State of Iowa v. Ashley Nicole Wiltse ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0212
Filed February 21, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ASHLEY NICOLE WILTSE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Colleen D. Weiland,
Judge.
Ashely Nicole Wiltse appeals her conviction and sentence for wanton
neglect of a resident of a health care facility. CONVICTION AFFIRMED,
SENTENCE VACATED, AND CASE REMANDED FOR RESENTINCING.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.
Ashely Nicole Wiltse appeals her conviction and sentence for wanton
neglect of a resident of a health care facility. We find trial counsel was not
ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and error was
not preserved concerning the admission of a recorded interview. We do find the
district court abused its discretion in establishing conditions of Wiltse’s probation.
We affirm the district court in part, vacate the sentence and remand for
resentencing.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Wiltse worked as a certified nurse’s assistant (CNA) at Chautauqua Guest
Homes (Chautauqua), a health care facility in Charles City, Iowa. On
February 12, 2016, Wiltse sent a text message asking a former employee of
Chautauqua where she could get Xanax. The former employee did not respond.
On February 16, Caleb Schadt was found unresponsive in his room.
Schadt was a resident of Chautauqua after receiving severe injuries in a car
accident, leaving him a quadriplegic. Schadt was moved from his chair to the
bed and could not be awakened. Wiltse’s shift ended, and she left with another
CNA. During the drive Wiltse told the other CNA she had given Schadt Xanax
and had taken some herself. Neither Schadt nor Wiltse had a prescription for
Xanax.
Schadt eventually regained consciousness and admitted he had taken
Xanax but would not tell staff how it was obtained. The only guest Schadt had on
February 16 was Jamison Zirbel, a friend of Schadt and Wiltse’s former fiancé.
At trial Schadt testified Zirbel had given him the Xanax.
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Wiltse pleaded not guilty on April 20. Trial was held on November 29 and
30. Wiltse filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the use of a recording of an
interview, which she describes as an interrogation, by an investigator for the Iowa
Department of Inspections and Appeals. Wiltse also filed an amended motion in
limine on this issue. Both motions were denied. Wiltse was found guilty of
wanton neglect of a resident of a health care facility, in violation of Iowa Code
section 726.7(1) and (3) (2016). The district court sentenced Wiltse to one year
in jail with credit for time served and all but ten days suspended, two years of
probation, and a $625 fine with a thirty-five percent surcharge, and with all but
$100 suspended. The district court also entered a no-contact order, ordered
payment of sheriff’s fees and costs, and ordered payment of $150 in attorney
fees. Wiltse now appeals.
II. Standard of Review
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed de novo.
Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). “To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, the [defendant] must demonstrate both
ineffective assistance and prejudice.” Id. at 142. “If the claim lacks prejudice, it
can be decided on that ground alone without deciding whether the attorney
performed deficiently.” Id. Both elements must be proved by a preponderance of
the evidence. Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Iowa 1991).
“When a defendant challenges the terms of probation, ‘[i]t has long been a
well-settled rule that trial courts have a broad discretion in probation matters
which will be interfered with only upon a finding of abuse of that discretion.’”
State v. Valin, 724 N.W.2d 440, 444 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted). “[O]ur task
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on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to
determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 445.
District courts’ evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 476 (Iowa 2013).
III. Ineffective Assistance
Wiltse first claims counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence. The jury instructions stated:
[T]he state must prove both of the following elements of wanton
neglect of a resident of a health care facility:
1. On or about February 16, 2016, the defendant knowingly
acted in a manner likely to cause injury to the physical or mental
welfare of Caleb Schadt.
AND
2. Caleb Schadt was a resident of a health care facility.
Wiltse claims the evidence was not sufficient to prove injury was likely.
At trial, testimony was presented that Xanax is a schedule IV narcotic.
Schedule IV narcotics are the second lowest tier of controlled substances and
have a lower potential for abuse, with some risk of physical or psychological
dependence. Iowa Code § 124.209. Wiltse claims this shows injury was not
likely, and therefore, the evidence was insufficient.
