In the Interest of A.M.C., Minor Child, A.C., Mother ( 2016 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 16-0634
    Filed August 17, 2016
    IN THE INTEREST OF A.M.C.,
    Minor Child,
    A.C., Mother,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County, David C.
    Larson, District Associate Judge.
    A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child.
    AFFIRMED.
    Michael H. Johnson of Johnson Law Firm, Spirit Lake, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Shannon L. Sandy of Sandy Law Firm, P.C., Spirit Lake, for minor child.
    Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Tabor, JJ.
    2
    TABOR, Judge.
    The juvenile court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her three
    children—ages nine, seven, and five. On appeal, she only challenges the court’s
    decision regarding the youngest child, A.M.C. The juvenile court relied on Iowa
    Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2015) as the basis for termination.        The mother
    argues the State did not prove the statutory grounds by clear and convincing
    evidence. Additionally, the mother asserts the State did not exert reasonable
    reunification efforts. Finally, the mother claims termination is not in the best
    interests of the child. Because the State offered ample evidence A.M.C. could
    not be returned to his mother’s care and termination offered him the best chance
    at long-term nurturing and growth, we affirm.
    I.     Background Facts and Proceedings
    A.M.C. lived with his mother, sister, and brother before 2014. The mother
    was divorced from the children’s father, and the father had little to no involvement
    with the children. The family first came to the attention of the Iowa Department of
    Human Services (DHS) in 2012 because the mother was alleged to have used
    methamphetamine and marijuana in the home while A.M.C. and his siblings were
    sleeping. Following this incident, the mother received voluntary substance abuse
    treatment until the DHS deemed the issue resolved in late 2013.
    In April 2014, the father took his own life. Following the death of the
    father, the mother increasingly struggled with her mental health, and the DHS
    workers believed she was no longer able to care for her children. In July 2014,
    A.M.C. and his brother were voluntarily placed with their maternal aunt after
    being found unattended outdoors while their mother was home sleeping,
    3
    unaware they were missing. A.M.C.’s sister was living with the grandmother.
    The mother moved in with her mother in November 2014 after losing her mobile
    home.
    On December 3, 2014, the voluntary placement became court ordered
    when A.M.C. and his siblings were adjudicated as children in need of assistance
    (CINA). During the pendency of the CINA proceeding, the DHS became aware
    that A.M.C. and his brother were sexually abused by their maternal uncle.
    Following the abuse, A.M.C. displayed inappropriate sexual behavior and had
    difficulty trusting others.   A.M.C. requires special care because of these
    concerns—including near constant supervision and reinforcement of proper
    behavior.
    The mother underwent a psychological evaluation in January 2015, at
    which point she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress
    disorder, and borderline personality disorder. The evaluator noted a belief the
    mother would continue to struggle to put the children’s needs before her own due
    to these mental health issues. The DHS provided services to help the mother
    improve her mental health.
    A.M.C. and his brother remained with their aunt until she requested the
    boys be removed from her home in April 2015. This request was spurred by
    sexual acts and violent behavior between A.M.C. and his brother. Thereafter,
    A.M.C. was placed with a foster family, with whom he has remained. During this
    time, the mother was offered a variety of services including, but not limited to,
    phone calls with A.M.C., individual weekly supervised visits with A.M.C.,
    transportation to those visits, parenting classes, and mental health services.
    4
    During the time leading up to the termination, the mother missed or was
    late to a number of visits and scheduled phone calls with A.M.C. The mother
    often refused to adjust her personal schedule to make time for visits with the
    children. During the visits the mother did attend, she struggled to apply the
    parenting skills she had been taught in the classes provided by the DHS.
    Following visits and phone calls with the mother, A.M.C. would often become
    upset easily, disobey his foster parents, and misbehave in school.
    At the time of the termination proceedings, the mother had a paramour in
    Minnesota, where she intended to move in the near future. The mother would
    not provide the DHS with her paramour’s personal information.
    The juvenile court held a termination hearing in January 2016. The court
    issued an order terminating the rights of the mother to all three children on
    January 27, 2016, under section 232.116(1)(f). The mother now appeals the
    termination of her rights to A.M.C.1
    II.    Standard of Review
    We review termination proceedings de novo. In re M.W., 
    876 N.W.2d 212
    ,
    219 (Iowa 2016). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s findings of fact, but
    we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility of witnesses.” 
    Id.
    (quoting In re D.W., 
    791 N.W.2d 703
    , 706 (Iowa 2010)). Clear and convincing
    evidence must support the termination. 
    Id.
