State of Iowa v. Adam Donnell Boyd ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0333
Filed September 13, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ADAM DONNELL BOYD,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carol L. Coppola
(plea) and Odell G. McGhee II (sentencing), District Associate Judges.
Adam Boyd appeals the conviction and sentence entered upon his guilty
plea to possession of a controlled substance (first offense). AFFIRMED.
Sandra P. Trevino of Jensen & Trevino, P.C., East Dubuque, Illinois, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
Adam Boyd pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance (first
offense), a serious misdemeanor. See Iowa Code § 124.401(5) (2016). The
district court sentenced him to 365 days in jail, with all but eleven days
suspended, and imposed a fine and surcharges, one year of supervised
probation, and a mandatory driver’s license revocation.
On appeal, Boyd contends (1) the district court abused its discretion in
sentencing him and (2) his plea attorney was ineffective in failing to seek the
suppression of evidence gained in a search of his pocket.
I. Sentencing Decision
The district court gave the following reasons for the sentence:
1. The nature and circumstances of the crime
2. Protection of the public from further offenses
3. Defendant’s criminal history
4. Defendant’s substance abuse history
5. Defendant’s propensity for further criminal acts
6. The Plea Agreement
Boyd argues (1) “[n]othing about the ‘nature and circumstances of the
crime’ suggest that ‘protection of the public from further offenses’ is implicated,”
(2) there was no “testimony or evidence indicating that [he] had a criminal history
meriting a more severe sentence,” (3) the record does not reflect he had “a
substance abuse history,” and (4) there was “no basis on which to make an
assessment of [his] ‘propensity for further criminal acts.’”
Our review is for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269,
272 (Iowa 2016). An abuse will be found when the court’s sentencing rationale
“is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous
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application of the law.” Id. (quoting State v. Putnam, 848 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa
2014)).
The record includes the minutes of testimony and attachments to the
minutes. These documents support the sentencing reasons identified by the
district court. See State v. Summers, No. 08-0164, 2008 WL 4531565, at *4
(Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2008) (finding support for sentencing reasons in the
minutes of testimony).
We begin with the nature and circumstances of the crime. According to an
incident report, a Des Moines police officer who approached Boyd after learning
there was an active warrant for his arrest thought “he was going to run.” The
officer handcuffed him, but Boyd still “attempted to run two times.” The officer
enlisted the help of another officer in subduing Boyd. During the struggle, he
“observed Boyd trying to dig in his right coin pocket.” The officer searched the
pocket and discovered a small baggy of white powder, later determined to be
cocaine. The officer confirmed the existence of the outstanding warrant, naming
Boyd as a “wanted person.” Boyd was arrested. In sum, the report documented
obstructionist behavior on Boyd’s part and an effort to conceal evidence of guilt.
Boyd’s attempts to flee and his arrest on the outstanding warrant support
the second reason for the sentence—protection of the public from further
offenses. As for Boyd’s criminal history, the minutes of testimony reveal a prior
conviction for possession of a controlled substance. That conviction also is
indicative of Boyd’s substance abuse history. The prior conviction, together with
the outstanding arrest warrant and the current conviction for drug possession,
underscore Boyd’s propensity for future criminal acts.
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We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Boyd.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Boyd argues his attorney was ineffective in “failing to pursue a motion to
suppress when the arresting officer exceeded the scope of his authority under
Terry v. Ohio by searching [his] coin pocket prior to arrest without probable cause
or reasonable fear of danger.”1 We find the record adequate to address this
issue. See State v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Iowa 2008). To prevail, Boyd
must establish (1) his attorney breached an essential duty, and (2) prejudice
resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Harris,
891 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 2017).
We begin and end with the State’s argument that Boyd’s attorney did not
breach an essential duty in failing to move for suppression of the drug evidence
because the drugs would have been inevitably discovered. Under this doctrine,
“evidence gathered despite Fourth Amendment violations is not constitutionally
excluded when the police would have inevitably discovered the same evidence
acting properly.” State v. Christianson, 627 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Iowa 2001).
We applied the doctrine in State v. Ericson, No. 14-1746, 2016 WL
719178, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016). There, troopers believed the
defendant was the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant. Ericson, 2016 WL
719178, at *1, *3. They removed the defendant from the vehicle in which he was
riding and handcuffed and searched him; they discovered methamphetamine in
his pocket. Id. The defendant was arrested for possession of a controlled
1
See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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substance. Id. The troopers then received confirmation of the outstanding
warrant. Id. In reviewing the district court’s suppression ruling, this court stated,
“Because the troopers inevitably and actually in short order, would have
searched [the defendant] incident to executing the valid arrest warrant and would
have obtained the methamphetamine through lawful means, the exclusionary
rule does not apply.” Id. at *3.
Boyd argues Ericson is distinguishable because the troopers knew there
was an outstanding warrant for Ericson’s arrest, whereas the officer in this case
merely suspected the existence of a warrant. We disagree. Like the officer who
detained Boyd, the troopers in Ericson only possessed “initial information that
Ericson had an outstanding warrant for his arrest.” See id. And, like the officer
who detained Boyd, the troopers in Ericson did not confirm the existence of the
warrant until after the search was conducted. Boyd’s case is indistinguishable
from Ericson in all material respects. Ericson constitutes persuasive authority in
support of applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to his case.
We conclude Boyd cannot establish that his attorney breached an
essential duty in failing to move for suppression of the drugs based on what he
characterizes as an unconstitutional search because, even if the officer violated
the Fourth Amendment in conducting a warrantless search of his pocket, the
police would have inevitably discovered the evidence. In reaching this
conclusion, we have considered Boyd’s argument that “the exception gives
peace officers no incentive to refrain from conducting illegal searches.” The Iowa
Supreme Court has considered and rejected this argument, stating:
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[T]he exceptions to the exclusionary rule assure the prosecution is
not put in a worse position than it would have been in had the
police misconduct not occurred. These exceptions limit the sweep
of the exclusionary rule in recognition of the “enormous price
[exacted] from society and our system of justice” by suppressing
relevant information.
State v. Seager, 571 N.W.2d 204, 211 (Iowa 1997) (alteration in original)
(quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 816 (1984)). Boyd’s
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails.
We affirm Boyd’s conviction and sentence for possession of a
controlled substance (first offense).
AFFIRMED.