State of Iowa v. Mary Elizabeth Haglin , 919 N.W.2d 635 ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0447
Filed May 2, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARY ELIZABETH HAGLIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Kevin McKeever,
Judge.
Mary Haglin appeals from her conviction for sexual exploitation by a school
employee. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
2
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
Mary Haglin appeals from her conviction for sexual exploitation by a school
employee, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.15(2), (3)(a)(2), and (5)(b) (2016).
Haglin maintains the district court erred in finding in favor of the State on Haglin’s
motion to adjudicate law points on the issue of whether Haglin met the definition
of a “school employee” under section 709.15. Finding no error, we affirm.
Haglin, a long-term substitute teacher at Washington High School in Cedar
Rapids, was charged by trial information on September 2, 2016, for sexual
exploitation by a school employee, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.15(1),
(3)(a)(2), (5)(b) after it was discovered she engaged in a sexual relationship with
a seventeen-year-old student for a number of months. Both Haglin and the student
confirmed they had a sexual relationship.
Haglin filed a motion to adjudicate law points on October 17, 2016, arguing,
in part, that she did not fall under the definition of a “school employee” for purposes
of section 709.15. A hearing was held on the motion to adjudicate law points on
November 10. At a November 16 hearing on additional pre-trial motions, the court
orally ruled on the motion to adjudicate law points. The court held, “I have reviewed
the submissions by the State and by the defendant; I have looked at the statutes
and the case law; and it is my conclusion that Ms. Haglin does fit the definition of
a school employee under the code.”
Haglin stipulated to a bench trial on the minutes of evidence. At the start of
the November 28 bench trial, the court further clarified its ruling on the applicability
of the definition of a “school employee” to Haglin:
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The second thing I wanted to recap for the record was we had
a number of motions, and one of them was a motion to adjudicate
law points. I want to make sure that the record accurately reflects
that my finding was specifically that—with regard to the law point that
involved the definition of school employee as it pertained to Ms.
Haglin, that if at the trial the State was successful in providing the
things that they alleged in the minutes, it was my determination that
they would be able to prove that under Iowa Code section 272.1(7)
[(defining “Practitioner”)], that Ms. Haglin fit the definition of that
subsection and therefore would be determined to be a school
employee. Specifically 272.1(7) includes a licensed professional that
provides educational assistance to students.
Upon its review of the evidence, the court found Haglin guilty of sexual
exploitation by a school employee, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of
sections 709.15(2), (3)(a)(2), (5)(b). Haglin now appeals, arguing the court erred
in finding she—a substitute teacher—was a “school employee” for purposes of
section 709.15.
“This court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to adjudicate law points
for correction of legal error.” State v. Muhlenbruch, 728 N.W.2d 212, 214 (Iowa
2007). “The appropriateness of the district court’s action turns on the correctness
of its interpretation of the relevant statutes, which are reviewable for correction of
errors at law as well.” Id.The applicable code section during these proceedings stated a “school
employee” “means a practitioner as defined in section 272.1.” Iowa Code
§ 709.15(1)(f).1 Section 272.1(7) further provides, “‘Practitioner’ means an
1
Section 709.15(1)(f) was amended, effective July 1, 2017, to define “school employee”
as any of the following (with exceptions not pertinent here):
(a) A person who holds a license, certificate, or statement of
professional recognition issued under chapter 272.
(b) A person who holds an authorization issued under chapter 272.
(c) A person employed by a school district full-time, part-time, or as
a substitute.
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administrator, teacher, or other licensed professional, including an individual who
holds a statement of professional recognition, who provides educational
assistance to students.”
Haglin does not dispute that she engaged in a sexual relationship with a
seventeen-year-old student. Instead, she argues that as a substitute teacher, she
is neither a “teacher” nor an “other licensed professional” under section 272.1.2
When we are asked to interpret the language of a statute, we apply
well-settled principles of statutory interpretation:
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine
the legislature’s intent. We give words their ordinary
and common meaning by considering the context
within which they are used, absent a statutory definition
or an established meaning in the law. We also
consider the legislative history of a statute, including
prior enactments, when ascertaining legislative intent.
When we interpret a statute, we assess the statute in
(d) A person who performs services as a volunteer for a school
district and who has direct supervisory authority over the student with
whom the person engages in conduct prohibited under subsection 3,
paragraph “a.”