     Evidence is clear and convincing
    when we have no serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness of
    conclusions of law drawn from it. 
    Id.
    1
    The State filed a response to the mother’s petition on appeal and the guardian ad litem
    for the child joined in that response.
    5
    III.    Analysis
    “Our review of termination of parental rights under Iowa Code Chapter 232
    is a three-step analysis.” M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 219. First, we must determine
    whether the State established the statutory grounds for termination, here section
    232.116(1)(f), by clear and convincing evidence. See id. If statutory grounds are
    established, we next consider whether termination is in the child’s best interests
    under section 232.116(2). See id. at 219-20. Finally, we determine whether any
    exceptions contained in section 232.116(3) outweigh termination. See id. at 220.
    Statutory Grounds. The mother argues the State failed to prove by clear
    and convincing evidence A.M.C. could not be returned to her custody, as
    required by section 232.116(1)(f)(4).2 She concedes she cannot presently take
    care of all three children at the same time but contends she is able to adequately
    care for A.M.C. alone.         We conclude the State offered clear and convincing
    evidence to satisfy the statutory requirements of section 232.116(1)(f).
    A.M.C.’s special needs require above-average parenting skills. A.M.C.’s
    therapist testified A.M.C.’s vulnerability requires him to live in a stable and
    predictable environment in order to continue improving his mental health and
    trust issues. Despite the services provided by the DHS to improve the mother’s
    parenting skills, she has not attained the skills to satisfy A.M.C.’s needs. While
    2
    Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) states the juvenile court may terminate the rights of a parent to
    a child if:
    (1) [t]he child is four years of age or older, (2) [t]he child has been adjudicated a
    CINA pursuant to section 232.96, (3) [t]he child has been removed from the
    physical custody of the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen
    months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home
    has been less than thirty days, and (4) [t]here is clear and convincing evidence
    that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s
    parents as provided in section 232.102.
    The mother does not dispute the first three elements—she argues the State failed to
    prove the fourth element.
    6
    A.M.C. has made significant headway in addressing his mental health during his
    time with his foster parents, his foster parents consistently observed regression
    in his behavior following his mother’s visits. The mother continues to struggle to
    understand A.M.C.’s need for intensive supervision and reinforcement of proper
    behavior.
    The mother’s struggle with her own mental health has affected her ability
    to provide adequate care for her children in the past. The mother’s psychological
    evaluator stated it would likely be difficult for her to put the needs of her children
    above her own due to her mental health diagnoses. Therefore, we agree with
    the juvenile court’s assessment that the mother has not adequately addressed
    her mental health needs or improved her parenting skills so as to be able to
    provide the special care necessary to nurture the emotional welfare of A.M.C.
    See In re A.M.S., 
    419 N.W.2d 723
    , 734 (Iowa 1988) (finding it unlikely mother
    with mental disability could improve her parenting skills to meet special needs of
    daughter).
    Furthermore, the mother has not put forth a significant effort to maintain
    financial stability. In the year leading up to the termination hearing, the mother
    primarily worked part-time and had not saved sufficient funds to provide for
    A.M.C. The mother did not have her own housing and did not take advantage of
    the DHS services offered to assist her in obtaining independent housing. The
    mother currently lives with the children’s grandmother and A.M.C.’s sister. It is
    unclear how A.M.C. would interact with his sister given his inappropriate behavior
    following the sexual abuse he experienced. Moreover, the mother often had
    difficulty securing reliable transportation.     The mother seemed unable to
    7
    understand emergencies requiring transportation may arise when caring for a
    child and to understand she would be responsible for transporting A.M.C. to
    therapy, additional doctor’s appointments, and other activities.
    The mother has had significant time to improve her parenting skills and
    place herself in a position to provide adequate care for A.M.C., but she has not
    reached that level of stability. While there are no allegations A.M.C. suffered
    intentional physical abuse at the hands of his mother, the record demonstrates a
    number of instances of neglect. Our statutory termination provisions being both
    preventative and remedial, the State need not wait until tangible harm has
    occurred before initiating a termination. See In re J.E., 
    723 N.W.2d 793
    , 798
    (Iowa 2006). Given the high probability of imminent harm and continued neglect,
    we find clear and convincing evidence A.M.C. could not be safely placed in his
    mother’s care at the time of the hearing. See 
    id.
     Consequently, termination was
    proper under subsection (f). See 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (1)(f).
    Reasonable Efforts. The DHS is required to “make every reasonable
    effort to return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with
    the best interests of the child.” 
