State of Iowa v. Loren Anton Goodwin ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1407
Filed August 2, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
LOREN ANTON GOODWIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Paul G. Crawford,
District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals his guilty plea. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Andrew J. Boettger of Hastings, Gartin & Boettger, L.L.P., Ames, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., Doyle, J., and Goodhue, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2017).
2
VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
Loren Goodwin appeals his conviction following his guilty plea to driving
while barred as a habitual offender, in violation of Iowa Code sections 321.560
and 321.561 (2016). Goodwin claims his plea was not knowing and voluntary
because he was not fully advised about the consequences of his plea.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On February 26, 2016, the State charged Goodwin with operating a motor
vehicle while barred as a habitual offender. On May 13, 2016, Goodwin agreed
to plead guilty; in exchange, the State agreed to recommend a sentence of ninety
days of work release. The written plea of guilty signed by Goodwin disclosed the
maximum prison sentence and the maximum and minimum fine Goodwin faced,
but it did not disclose the applicable criminal surcharge on the fine.1 On July 27,
the district court entered and sentenced Goodwin to one year in jail with all but
ninety days suspended. The court suspended the applicable fine and surcharge.
Goodwin appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“We ordinarily review challenges to guilty pleas for correction of errors at
law.” State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 2016).
1
Goodwin also challenges his plea because the plea form did not disclose court costs or
the revocation of his driver’s license. As we reverse based on Goodwin’s surcharge
claim, we decline to address these issues.
3
III. Guilty Plea
A. Error Preservation
In order to challenge a guilty plea on direct appeal, a defendant must
normally file a motion in arrest of judgment. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(d) (“The
court shall inform the defendant that any challenges to a plea of guilty based on
alleged defects in the plea proceedings must be raised in a motion in arrest of
judgment and that failure to so raise such challenges shall preclude the right to
assert them on appeal.”). “A defendant’s failure to challenge the adequacy of a
guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude the
defendant’s right to assert such challenge on appeal.” Iowa R. Crim. P.
2.24(3)(a); see also State v. Meron, 675 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Iowa 2004)
(“Generally, a defendant must file a motion in arrest of judgment to preserve a
challenge to a guilty plea on appeal.”). However, this bar does not apply when a
defendant is not given an adequate motion-in-arrest-of-judgment advisory.
Fisher, 877 N.W.2d at 680.
Here, the State concedes Goodwin was not adequately advised about the
consequences of failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment. Upon our review of
the written plea agreement, we concur. Thus, Goodwin may challenge his guilty
plea on direct appeal. See id.
B. Merits
Goodwin claims that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary
because he was not fully advised about the consequences of his plea,
specifically, the applicable surcharge that applied to the fine he was potentially
subject to.
4
In Fisher, our supreme court determined that defendants must be
informed of surcharges because surcharges are part of the maximum possible
punishment under rule 2.8(2)(b)(2).2 Id. at 685–86. Yet, the court left open the
question whether failure to fully inform a defendant about the applicable
surcharges on its own renders a guilty plea unknowing and involuntary:
Because we are vacating Fisher’s plea and sentence and
remanding for further proceedings anyway based on failure to
disclose the mandatory license suspension, we need not decide
today whether failure to disclose the surcharges alone would have
meant the plea did not substantially comply with rule 2.8(2)(b)(2).
Regardless, we hold that actual compliance with rule 2.8(2)(b)(2)
requires disclosure of all applicable chapter 911 surcharges.
Id. at 686 n.6. Thus, in this case, we must decide whether Goodwin’s plea
substantially complied with rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) despite the failure to disclose the
applicable surcharge.
“Under the substantial-compliance standard, a trial court is not required to
advise a defendant of his rights using the precise language of the rule; it is
sufficient that the defendant be informed of his rights in such a way that he is
made aware of them.” State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Iowa 2002).
“Substantial compliance requires that the essence of each requirement of the
2
Rule 2.8(2)(b) provides:
b. Pleas of guilty. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty,
and shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea
is made voluntarily and intelligently and has a factual basis. Before
accepting a plea of guilty, the court must address the defendant
personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that
the defendant understands, the following:
....
(2) The mandatory minimum punishment, if any, and the
maximum possible punishment provided by the statute defining the
offense to which the plea is offered.
5
rule be expressed to allow the court to perform its important role in each case.”
Meron, 675 N.W.2d at 544.
Goodwin’s written plea did inform him of the minimum and maximum fine,
but it omitted the increase caused by application of the mandatory surcharge.
The omission resulted in Goodwin being misinformed as to the potential total
minimum and maximum amount he may have been required to pay. See State v.
Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 21–22 (Iowa 2001) (holding failure to inform defendant
about possible partial waiver of mandatory minimum sentence “was tantamount
to a failure to advise her of the maximum possible punishment”). As Goodwin
was not fully informed as to the mandatory surcharge attached to the minimum
and maximum possible fine that could be imposed following his guilty plea, we
conclude the plea was not knowing and voluntary.
IV. Conclusion
Because we conclude Goodwin’s plea was not knowing and voluntary, we
vacate his conviction and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Goodhue, S.J., concurs; Doyle, J., dissents.
6
DOYLE, Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent for the reasons articulated in the dissent in State v.
Weitzel, No. 16-1112, 2017 WL 1735743, at *11-17 (Iowa Ct. App. May 3, 2017).