In the Interest of E.D., F.D., and J.D., Minor Children, R.G., Mother ( 2016 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 16-0829
    Filed August 17, 2016
    IN THE INTEREST OF E.D., F.D., AND J.D.,
    Minor Children,
    R.G., Mother,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Julie A.
    Schumacher, District Associate Judge.
    A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to three children
    who are members of an Indian tribe. AFFIRMED.
    Harold K. Widdison of Harold K. Widdison, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant
    mother.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Jessica R. Noll of Deck Law L.L.P., Sioux City, for minor children.
    Ainsley Griffin Sr., Macy, Nebraska, for the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska.
    Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Tabor, JJ.
    2
    TABOR, Judge.
    This termination-of-parental-rights appeal involves three children—ages
    eight, four, and one—who are members of the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska.1 Their
    mother, who lived on the reservation at the time of the hearing, seeks reversal of
    the juvenile court’s termination order. The mother’s petition on appeal lacks
    clarity as to the legal issues presented and the juvenile court findings with which
    she disagrees.    She mentions the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
    grounds for termination, but she does not pinpoint the elements the State fell
    short of proving.     Instead she alleges the State failed to show the Iowa
    Department of Human Services (DHS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the
    family. She also claims the juvenile court erred in denying the tribe’s motion to
    transfer.2 Finally, she asserts the State failed to “comply with the spirit and the
    letter” of the Indian Child Welfare Act—without specifying the ICWA provisions
    allegedly breached.
    Assuming the mother’s petition adequately raises a sufficiency issue, we
    conclude the juvenile court properly terminated her parental rights under Iowa
    Code section 232.116(1)(d) (2015).        We also agree with the juvenile court’s
    conclusion that the State engaged in “reasonable efforts” under Iowa Code
    section 232.102(7), as well as “active efforts” to “provide remedial services and
    rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family”
    under section 232B.5(19). Given the unusual procedural history here, we find no
    error in the juvenile court’s denial of the tribe’s motion to transfer the case under
    1
    A fourth child, Js.D., who tested positive for methamphetamine at birth in December
    2013, was living with a relative and was not a subject of these termination proceedings.
    2
    The tribe did not file any documents in this appeal.
    3
    section 232B.5. Finally, the mother’s passing reference to non-compliance with
    ICWA is too vague to trigger a more extensive review under chapter 232B.
    I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
    As described in the juvenile court’s decision, this family has had
    “extensive history” with the DHS. Child Protection Service investigators returned
    no less than eight founded assessments between 2012 and 2015. In June 2012,
    the parents left F.D. (born in August 2011) and Jr.D. (born in April 2007)
    unsupervised to care for themselves.          Following that incident, the family
    participated in voluntary services offered by the DHS.       A similar incident of
    neglect occurred in June 2013.      The father was arrested for assaulting the
    mother in October 2013; he told authorities the mother also struck him.
    By January 2014, substance abuse by the parents prompted a child-in-
    need-of-assistance   (CINA)    hearing.       The   mother   admitted   she   used
    methamphetamine during her pregnancy with Js.D. The juvenile court
    adjudicated Jr.D., F.D., and Js.D. as CINA under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(b),
    (c)(2), (n), and (o). By the end of that month, the proceedings were transferred to
    the Omaha Tribe in Macy Nebraska.
    The tribe removed the children from their parents’ custody in July 2014
    based on a child protective assessment showing the mother and father both used
    methamphetamine while caring for the children. The mother attended an in-
    patient substance abuse treatment program in Winnebago, Nebraska, during
    January 2015.    The tribe returned the children to her one month after she
    completed treatment. The tribe dismissed the case in March 2015.
    4
    But renewed concerns about the mother’s drug use emerged when she
    gave birth to E.D. a month later. In April 2015, the State filed a new CINA
    petition because the medical staff believed the baby was going through
    withdrawal.   When the meconium test came back negative, the matter was
    dismissed.
