State of Iowa v. Paul Lee Degroot ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0643
Filed November 8, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PAUL LEE DeGROOT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Peter B. Newell,
District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled
substance, third offense. AFFIRMED.
Thomas P. Frerichs of Frerichs Law Office, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kelli A. Huser, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
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VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
Paul DeGroot appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled
substance, third offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2014),
claiming the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. First of all,
DeGroot cannot assert another person’s constitutional rights. Further, because
DeGroot was not in custody when he admitted he had marijuana and he
voluntarily turned over the drugs to the police, we find no error in the district
court’s denial of the motion and affirm DeGroot’s conviction.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On November 25, 2014, Tripoli Police Chief Daniel Banks set up a drug
buy with a juvenile. Chief Banks learned from the juvenile that T.D., DeGroot’s
stepson, would be able to get marijuana from his parents and sell it to the
juvenile. Just before the buy, the chief parked his unmarked vehicle where he
observed T.D. take something out of his backpack and put it in his pocket. After
approximately thirty seconds, the chief exited his vehicle and approached the two
boys. There, he observed a small plastic bag containing a green leafy substance
hanging halfway out of T.D.’s pocket. He told T.D. to hand over the bag. T.D.
indicated his parents did not know he took the marijuana from their house, it was
his father’s marijuana, and there was more at home.
The chief advised T.D. he needed to escort him to city hall and contact his
parents. The chief did not read T.D. his Miranda1 rights and drove him the short
1
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) (holding a person subject to
custodial interrogation must be advised that “he has a right to remain silent, that any
3
distance to city hall. While the chief was escorting T.D. inside, DeGroot and his
wife drove by and saw their son being escorted into city hall. They stopped and
entered the building. The chief placed T.D. in his office and took DeGroot and
his wife into the nearby city council meeting room to explain the situation. The
chief explained that T.D. was caught attempting to sell marijuana and T.D. had
told the chief the marijuana belonged to DeGroot. DeGroot responded with
laughter.
DeGroot initially denied there was more marijuana at his home, but after
the chief explained he would either get a search warrant or DeGroot could
voluntarily handover the marijuana, DeGroot agreed to voluntarily hand it over.
DeGroot then accompanied the chief in the front seat of his patrol car to
DeGroot’s home, which was outside the city limits of Tripoli. During the ride,
DeGroot requested he not be charged with possession as it would be his third
possession charge, and the chief advised DeGroot that he would not charge
DeGroot. When they arrived at the home, DeGroot retrieved the marijuana and
turned it over to the chief. After the chief took possession of the marijuana he
informed the Bremer County Sheriff’s Department of the situation.
The sheriff decided to pursue the issue, and DeGroot was then charged
with possession of a controlled substance, third or subsequent offense. DeGroot
filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from his statements, his stepson’s
statements, and stemming from an illegal search of his home. The district court
denied DeGroot’s motion. After a trial on the minutes of evidence, the district
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed”).
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court found DeGroot guilty and sentenced him to 180 days in jail with all but four
days suspended.
DeGroot appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
DeGroot claims the district court should have granted his motion to
suppress, as amended, on federal and state constitutional grounds. Therefore,
our review is de novo. State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Iowa 2011).
III. Stepson’s Statements
DeGroot asserts the district court should have granted his motion to
suppress because his thirteen-year-old stepson’s Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated. Moreover, DeGroot asserts the chief violated
Iowa Code sections 232.112 and 232.193 by failing to immediately notify him and
his wife that his stepson was taken into custody. Because of these assertions,
DeGroot contends his stepson was interrogated without being advised of his
Miranda rights, and his stepson was not allowed to talk to his parents before
making statements to police. See Iowa Code § 232.19. He asserts his stepson’s
statements and all evidence gathered as a result of those statements must be
suppressed.
Generally, a party may not assert the rights of others not before the court.
Krull v. Thermogas Co. of Northwood, 522 N.W.2d 607, 614 (Iowa 1994). Fourth
2
Iowa Code sentence 232.11 provides a child with the right to be represented by
counsel during certain stages of juvenile delinquency proceedings.
