Lynette Anne Heims v. Brad Francis Heims , 919 N.W.2d 636 ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1238
Filed May 2, 2018
LYNETTE ANNE HEIMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
BRAD FRANCIS HEIMS,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Thomas A. Bitter,
Judge.
Former spouse appeals the district court’s denial of her application for
contempt. AFFIRMED.
Jenny L. Weiss of Fuerste, Carew, Juergens & Sudmeier, P.C., Dubuque,
for appellant.
Darin S. Harmon and Nina K. Sheller of Kintzinger, Harmon, Konrardy,
P.L.C., Dubuque, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
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VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
Lynette Heims appeals from the district court’s denial of her application for
rule to show cause. She argues Brad Heims should be held in contempt for failing
to pay spousal support, in violation of their marital settlement agreement, which
was incorporated into their Illinois “Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage.” We
conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Lynette did not
prove Brad engaged in willful disobedience of his obligation to pay spousal
support, nor did it abuse its discretion in declining to order Brad to pay Lynette’s
attorney fees. Therefore, we affirm. We also decline to order Brad to pay Lynette’s
appellate attorney fees.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On February 13, 2014, the marriage of Brad and Lynette Heims was
dissolved in Illinois. At that time, the parties entered into a marital settlement
agreement, under which Brad agreed to pay “Maintenance (Alimony)” to Lynette
in the amount of $160.28 per week “for a period of not less than three (3) years
from the date of entry of this Marital Settlement Agreement.”1 On August 21, 2015,
the parties registered their dissolution of marriage decree, including the
incorporated marital settlement agreement, in Iowa. On December 12, 2016, Brad
filed a petition to modify in Iowa, seeking to terminate his spousal support
1
The parties, in their marital settlement agreement and other filings and communications,
refer to Brad’s payments as “maintenance” or “alimony.” Under Iowa Code section
598.21A (2017), an Iowa court may grant a “spousal support” order requiring one party to
make support payments to the other. For simplicity, this opinion will refer to all of Brad’s
payments for Lynette’s support as “spousal support.”
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obligation upon completion of the third year, as permitted under the marital
settlement agreement.2
The Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services (“DHFS”)
administered the couple’s child support and spousal support payments by
withholding amounts from Brad’s paychecks. On February 13, 2017, DHFS
stopped withholding spousal support from Brad’s paychecks, but it continued
withholding child support. Lynette does not know why DHFS stopped withholding
spousal support. Brad testified he did not do anything affirmative to stop the
withholding, and Lynette does not accuse him of any such actions. Brad believes
DHFS simply interpreted the marital settlement agreement to end the spousal
support payments after exactly three years and acted without consultation with
either party. On March 4, DHFS began withholding an additional $160.28 from
Brad’s paycheck, but it credited this amount to past-due child support and not
spousal support. On March 31, DHFS stopped withholding the $160.28 from
Brad’s paycheck. On April 28, DHFS resumed withholding the $160.28 from
Brad’s paychecks for spousal support.
The parties scheduled mediation for March 10, 2017, though they cancelled
when the mediator did not attend due to a conflict. At this time, Lynette testified
she asked Brad to pay spousal support directly to her while DHFS was not correctly
withholding, but Brad refused. On April 21, the parties discussed spousal support
in mediation, but this mediation failed. On April 25, Lynette filed this application
for rule to show cause, seeking to hold Brad in contempt for failure to pay spousal
2
Lynette filed this appeal of the district court’s order on July 31, 2017. At that time, the
district court had not ruled on Brad’s petition to end his spousal support obligation.
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support. On May 1, Brad personally went to the DHFS office to straighten out the
withholding issues and make a lump-sum payment for spousal support. He
testified he took a day off from work in Chicago, Illinois, to travel to the DHFS office
in Rockford, Illinois. He paid $1,475.12, which he testified is the amount of
arrearage DHFS calculated.
After a hearing, the district court issued an order declining to find Brad in
contempt. The district court also rejected Lynette’s request for attorney fees.
Lynette appeals the district court’s order on contempt and her attorney fees, and
she requests appellate attorney fees.