    The family returned to the attention of the DHS a few months later. On
    four occasions in the summer of 2015, the children were left unattended in the
    early morning hours. In one instance, the manager of the apartment complex
    where they lived saw four-year-old F.D. on top of a car. In another episode, a
    police officer found three of the children alone in the apartment without a
    telephone or knowledge of their parents’ whereabouts.
    In September 2015, the juvenile court adjudicated E.D., F.D., and Jr.D. as
    CINA under section 232.2(6)(b), (c)(2), and (n). The State asked the court to set
    a hearing to determine if aggravating circumstances existed to waive the
    requirement of reasonable efforts to reunify the family. The DHS initially placed
    the children with a relative, who less than three weeks later asked that they be
    removed from her care.     After a shelter-care hearing on September 29, the
    juvenile court asked the tribe to “immediately identify to the Iowa DHS any
    potential relative placements” for three children. Because no family members
    were identified, the DHS placed the children in foster care. The parents did not
    exercise visitation with the children between August 2015 and November 2015.
    On October 13, 2015, the Omaha Tribe filed a motion to transfer the CINA
    cases to tribal court. The parents supported the transfer motion. The guardian
    ad litem (GAL) resisted the motion, asserting it was not in the children’s best
    5
    interest to have their cases handled by the tribal court. The GAL reasoned that
    transferring jurisdiction to the tribal court would delay permanency for the
    children.   The State and the DHS took no position on the tribe’s motion to
    transfer. At a hearing on the motion to transfer, the Family Safety Risk and
    Permanency (FSRP) worker testified she had provided parenting education,
    budgeting, and supervised visitation for the family since August 2015.       After the
    hearing, the juvenile court decided on January 20, 2016, to retain jurisdiction of
    the CINA cases. The court noted the denial of the motion to transfer did not
    preclude the tribe from participating in the CINA proceedings. The court also
    determined the DHS had provided active efforts to prevent the breakup of the
    family, including staffing the case on a weekly basis with the DHS liaison for
    Native American issues.
    On November 9, 2015, the court found the existence of aggravated
    circumstances under section 232.102(12)(b) and granted the State’s motion to
    waive reasonable efforts and proceed to permanency. Less than one month
    later, the State filed its petition to terminate parental rights of both the father and
    mother as to E.D., F.D. and Jr.D. Before the termination hearing occurred, the
    father was arrested for assaulting the mother after they had both been drinking.
    During this same time period, the mother was evicted from her apartment in
    Sioux City for not paying rent and moved in with a relative living on the Omaha
    Tribe’s reservation in Macy, Nebraska.
    The juvenile court held a termination hearing on April 8, 2016. The DHS
    case manager Robin Garraway testified the mother had not been cooperative
    with services and could not provide the children with stability.          The mother
    6
    testified that since August 2015, she had not completed a substance abuse
    evaluation, had not followed through with the parenting curriculum provided by
    the FSRP worker, and did not have any income.           The court observed: “The
    mother was belligerent throughout the termination hearing, shouting things out
    during other witnesses’ testimony, leaving the courtroom during the proceedings,
    refusing to sit at the counsel table, sleeping during the proceedings, staring at the
    ceiling, and refusing to answer questions on both direct and cross-examination.”
    The court issued its order terminating the parental rights of both the
    mother and the father on May 8, 2016. Despite earlier waiving the reasonable-
    efforts requirement, the court found the DHS efforts to reunify the family were
    “tantamount to ‘a vigorous and concerted level of casework beyond the level that
    typically constitutes reasonable efforts.’” The mother appeals.
    II. Scope and Standards of Review
    We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re J.L.,
    
    779 N.W.2d 481
    , 485 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). But we review the juvenile court’s
    denial of a motion to transfer jurisdiction under section 232B.5 for correction of
    legal error. 
    Id.
    This case involves Indian children, and the parties agree that Iowa ICWA
    provisions apply. The ICWA has a dual purpose—to protect the best interests of
    a child and preserve the Indian culture. 
    Id. at 492
    . We strictly construe the
    ICWA provisions, though our “paramount interest” remains the protection of the
    children’s best interests. See In re D.S., 
    806 N.W.2d 458
    , 465 (Iowa Ct. App.