3
Iowa Code sentence 232.19 provides a child may be taken into custody and the person
taking the child into custody shall notify the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian as
soon as possible.
5
and Fifth Amendment rights are personal in nature and may not be asserted
vicariously. See State v. Graham, 291 N.W.2d 345, 348-49 (Iowa 1980),
superseded on other grounds by Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(6)(a), (c) as stated in
State v. Wells, 629 N.W.2d 346 (Iowa 2001); see also State v. Bakker, 262
N.W.2d 538, 544 (Iowa 1978) (“[S]tanding to object to a search belongs only to
the victim of illegal search and seizure. A litigant cannot invoke an alleged
violation of constitutional rights of third persons.”). Because this is a criminal
prosecution brought against DeGroot, he may only assert alleged violations of his
own constitutional rights, not rights personal to his stepson. We conclude
DeGroot lacks standing to challenge the legality of his stepson’s statements, and
we decline to analyze the merits of DeGroot’s claim on this issue or DeGroot’s
claims of statutory violations committed against his stepson.4
IV. DeGroot’s Statements
DeGroot next asserts the district court should have granted his motion to
suppress with respect to the statements he made to Chief Banks because his
constitutional rights were violated. Principally, DeGroot contends he was in
4
In his reply brief, DeGroot asserts the State has waived the argument that DeGroot
lacks standing to challenge the legality of his stepson’s statements by failing to assert
standing in front of the district court. We disagree that a party can waive standing. Our
supreme court has held certain fundamental issues like subject matter jurisdiction cannot
be waived by the parties failing to challenge it. See Klinge v. Bentien, 725 N.W.2d 13,
15-16 (Iowa 2006) (“The parties themselves cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on
a court by an act or procedure. Unlike personal jurisdiction, a party cannot waive or vest
by consent subject matter jurisdiction.”). Our supreme court has also held standing is
jurisdictional and can be raised at any time. Schott v. Schott, 744 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Iowa
2008). Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and because standing is
jurisdictional and can be raised at any time, we conclude the State’s failure to raise the
issue of standing before the district court is not fatal to its ability to challenge standing on
appeal.
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custody and interrogated without being read his Miranda rights when he was
asked about marijuana in his home.5
The Supreme Court held that a suspect is in custody after the suspect is
formally arrested or “otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. “A custody determination depends on objective
circumstances, not the subjective belief of the officers or the defendant.” State v.
Bogan, 774 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 2009). “In determining whether a suspect is
in custody at a particular time, we examine the extent of the restraints placed on
the suspect during the interrogation in light of whether a reasonable man in the
suspect’s position would have understood his situation to be one of custody.”
State v. Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d 244, 251 (Iowa 2009). We apply a four-factor test.
State v. Miranda, 672 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Iowa 2003). These factors are “the
language used to summon the individual, the purpose, place and manner of the
interrogation, the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of his
guilt, and whether the defendant is free to leave the place of questioning.” State
v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 274-75 (Iowa 2006).
Here, DeGroot was confronted with evidence of his guilt. However, the
chief did not summon DeGroot; instead, DeGroot and his wife happened to be
driving by when the chief escorted DeGroot’s stepson into the city council
building. DeGroot voluntarily entered the station and asked the chief what was
going on. The police station is connected to the city hall, and the chief met with
DeGroot and his wife in the city council meeting room, not a police interrogation
5
We note that DeGroot does not point to any particular statement which he asserts
should be suppressed but makes only general reference to the “brief interrogation.”
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room. Although the chief did not let either DeGroot or his wife speak to their son,
the chief did not extensively question either the stepson or DeGroot. The chief
quickly asked DeGroot if his son was correct that there was marijuana at home.
DeGroot responded with a laugh but then confirmed there was additional
marijuana and said he would voluntarily hand it over.
