a search of his person. Lane asserts officers obtained DNA samples
from his person, including a sample of the dried blood on his knee, without
10
obtaining a valid consent. He states his consent was the result of duress or
coercion. Lane points out that he consented to a search of his person prior to
being informed of his Miranda rights.
In general, a warrantless search is considered to be per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 568 (Iowa 2012).
One of the exceptions to the warrant requirement are searches based on
consent. Id. “[T]he validity of a consent to search is whether the consent was
voluntarily given and not a result of duress or coercion, express or implied.”
State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 777 (Iowa 2011). We consider a defendant’s
characteristics,
such as age, education, intelligence, sobriety, and experience with
the law; and features of the context in which the consent was given,
such as the length of detention or questioning, the substance of any
discussion between the [consenter] and police preceding the
consent, whether the [consenter] was free to leave or was subject
to restraint, and whether the [consenter’s] contemporaneous
reaction to the search was consistent with consent.
Lane, 726 N.W.2d at 378.
Whether a defendant’s consent is voluntary is a question of fact, to be
determined from all the circumstances. Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 777. It is the State’s
burden to show consent was voluntary. Lane, 726 N.W.2d at 378. Again, our
review on this constitutional issue is de novo. Short, 851 N.W.2d at 478.
Officers went to the home of Lane’s parents on the morning of September
27, 2013, at about 5:41 a.m.2 Lane’s mother, Pamela, answered the door, and
they told her they needed to speak to Lane. Pamela woke him up, and he met
2
There was evidence Lane worked a “third-shift type schedule,” where he often stayed
up until 5:00 or 6:00 a.m. and then slept into the afternoon.
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the officers on the front porch. The officers told Lane there had been an incident
at his former residence and asked him to come to the police station for an
interview. Lane asked if he could talk to them at his house, but the officers
stated they preferred for him to come to the station, and he agreed. Pamela
drove him to the police station.
At the station, Pamela asked if she could accompany Lane, but because
he was an adult, the officers stated they would speak to him alone. Lane was
taken to an interview room, where he was informed he was free to leave at any
time. He retained possession of his cell phone throughout the interview. The
interview was described as “cordial,” and “[j]ust normal conversation,” by the two
officers conducting the interview. Lane responded appropriately to the officers’
questions. The interview was videotaped.
Lane was wearing shorts, and the officers observed dried blood on his
knee. The officers asked to take a sample of the blood and to take a swab of the
inside of Lane’s mouth (to obtain a sample of his DNA). Lane was informed he
had the option to refuse to give his consent. Lane said, “I guess so.” He then
signed a written consent form. The written form states, “I have been informed of
my rights under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of
America, which states that I am secure from an unreasonable search and
seizure.”
The district court found:
In obtaining consent, there is nothing in the record which
would indicate that defendant was threatened in any way to provide
consent. No promises of leniency or promises of any kind were
made to the defendant to obtain his consent. Examining the totality
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of the circumstances, in light of all of the evidence presented at
hearing, the court concludes that the consent was given freely,
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Defendant was specifically
informed that he did not have to consent.
On our de novo review, we agree with the district court’s conclusions.
After examining the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the State met its
burden to show Lane’s consent to a search of his person was voluntary. The
evidence does not support Lane’s claim he was subjected to duress or coercion.
Lane was twenty-one years old and had a high school education. He had been
questioned for about one hour and twenty minutes when he consented to the
search. There is no evidence the officers engaged in aggressive or intimidating
tactics or that they improperly made promises of leniency. Lane was specifically
informed he was free to leave the interview room at any time and he was free to
withhold his consent to the search. We affirm the district court’s decision denying
Lane’s motion to suppress on the ground he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently consent to a search of his person.3
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Lane contends there is insufficient evidence in the record to support
his conviction for first-degree burglary. He asserts the State did not present
sufficient evidence to show he broke into the residence. He states the term
“break” implies damage or improper force. Lane claims he did not “break” into
the residence because he used a key and did not use improper force or cause
any damage.
