In the Interest of D.R., T.H., C.S., and E.L., Minor Children, T.H., Mother, D.A.R., Father, C.S., Father ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1968
Filed March 23, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF D.R., T.H., C.S., AND E.L.,
Minor Children,
T.H., Mother,
Appellant,
D.A.R., Father,
Appellant,
C.S., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Barbara H. Liesveld,
District Associate Judge.
A mother and two fathers separately appeal the termination of their
parental rights. AFFIRMED ON ALL APPEALS.
Carrie K. Bryner, Cedar Rapids, for appellant mother.
John D. Jacobsen of Jacobsen, Johnson, & Wiezorek, P.L.C., Cedar
Rapids, for appellant father C.S.
Kelly Dean Steele, Cedar Rapids, for appellant father D.A.R.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Julie G. Trachta of Linn County Advocate, Inc., Cedar Rapids, for minor
children.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
2
DOYLE, Judge.
T.H. is the mother of four children: D.R. Jr., born in 2004; T.H., born in
2006; C.S. Jr., born in 2007; and E.L., born in 2010. D.R. Sr. is the father of
D.R. Jr., and C.S. Sr. is the father of T.H. and C.S. Jr.1 Following a hearing, the
juvenile court terminated the parents’ parental rights. They now appeal,
separately. We affirm.
I. Standard of Review.
Our review is de novo. See In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 2014).
“We are not bound by the juvenile court’s findings of fact, but we do give them
weight, especially in assessing the credibility of witnesses.” In re A.M., 843
N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014).
II. Analysis.
In determining whether parental rights should be terminated under Iowa
Code chapter 232 (2015), the juvenile court “follows a three-step analysis.” See
In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). Step one requires the court to
“determine if a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been
established” by the State. Id. If the juvenile court finds grounds for termination,
the court moves to the second step of the analysis: deciding if the grounds for
termination should result in a termination of parental rights under the best-
interest framework set out in section 232.116(2). See id. at 706-07. In making
this determination, the primary considerations are the children’s safety, their best
placement for furthering their long-term nurturing and growth, and their physical,
mental, and emotional conditions and needs. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2).
1
The parental rights of E.L.’s putative father are not at issue here.
3
Even if the juvenile court finds “the statutory best-interest framework supports
termination of parental rights,” the court must proceed to the third and final
step: considering “if any statutory exceptions set out in section 232.116(3) should
serve to preclude termination of parental rights.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707.
A. Grounds for Termination.
The juvenile court terminated the fathers’ parental rights pursuant to
section 232.116(1) paragraphs (b) and (f). When the juvenile court terminates
parental rights on more than one ground, we may affirm the order on any ground
we find supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. See D.W.,
791 N.W.2d at 707. The mother’s parental rights were terminated under
paragraph (f) only. We therefore choose to address each of the parents’
grounds-for-termination challenge under paragraph (f).
Paragraph (f) requires the State to establish the child is four years of age
or older, has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA), has been
removed from the physical custody of the parents for at least twelve of the last
eighteen months, and cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as
provided in section 232.102. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(1)-(4). Each parent
challenges the fourth element—that the child could not be returned to the
parent’s custody.
1. Mother.
The mother has a long history of involvement with the Iowa Department of
Human Services (DHS). In 2006, it was reported to the DHS that her oldest
child—then her only child—witnessed domestic violence in her home between
her and C.S. Sr. Following the DHS’s assessment, it determined the child abuse
4
report of denial of critical care in failing to provide proper supervision was
founded. The mother has since had founded child abuse reports in 2007, 2009,
2011, and then most recently, during this case, 2013. Domestic violence has
continued to be a prominent issue throughout all of these cases, along with the
mother’s failure to properly treat and maintain treatment of her mental-health
diagnoses. In each instance of reported child abuse, the DHS has stepped in
and provided the mother services. In 2011, a DHS social worker that previously
worked with the mother opined:
[The mother] struggles to manage the care of these kids. She is
overwhelmed and suffers from depression. [I think the mother] is
the type to think she is doing good so she can stop meds or therapy
or whatever so she will never be consistent with mental health
treatment.
[The mother] is a huge target for abusive men. . . . [I feel]
that if the abusive fathers of the [children] told her to do something
she would do it knowing she could get into trouble. [I think the
mother] is so scared of them that she will try to make them happy.
[I am] worried about this as a potential risk.
[The mother] is a young mom with [four] kids and she can
get very overwhelmed.
[I am concerned] that it is possible [the mother] would leave
the kids home alone while she ran an errand as it would be easier
than taking them all with her.
[I am also concerned] that [the mother] would also leave
them with an inappropriate caregiver. [I believe the mother] would
think that she “knows” the person and “knows” they would never
hurt her kids despite them having a criminal background. [The
mother] just does not think those types of things are a big deal.