    2011).
    7
    III. Analysis of Mother’s Issues
    A. Statutory Grounds for Termination
    In its petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights, the State relied on
    Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b), (d), (i), and (l). The court’s order terminated
    the mother’s rights under subsections (d), (i), and (l).3
    In her petition on appeal, the mother mentions the sufficiency of the
    evidence, but does not focus our attention on what is missing from the State’s
    proof.    The State contends the mother waived any argument related to the
    specific provisions of each code section.        We agree the mother’s petition is
    scanty on the basis for her sufficiency claim, but we nevertheless address the
    grounds for termination.
    When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one
    statutory ground, we may affirm the order on any ground supported by clear and
    convincing evidence. In re D.W., 
    791 N.W.2d 703
    , 707 (Iowa 2010). In this
    case, we find clear and convincing evidence to support the order under
    subsection (d), which requires proof of the following elements:
    (1) The court has previously adjudicated the child to be
    [CINA] after finding the child to have been physically or sexually
    abused or neglected as the result of the acts or omissions of one or
    both parents, or the court has previously adjudicated a child who is
    a member of the same family to be [CINA] after such a finding.
    (2) Subsequent to the [CINA] adjudication, the parents were
    offered or received services to correct the circumstance which led
    to the adjudication, and the circumstance continues to exist despite
    the offer or receipt of services.
    
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (1)(d).
    3
    The court decided the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
    mother abandoned the children under section 232.116(1)(b).
    8
    The court adjudicated F.D. and Jr.D. as CINA in January 2014 based on a
    finding of parental neglect. The court adjudicated E.D., F.D., and Jr.D. as CINA
    in September 2015.        The two adjudications may serve as the basis for
    termination of parental rights under section 232.116(1)(d). See In re J.S., 
    846 N.W.2d 36
    , 41 (Iowa 2014). The record shows after the CINA adjudication, the
    mother was offered and received services to address her substance-abuse
    issues, her lack of parenting skills, and her abusive relationship with the father.
    The juvenile court opined: “It would be difficult to imagine a parent that has been
    more resistive to reunification services than the mother in this case.” Our de
    novo review of the record reveals support for that opinion. We agree with the
    juvenile court’s determination that despite the offer and receipt of services, the
    circumstances leading to the CINA adjudication still exist. Accordingly, we affirm
    termination of the mother’s rights under subsection (d).4
    B. DHS Efforts to Reunify the Family
    When the DHS removes children from their parent’s care, the State is
    responsible for making “every reasonable effort” to return them home as quickly
    as possible consistent with their best interests. See 
    Iowa Code § 232.102
    (7).
    “Reasonable efforts” are those actions that make it possible for the children to
    safely return to the family's home. 
    Id.
     § 232.102(10)(a).
    When the DHS removes Indian children from their parent’s care, the State
    must offer clear and convincing evidence to the juvenile court that “active efforts
    have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs
    4
    Although the juvenile court found aggravating circumstances warranting waiver of the
    obligation to make reasonable efforts towards reunification, the DHS provided a plethora
    of services before the waiver order was filed.
    9
    designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have
    proved unsuccessful.” Iowa Code § 232B.5(19); D.S., 806 N.W.2d at 466. The
    active-efforts requirement set forth in section 232B.5(19) aims to preserve the
    parent-child relationship or the children’s connection to Indian culture. D.S., 806
    N.W.2d at 466.         The juvenile court shall not order termination, “unless the
    evidence of active efforts shows there has been a vigorous and concerted level
    of casework beyond the level that typically constitutes reasonable efforts . . . .
