Bobby Joe Stouffer, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1606
Filed January 13, 2016
BOBBY JOE STOUFFER,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Richard G. Blane II,
Judge.
Applicant challenges the dismissal of his second application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Matthew G. Sease of Kemp & Sease, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ. Blane, J.,
takes no part.
2
MCDONALD, Judge.
In 2007, Bobby Stouffer was convicted of murder in the second degree
and sentenced to a term of incarceration not to exceed fifty years. The facts and
circumstances surrounding the murder are set forth in two prior appellate
decisions and need not be repeated here. See Stouffer v. State, No. 12-0932,
2013 WL 5498060, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2013); State v. Stouffer, No. 07-
0693, 2008 WL 5234353, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2008).
By way of background, on direct appeal, Stouffer claimed there was
insufficient evidence to corroborate inculpatory statements he made to detectives
and three different jailhouse informants. Stouffer also claimed the district court
erroneously denied his motion for mistrial following the inadvertent publication to
the jury of certain portions of Stouffer’s multiple interviews with police. This court
affirmed Stouffer’s conviction. See Stouffer, 2008 WL 5234353, at *8.
Procedendo issued on February 23, 2009.
In his first application for postconviction relief, Stouffer challenged the
venue of his trial, claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly
counsel him concerning his right to testify, and claimed his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to effectively impeach jailhouse informant Terance
Edgington. The postconviction court denied Stouffer’s application, and this court
affirmed. See Stouffer, 2013 WL 5498060, at *7.
This appeal arises out of the district court’s dismissal of Stouffer’s second
application for postconviction relief. Stouffer filed the application on November
26, 2013, almost five years after procedendo issued in his direct appeal. The
3
application sets forth several claims for relief, including a claim Stouffer’s trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach witness Edgington. Specifically,
Stouffer argued Edgington may have received sentencing concessions in a
federal case after testifying at Stouffer’s trial. The State moved for summary
judgment. With respect to this particular claim, the State argued the claim was
time-barred, was barred res judicata, and was too nebulous to warrant relief.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss with respect to this particular
claim, concluding Stouffer should have the opportunity to recast his claim with
greater specificity. In response to the district court ruling, Stouffer filed several
pro se motions essentially seeking more time to obtain Edgington’s criminal
history records. The district court denied Stouffer’s motions and ultimately
dismissed Stouffer’s second application for postconviction relief.
We conclude the district court correctly granted the State’s motion for
summary judgment. Stouffer’s claim regarding impeachment evidence is barred
by the statute of limitations. See Iowa Code § 822.3 (2013) (“All other
applications must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or
decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of
procedendo is issued.”). The ground-of-fact exception to the statute of limitations
is inapplicable here. See Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 520-21 (Iowa
2003) (setting forth the showing required to succeed on the ground-of-fact
exception to the statute of limitations). On cross-examination, Edgington
admitted he had pleaded guilty to the federal offense at issue and also admitted
to several state convictions. The sentencing information is thus not relevant
4
within the meaning of Harrington. See id. Further, Stouffer presented the same
or largely the same claim in his first application for postconviction relief. His
claim is thus barred res judicata. See Iowa Code § 822.8 (“Any ground finally
adjudicated or not raised, or knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived in the
proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence, or in any other proceeding
the applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent
application . . . .”); Holmes v. State, 775 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009)
(“A postconviction proceeding is not intended as a vehicle for relitigation, on the
same factual basis, of issues previously adjudicated, and the principle of res
judicata bars additional litigation on this point.”).
AFFIRMED.