(e) A person who provides services under a contract for such
services to a school district and who has direct supervisory authority over
the student with whom the person engages in conduct prohibited under
subsection 3, paragraph “a.”
(Emphasis added.)
2
Haglin argues because House File 6—seeking to expand the applicability for sexual
exploitation by a school employee to include all school district employees—expressly
sought to include substitute teachers as individuals to which the crime is applicable but
was not enacted, it indicates section 709.15 as it is stood at the time of her offense did not
consider substitute teachers to be “school employees.” However, “[I]t is not the province
of this court to speculate about probable legislative intent without regard to the wording of
the statute, and any determination must be based upon what the legislature actually said
rather than on what it might have said or should have said.” State v. Nicoletto, 845 N.W.2d
421, 431 (Iowa 2014), superseded by statute, Iowa Code § 709.15(f)(1)(b). “As we have
traditionally and repeatedly stated, ‘We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask
only what the statute means.’” Id. (citation omitted). We cannot discern from the
legislature’s past efforts to amend section 709.15 and the actual amendment of the statute
resulting in its current form, which expressly includes substitute teachers, whether
substitute teachers were clearly not included in the previous applicable version of the
statute or whether the legislature merely intended to clarify that substitute teachers have
always been contemplated by section 709.15. We must look to the actual language and
legislative intent of the statute to determine its meaning.
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its entirety, not just isolated words or phrases. We may
not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the meaning
of a statute under the guise of construction.
State v. Howse, 875 N.W.2d 684, 691 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). “We construe
a statute ‘liberally with a view to promoting its objects and assisting the parties in
obtaining justice.’” Willard v. State, 893 N.W.2d 52, 61 (Iowa 2017) (citation
omitted).
We find Haglin meets the definition of a “school employee” under sections
709.15(1)(f) and 272.1(7). Haglin has a teaching license to instruct students in
grades five through twelve. And Haglin taught at the high school as a long-term
substitute teacher every day during the duration of her relationship with the
student. As such, we find Haglin was a “teacher” under section 272.1.3
Haglin maintains she could not be a teacher because she did not have an
obligation to diagnose, prescribe, evaluate, or direct student learning; share
responsibility for the development of coordinating activities; or evaluate and assess
student progress. Even if Haglin could not be considered a “teacher” as she
contends, she clearly falls under the definition of an “other licensed professional
. . . who provides educational assistance to students.” Iowa Code § 272.1(7).
Haglin was thus a “practitioner” under section 272.1(7) and a “school employee”
under section 709.15 at the time she engaged in a relationship with the minor
3
See Iowa Code § 272.1(16), defining a “teacher” as:
a licensed member of a school’s instructional staff who diagnoses,
prescribes, evaluates, and directs student learning in a manner which is
consistent with professional practice and school objectives, shares
responsibility for development of an instructional program and any
coordinating activities, evaluates or assesses student progress before and
after instruction, and who uses the student evaluation or assessment
information to promote additional student learning.
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student. See State v. Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169, 177 (2013) (“‘School employee’
includes professionals who are not teachers. In drafting the statute, the legislature
defined ‘school employee’ much more broadly than Romer acknowledges. The
legislature did not intend to criminalize actions only by teachers, but by the much
broader category of ‘school employee,’ which it defines as ‘an administrator,
teacher, or other licensed professional, including an individual who holds a
statement of professional recognition, who provides educational assistance to
students.’” (citation omitted)).
In Romer, the supreme court discussed the legislative intent of section
709.15, which was to avoid the exploitation of a power relationship by individuals
covered in the statute. 832 N.W.2d at 177. The supreme opined that a substitute-
teacher position is one that may give rise to exploitation through a power
relationship. Id. at 178 (“We believe the legislature intended to protect students
from being exploited by the teacher in the next classroom, the former middle school
principal the student respected and admired, or the substitute teacher the student
had in elementary school, for example.” (emphasis added)). As a long-term
substitute teacher who worked full-time teaching students at the high school every
day, Haglin was in the precise position of power subject to potential exploitation as
contemplated by section 709.15.
We find the district court did not err in finding Haglin was a “school
employee” under section 709.15. We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.