3
Because we have affirmed based on the district court’s ruling that Lane voluntarily
consented to a search of his person, we do not address the State’s alternative
arguments based on the inevitable discovery doctrine.
13
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for the correction
of errors at law. State v. Keopasaeuth, 645 N.W.2d 637, 639-40 (Iowa 2002).
“The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including
all reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 640.
A verdict will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. State v.
Sanford, 804 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012). “Evidence is considered substantial
if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it can convince a rational
jury that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. We consider all
of the evidence in the record not just the evidence supporting the verdict. State
v. Dalton, 674 N.W.2d 111, 116 (Iowa 2004).
The trial information alleged that Lane committed first-degree burglary by:
Having the intent to commit a felony or assault therein and having
no right, license, or privilege to do so breaks an occupied structure
in which one or more persons are present and has possession of a
dangerous weapon or performs or participates in a sex act
constituting sexual abuse.
The definition of burglary in section 713.1 applies to a person having the intent to
commit a felony, assault, or theft who enters an occupied structure or who breaks
an occupied structure. The trial information in this case only refers to the
alternative of a person “who breaks an occupied structure.” See Iowa Code
§ 713.1.
The meaning of the term “breaking” was discussed in State v. Houghland,
197 N.W.2d 364, 365 (Iowa 1972), where the court stated, “‘Breaking’ means
making an opening into a building by trespass and occurs when an intruder
removes or puts aside some part of the structure relied on as an obstruction to
14
intrusion. Opening an entrance door is a breaking.” See also State v. Clay, 213
N.W.2d 473, 480 (Iowa 1973) (quoting Houghland, 197 N.W.2d at 365).
“Breaking” has also been defined as “the act of entering a building without
permission.” State v. McCall, 754 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 201 (8th ed. 2004)).
We determine there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
district court’s conclusion, “Defendant clearly removed and put aside obstructions
to enter the front doorway of [the residence] and the doorway to J.C.’s private
room at that address.” Lane opened the entrance door to the residence and the
entrance door to J.C.’s bedroom. There is sufficient evidence in the record to
show Lane broke into an occupied structure.
B. Lane claims there is insufficient evidence in the record to show he
did not have permission or authority to enter the residence. He states he had a
“blanket privilege” to enter the residence. He asserts other tenants knew he still
had a key and continued to use it. He also states it was common for him to enter
the house without asking for permission.
As an element of burglary, the State must prove a defendant did not have
the right, license, or privilege to enter a structure. State v. Franklin, 368 N.W.2d
716, 718 (Iowa 1985). A person does not commit burglary “if the person entering
has a right to do so, although he may intend to commit, and may actually commit,
a felony.” State v. Peck, 539 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa 1995). A defendant does
not commit burglary if the residents of a house acquiesce to the defendant’s
presence or give him implied consent to enter. State v. King, 344 N.W.2d 562,
15
563 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). A person who has a general right of entry, however,
may be guilty of burglary “if he exceeds his rights either with respect to the time
of entering or the place into which he enters.” Peck, 539 N.W.2d at 173.
Only one of the tenants at the residence, Johnson, was aware Lane still
had a key to the residence, and he had never seen Lane use it. Johnson
testified Lane came over when he was invited, and he did not have any right or
authority to be in the house on his own. The evidence shows Lane did not have
a general right of entry to the residence, except when he was specifically invited
over. Even if Lane had a general right of entry to the common areas of the
residence, he did not have the right to enter the bedrooms of the tenants, which
they uniformly testified were considered private. Furthermore, J.C. specifically
testified Lane did not have permission to enter her bedroom. On cross-
examination Lane also stated he did not have the right to ever go into J.C.’s
personal bedroom. We find there is sufficient evidence in the record to show
Lane did not have the right, license, or privilege to enter the residence or J.C.
private bedroom.