    Reasonable efforts shall not be construed to be active efforts.” Iowa Code §
    232B.5(19).5
    The mother’s petition on appeal primarily discusses the reasonable-efforts
    standard, but does include the following sentence: “There has NOT been a
    ‘vigorous and concerted level of case work beyond the level typically constituting
    reasonable efforts.’” Although the mother’s argument is minimal on the active-
    efforts requirement, we nevertheless examine whether the State met its burden
    to show a concerted level of casework to prevent the breakup of this Indian
    5
    Iowa Code section 232B.5(19) states:
    Active efforts shall include but are not limited to all of the following:
    a. A request to the Indian child’s tribe to convene traditional and
    customary support and resolution actions or services.
    b. Identification and participation of tribally designated
    representatives at the earliest point.
    c. Consultation with extended family members to identify family
    structure and family support services that may be provided by extended
    family members.
    d. Frequent visitation in the Indian child’s home and the homes of
    the child’s extended family members.
    e. Exhaustion of all tribally appropriate family preservation
    alternatives.
    f. Identification and provision of information to the child’s family
    concerning community resources that may be able to offer housing,
    financial, and transportation assistance and actively assisting the family in
    accessing the community resources.
    10
    family.     Our examination confirms the DHS engaged in active efforts at
    reunification.
    The DHS has offered this family numerous services dating back to 2012.
    After founded child abuse reports in June 2012 and June 2013, the DHS offered
    FSRP assistance through Boys Town, but the family largely refused those
    services.      In January 2014, the mother completed a substance abuse
    assessment       at   Jackson   Recovery    Center,   which   diagnosed   her   with
    amphetamine dependence and recommended residential treatment.              But she
    refused to enter the Women and Children’s Center program that was offered.
    The mother did receive drug treatment from the Winnebago Tribe and parenting
    classes through the Ponca Tribe in January 2015.
    The mother was offered assistance with applying for child care and
    housing in August 2015, but failed to attend. In that same time period, the family
    was offered FSRP services, including supervised visitation, budgeting, and
    parenting skill training.   The parents initially refused to attend visitation and
    cooperated with the FSRP provider only sporadically.
    On appeal, the mother focuses on her transportation difficulties.     She
    argues, while the State offered her bus passes, “those are no help because there
    is no bus services between Macy, Nebraska, where the Mother lives and Sioux
    City, Iowa where services are offered.” The mother moved to Macy late in the
    case, after she was evicted from her apartment in Sioux City for not paying rent.
    DHS worker Garraway disputed the mother’s position that transportation
    was the greatest barrier to reunification. Garraway—who was assigned to the
    DHS Native American unit and had knowledge regarding the Omaha Tribe—
    11
    testified the Macy reservation offered tribal services to people in its community,
    but the mother had not chosen to participate.
    In addition, the FSRP worker from Southwest Iowa Family Access Center
    testified at the termination hearing that during early 2016 she had provided
    round-trip transportation to the mother from Macy, Nebraska, to the children’s
    foster home in Schaller, Iowa, and back—a five-hour round trip. Together with
    the two-hour visitation, the process took a total of seven hours. The worker
    testified the service was “above and beyond” the typical case.      The worker also
    testified she provided the parents with resources to help them set up a household
    budget as well as a Love & Logic parenting curriculum, but the parents did not
    follow through with the projects.
    We agree with the juvenile court’s determination that the State satisfied
    both the reasonable-efforts requirement under section 232.102(7), as well as the
    more demanding ICWA active-efforts requirement.
    C. Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction to Tribe
    The mother claims the juvenile court erred in failing to grant the tribe’s
    motion to transfer jurisdiction because “the court determined that ICWA applied
    in this case” and because “both parents supported the Tribe’s motion to transfer.”
    The State argues the mother did not preserve error on the issue of denial
    of the tribe’s motion to transfer because (1) the mother did not present evidence
    in support of the transfer motion and (2) neither the mother nor the tribe appealed
    the January 20, 2016 order denying the motion to transfer.6 In the alternative,
    6
    The State’s response to the petition on appeal cites cases concerning standing but
    does not outright argue the mother lacks standing to contest the denial of the tribe’s
    12
    the State contends the juvenile court correctly found good cause to deny the
    tribe’s transfer motion.
    We start with the preservation question. The State suggests the mother
    waived her objection by not appealing the denial-of-transfer order. We disagree.