However, testimony also showed the medical staff at Chautauqua “was
concerned for [Schadt’s] respiratory status because of his condition . . . . He’s
not able to breathe well, and taken that amount of Xanax would lower his
respirations even more.” Additionally, in a text, Zirbel stated, “He wanted
[Xanax]! Don’t try [to] say this is [Wiltse’s] fault because he wanted those and he
knows he’s in no condition to be doing that.” When asked how much Xanax
Schadt had taken, in another text Wiltse responded, “I have no idea how
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much[.] . . . [H]e told me he thought he could handle as much as he did before[.]
I told him his body is different now he can’t be doing that[.]”
We find the evidence was sufficient to find injury was likely to occur.
Giving unprescribed medications to a patient with complicated medical needs,
requiring around-the-clock care, on a significant amount of medication, can be
found to likely cause injury, especially when evidence indicates many people,
including the Wiltse, were aware of the risks. We find trial counsel was not
ineffective for failing to object to the sufficiency of the evidence, as such an
objection would have been meritless. See State v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 215
(Iowa 2008).
IV. Admission of Evidence
Wiltse next claims the district court should not have allowed into evidence
a recording of an interview by the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals.
The State claims error was not preserved on this issue. “It is a fundamental
doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and
decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v.
Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002).
At trial Wiltse filed a motion in limine seeking to bar the use of the
recording because Wiltse was in custody and not informed of her constitutional
right to remain silent. Wiltse also asked statements made during the interview
“regarding what other witnesses have told [the investigator] should be excluded
as this would amount to hearsay and would not be covered by any exception.”
Wiltse now claims the district court should not have allowed the recording
to be introduced because the probative value was minimally relevant and
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outweighed by the prejudice the recording could cause. Wiltse did not raise this
issue before the district court, and therefore, it was not preserved for our review.1
V. Probation Conditions
Wiltse finally claims the district court abused its discretion when
establishing the conditions of her probation. The conditions, in relevant part,
state, “[Defendant] shall abstain from the use of alcohol or other illegal drugs”
and “[Defendant] shall not frequent bars, taverns or other liquor stores.” The
State claims these restrictions were a proper exercise of the district court’s
authority.
“[T]rial courts have a broad discretion in probation matters which will be
interfered with only upon a finding of abuse of that discretion.’” Valin, 724
N.W.2d at 444 (citation omitted). Conditions of probation should be “reasonably
related to the crime of which defendant was convicted or to future criminality.”
State v. Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Iowa 2010).
The State contends that prohibiting Wiltse from drinking alcohol and
frequenting bars, taverns, and other liquor stores is rationally related because
Wiltse was convicted of operating while intoxicated in 2012, there was evidence
regarding Wiltse’s drug use, and the crime involved the use of intoxicating
substances. The record contains no indication of problems with alcohol outside
of the conviction in 2012.
An isolated incident, with no indication of a continuing pattern of offense,
is not a rational basis for imposing probation conditions. Similarly, while the
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Wiltse objected during the trial and filed a motion in limine to exclude the recording, but
neither motion sought to exclude the evidence based on Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403.
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current offense does involve intoxicating substances, a prescription drug, it does
not automatically follow Wiltse has an issue with every intoxicating substance. If
such a conclusion could be made, many substances, including other
medications, would be equally suitable for prohibition. We are unconvinced by
the State’s arguments.
While the prohibition of illegal drugs is proper and should remain, we find
prohibiting the consumption of alcohol and frequenting establishments primarily
serving alcohol is a condition that is not “reasonably related to the crime of which
defendant was convicted or to future criminality.” See Lathorp, 781 N.W.2d at
291. Therefore we vacate the sentencing order and remand to the district court
for resentencing in concurrence with this opinion.
CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED, AND CASE
REMANDED FOR RESENTINCING.