    Iowa Code § 232.102
    (7); In re C.B., 
    611 N.W.2d 489
    , 493 (Iowa 2000). In turn, the parent must ask for additional services before
    permanency or termination proceedings if they believe the current services to be
    inadequate. In re A.A.G., 
    708 N.W.2d 85
    , 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005); see also
    
    Iowa Code § 232.99
    (3). Consequently, to preserve for appeal the challenge that
    DHS failed to use reasonable efforts toward reunification, the parent must have
    demanded a change in the services. The record indicates the mother requested
    8
    additional and unsupervised visitation time with A.M.C. Because she sought
    additional services, the mother preserved her claim for appeal.
    The State’s duty to make reasonable efforts toward reunification is not “a
    strict substantive requirement of termination.”      C.B., 
    611 N.W.2d at 493
    .
    “Instead, the scope of the efforts by the DHS to reunify parent and child after
    removal impacts the burden of proving those elements of termination which
    require reunification efforts.” 
    Id.
    While visitation is imperative in achieving reunification, its nature and
    extent is always controlled by the best interest of the child. In re M.B., 
    553 N.W.2d 343
    , 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). Before visits, A.M.C. was often anxious
    and needed reassurance he would be returning to his foster family. The mother
    was often distracted and did not make significant efforts to engage A.M.C. during
    their visits.   She did not employ the skills she was taught through parenting
    education without prompts from supervisors. She often arrived late, and at times,
    did not show up for scheduled visits. During one visit in particular, A.M.C. was
    swimming with his mother when he suddenly became visibly upset, jumped out of
    the pool, and ran to the bathroom. When his foster mother inquired about his
    distress, A.M.C. said his mother inappropriately touched him while swimming.
    Following visits with his mother, A.M.C.’s foster parents reported he was often
    angry, destructive, and noncompliant.
    The DHS provided the mother with a number of services, including but not
    limited to, supervised visits, parenting-skills education, and therapy. Considering
    the mother’s poor connection with A.M.C. during visits and A.M.C.’s behavioral
    9
    regression following visits, the DHS appropriately limited the mother’s visits and
    made reasonable efforts to reunite her with her child. See 
    id.
    Best Interests and Factors Weighing Against Termination.                 The
    mother argues termination of her rights will sever the bond between A.M.C. and
    his siblings.   The mother further argues termination would be detrimental to
    A.M.C. due to the close parent-child bond. See 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (3)(c).
    In determining the best interests of the child, we give primary
    consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering his long-
    term nurturing and growth, and to his physical, mental, and emotional condition
    and needs. 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (2); see also D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 708. We
    agree with the juvenile court’s conclusion the child’s needs are best served by
    moving toward adoption.
    First, we address the mother’s contention that it is not in the best interests
    of the siblings to be separated from each other.          Our supreme court has
    expressed a preference to keep siblings together if possible. In re L.B.T., 
    318 N.W.2d 200
    , 202 (Iowa 1982).        But, that preference does not outweigh the
    consideration of the best interests of the individual child. 
    Id.
     Here, A.M.C. and
    his brother displayed inappropriate sexual behavior toward one another when
    living together. The two boys were separated as a result of this behavior, and
    reports from DHS workers indicate the risk of harm would return if they were
    again in each other’s company without proper supervision. Given the dynamics
    of the sibling relationships in this case, it is not counter to A.M.C.’s interests to
    separate him from his brother.      Furthermore, the mother’s rights have been
    10
    terminated as to A.M.C.’s siblings, and as such, the three children would not
    have a legal relationship even if A.M.C. were returned to his mother’s custody.
    Finally, we do not find the closeness of A.M.C.’s relationship with his
    mother outweighs his need for permanency.         The mother’s current lack of
    independent housing and plan to relocate to Minnesota in the near future to live
    near her paramour do not coincide with A.M.C.’s need for a consistent and safe
    home.     Further, A.M.C. was often fearful when faced with the prospect of
    returning to his mother’s care and reluctant to speak to his mother on the phone.
    During supervised visits, A.M.C. routinely chose to engage his foster mother
    rather than his biological mother. After visits with his mother, A.M.C. exhibited
    aggressive and inappropriate behavior. A.M.C.’s behavior and mental health has
    significantly improved since placement with his foster family. A.M.C. calls his
    foster parents “mom” and “dad” and has voiced his desire for his foster family to
    be his “forever family.”   His foster family has expressed the intent to move
    forward with adoption. While the mother shares a bond with A.M.C., we do not
    find termination would be detrimental to A.M.C. due to the closeness of this bond.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-0634

Filed Date: 8/17/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021