    The January 20 order did not dispose of all issues in the case. Accordingly, it
    was not a final appealable order. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(1)(a); In re T.R.,
    
    705 N.W.2d 6
    , 10 (Iowa 2005); see also Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Dinwiddie
    Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 1713-12-2, 
    2013 WL 4804901
    , at *2 (Va. Ct. App. Sept.
    10, 2013). The mother is entitled to raise the transfer issue on appeal from the
    final termination ruling.   See In re Y.V., No. 4199-672, 
    1999 WL 1255722
    , at *2
    (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1999).
    Having determined the issue is properly before us, we reject the mother’s
    argument.    The fact both parents supported a transfer of jurisdiction did not
    automatically require the juvenile court to grant the tribe’s motion.
    In J.L., we declared the transfer provisions of Iowa’s ICWA—sections
    232B.5(10) and (13)—unconstitutional because they considered only the
    interests of the tribe and the parents. 
    779 N.W.2d at 492-93
    . We found the
    “narrow definition of good cause prohibiting the children from objecting to the
    motion to transfer based upon their best interests and introducing evidence of
    their best interests” violated the children’s substantive due process rights. 
    Id.
     at
    motion to transfer. Because preservation of error and standing are separate concepts,
    we do not find the State’s preservation argument incorporates an objection to the
    mother’s standing to challenge the court’s transfer ruling. See Berent v. City of Iowa
    City, 
    738 N.W.2d 193
    , 202-03 (Iowa 2007). But even if the State had properly contested
    the mother’s standing, we would find she had a sufficient stake in the transfer of the
    CINA cases to the tribal court to obtain judicial review of the controversy. See 
    id.
    13
    492 (concluding “nothing in [the Iowa ICWA] places maintaining the Indian
    culture above a child’s rights or safety”). After our holding in J.L., if the children
    object to the transfer of jurisdiction to the tribe, as was done by the GAL in this
    case, the court must determine whether good cause, including the children’s best
    interests, exists to deny the petition to transfer. See Iowa Code § 232B.5(10),
    (13); In re E.D. No. 12-1839, 
    2012 WL 6190548
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 12,
    2012); J.L., 
    779 N.W.2d at 492
    .
    In denying the tribe’s motion to transfer, the juvenile court cited J.L. and
    articulated the critical issue: “This court must consider whether, despite the
    Omaha Tribe’s efforts to reunify the children with their parents, good cause exists
    to prevent transfer . . . including whether the transfer is in the best interests of the
    children.”   After considering the progression of the CINA cases, the court
    concluded, “at this time, good cause exists to deny the Omaha Tribe’s motion to
    transfer jurisdiction.” The court considered the “determining factor” to be the
    children’s best interests, and listed the following circumstances: (1) a “complete
    lack of progress” on the part of the parents; (2) a founded child abuse
    assessment only six months after the tribe returned custody to the mother; and
    (3) “most importantly,” the “safety of these three young children.” See J.L., 
    779 N.W.2d at 492-93
    . The juvenile court conducted a proper analysis under J.L.
    Given the particular struggles of this family and the new CINA adjudication after
    the tribe’s earlier dismissal of the child welfare case, we find the juvenile court did
    not err in denying the tribe’s motion to transfer.
    14
    D. ICWA Compliance
    At the conclusion of her petition on appeal, the mother asserts: “The State
    failed to comply with the spirit and letter of ICWA in this case.” This broad
    assertion does not direct us to any particular deficiency in the State’s handling of
    the placement of these Indian children.           Iowa’s ICWA, chapter 232B,
    encompasses fourteen sections with multiple subsections, spanning a dozen
    pages in the Iowa Code. Invocation of the entire chapter does not frame a viable
    assignment of error. Because we cannot play the role of advocate, we decline to
    address the mother’s vague ICWA argument. See Inghram v. Dairyland Mut. Ins.
    Co., 
    215 N.W.2d 239
    , 240 (Iowa 1974) (“To reach the merits of this case would
    require us to assume a partisan role and undertake the appellant’s research and
    advocacy. This role is one we refuse to assume.”).
    AFFIRMED.