State of Iowa v. Rachel Elizabeth Clay ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 11-1946
Filed July 16, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RACHEL ELIZABETH CLAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, James D. Coil,
District Associate Judge.
Defendant appeals her conviction for domestic abuse assault, enhanced.
AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney
General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, Sue Swan and Shana Guthrie,
Assistant County Attorneys, and Stephanie Koltookian, Student Legal Intern, for
appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., Doyle, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2013).
2
MAHAN, S.J.
Defendant appeals her conviction for domestic abuse assault, enhanced.
She claims her equal protection rights were violated when the prosecutor struck
the only African-American on the jury panel. The prosecutor gave sufficient
racially-neutral reasons for striking the juror—his previous conviction, his
employment, and a relative had been a victim of a crime. The prosecutor had
eliminated other prospective jurors for these same reasons. We affirm the
decision of the district court denying defendant’s challenge based on Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and affirm her conviction.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings.
On September 17, 2010, Rachel Clay was charged with domestic abuse
assault causing bodily injury, enhanced. The State alleged Clay had injured her
ex-husband and that she had a prior conviction for domestic abuse assault
causing bodily injury.
The jury trial commenced on September 6, 2011. During the jury selection
process, the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to strike Sauya Ammar, the
only African-American on the jury panel. Clay, who is also an African-American,
objected on the basis of Batson. The prosecutor gave three reasons for striking
Ammar: (1) he had a previous conviction for operating while intoxicated (OWI);
(2) he worked at the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS); and (3) his
cousin had been murdered. The prosecutor noted she had eliminated other
prospective jurors for these same reasons. The district court concluded the
prosecutor’s reasons for striking Ammar were racially neutral.
3
The jury found Clay guilty of the lesser-included offense of domestic
abuse assault. The offense was an aggravated misdemeanor due to Clay’s
previous conviction for domestic abuse assault. See Iowa Code § 708.2A(3)(b)
(2009). She was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed two years,
with all but seven days suspended. Clay now appeals her conviction, claiming
her equal protection rights were violated when the prosecutor struck the only
African-American on the jury panel.
II. Standard of Review.
On constitutional issues, our review is de novo. State v. Mootz, 808
N.W.2d 207, 214 (Iowa 2012). “In cases where the prosecution has been
accused of using strikes to engage in purposeful racial discrimination, we have
given a great deal of deference to the district court’s evaluation of credibility
when determining the true motives of the attorney when making strikes.” Id.
III. Merits.
It is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause if the State excludes
members of the defendant’s race from the jury due to purposeful racial
discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. A defendant has the burden to present
“a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the
relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 93-94.
Once this showing has been made, “the burden shifts to the State to explain
adequately the racial exclusion.” Id. at 94. The State must show it used
permissibly racially-neutral selection criteria. Id.
On appeal, the State contends Clay did not present a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination. Before the district court, however, the prosecutor did
4
not argue this aspect of the case, but instead immediately began explaining her
reasons for excluding Ammar. Even if we assume Clay presented a prima facie
case, however, the dispositive issue is whether the State met its burden to
articulate a clear and reasonably specific racially neutral explanation for its
action. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (“Once a
prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges
and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination,
the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing
becomes moot.”).
The prosecutor stated:
Well, Your Honor, the State did consider [Ammar’s] OWI in
deciding that he was inappropriate. We think—previously to this I
eliminated people with a history, but I also struck Jennifer Oliver.
Her brother is awaiting a trial in a criminal case.
I would also note that he works at DHS. I don’t know what
job he has there at DHS. But I also struck Miss Boatright that
works at DHS for reasons that may have to come into with family
strife.
I struck Mr. Ammar, whose cousin was murdered. We struck
Miss Praska, whose son was murdered. And also Miss Key, who
had a son who was murdered. And also I struck Miss Boatright,
who has a son and daughter who previously were incarcerated, and
Miss Smith whose nephew was in prison for drugs. I did strike a
good number because family members or themselves had been
victims or been charged with crimes. So for those three reasons—
Mr. Ammar’s place of employment, his previous conviction, and the
fact that his cousin was a crime victim.
The district court heard the prosecutor’s explanation and stated, “I do find
that the reasons for Mr. Ammar being stricken as a member of this jury are
racially neutral.” We give “a great deal of deference to the district court’s
evaluation of credibility when determining the true motives of the attorney when
making strikes.” Mootz, 808 N.W.2d at 214. On our de novo review we agree
5
with the district court’s conclusion. For each of the reasons given by the
prosecutor for striking Ammar, the prosecutor had excluded at least one other
juror who was not African-American for the same reason. We determine the
State met its burden to articulate a clear and reasonably specific racially-neutral
explanation for striking the only African-American on the jury panel.
We affirm the decision of the district court denying Clay’s Batson
challenge. We affirm her conviction for domestic abuse assault, enhanced.
AFFIRMED.