Jensen v. Champion Window ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0656
Filed January 10, 2018
RANDLE S. JENSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CHAMPION WINDOW OF OMAHA, L.L.C.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Paul D. Scott, Judge.
A former employee appeals the district court’s summary judgment ruling
and argues the court erred in applying Nebraska law to this dispute. AFFIRMED.
Terry A. White of Carlson & Burnett, LLP, Omaha, Nebraska, for appellant.
Kenneth M. Wentz III and Sarah J. Millsap of Jackson Lewis, P.C., Omaha,
Nebraska, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
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VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
Randle Jensen was fired from his job with Champion Window of Omaha,
L.L.C., in August 2013. In February 2016, he filed a lawsuit against Champion in
Iowa alleging he was wrongfully discharged when he refused to sign a lead
certification form for an Iowa construction project. Champion filed a motion to
dismiss the claim, which the district court granted based on the court’s conclusion
that Nebraska law applied to the dispute. Jensen appeals claiming the court erred
in applying Nebraska law and that Iowa law should be applicable to his claim.
Because we conclude the district court correctly applied Nebraska law to this
dispute, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Jensen’s lawsuit.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
After Jensen was fired from employment, he filed a lawsuit against
Champion in Nebraska Federal District Court. That action was dismissed following
Champion’s motion for summary judgment. The federal court concluded the
federal claims had no merit and then decided to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Jensen then filed petitions against Champion
in both the state court in Nebraska, and in the Iowa District Court in Polk County.
Jensen’s Nebraska state lawsuit was dismissed following Champion’s
motion to dismiss after that court concluded the law Jensen cited to support his
claims did not contain a private right of action, his newly asserted claims were
precluded by the federal district court’s dismissal, and the claims were otherwise
time barred. This dismissal was upheld on appeal by the Nebraska Court of
Appeals. Jensen v. Champion Window of Omaha, LLC, 900 N.W.2d 590, 592
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(Neb. Ct. App. 2017) (addressing Jensen’s challenge to the lower court’s
conclusion that his newly asserted claims were barred by issue preclusion).
With respect to the litigation in Iowa, Champion filed a motion to dismiss in
July 2016, asserting there is no private right of action under the law Jensen cited
for his retaliation claims and the Nebraska federal court’s dismissal precluded the
retaliation claims and the wrongful discharge claim. The court granted in part
Champion’s motion, concluding there was no private right of action under the law
Jensen cited in support of his retaliation claims but determining his wrongful
discharge claim was not precluded by the federal court’s dismissal.
Champion then filed a second motion to dismiss, asserting Nebraska law
applied to the parties’ employment relationship and as a result, Jensen’s petition,
which alleged only wrongful discharge under Iowa law, failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. After a hearing, the district court granted
Champion’s second motion to dismiss, concluding Nebraska law applied because
“[e]very aspect of Jensen’s relationship with Champion occurred in Nebraska.
Jensen is a Nebraska resident. Champion is a Nebraska company. Champion
hired Jensen in Nebraska. Jensen worked primarily in Nebraska.” The court went
on to find: “Iowa does not have the most significant relationship to the events giving
rise to Jensen’s complaint . . . . Iowa law cannot govern the employment
relationship between a foreign company that performs minimal . . . work in Iowa,
and its employee, a citizen of a foreign state, who has no ties to Iowa.” Jensen
appeals the court’s dismissal of his petition.
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II. Scope and Standard of Review.
Our review of the district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss is for the
correction of errors at law. Griffen v. State, 767 N.W.2d 633, 634 (Iowa 2009).
“We view the petition in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and will uphold
dismissal only if the plaintiff’s claim could not be sustained under any state of facts
provable under the petition.” Id. (citation omitted).
III. Choice of Law.
Jensen asserts the court erred in relying on the contract choice-of-law rules
when determining which state’s law applied to this case. He argues his claim of
wrongful discharge arises from tort, and therefore, the court was required to apply
the tort choice-of-law rules, which he claims result in the application of Iowa law.
In support of its ruling, the district court cited the case of Helfer v. Corona
Products, 127 F.2d 612, 622 (8th Cir. 1942), which determined the law of the state
where a contract was executed governed the dispute between an employer and a
sales agent. The court also cited the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
section 196 (Am. Law Inst. 1971), which provides the law of the state where a
contract requires services to be rendered applies to disputes regarding the validity
of the contract unless some other state has a more significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties. We agree both citations apply to actions involving
contract disputes and do not refer to common law tort actions such as wrongful
discharge. See Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 751, 761 (Iowa 2009) (noting
Iowa has long recognized the tort of wrongful discharge as an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine).
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Even assuming the tort conflict-of-law rules govern in this matter as Jensen
alleges, we still determine Nebraska law is applicable to Jensen’s claim. Under
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 145(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1971),
“[t]he rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles
stated in § 6.” See Cameron v. Hardisty, 407 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Iowa 1987) (noting
“Iowa has adopted the ‘modern’ choice of law rules” contained in Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (Am. Law Inst. 1971)). When determining which
state has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, the
court is to consider the following contacts:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1971). These
contacts are to be considered under the principles in section 6, which provides:
[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law
include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1971).
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Here, Jensen identifies only one contact with Iowa—prior to his termination,
he was asked to certify the lead testing for a project in Iowa that Champion
completed. However, Jensen admitted in his petition that he had “never worked
on, visited or tested” that project in Iowa. The request for Jensen to sign the
certification was made in Nebraska. Contrary to this single contact, the pertinent
contacts from section 145 and section 6 for Jensen’s wrongful discharge claim
focus solely on Nebraska.
Under section 145, the injury—the loss of Jensen’s job—occurred in
Nebraska. The location of the conduct causing the injury also occurred in
Nebraska—according to Jensen’s petition, he was asked to sign a falsified lead
certification in Nebraska and he was fired from his job in Nebraska. Jensen’s
domicile is Nebraska, and Champion Window of Omaha is incorporated in
Nebraska with a principle place of business there. The employment relationship
between Jensen and Champion is also centered in Nebraska, where Jensen did
most of his work for the company.
Under section 6, we do not see that the needs of the interstate or
international systems are implicated in this case. The relevant policies of
Nebraska in controlling the employer/employee relationships of its citizens
outweigh the policy interest of Iowa in ensuring proper lead abatement procedures
are followed. Neither party had any justified expectations in applying Iowa law,
and there do not appear to be any policies underlying wrongful discharge that need
to be addressed by the application of Iowa law. The certainty, predictability, and
uniformity of result favors applying Nebraska law in light of the fact the employment
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relationship was centered in that state. And finally, there is no issue regarding the
ease with which the law of either forum could be determined and applied.
Thus, even assuming the district court applied the incorrect choice-of-law
rules to Champion’s motion to dismiss, we still conclude under the tort choice-of-
law rules Nebraska law applies to Jensen’s wrongful discharge claim. Because
Nebraska law applies, the district court was correct to conclude this action must
be dismissed as Jensen only pled a cause of action for wrongful discharge under
Iowa common law.
AFFIRMED.