In the Interest of T.R., C.R., and K.R., Minor Children, J.R., Father, S.H., Mother ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1042
Filed September 27, 2017
IN THE INTEREST OF T.R., C.R., and K.R.,
Minor Children,
J.R., Father,
Appellant,
S.H., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Colin J. Witt, District
Associate Judge.
A father and mother appeal separately from the order terminating their
parental rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Alexandra M. Nelissen of Taylor Law Office, Des Moines, for appellant
father.
Marcy J. Lundberg of Lundberg Law Firm, Indianola, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ana Dixit, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
ConGarry Williams of the Juvenile Public Defender’s Office, Des Moines,
for minor children.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ.
2
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
A mother and a father separately appeal the order terminating their
parental rights to three children: K.H.R., born in May 2010; T.H.R., born in
October 2008; and C.H.R., born in September 2005. The children—all over the
age of four—were removed from the parents’ home on December 22, 2015; were
adjudicated children in need of assistance (CINA) on February 1, 2016; have
been out of the parents’ custody for well over a year; and could not be returned
to either parent at the time of the termination hearing on June 5, 2017. There is
therefore clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of each
parent’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2017)
(allowing termination of parental rights where child four years or older has been
adjudicated CINA, has been out of the parents’ custody for the last twelve
consecutive months, and cannot be returned at present).
While both the mother and father argue there was not clear evidence the
children could not be returned at present, which would negate a finding under
section 232.116(1)(f), we observe the father conceded as much at the
termination hearing.1 And the mother, on appeal, notes she “requested the court
grant her additional time to successfully transition the children back into her
care.” This is also an acknowledgment the children could not be returned at
present.
This family has a long history of involvement with the department of
human services and the juvenile court in relation to the parents’ inabilities to
1
At the June 5, 2017 hearing, the father’s attorney stated, “And it’s [the father’s] hope
that at some point in time he’ll be able to have a relationship with [his children], but he
recognizes that today is not that day and the children cannot be returned right now.”
3
provide safe and secure care. There are numerous founded child-abuse
assessments against these parents. An earlier CINA proceeding was opened in
2011 due to domestic violence and substance-abuse issues. The previous case
was closed in 2013, but a new CINA case was opened in December 2015 due to
the parents’ failure to care for the medical needs of their children. Their then
four-year-old child weighed 150 pounds and the other two children were also
obese.2 The children had not received necessary medical care and had
extensive medical needs. The parents tested positive for methamphetamine.
When allegations of physical and sexual abuse of the daughters by the
father later surfaced, visitation was suspended. The parents never progressed
past therapeutic visits. The father ceased participating in services.
On December 9, 2016, the juvenile court entered a permanency order
finding, in part:
[T]he children were subjected to a violent environment [including]
the display of weapons prior to their removal and that such was
perpetrated by the father . . . , and that this is a changed and new
finding from the hearing in August 2016. [The father] is not
sufficiently engaged and in therapy to give significant hope at this
time that reunification can take place with him. He needs to move
out or separate from the mother and engage much more deeply in
his own treatment(s) to include mental health and substance abuse.
The court changed the permanency goal to reunification with the mother
and granted her an extension, requiring the children’s continued attendance in
family therapy sessions “that include the mother and [comprise] a genuine
2
K.H.R. was diagnosed with childhood obesity, Chiari Malformation Syndrome, sleep
apnea, asthma, pica, and diabetes. The other children in the home were also obese,
and T.H.R. was also diabetic. The parents struggled to manage their diets and follow
doctor recommendations. When removed from the parents’ home all the children began
to lose weight.
4
exploration of times where the children were or felt unsafe, and the mother
demonstrates an ability to listen and hear their concerns and assuage their fears
that she will [be] safe, sober, and protective,” and also requiring the mother to
continue[] in recovery from substance abuse, a path the court
accepts she has been on since end of April 2016, and she follows
her therapists advice in therapy and attends to her mental health
medication needs (which the court deems more important than a
piece of paper from House of Mercy indicating fully successful
discharge from SA treatment aftercare requirements).
A review hearing was held on April 12, 2017. We have no transcript of
that hearing. This written ruling was filed on April 14:
Permanency record opened on April 12, 2017, for this family.
An extension was already given in December 2016 at the
one year mark of the child welfare matters. That order remains
governing and unchanged.
A sufficient amount of time has been set in early June to
have permanency fully submitted. If State files TPR petition(s) all
parties are on notice that it will be heard as well at time set for
permanency. We will be at the [eighteen] month mark in these
child welfare matters, permanency decisions will be made as these
[three] children have been out of home for the entire length of the
child welfare case without reunification.
In May 2017 the mother again tested positive for methamphetamine.
At the June 5, 2017 permanency/termination hearing, the parents
appeared after the time scheduled to begin. The court allowed the parents to
meet and confer with their respective attorneys. The father’s attorney then stated
on the record, “[M]y client would not contest the termination, but will not be
signing a consent.” The mother’s attorney stated, “My client is resisting the
termination, but she is not going to present any independent evidence.” The
children’s guardian ad litem recommended termination of the parents’ rights.
5
The court rejected the father’s and mother’s later-filed motions to reopen
the record, specifically rejecting the parents’ claims that their waiver of evidence
had been due to coercion. We find no abuse of the juvenile court’s discretion.
See In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d 311, 318 (Iowa 1984) (noting “the court has broad
discretion to reopen the evidence”).
The presiding judge has been involved with these parents for several
years, and in the order terminating parental rights, the court made findings and
conclusions fully supported by the record. We need not reiterate those findings
here; suffice it to say that upon our de novo review of the record, see In re A.M.,
843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014), we conclude there is clear and convincing
evidence to support termination of both parents’ parental rights to these three
children pursuant to section 232.116(1)(f).
The mother contends the evidence is insufficient as it concerns
termination pursuant to section 232.116(1)(d).3 Having already found termination
proved by clear and convincing evidence under section 232.116(1)(f), we need
not address this assertion.4 See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012)
(“When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory
ground, we may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground we find supported
by the record.”).
3
Section 232.116(1)(d) allows termination where services were offered or received to
correct the circumstance which led to the adjudication, and the circumstance continues
to exist despite the offer or receipt of services.
4
The only complaint levied to the court by the parents regarding reasonable services
sought additional visitation after an allegation of sexual abuse, and a multitude of
services were provided by the department of human services.
6
The children are in need of long-term security and stability, which they
have not been able to receive from their parents. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)
(requiring that we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best
placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to
the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child”). “It is well-
settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has
proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a
parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the
child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010). The children are doing well in
their respective foster homes. Termination is in the children’s best interests.
The father contends termination is not appropriate because of “a close
bond with the father and maternal side of the family.” Section 232.116(3) sets
out permissive factors the juvenile court can consider that might, under some
circumstances, preclude termination. See A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113. Section
232.116(3)(c) allows the juvenile court not to terminate when “[t]here is clear and
convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the
time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” This is not such a
case. Because termination is in the children’s best interests, and no section
232.116(3) permissive factor weighs against termination, we affirm.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.