C. Lane asserts there is insufficient evidence in the record to show he
was armed with a dangerous weapon. The information alleged Lane committed
first-degree burglary under section 713.3(1)(b) (“The person has possession of a
dangerous weapon.”) or 713.3(1)(d) (“The person performs or participates in a
sex act with any person which would constitute sexual abuse.”). The trial
information also alleged Lane committed second-degree sexual abuse under
section 709.3(1) (“During the commission of sexual abuse the person displays in
16
a threatening manner a dangerous weapon, or uses or threatens to use force
creating a substantial risk of death or serious injury to any person.”). Lane claims
there is insufficient evidence to show he used the knife in a manner to indicate he
intended to inflict death or serious injury upon another.
The term “dangerous weapon” is defined in section 702.7:
A “dangerous weapon” is any instrument or device designed
primarily for use in inflicting death or injury upon a human being or
animal, and which is capable of inflicting death upon a human being
when used in the manner for which it was designed, . . . .
Additionally, any instrument or device of any sort whatsoever which
is actually used in such a manner as to indicate that the defendant
intends to inflict death or serious injury upon the other, and which,
when so used, is capable of inflicting death upon a human being, is
a dangerous weapon.
The parties agree the knife used in this case did not have a blade exceeding five
inches in length, and therefore, was not a dangerous weapon per se. See Iowa
Code § 702.7.
The State asserts there was substantial evidence in the record to show
Lane actually used the knife in a manner so as to indicate he intended to inflict
death or serious injury upon J.C., and the knife was capable of inflicting death
upon a human being. “[A]n accused satisfies this definitional requirement when
the accused objectively manifests to the victim his or her intent to inflict serious
harm upon the victim.” State v. Ortiz, 789 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Iowa 2010). “[A]
defendant objectively indicates intent to inflict harm when the defendant engages
in a personal confrontation with another while possessing an instrument capable
of causing bodily harm.” Id.
17
The knife used by Lane was nine inches long, with a blade four and one-
eighth inches long. Lane stated he brought the knife to J.C.’s bedroom because
he wanted to scare her. When he entered the room, he told J.C., “If you scream,
I’ll kill you,” and held the knife against her arm. He continued to hold the knife to
her as he tore off her shirt and slapped her breasts. J.C. told a nurse Lane told
her, “he would cut her or harm her if she would move or scream and the threat
was to cut her throat.” We conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to
show Lane objectively manifested to J.C. his intent to inflict serious harm upon
her. See id. This satisfied the definitional requirement to show he actually used
the knife in a manner to indicate he intended to inflict death or serious injury upon
another. See id. Lane does not dispute the knife was capable of inflicting death
upon a human being. We conclude there is substantial evidence to show Lane
was armed with a dangerous weapon.
D. Finally, Lane claims there is not sufficient evidence in the record to
show he used or threatened to use force creating a substantial risk of death or
serious injury. He asserts he did not use sufficient force to create a substantial
risk of death or serious injury. He states that while J.C. was injured, she was
able to be treated and she healed completely.
Under section 709.3(1), a person commits sexual abuse in the second
degree when “During the commission of sexual abuse the person displays in a
threatening manner a dangerous weapon, or uses or threatens to use force
creating a substantial risk of death or serious injury to any person.” (Emphasis
added.) “Violations of section 709.3 include acts of sexual abuse where the
18
person displays a dangerous weapon, or uses or threatens force creating a
substantial risk of death or serious injury to any person.” State v. Oliver, 812
N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2012). There is no requirement that the defendant
actually causes death or serious injury to the victim. State v. Taylor, 538 N.W.2d
314, 315-16 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
The evidence shows that while displaying a knife, Lane threatened to kill
J.C. There was also evidence he threatened “he would cut her or harm her if she
would move or scream and the threat was to cut her throat.” Thus, there is
substantial evidence to show he threatened to use force creating a substantial
risk of death or serious injury.
We affirm Lane’s convictions.
AFFIRMED.