Carter v. Genesis Health System ( 2017 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 17-0045
    Filed December 20, 2017
    ALBERT CARTER,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    vs.
    GENESIS HEALTH SYSTEM d/b/a GENESIS MEDICAL CENTER,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Paul L. Macek, Judge.
    Albert Carter appeals the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment
    in favor of Genesis Health System d/b/a Genesis Medical Center on his medical
    malpractice action. AFFIRMED.
    William J. Bribriesco of Bribriesco Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Bettendorf, for
    appellant.
    Diane M. Reinsch of Lane & Waterman L.L.P., Davenport, for appellee.
    Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
    2
    VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
    Albert Carter sued Genesis Medical Center for negligence in connection
    with a nurse’s insertion of an indwelling catheter and the subsequent erosion of his
    penile implant. Genesis moved for summary judgment. Carter conceded the
    motion was appropriate on all but one of his claims: whether the nurse’s failure to
    consult a physician about the use of a condom catheter instead of an indwelling
    catheter amounted to negligence. The district court granted Genesis’ motion on
    that claim after concluding Carter lacked a causation expert. See Kennis v. Mercy
    Hosp. Med. Ctr., 
    491 N.W.2d 161
    , 165 (Iowa 1992) (noting in a medical
    malpractice action, a “plaintiff must show evidence which establishes the
    applicable standard of care, demonstrate this standard has been violated, and
    develop a causal relationship between the violation and the alleged harm”); see
    also Phillips v. Covenant Clinic, 
    625 N.W.2d 714
    , 718 (Iowa 2001) (“Expert
    testimony is nearly always required to establish each of these elements . . . .
    [P]roximate cause, like the other elements, cannot be based upon mere
    speculation.”). Carter appealed.
    “In reviewing a summary judgment in a medical malpractice action, the ‘task
    is to determine whether any evidence in the summary judgment record enables
    plaintiffs to establish the applicable standards of care, and defendant’s breach of
    those standards.’”   Kennis, 
    491 N.W.2d at 164
     (citation omitted).        Summary
    judgment is appropriate “when the party can demonstrate that the proof of the other
    party is deficient as to a material element of that party’s case.” Thompson v.
    Embassy Rehab. & Care Ctr., 
    604 N.W.2d 643
    , 646 (Iowa 2000); see also Welte
    v. Bello, 
    482 N.W.2d 437
    , 440 (Iowa 1992) (“If expert testimony is required to
    3
    establish general negligence or the foundational facts and expert testimony is
    unavailable, then summary judgment is appropriate.”); Oswald v. LeGrand, 
    453 N.W.2d 634
    , 635 (Iowa 1990) (stating “where plaintiffs are limited in the
    presentation of expert testimony, the issue becomes not whether there
    was negligence in the actions of the defendant but whether there was evidence
    upon which liability could be found”).
    Carter does not argue a causation expert was unnecessary. See Kennis
    
    491 N.W.2d at 165
     (stating negligence could be established in three ways,
    including “through expert testimony” or “through evidence showing the [healthcare
    professional’s] lack of care so obvious as to be within comprehension of a”
    layperson). To the contrary, he named and proffered the opinions of two experts.
    In his view, these experts generated an issue of material fact on the element of
    causation. Carter points to a report of his nurse expert, who opined “there was a
    breach in the standard of care when the patient condition and the potential for
    likelihood of penile implant complication were not addressed by the nursing and
    physician staff of Genesis Medical Center.” He also cites the same expert’s
    deposition testimony opining the standard of care required the nurse, who inserted
    the indwelling catheter, to “have [a] conversation with the physician” about the use
    of a condom catheter instead of an indwelling catheter. Finally, he refers to the
    deposition testimony of his physician expert, who opined, “[I]f [Carter] had not had
    an indwelling catheter, he probably would not have had a penile—or an erosion of
    his prosthesis, so in that sense, it was probably a contributing cause.” Based on
    these portions of the summary judgment record, Carter contends “an inference can
    be drawn that if a discussion had occurred between [the] nurse . . . and the ordering
    4
    physician regarding condom v. indwelling catheter; the ordering physician would
    have used a condom catheter.”
    The district court concluded this expert testimony failed to establish
    causation. The court conceded Carter had “expert testimony that [the nurse]
    breached the standard of care in not questioning the order” but stated there was
    no opinion that “the failure to question the order caused the penile erosion.” The
    court explained:
    Plaintiff’s claim fails because a jury would have to infer that when [the
    nurse] asked the ordering physician if a condom catheter was
    required, that the physician would have said yes and changed her
    order. If the ordering physician does not change the order, then [the
    nurse’s] failure to question the order would not have caused
    Plaintiff’s injury, because an indwelling catheter would have been
    placed in spite of [the nurse] questioning the order. In other words,
    [the physician’s] testimony on causation relates to the placement of
    an indwelling catheter and not to the factual circumstance of [the
    nurse’s] failure to ask the ordering physician if a condom catheter
    should be used.
    The district court did not err in reaching this conclusion. See McKee v. Isle
    of Capri Casinos, Inc., 
    864 N.W.2d 518
    , 525 (Iowa 2015) (setting forth standard of
    review). Without expert testimony that the claimed breach of the standard of care
    was the cause of his harm, Carter could not establish a prima facie case of medical
    negligence. See Oswald, 
    453 N.W.2d at 635
    .
    We affirm the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of Genesis.
    AFFIRMED.