State of Iowa v. Joshua David Johnson ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0870
Filed July 19, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOSHUA DAVID JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, Annette J.
Scieszinski, Judge.
A defendant challenges his sentence following a probation revocation
hearing. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., McDonald, J., and Blane, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2017).
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BLANE, Senior Judge.
After engaging in sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old he believed to
be eighteen, Joshua Johnson was charged with sexual abuse in the third degree,
in violation of Iowa Code section 709.4(1)(b)(3)(d) (2015). While the case was
pending, Johnson violated the conditions of his pretrial release by marrying his
girlfriend and living with her two-year-old daughter. Johnson then pled guilty to
the charged offense. At sentencing, judgment was deferred, and Johnson was
placed on probation for three years. Johnson filed a pro se motion to terminate
the probation requirement, titled “Why Probation Won’t Do Any Good.” Johnson
argued he had no sexual desire for minors, and therefore, his probation
requirement limiting contact with minors, including his step-daughter, was
misguided and arbitrary. The district court denied his motion. Subsequently,
Johnson violated his probation, including by having continued contact with his
step-daughter. The district court revoked Johnson’s probation and deferred
judgment and imposed a ten-year sentence. Johnson now appeals.
I. Standard of Review
We review challenges to terms of probation for abuse of discretion. See
State v. Valin, 724 N.W.2d 440, 444 (Iowa 2006). Our “task on appeal is not to
second guess the decision made by the district court, but to determine if it was
unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 445.
II. Analysis
Johnson argues the terms of his probation were not reasonably related to
his rehabilitation or the protection of the community. See Iowa Code § 907.6(providing the court may impose reasonable conditions on probation that promote
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rehabilitation or community protection). “A condition of probation promotes the
rehabilitation of the defendant or the protection of the community when it
addresses some problem or need identified with the defendant, or some threat
posed to the community by the defendant.” Valin, 724 N.W.2d at 446 (citations
omitted). “A condition is reasonable when it relates to the defendant’s
circumstances in a reasonable manner, and is justified by the defendant’s
circumstances.” Id. (citations omitted).
In contrast, a condition is “not reasonable if it is found to be ‘unnecessarily
harsh or excessive in achieving the goals’ of rehabilitation and community
protection.” State v. Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d 288, 299 (Iowa 2010) (citation
omitted).
A reasonable nexus must exist between any special
condition of probation and the crime for which it is imposed. A
condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is
not itself criminal is valid only if that conduct is reasonably related
to the crime of which defendant was convicted or to future
criminality.
Id.In Lathrop, the supreme court held it was unnecessarily excessive for a
probation term to prohibit all unsanctioned contact with minors and instructed the
district court to craft “a more realistic and precise condition” related to the goals
of probation. Id. at 301. Johnson here alleges his probation agreement suffers
from the same deficiency.
The court in Lathrop distinguished its facts from another case, State v.
Hall, 740 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007), in which our court held
reasonable a similar prohibition “because the restriction contain[ed] an exception
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for ‘incidental contact in public places where other responsible adults are
present.’” While Johnson’s probation agreement contains the same language
held unreasonable in Lathrop—requiring pre-approval for any contact with a
minor—Johnson’s sex offender treatment contract contains similar language to
that of Hall: “Incidental contact with minors is not prohibited, but is to be reported
to treatment staff and [the] supervising officer.” The record suggests Johnson is
expected to comply with both the probation agreement and sex offender
treatment contract. As a result, we think the language of the probation
agreement is improper unless the probation agreement text is interpreted
together with the language of the sex offender treatment contract, allowing
incidental contact with minors.
Nonetheless, we affirm the judgment of the district court. First, the
probation violations alleged against Johnson did not involve incidental contact;
they involved living with a minor child. That living arrangement would violate
even the reasonable Hall prohibition. Second, Johnson was charged with
multiple separate probation violations, including: terminating his mental-health
counseling, missing curfew several times, skipping group treatment on multiple
occasions, failing to report contact with law enforcement to his supervising
officer, quitting employment without permission or approval from his supervising
officer, missing an appointment with his supervising officer, and lying to his
supervising officer about his living arrangement. The court excused one of
Johnson’s absences from group treatment due to a death in the family but
otherwise found all these allegations credible and proven by a preponderance of
the evidence. Even if Johnson were right about the challenged ground, the other
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grounds “adequately support the revocation order.” State v. Farmer, 234 N.W.2d
89, 91 (Iowa 1975).
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.