Bobby Gene Blue, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2017 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 16-2201
    Filed September 13, 2017
    BOBBY GENE BLUE,
    Applicant-Appellant,
    vs.
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, John J. Haney,
    Judge.
    The applicant appeals from the district court’s denial of his application for
    postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
    Darrell G. Meyer, Marshalltown, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ.
    2
    POTTERFIELD, Judge.
    Bobby Blue appeals from the district court’s denial of his application for
    postconviction relief (PCR). Blue was originally charged with sexual abuse in the
    second degree, lascivious acts with a child, and indecent contact with a child. If
    convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree, Blue faced a twenty-five-year
    prison sentence with a mandatory minimum of seventy percent. He reached a
    plea agreement with the State whereby he pled guilty to sexual abuse in the third
    degree and lascivious acts with a child and he received a fifteen-year sentence
    without a mandatory minimum.
    Blue did not file a motion in arrest of judgment before sentencing, and he
    did not file an appeal.
    Blue challenged his guilty plea for the first time in his application for PCR.
    He claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress
    inculpatory statements Blue made to the police. Blue asserted he would not
    have entered into a plea agreement with the State and instead would have
    insisted on going to trial if counsel had alerted him that his incriminating
    statements may not have been admissible at that trial. Blue makes the same
    claim on appeal, arguing the PCR court decided the issue wrongly.
    Although we generally review the denial of an application for PCR for
    correction of errors at law, when there is an alleged denial of constitutional rights,
    we make our evaluation of the totality of the circumstances in a de novo review.
    See Everett v. State, 
    789 N.W.2d 151
    , 155 (Iowa 2010). To succeed on his
    claim of ineffective assistance, Blue has the burden to establish “(1) counsel
    failed to perform an essential duty; and (2) prejudice resulted.”         
    Id.
     at 158
    3
    (quoting State v. Maxwell, 
    743 N.W.2d 185
    , 195 (Iowa 2008)). In the context of a
    guilty plea, an applicant for PCR must prove a reasonable probability that, but for
    counsel’s alleged errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted
    on going to trial.     State v. Carroll, 
    767 N.W.2d 638
    , 641 (Iowa 2009).
    Additionally, “[a] defendant’s guilty plea is not necessarily rendered involuntary
    merely because it follows his defense counsel’s mistaken assessment of the
    admissibility of the State’s evidence.” 
    Id.
     Blue “can, however, challenge the
    validity of his guilty plea by proving the advice he received from counsel in
    connection with the plea was not within the range of competence demanded of
    attorneys in criminal cases.” See 
    id. at 642
    . Here, we consider whether trial
    counsel breached a duty in not filing a motion to suppress Blue’s confession to a
    police officer and whether Blue suffered prejudice as a result. See 
    id. at 644
    .
    Blue’s claim fails if is he unable to establish either element, and in such a
    situation, we need not consider both. See Kirchner v. State, 
    756 N.W.2d 202
    ,
    204 (Iowa 2008) (“The court need not address both components if the [applicant]
    makes an insufficient showing on one of the prongs.” (alteration in original)). But
    here, we specifically find that Blue has failed in both regards.
    If we accepted Blue’s testimony about the police interview as true, we may
    find that a motion to suppress Blue’s confession was likely to succeed and
    should have been pursued.        But Blue’s testimony regarding what happened
    during the police interview was at odds with his trial counsel’s testimony, and the
    PCR court specifically found the attorney’s statements more credible. See State
    v. Tague, 
    676 N.W.2d 197
    , 201 (Iowa 2004) (noting that even when we review an
    issue de novo, we still “give considerable deference to the trial court’s findings
    4
    regarding the credibility of the witnesses”). Moreover, Blue has the burden to
    establish that his trial counsel breached a duty, yet he failed to introduce into
    evidence a copy of the video containing the confession so the reviewing court
    could ascertain the chance of success of such a motion. We cannot say counsel
    breached a duty by not filing a motion to suppress when we have no way of
    ascertaining whether the motion would have merit. State v. Dudley, 
    766 N.W.2d 606
    , 620 (Iowa 2009) (noting “counsel has no duty to raise issues that have no
    merit,” so counsel cannot be found to be ineffective if the defendant’s underlying
    claims lack validity).
    Blue also failed to establish that he would have insisted on going to trial if
    counsel made him aware of the option to file a motion to suppress. At the PCR
    hearing, Blue repeatedly testified he chose to enter into a plea deal with the State
    after his trial counsel “scared him” by accurately conveying the charges he faced
    and the sentence he would receive if found guilty of those charges. Blue agreed
    his plan or intent for his case was “damage control,” meaning he wanted to “get
    the best offer and move on.”      His trial counsel testified similarly, stating Blue
    never told him he was innocent, “they got the wrong guy,” or that he wanted to
    proceed to trial. The only caveat trial counsel offered was that he was “fairly
    certain” they would have proceeded to trial “[h]ad the State rejected the 15-year
    or wanted him to go higher.” Although Blue made a few statements during his
    testimony at the PCR hearing that he would have insisted on going to trial if he
    knew there was a chance his confession could be suppressed, these self-serving
    statements are not enough to establish prejudice. See Kirchner, 
    756 N.W.2d at 206
     (noting the defendant “offered no evidence to support his self-serving
    5
    statement” as he attempted to establish prejudice in a claim of ineffective
    assistance); State v. Tate, 
    710 N.W.2d 237
    , 241 (Iowa 2006) (“‘[C]onclusory
    claims of prejudice’ are not sufficient to satisfy the prejudice element.” (citation
    omitted)).
    We affirm the denial of Blue’s application for PCR.
    AFFIRMED.