Neil Dewit and Melissa Dewit v. Madison County Zoning Board and Madison County Board of Adjustment ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1746
Filed September 13, 2017
NEIL DEWIT and MELISSA DEWIT,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
MADISON COUNTY ZONING BOARD and MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Gregory A. Hulse,
Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal from an order dismissing without prejudice their petition
for want of timely service of original notice. AFFIRMED.
Lisa M. Noble of Noble Law Office, Des Moines, for appellants.
Matthew D. Schultz, County Attorney, Madison County, for appellees.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.
The question presented is whether the district court erred in dismissing
without prejudice plaintiffs Neil and Melissa DeWit’s petition for writ of certiorari
and declaratory action for failure to timely serve original notice on defendants
Madison County Zoning Board and Madison County Board of Adjustment. Our
review is for the correction of legal error. See Palmer v. Hofman, 745 N.W.2d
745, 747 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008). “When considering a motion to dismiss for delay
of service, the district court’s factual findings are binding if they are supported by
substantial evidence.” Id.This case involves a land use dispute between the Dewits and Madison
County. In March 2015, the Madison County Office of Zoning and Environmental
Health filed civil infractions against the Dewits for several violations of county
zoning ordinances. The case number assigned to the civil infractions was
CVCV034188. The civil-infractions case was resolved by way of consent order in
September of 2015. The consent order required the Dewits to abate the
violations within six months.
After the consent order was issued, the Dewits filed an application for an
agricultural exemption from the zoning ordinances. The Office of Zoning and
Environmental Health denied the application. The Board of Adjustment affirmed
the denial of the application.
On April 20, 2016, the Dewits filed a petition for writ of certiorari and
declaratory action challenging the Board of Adjustment’s decision that denied the
Dewits’ application for an exemption. The Dewits filed their petition in the civil-
infraction case, CVCV034188. The county attorney accepted service of the
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petition. Original notice was not included in the materials sent to or accepted by
the county attorney.
The defendants moved to dismiss the petition on the ground the petition
should have been docketed as a new action and not as a filing in the civil-
infraction case. On June 7, 2016, the district court denied the motion to dismiss.
The district court ordered the clerk of court to transfer the petition and all related
filings to the appropriate docket and to assign a new case number to the petition.
The order specified the petition would relate back to and be deemed to have
commenced on the date of filing, April 20. The district court’s order also stated
that original notice had not been issued or served on the board of adjustment and
that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction until service of the original
notice was obtained. The petition was transferred to the appropriate docket and
assigned a new case number on June 14, 2016.
The Board of Adjustment filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
September 1, 2016, for failure to timely serve original notice. The next day, the
DeWits served original notice on the board. This service occurred 135 days from
the date of filing—April 20—but fewer than 80 days from the date the petition was
transferred and assigned a new case number. The district court granted the
second motion to dismiss, concluding service of original notice was not timely
pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302.
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302 governs the service of original notice.
It provides in relevant part:
If service of the original notice is not made upon the defendant,
respondent, or other party to be served within 90 days after filing
the petition, the court, upon motion or its own initiative after notice
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to the party filing the petition, shall dismiss the action without
prejudice as to that defendant, respondent, or other party to be
served or direct an alternate time or manner of service. If the party
filing the papers shows good cause for the failure of service, the
court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period.
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.302(5).
The Dewits did not serve original notice on the defendants within 90 days
after filing their petition. The petition was filed in the wrong case on April 20,
2016. When the district court ordered the petition to be transferred to the correct
docket and given a new case number, the district court explicitly stated for
purposes of service the filing date would be April 20, as opposed to the date the
petition was assigned a new case number. The district court’s order further
advised the Dewits they had not yet served original notice on the defendants.
The service of the defendants on September 2 was not within the 90-day service
period.
The Dewits seem to contend that the county attorney’s acceptance of
service of the petition alone is sufficient to comply with the Rule 1.302. This is
incorrect. The original notice and petition are separate and distinct. See Iowa R.
Civ. P. 1.302(3) (providing an original notice shall be served with a copy of the
petition). “An original notice is the formal writing, issued by authority of law, for
the purpose of bringing defendants into court to answer plaintiff's demands in a
civil action.” Jacobson v. Leap, 88 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Iowa 1958). The contents
of the original notice are prescribed by rule. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.302(1) (setting
forth the required content of original notice). In contrast, the petition is a pleading
that sets forth a simple and concise statement of the claim or claims at issue.
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See Iowa Rs. Civ. P. 1.401, 1.402. The rules of civil procedure require service of
the original notice. We are not at liberty to ignore the plain language of the rule:
We cannot . . . ignore a clear statutory requirement to achieve what
appears to be the best result in a particular case. Such action
almost always makes bad law . . . . “The so-called technicalities of
the law are not always what they seem. When they establish an
orderly process of procedure, they serve a definite purpose and are
more than technical; they have substance, in that they lay down
definite rules which are essential in court proceedings so that those
involved may know what may and may not be done, and confusion,
even chaos, may be avoided. They are necessary; without them
litigants would be adrift without rudder or compass.”
Krebs v. Town of Manson, 129 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1964) (quoting Esterdahl
v. Wilson, 110 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Iowa 1961)).
The district court could have taken one of three actions upon the plaintiffs’
failure to timely serve original notice on the defendants. Those actions are (1)
dismiss the petition without prejudice, (2) impose alternative directions for
service, or (3) grant an extension of time to complete service. See Meier v.
Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 541 (Iowa 2002).
An extension of time under the rule requires a showing of good cause.