Additionally, the chief was the only officer to speak with DeGroot, and
DeGroot was never placed in handcuffs. DeGroot was free to leave until the
point in time when he admitted to possessing marijuana at his home. The record
establishes DeGroot was not in custody when he admitted to possessing
marijuana and would voluntarily produce the marijuana. Because DeGroot was
not in custody during the encounter with the chief in city hall, no Miranda warning
was required, and the motion to suppress DeGroot’s admissions was properly
denied.
V. Consent to Search
DeGroot next contends his consent to search his home was coerced
through threats of punishment and promises of leniency.
After DeGroot admitted to having marijuana in his home, the chief advised
DeGroot the police would either obtain a search warrant or he could voluntarily
turn over the marijuana. DeGroot indicated he would voluntarily turn over the
marijuana. Even though DeGroot testified in the suppression hearing, “[I]t’s
either let somebody tear my house up or voluntarily give it over,” nothing in the
record indicates the chief threatened DeGroot; instead, he provided DeGroot with
options of how he could obtain the evidence following DeGroot’s admission.
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Thereafter, as DeGroot rode with the chief in the front seat of the squad
car, he asked whether the chief could let this one go because “he couldn’t afford
another charge.” The chief responded by indicating he would not pursue
charges. When they reached the house, the chief followed DeGroot into the
living room, where DeGroot retrieved a mason jar of marijuana. No search of the
house was conducted. Afterwards, the chief discussed with DeGroot that he
should turn himself in the next morning to the county sheriff. Because the chief
could not turn a blind eye to the illegal conduct, his only option was to take
possession of the marijuana and notify the country sheriff with the information
regarding DeGroot’s possession of the marijuana.
As he left the house, the chief joked with DeGroot that “every Thursday,
on the side of the road, give me a glass of water.” DeGroot asserts this
statement further shows the chief promised leniency. The record, however,
supports that this statement was made in jest. The chief did not press charges
nor did he advise the Bremer County Sheriff to press charges. Rather, he
testified he notified the sheriff’s office that DeGroot provided him with marijuana
and he left it up to that office to decide whether to pursue any charge against
DeGroot.
The record establishes there was no search of DeGroot’s residence.
Further, DeGroot voluntarily offered to produce the marijuana before the chief
stated he would not pursue charges. Accordingly, we find DeGroot voluntarily
agreed to produce the marijuana with no promise of leniency or coercion.
Further, we find DeGroot’s subjective belief that the chief would not charge him
does not preclude another office, in this case the sheriff’s office, from pursuing
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charges. Therefore, DeGroot’s will was not overborne, and his capacity for self-
determination was not critically impaired. See State v. Nolan, 390 N.W.2d 137,
142 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). The totality of the circumstances reveals the absence
of any coercion and demonstrates that DeGroot’s production of marijuana was
voluntary. Therefore, the district court properly denied DeGroot’s motion to
suppress the marijuana evidence.
VI. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
Finally, DeGroot asserts that all evidence obtained through his or his
stepson’s statements and his turning over the marijuana should be suppressed
because all evidence was obtained as fruit of the poisonous tree.
The phrase “fruit of the poisonous tree” refers to indirect or secondary
evidence obtained as a result of a prior illegality. See Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). Under the doctrine, the “fruits” that resulted from the
prior illegality are excluded if they were an exploitation of that prior illegality. See
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). Thus, the doctrine
operates as an extension of the exclusionary rule. State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d
371, 380 (Iowa 2007).
Since DeGroot could not assert a violation of his stepson’s constitutional
rights, he cannot challenge, in his own motion to suppress, evidence obtained
from his stepson’s statements. Further, evidence obtained from DeGroot’s
noncustodial, voluntary statements, as well as his voluntary production of
marijuana, was obtained legally. Therefore, none of the evidence was “fruit of
the poisonous tree.”
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VII. Conclusion
Because DeGroot was not in custody when he admitted to possessing
marijuana, he voluntarily turned over the marijuana, he lacks standing to assert
the constitutional rights of his stepson, and the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree
doctrine is inapplicable, the district court properly overruled DeGroot’s motion to
suppress, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.