Mantha Lee Henderson Sr., Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0546
Filed July 27, 2016
MANTHA LEE HENDERSON SR.,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David P.
Odekirk, Judge.
Mantha Lee Henderson Sr. appeals the summary dismissal of his
application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
James P. Moriarty of James P. Moriarty, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Goodhue, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
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GOODHUE, Senior Judge.
This matter comes before the court as the result of an appeal of a
summary dismissal of Mantha Lee Henderson’s application for postconviction
relief. The only record available to the court is Henderson’s application, a
transcript of the arguments of counsel, the district court’s ruling, and an undated
transcript of either a prior postconviction hearing or a deposition. The transcript
includes testimony of the Honorable George Stigler, the presiding judge, and
John Ackerman, Henderson’s attorney during the trial that convicted him. It is
not clear if the transcript was before the trial court in this proceeding. To the
extent it contains information favorable to Henderson, we will assume it was.
I. Factual Background
From Henderson’s petition, and the trial court’s undisputed finding of facts
and procedural history in its order of dismissal, it is apparent Henderson was
found guilty by a jury trial of first-degree sexual abuse in 1985 and, accordingly,
received a sentence of life in prison. He appealed, but his appeal was
unsuccessful, and mittimus was issued. Since then, Henderson has filed three
postconviction requests, all of which have been denied by the district court and
affirmed on appeal.
In the present postconviction proceeding—Henderson’s fourth—
Henderson alleges his trial counsel was ineffective by allegedly failing to convey
a proposed plea agreement that would have resulted in a sentence less than the
life sentence he received. Henderson admits he had raised the issue of trial
counsel’s ineffectiveness in communicating plea negotiations and offers in at
least two prior postconviction-relief proceedings.
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II. Discussion
Applications for postconviction relief must be filed within three years of the
date the writ of procedendo is entered. Iowa Code § 822.3 (2015). The State
contends the time for Henderson to request postconviction relief has expired.
Although the district court did not dismiss Henderson’s claim based on the three-
year bar, we may uphold the district court’s ruling on any basis appearing in the
record and urged on appeal, even if the district court did not decide the case on
that basis. Keen v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Iowa 2012). The State raised the
issue before the postconviction court, and therefore, we may dismiss
Henderson’s application on this basis if proper. We hold that it is.
Henderson does not contest that more than three years have elapsed
since procedendo issued but instead contends the three-year bar is not
applicable. See Iowa Code § 822.3 (stating “this limitation does not apply to a
ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time
period”). He asserts ineffective assistance of counsel in the area of plea
communication and negotiation is new law that did not exist prior to 2012 when
the United States Supreme Court handed down two rulings in which ineffective
assistance of counsel in plea communications between counsel and the accused
became the basis for some measure of the relief requested by a petitioner in a
postsentencing proceeding. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384-88
(2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012). We disagree. It has
been consistently held that effective assistance of counsel is to be afforded at all
“critical” stages of a criminal proceeding, see Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778,
786 (2009); Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001), including
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during plea negotiations, see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985). At least
one of the circuit courts of appeal has specifically held that Lafler and Frye do not
constitute new law. See Buenrostro v. United States, 697 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th
Cir. 2012). The three-year bar is clearly applicable, and the trial court’s decision
is affirmed on that basis.
The trial court dismissed Henderson’s claim after finding that the issue of
the plea negotiation and communication had been included as the basis for a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in at least two of his previous
applications for postconviction relief. Henderson confirmed that finding in his
own verified petition. Even assuming a timely filed petition grounds raised in a
previous postconviction proceeding may not be relitigated in a subsequent
application. Iowa Code § 822.8 (“Any ground finally adjudicated . . . in any other
proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a
subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which
for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised . . . .”); Holmes
v. State, 775 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (noting a postconviction-
relief proceeding is not intended to be a vehicle to relitigate issues already
adjudicated). The trial court properly dismissed Henderson’s application
because his claim had already been adequately raised and decided in prior
applications.
We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Henderson’s application for
postconviction relief on both grounds set out above.
AFFIRMED.