See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.302(5); Crall v. Davis, 714 N.W.2d 616, 619–20 (Iowa
2006). Good cause requires the plaintiff to show they have
taken some affirmative action to effectuate service of process upon
the defendant or have been prohibited, through no fault of his own,
from taking such an affirmative action. Inadvertence, neglect,
misunderstanding, ignorance of the rule or its burden, or half-
hearted attempts at service have generally been [viewed] as
insufficient to show good cause
Palmer, 745 N.W.2d at 747; Henry v. Shober, 566 N.W.2d 190, 192–93 (Iowa
1997).
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The Dewits did not argue there was good cause to extend the time for
service. Even if they had, those arguments would be unavailing. They filed the
petition in the wrong case. They failed to send original notice to the county
attorney. The district court’s order transferring the case to the correct docket
explicitly stated the relevant filing date was April 20 and the Dewits still had to
serve the original notice. The plaintiffs had five weeks from the date of this order
to serve original notice on the defendants but failed to do so. The plaintiffs
simply missed the relevant deadline. This is insufficient to establish good cause.
The plaintiffs’ untimely service of the original notice on September 2 does not
remedy the failure to timely serve original notice. See Brubaker v. Estate of
DeLong, 700 N.W.2d 323, 327 (Iowa 2005) (“The fallacy with Brubaker’s
argument is that Brubaker obtained the second acceptance of service after the
time given by the court to obtain service on the defendant had expired. Even if
we assume the second acceptance cured any defects in the first acceptance of
service, there was no order extending the time to serve the defendant.”).
As a fallback position, the Dewits argue the failure to timely serve original
notice should be excused here because Iowa courts liberally construe the rules
of civil procedure to allow for resolution on the merits and because the
defendants had actual notice of the suit. It is true Iowa courts “are now
committed to liberal construction of our rules of procedure to insure resolution of
disputes on their merits.” Smith v. Baule, 260 N.W.2d 850, 854 (Iowa 1977). In
that light, we have held that minor, technical errors in the original notice should
not warrant dismissal of an action. See, e.g., Burg v. Bryant, 264 N.W.2d 750,
751–752 (Iowa 1978) (allowing action to proceed where the defendant’s name
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was incorrect); Patten v. City of Waterloo, 260 N.W.2d 840, 841 (Iowa 1977)
(allowing claim to proceed where original notice did not include name and
address of plaintiff’s attorney). However, serious errors are still grounds for
dismissal. See, e.g., McFadden v. Dep’t of Transp., 877 N.W.2d 119, 121 (Iowa
2016) (noting “[r]ules, especially those which fix jurisdictional matters, are . . .
vital to the proper conduct of court business.”); Smith, 260 N.W.2d at 854(holding original notice served on a wrongly identified party warranted dismissal);
Hartson v. Estate of Iverson, No.16-0475, 2017 WL 1088114, at *1 (Iowa Ct.
App. Mar. 22, 2017) (holding original notice which directs appearance/filing of an
answer in the wrong county or city is defective).
The failure to timely serve original notice cannot be deemed a minor or
technical error even where the defendant has actual notice of the petition. See,
e.g., Waddy v. Lumbard, No. 05-1938, 2007 WL 248093, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Jan. 31, 2007) (affirming dismissal of suit where plaintiffs failed to timely serve
original notice, parties were in settlement negotiation, the defendant was aware
of the suit, and the defendant refused to accept service of original notice and
noting “[s]ending opposing counsel a form for acceptance of service for his
clients is, at best, a half-hearted attempt at service.” Our supreme court has
made clear it is the plaintiffs’ obligation to effect timely service of original notice
even where the defendant or defendants had actual notice of the action:
In fact, Mokhtarian has provided no explanation for the delay in
proper service, but simply asserts that GTE suffered no prejudice
from the delay because GTE obviously knew a petition had been
filed. He also asserts that his attempts at service show that delay in
service was not intentional. The point, however, is not whether GTE
suffered prejudice from the delay in service or whether the delay
was intentional, but rather whether Mokhtarian can show
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justification for the delay. See Henry, 566 N.W.2d at 192 (if delay in
service is presumptively abusive, it does not matter whether delay
in service was intentional). Moreover, it is irrelevant whether GTE
knew a lawsuit had been filed because Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 49 still requires service of an original notice and petition
upon the defendant. As we said in Henry, “[n]otice of the possibility
of a lawsuit is not sufficient; the party being sued must be served
with an original notice as required by our rules of civil procedure.”
Id. (rejecting plaintiff's assertion that defendant was not prejudiced
by delay because defendant had knowledge of lawsuit). Thus, the
fact that Mokhtarian made previous unsuccessful attempts at
service by mail is not adequate justification for the delay since
those attempts at service had no legal significance.
In reality, we think that the delay in service can be attributed to
plaintiff counsel’s initial belief that service could be accomplished
by certified mail. We understand that counsel, not being licensed to
practice law in Iowa, was probably unfamiliar with Iowa rules
regarding the timeliness and proper manner of service of an original
notice. Counsel’s lack of knowledge, misunderstanding or
ignorance of our rules of civil procedure, however, does not excuse
the delay in proper service. Id. (quoting Vincent v. Reynolds Mem'l
Hosp., Inc., 141 F.R.D. 436, 437–38 (N. D. W. Va. 1992)). Once a
plaintiff files a petition, we believe it only appropriate that the
plaintiff should bear the burden of ensuring that service of the
original notice and petition on defendant is both proper and timely.
The plaintiff cannot rely on the opposing party to inform him or her
that service was not sufficient under our rules of civil procedure and
then argue the delay in service was justified by previous
unsuccessful or legally insignificant attempts at service.
Mokhtarian v. GTE Midwest Inc., 578 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Iowa 1998).
We thus conclude the district court did not err in dismissing the Dewits’
petition without prejudice.
AFFIRMED.