In re J.S., T.K., & C.K. ( 2017 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 17-1536
    Filed December 6, 2017
    IN THE INTEREST OF J.S., T.K., & C.K.,
    Minor Children,
    P.S., Mother,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Peter B. Newell,
    District Associate Judge.
    The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children,
    C.K. and T.K., and the permanency order placing her child, J.S., in the sole
    custody of his father. AFFIRMED.
    Mark A. Milder of Mark Milder Law Firm, Waverly, for appellant mother.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee State.
    Linnea Nicol of the Juvenile Public Defender’s Office, Waterloo, for minor
    children.
    Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
    2
    DANILSON, Chief Judge.
    The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children,
    C.K. and T.K.,1 and the permanency order placing her child, J.S., in the sole
    custody of his father.2 The mother asserts the district court erred in giving weight
    to the mother’s hair-stat test results in reaching its determinations. The mother
    also contends it is in C.K. and T.K.’s best interests to be returned to her care, or
    in the alternative, to be placed in a guardianship. Because we conclude there
    are grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights to C.K. and T.K. and
    for the placement of J.S. in the sole custody of his father, and the court’s
    determinations are in the children’s best interests, we affirm.
    I. Background Facts & Proceedings.
    At the time of the combined termination and permanency hearing, J.S.
    was fourteen years old, C.K. was eight, and T.K. was seven.               The Iowa
    Department of Human Services (DHS) became involved with the family in
    September 2015 due to concerns of methamphetamine use by the mother. This
    was not the first time the family had formal interactions with DHS due to
    methamphetamine-related concerns.3         The children were removed from the
    mother’s care in December 2015. C.K. and T.K. were placed in family foster
    care, and J.S. was placed in the sole custody of his father.         The children’s
    1
    C.K. and T.K.’s father’s parental rights were also terminated. He does not appeal.
    2
    J.S. has a different father than C.K. and T.K.
    3
    DHS became involved with the family in 2007, when J.S. tested positive for
    methamphetamine, and again in 2009, when the father of C.K. and T.K. was arrested for
    manufacturing methamphetamine.
    3
    removal stemmed from the mother’s continued use of methamphetamine and the
    mother’s and father to C.K. and T.K.’s continued ties to the drug culture.4
    Though the mother obtained substance-abuse and mental-health
    treatment, consistently attended visitation with the children, and participated in
    DHS services throughout the pendency of this matter,5 she was not able to
    demonstrate honesty about her use of methamphetamine or provide negative
    hair-stat tests. The mother tested positive for methamphetamine by hair-stat
    testing on August 5 and September 2, 2016, and January 18, February 22, April
    9, June 22, July 3, and August 23, 2017. The last positive hair-stat test was on
    the second day of the termination and permanency hearing—the district court left
    the record open for admission of the test results. The mother contended her last
    use was September 2016; however, a DHS caseworker testified hair-stat testing
    can only provide positive results if a person has used within the last ninety days.
    When asked at the termination and permanency hearing, the DHS
    caseworker explained the meaning of the string of hair-stat test results showing
    methamphetamine in the mother’s system:
    It meant that from each one of those dates there was a use
    and what they tell us, train us, what they say, is that for it to show
    up in a hair-stat there had to be three uses in that 90-day time
    period. We’re not going to catch one use, so what that would tell
    me is that well, we have consistently had use from January through
    June.
    4
    At one point during the pendency of this matter there was concern for C.K. and T.K.’s
    safety due to their father’s involvement and self-admitted prominent position in the drug
    culture, requiring C.K. and T.K. to be placed in a sequestered foster home.
    5
    The mother also obtained employment about three months prior to the termination and
    permanency hearing. The mother had not been employed for approximately two years.
    She was terminated from her last job as a nurse in 2015 after she was charged with
    crimes related to taking medication from the care center.
    4
    The mother argued the hair-stat tests could be coming back positive due
    to exposure from her environment rather than actual methamphetamine use.
    The mother pointed out that her urinalysis tests through her substance-abuse
    treatment at Pathways and those submitted as a part of the mother’s probation
    were negative for illegal substances.        The mother submitted twenty-nine
    urinalysis tests through Pathways and three as a condition of her probation—all
    negative for illegal substances.     However, the DHS caseworker testified the
    urinalysis tests were submitted in correlation with her scheduled Pathways
    appointments and two out of three of the tests submitted as part of the mother’s
    probation were scheduled, meaning “of the [thirty-one] tests I talked about that
    were conducted by Pathways or Corrections, one of those tests w[as] done
    where [the mother] couldn’t have anticipated the probability of testing.” The DHS
    caseworker further testified the window for picking up methamphetamine in a
    person’s system by way of urinalysis is typically only forty-eight hours. The DHS
    caseworker also testified Pathways does not typically send urinalysis tests to a
    laboratory for further testing.    The mother’s Pathways treatment coordinator
    testified all the urinalysis tests taken through Pathways are observed but
    admitted “there’s probably always a way” to substitute urine even while being
    observed. Ultimately, the district court determined:
    [T]he hair-stat testing is credible evidence of ongoing
    methamphetamine usage. The mother’s ability to avoid the
    detection of her methamphetamine usage while providing urine
    samples is evidence of duplicity and not abstinence. The urine
    tests that the mother took did not occur randomly. She submitted
    urine samples when she was scheduled to have appointments with
    her substance abuse counselor. These tests were not forwarded to
    a laboratory for further testing.