II. Standard of Review
Contempt actions are governed by Iowa Code section 598.23 (“If a person
against whom a temporary order or final decree has been entered willfully
disobeys the order or decree, the person may be cited and punished by the court
for contempt . . . .”). We review contempt decisions for abuse of discretion. Ary v.
Iowa Dist. Ct., 735 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa 2007) (citing Ickowitz v. Iowa Dist. Ct.,
452 N.W.2d 446, 452 (Iowa 1990)). The district court may consider all
circumstances in deciding whether to impose punishment for contempt. In re
Marriage of Swan, 526 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Iowa 1995). We review decisions on
attorney fees for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Michael, 839 N.W.2d 630,
635 (Iowa 2013) (citing In re Marriage of Goodwin, 606 N.W.2d 315, 324 (Iowa
2000)).
III. Contempt
A finding of contempt, or willful disobedience, “‘requires evidence of conduct
that is intentional and deliberate with a bad or evil purpose, or wanton and in
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disregard of the rights of others, or contrary to a known duty, or unauthorized,
coupled with an unconcern whether the contemner had the right or not.’” Ary, 735
N.W.2d at 624 (quoting Lutz v. Darbyshire, 297 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Iowa 1980)).
“[T]he person alleging contempt retains the burden of proof to establish willfulness
beyond a reasonable doubt because of the quasi-criminal nature of the
proceeding.” Id. (citing Ervin v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 495 N.W.2d 742, 745 (Iowa 1993)).
Lynette argues Brad should be held in contempt because he knew DHFS
stopped withholding spousal support on February 13, he refused her repeated
requests to pay spousal support directly to her beginning March 10, and he did not
resume paying spousal support until April 28 after the filing of this action seeking
a contempt finding.
DHFS stopped withholding spousal support on February 13. As the district
court found, the record contains no indication Brad did anything to cause this
stoppage. DHFS resumed withholding spousal support on April 28, more than ten
weeks later. At least part of this gap is attributable to confusion over why DHFS
stopped withholding spousal support and whether the stoppage was proper. Brad
remained in contact with Lynette during this time and scheduled two mediation
sessions. DHFS resumed withholding spousal support on Friday, April 28, 2017,
one week after Brad and Lynette finally met in a failed mediation. Three days later,
on Monday May 1, Brad travelled to the DHFS office on his own time and expense
to straighten the withholding issues and to pay the missing spousal support. While
he was in their office, Brad testified DHFS calculated he owed $1,475.12 in spousal
support for the ten-plus weeks of missed withholding, which he paid in full at that
time. Under these circumstances, Lynette has not established beyond a
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reasonable doubt that Brad acted with willful disobedience in failing to pay spousal
support during the ten-plus weeks. See id. Therefore, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to hold Brad in contempt.
IV. Attorney Fees
Lynette also argues the district court should have ordered Brad to pay her
attorney fees. If the district “court determines that the party is in default or
contempt of the decree, the costs of the proceeding, including reasonable
attorney’s fees, may be taxed against that party.” Iowa Code § 598.24. As
explained above, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold
Brad in contempt. Therefore, the district court also did not abuse its discretion in
declining to order Brad to pay Lynette’s attorney fees.
Finally, Lynette requests appellate attorney fees. Appellate attorney fees
are within the discretion of the appellate court. In re Marriage of Ask, 551 N.W.2d
643, 646 (Iowa 1996) (citing In re Marriage of Gaer, 476 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Iowa
1991)). “‘In determining whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the
needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and
whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the decision of the
trial court on appeal.’” In re Marriage of Hoffman, 891 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Iowa Ct.
App 2016) (quoting In re Marriage of Kurtt, 561 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Iowa Ct. App.
1997). We find the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to sanction
Brad, and hence, Lynette was not successful on appeal. We therefore decline to
order Brad to pay Lynette’s appellate attorney fees.
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V. Conclusion
Because Lynette did not prove willful disobedience beyond a reasonable
doubt, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold Brad in
contempt for failing to pay alimony, nor did it abuse its discretion in declining to
order him to pay attorney fees. We also decline to order Brad to pay Lynette’s
appellate attorney fees. Costs on appeal assessed to Lynnette.
AFFIRMED.