In the Interest of Z.Y., G.Y., K.Y., and G.Y., Minor Children, H.Y., Mother, G.Y., Father of G.Y., K.Y., and G.y, S.y, Father of Z.Y. ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0900
Filed August 2, 2017
IN THE INTEREST OF Z.Y., G.Y., K.Y., and G.Y.,
Minor Children,
H.Y., Mother,
Appellant,
G.Y., Father of G.Y., K.Y., and G.Y,
Appellant,
S.Y, Father of Z.Y.,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Nancy S. Tabor,
Judge.
Parents appeal the termination of their parental rights. AFFIRMED ON
ALL APPEALS.
Patrick J. Kelly, Bettendorf, for appellant mother.
Michael A. Woods of Zamora, Taylor, Woods & Frederick, Davenport, for
appellant father G.Y.
Barbara E. Maness, Davenport, for appellant father S.Y.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ana Dixit, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
2
Neill A. Kroeger, LeClaire, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ. Tabor, J.,
takes no part.
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DOYLE, Judge.
H.Y. is the mother of four children; her eldest was born in 2009 and her
youngest in 2015. S.Y. is the father of the oldest child, and G.Y. is the father of
the three younger children. In May 2017, the juvenile court terminated the
parents’ parental rights to their children,1 finding grounds for termination under
several paragraphs of Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2017), including paragraph
(f) as to the children aged four and older, and paragraph (h) as to the child under
four.
Each parent appeals the court’s order. The mother challenges the
grounds for termination found by the court and the court’s determination that
termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interests, arguing she
should have been given additional time for reunification. G.Y. similarly
challenges the court’s grounds-for-termination and best-interests findings, but he
also claims he was not provided reasonable reunification services. S.Y. likewise
maintains he was not provided reasonable services for reunification and argues
termination of his parental rights was not in his child’s best interests, but he only
challenges an element of one of the four grounds for termination found by the
juvenile court.
Parental rights may be terminated under Iowa Code chapter 232 if the
following three conditions are true: (1) a “ground for termination under section
232.116(1) has been established” by clear and convincing evidence, (2) “the
best-interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2) supports the termination
1
Though we recognize S.Y. only has the one child, we use the plural “children” for ease
of reference unless otherwise stated.
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of parental rights,” and (3) none of the “exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to
preclude termination of parental rights.” In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219-20
(Iowa 2016). However, prior to termination of a parent’s parental rights, the State
must make reasonable efforts “to make it possible for the child to safely return to
the family’s home.” Iowa Code § 232.102(6)(b); In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147
(Iowa 2002). Our review is de novo, and, where the juvenile court had found
several statutory grounds for termination, “we may affirm the juvenile court’s
termination order on any ground that we find supported by clear and convincing
evidence.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010).
Grounds for Termination and Reasonable Efforts. Each parent argues
the State failed to prove the children could not be returned to that parent’s care at
the time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, an element the State must
prove in paragraphs (f) and (h) of section 232.116(1) to support termination
under those grounds. Additionally, S.Y. and G.Y. each argue he should have
been permitted to have a trial placement of the children in his home as part of
providing him reasonable services. Upon our de novo review of the record, we
find that reasonable efforts were provided to each parent by the State and the
Iowa Department of Human Services (Department) for reunification with their
children, but the same concerns that led to the children’s removal continued to
exist years later, making the provision of a trial placement inappropriate.
Although the children came to the Department’s attention due to
deplorable housing conditions, “over time, what became overwhelming[ly] clear
was that the children’s needs were not being met.” The social work case
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manager testified the Department had not transitioned to any unsupervised
visitation because the parents, the manager believed, were
incapable of . . . providing safety care for their children. [The
youngest child] is the only one that does not have special
needs, . . . all three other children have special needs, which
include behavioral, as well as some mental health and/or
developmental things. They require a lot, and the parents struggle
with following through on a consistent basis on meeting their own
needs and have demonstrated that would not be different if the kids
were back in their care, and they continue to struggle with
supervision as well.
Two of the children
were not consistently getting to the therapies they needed, the
children’s health needs were not being met; including concerns
regarding [two of the children’s] nutritional health. The
children . . . did not have appropriate rules and expectations within
the home, nor were the children being appropriately supervised.
The parents (including [S.Y.]) had a volatile relationship, often
verbally abusive. Despite many efforts over the years and various
techniques to teach the family the skills needed, the parents have
not been able or willing to make the necessary changes.
[The mother] desperately wants to effectively parent her
children. However, she seems incapable.
[G.Y. and S.Y.] do not seem to have the desire to do
anything differently. As a result, they too have not demonstrated
the ability (or willingness) to safely parent their children.
We agree with the juvenile court’s assessment that after
providing services to this family group for over three years[, n]one
of the parents have been able to sustain appropriate and safe
parenting to these children for extended periods of time. The
period that the children were returned to [the mother and G.Y.’s]
care was evidenced by a steady decline in the safety of the children
resulting in their removal again within a year’s time. [S.Y.’s]
parenting of [his child] on his own lasted only two months.
....
. . . These parents all mean well, but are mentally and
emotionally unable to provide that sustainable care to these
especially needy children who have emotional, mental, physical
and educational needs that exceed the norm and are challenging.
The three year history of this case reveals that. Visitation has not
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yet progressed to unsupervised contact with the parents and
relatives. There are still serious safety concerns in each home.
We conclude the State proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
children could not be returned to the parents’ care at the time of the termination-
of-parental-rights hearing despite the offer or receipt of substantial services.
Consequently, we agree termination of the parents’ parental rights was proper
under paragraphs (f) and (h).
Best Interests and Additional Time. Each parent argues termination of
his or her parental rights was not in the children’s best interests, and the mother
argues she should have been given additional time for reunification. When
considering whether termination of parental rights is in the children’s best
interests, “we ‘shall give primary consideration to the [children’s] safety, to the
best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the [children],
and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the [children].’”
M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 224 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). “While a parent’s
lower mental functioning by itself is not a sufficient ground for termination,” it can
be a relevant consideration if it affects the children’s well-being. In re A.M., 843
N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014). Thus, our “assessment may include whether ‘the
parent’s ability to provide the needs of the [children] is affected by the parent’s
mental capacity or mental condition.’” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 708 (quoting Iowa
Code § 232.116(2)(a)).
Here, all three parents
have diminished capacities, both intellectually and emotionally and
lack intellectual capacity for appropriate oversight and care of the
children. They have a difficult enough time managing their own
needs. Despite the several years of services and their own
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deficiencies, these parents are not equipped to safely and
appropriately care for their children. They all love their children;
however, these children need much more.
Additionally, the “Department, Provider, CASA and Foster Care Review Board
are in agreement that additional time will not impact the parents’ ability to safely
parent; as they lack the capacity to make the necessary changes.” “It is well-
settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has
proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a
parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the
child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010). The children are doing well in
their respective foster homes, and it is clear that any additional time in limbo
would not be in their best interests. Considering all relevant factors, we agree
with the juvenile court that termination of the parents’ parental rights was in the
children’s best interests.2
Because reasonable reunification services were provided to the parents
by the State and the Department, the State proved grounds for termination by
clear and convincing evidence, and termination of the parents’ parental rights at
this time is in the children’s best interests, we affirm the juvenile court’s order
terminating the parents’ parental rights.
AFFIRMED ON ALL APPEALS.
2
Because the parents do not challenge the juvenile court’s determination that none of
the exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude termination of their parental
rights, we need not discuss that consideration. See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40.