    5
    After a combined termination and permanency hearing held July 21 and
    August 23, 2017, the court terminated the mother’s parental rights to C.K. and
    T.K. pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) and (l) (2017). The court also
    ordered the sole custody of J.S. to be transferred to his father pursuant to section
    232.104(2)(d)(2). The mother appeals.
    II. Standard of Review.
    We review termination-of-parental rights and child-in-need-of-assistance
    (CINA) proceedings de novo. In re A.M., 
    843 N.W.2d 100
    , 110 (Iowa 2014)
    (termination); In re J.S., 
    846 N.W.2d 36
    , 40 (Iowa 2014) (CINA). “We are not
    bound by the juvenile court’s findings of fact, but we do give them weight,
    especially in assessing the credibility of witnesses.” A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 110. In
    both cases, the best interests of the children is our primary concern. See In re
    J.E., 
    723 N.W.2d 793
    , 798 (Iowa 2006); J.S., 846 N.W.2d at 40.
    III. Analysis.
    1) Hair-Stat Testing. The mother first contends the court erred in giving
    weight to the hair-stat tests showing positive results for methamphetamine in
    determining termination of the mother’s rights to C.K. and T.K. and confirmation
    of J.S. as a CINA was necessary. The mother asserts hair-stat testing is of
    questionable reliability and should not have been relied upon by the court. The
    mother argues the court should have given more weight to the negative urinalysis
    tests completed through her substance-abuse treatment instead. However, the
    mother cites no Iowa authority supporting the argument hair-stat testing is
    unreliable and should not be utilized by courts. We therefore will not address this
    issue. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3).
    6
    2) Grounds for Termination—C.K. & T.K. The mother also challenges the
    court’s finding grounds for termination of her parental rights to C.K. and T.K.
    Section 232.116(1)(f) provides the court may order the termination of parental
    rights where the child is four years of age or older; has been adjudicated a CINA;
    has been out of the parent’s care for at least twelve months of the last eighteen
    months, or for the last twelve consecutive months; and it is established by clear
    and convincing evidence the child cannot be safely returned to the parent’s
    custody at present. C.K. and T.K. were both over the age of four at the time of
    the termination hearing and had been adjudicated CINA and out of the mother’s
    care for nearly two years.
    The mother argues the State has failed to show the children could not be
    returned to her care safely because the only factor supporting the children’s
    continued removal was the string of positive hair-stat tests. The mother cites to
    In re M.S., 
    889 N.W.2d 675
    , 682 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016), and asserts the State
    failed to show a nexus between the mother’s alleged methamphetamine use and
    safety concerns for the children. In M.S., this court found no adjudicatory harm
    supporting termination of a father’s parental rights where the father provided
    illegal substance tests positive for THC during the pendency of the CINA
    proceeding because there were no additional safety concerns. 889 N.W.2d at
    682-83.   We also note our supreme court has stated, “[W]e do not believe
    general   statements   about   methamphetamine       addiction   are   enough   by
    themselves to prove that a child is imminently likely to suffer physical harm under
    section 232.2(6)(b).” J.S., 846 N.W.2d at 42. However, despite the mother’s
    effort and participation in DHS services, the record in this case establishes that
    7
    due to the mother’s long-standing methamphetamine addiction there exists
    potential harm to the children if returned to her care.
    This is not the first time the family has been brought to the attention of
    DHS due to the mother’s substance-abuse issues. The mother testified she has
    been addicted to methamphetamine since 2006, and DHS was involved with the
    family as early as 2007 due to J.S. testing positive for methamphetamine. The
    mother has shown an inability to maintain sobriety.          The mother provided a
    number of hair-stat tests positive for methamphetamine—the last on the very
    same day as the second day of the termination and permanency hearing.
    Despite the continued indication of use via hair-stat testing, the mother denied
    using methamphetamine since September 2016.               This indicates the mother’s
    inability to be honest about her use. A behavior-health-intervention specialist
    who worked with the mother and the children testified dishonesty is a bar to
    recovery in that it is usually a sign of relapse or a sign relapse will likely occur.
    Throughout the pendency of these proceedings, the mother’s substance-abuse
    issues resulted in criminal charges and caused the mother to be unemployed.
