Joshua Allen Taft v. Iowa District Court For Monroe County ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0170
Filed March 7, 2018
JOSHUA ALLEN TAFT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR MONROE COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monroe County, Annette J.
Scieszinski, Judge.
Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari, challenging his special
sentence under Iowa Code section 903B.1 (2007). WRIT ANNULLED.
Monte M. McCoy of McCoy Legal Services, Centerville, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Bower, JJ.
2
BOWER, Judge.
Joshua Taft filed a petition for writ of certiorari, challenging his special
sentence under Iowa Code section 903B.1 (2007). Taft has not shown (1) the
special sentence of lifetime parole is facially cruel and unusual, (2) the sentence
is grossly disproportionate to the offense, or (3) the sentence violates double
jeopardy. We find the district court did not act illegally and annul the writ of
certiorari.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
On October 13, 2008, Taft pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the third
degree, in violation of section 704.4(2)(c)(4), a class “C” felony. The district court
sentenced him to a term of imprisonment not to exceed ten years. The judgment
entry also provided:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant is committed
to the custody of the director of the Iowa Department of Corrections
for the rest of his life, pursuant to Section 903B.1, Code of Iowa,
with eligibility for parole as provided in Chapter 906. The special
sentence shall commence upon completion of the sentence
imposed for the underlying criminal offense, and the defendant
shall begin the sentence under supervision as if on parole.
Taft did not appeal his conviction.
On May 4, 2016, Taft filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming
the special sentence under section 903B.1 was unconstitutional because it
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the sentence was grossly
disproportionate to the offense, and it amounted to double jeopardy. After a
hearing, the district court denied Taft’s motion, finding Taft had not shown his
3
sentence was illegal. Taft filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Iowa
Supreme Court granted.1
II. Standard of Review
Our review of a constitutional challenge to a sentence is de novo. State v.
Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 816 (Iowa 2016). “In our review, we independently
evaluate the totality of the circumstances as evidenced by the whole record.”
State v. Simpson, 587 N.W.2d 770, 771 (Iowa 1998). “The court may correct an
illegal sentence at any time.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5)(a).
III. Merits
A. Taft claims the special sentence under section 903B.1 is facially
invalid on the ground it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.2 He states the
special sentence could potentially go on indefinitely, making it inherently cruel
and unusual. The Iowa Supreme Court has concluded the imposition of a special
sentence of lifetime parole cannot be categorically characterized as cruel and
unusual punishment. State v. Graham, 897 N.W.2d 476, 488 (Iowa 2017)
(finding defendant, a juvenile who had been convicted of third-degree sexual
abuse, was not entitled to relief from the special sentence of lifetime parole on
the ground it was cruel and unusual punishment, noting the parole board might
relieve defendant from parole obligations sometime in the future).
1
Taft filed a notice of appeal. The Iowa Supreme Court determined it would treat the
notice as a petition for writ of certiorari, citing State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa
2017).
2
Before the district court, Taft claimed the special sentence was unconstitutional under
the United States and Iowa Constitutions. He did not, however, make a separate
argument regarding the Iowa Constitution, and therefore, we will not address the issues
in this case under the Iowa Constitution. See State v. Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d 838, 842 n.1
(Iowa 2008).
4
B. Taft claims the special sentence is grossly disproportionate when
considering the harshness of the punishment to the gravity of the offense. Even
when a sentence is not facially invalid, it may still constitute cruel and unusual
punishment if it is grossly disproportionate to the offense. State v. Bruegger, 773
N.W.2d 862, 873 (Iowa 2009). We previously stated, “We conclude that Iowa
Code section 903B.1 . . . is not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the
offenses to which it applies and its imposition does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.” State v. Harkins, 786 N.W.2d 498, 507 (Iowa Ct. App.
2009) (discussing section 903B.1 in relation to a defendant who had been
convicted of third-degree sexual abuse). As the State points out, Taft does not
argue how his sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime.
C. Finally, Taft claims the special sentence under section 903B.1
amounts to double jeopardy under the United States Constitution. “The Double
Jeopardy Clause protects those accused of a crime from both multiple
prosecution and multiple punishment.” State v. Franzen, 495 N.W.2d 714, 716
(Iowa 1993). “Because power to prescribe crimes and determine punishment is
vested with the legislature, the question under the Double Jeopardy Clause
whether punishments are ‘multiple’ is essentially one of legislative intent.” Id.Section 903B.1 states a special sentence under this section will be imposed “in
addition to any other punishment provided by law.” We conclude the special
sentence under section 903B.1 does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
We find the district court did not act illegally and annul the writ of certiorari.
WRIT ANNULLED.