    The mother only obtained employment again a few months prior to the
    termination and permanency hearing. Although the mother has exhibited effort to
    meet the requirements imposed by DHS, her inability to be fully honest about her
    use of methamphetamine and to achieve sobriety cause significant instability that
    makes it impossible for her to safely parent the children. There is clear and
    convincing evidence C.K. and T.K. could not be safely returned to the mother’s
    care at the time of the termination hearing. We agree with the district court that
    8
    there are grounds supporting the termination of the mother’s parental rights to
    C.K. and T.K. under section 232.116(1)(f).6
    3) Best Interests.    The mother maintains it is in C.K. and T.K.’s best
    interests to be returned to her care. In determining whether termination is in the
    children’s best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety,
    to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the
    child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the
    child[ren].” 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (2).
    C.K. and T.K. have been in a state of instability for nearly two years while
    waiting for the mother to maintain sobriety and exhibit she can safely parent the
    children.   They deserve permanency.           “It is well-settled law that we cannot
    deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for
    termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be
    a parent and provide a stable home for the child.” A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 112
    (citation omitted). C.K. and T.K. are placed in family foster care with their aunt
    and uncle who provide a safe and nurturing environment for the children and who
    are willing to adopt them. Their best interests are served by terminating the
    mother’s parental rights.
    Alternatively, the mother maintains it is in C.K. and T.K.’s best interests for
    a guardianship to be created rather than terminate the mother’s parental rights.
    The mother cites to In re B.T., 
    894 N.W.2d 29
    , 34 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017), in
    6
    We need only find termination appropriate under one of the sections asserted to affirm.
    In re J.B.L., 
    844 N.W.2d 703
    , 704 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014).
    9
    support of this contention. In B.T., this court determined placing the child in a
    guardianship with the grandmother was appropriate, stating, “This is not a case
    where the child’s future placement will remain in limbo if the mother’s parental
    rights are not terminated.” 894 N.W.2d at 34. There, we noted the mother had
    “had successful years of sobriety” and the grandmother had always protected the
    child. Id. The same is not true here.
    In any event, by requiring under section 232.104(4)(a) that the court find
    termination would not be in the children’s best interests prior to entering a
    guardianship, “[t]he legislature has categorically determined ‘the needs of a child
    are promoted by termination of parental rights’ if the grounds for termination of
    parental rights exist.” In re L.M.F., 
    490 N.W.2d 66
    , 68 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992)
    (quoting In re M.W., 
    458 N.W.2d 847
    , 850 (Iowa 1990)). In this case, placing
    C.K. and T.K. in a guardianship would not provide permanency. A guardianship
    requires annual review by the court7 and would provide the mother repeated
    opportunities to contest the court’s determination the children should not be
    placed in her custody. This would leave the children in limbo—perhaps hoping
    they will be returned to their mother’s care or hoping they will not—and is not in
    C.K. and T.K.’s best interests. Termination of the mother’s parental rights and
    adoption of the children by their aunt and uncle will provide protection for the
    children and allow the children the sense of stability they deserve.
    4) Permanency Order—J.S. The mother also challenges the court’s order
    placing J.S. in the sole custody of his father pursuant to Iowa Code section
    7
    See 
    Iowa Code § 232.104
    (8)(a).
    10
    232.104(2)(d)(2). Section 232.104(2)(d)(2) provides after a permanency hearing,
    the court shall enter an order, pursuant to the findings required by section
    232.104(4), to “[t]ransfer sole custody of the child from one parent to another
    parent.” Section 232.104(4) in turn requires:
    Prior to entering a permanency order . . . convincing evidence must
    exist showing that all of the following apply:
    a. A termination of the parent-child relationship would not be
    in the best interests of the child.
    b. Services were offered to the child’s family to correct the
    situation which led to the child’s removal from the home.
    c. The child cannot be returned to the child’s home.
    The mother asserts the record does not support the finding J.S. could not
    be returned to the shared-care arrangement between her and J.S.’s father that
    was in place prior to the commencement of these proceedings. As explained
    above, the mother’s failure to acknowledge her continued use and to achieve and
    maintain sobriety stands in the way of her ability to provide a safe environment in
    which to parent her children. We agree with the district court’s determination that
    placement of J.S. in the mother’s care would be contrary to J.S.’s welfare. We
    affirm the court’s order placing J.S. in the sole custody of his father.
    IV. Conclusion.
    We find the district court did not improperly consider the mother’s hair-stat
    test results in reaching its determinations, there are grounds for termination of
    the mother’s rights to C.K. and T.K., termination is in C.K. and T.K.’s best
    interests, and no section 232.116(3) factor weighs against the need for
    termination. We also find there are grounds for placement of J.S. in the sole
    custody of his father pursuant to section 232.104(2)(d)(2). We therefore affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-1536

Filed Date: 12/6/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021