The mother has shown over the years that when she is maintaining her
mental-health regimen, she can generally put her children’s needs first.
However, she has also repeatedly shown she is unable or unwilling to maintain
that routine for long periods of time, which then places her children in danger by
way of her domestically-violent relationships, her substance abuse, and her lack
5
of supervision of the children. For instance, in 2009, it was reported two of her
children, then ages two and three, were found in a nearby grocery-store parking
lot alone on a Saturday night while the mother was at home. The mother denied
the allegations, but only a day later, an officer drove by the mother’s house and
noticed two young children on the roof of her home. When the mother finally
answered the door, she stated “she had been in the bathroom because the pain
medication she was on,” which she was taking for an injury received in another
incident of domestic violence, “was making her sick and drowsy,” and “she didn’t
know the children had gotten out onto the roof.”
Most recently, the DHS became involved with the family in late 2013, after
there were reports of domestic violence between the mother and D.R. Sr. while
D.R. Jr. was present, as well as allegations that D.R. Jr. had been sexually
abused. The DHS social worker learned the mother had been homeless for
some time and had placed her children in the care of others. C.S. Sr.’s children
had been in his care for about a year. The mother’s youngest child had been
living with a friend of the mother since April 2013. D.R. Jr. had lived with a
grandparent out of state for about a year until approximately August 2013, when
the mother brought the child back to Iowa. The mother and D.R. Jr. then lived
with D.R. Sr. for about a month, until there was another incidence of domestic
violence between the couple. The mother and D.R. Jr. next stayed with C.S. Sr.
Though the mother only stayed there a short time, she left D.R. Jr., C.S. Jr., and
T.H. in C.S. Sr.’s care.
After the DHS began investigating the 2013 allegations, a hair-stat test
was performed on D.R. Jr.’s hair, and it tested positive for exposure to cocaine
6
and marijuana. In early 2014, there was domestic violence between C.S. Sr. and
his paramour. Thereafter, the children were adjudicated CINA and subsequently
removed from the mother’s and C.S. Sr.’s care.
Since the juvenile court’s most recent involvement in 2014, the mother has
had three different DHS social workers assigned to her case and at least two
different service providers. The mother points to this to excuse her lack of
progress in the most recent case until right before the termination-of-parental-
rights hearing, claiming reunification “was slowed immensely through the lack of
effort and support by [the DHS].” She claims her children “have never been at
risk of physical injury from [her]” and her last-minute progress evidences she
should have been given more time to work towards reunification. We are
unconvinced.
The juvenile court’s March 2014 dispositional order advised the mother
that if there were “services that [she] believe[d] would assist [her] in achieving
reunification that [were] not currently offered, [she] must come forward and
request those services.” The orders thereafter found reasonable efforts had
been made. For the first time, at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, the
mother claimed she had not been provided reasonable services by the DHS.
This is not sufficient to preserve the claim for our review. See In re C.H., 652
N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002) (“In general, if a parent fails to request other
services at the proper time, the parent waives the issue and may not later
challenge it at the termination proceeding. If a parent has a complaint regarding
services, the parent must make such challenge at the removal, when the case
permanency plan is entered, or at later review hearings. Moreover, voicing
7
complaints regarding the adequacy of services to a social worker is not sufficient.
A parent must inform the juvenile court of such challenge.” (internal citations
omitted)).
Furthermore, our de novo review of the record reveals the mother was
offered and provided numerous services for reunification from the beginning of
DHS’s re-involvement with the family in late 2013, not to mention the numerous
services she received in past years. The mother’s most recent DHS social
worker, who began working on the mother’s case in April 2015, has gone above
and beyond to assist the mother, and the mother complains her earlier social
workers did not do more. However, her new social worker testified the mother
had a very good support system before that worker entered the case, explaining
the mother’s service provider had
spent extensive time above and beyond what [the social worker]
normally see[s] with [service] providers in meeting with [the mother]
outside of interactions, getting ahold of her to follow up on what her
Case Plan expectations were, making short-term goals and long-
term goals with her, taking her out for an entire day and going
around and trying to fill out applications for housing. So she had
significant support.
. . . And then, of course, the mother had the opportunity for
therapy and for substance abuse treatment and different formal
supports.
Clearly the State provided or offered the mother reasonable reunification
services.
The mother’s late progress in the case did not begin until after the State
filed its petition seeking termination of parental rights. Only then did the mother
fully engage in the services offered to her, testifying she was motivated by
“coming to the realization that [she] was about to lose [her] kids.” However, she
8
admitted the children could not be returned to her care at the time of the
termination-of-parental-rights hearing. We agree with the juvenile court that the
State proved by clear and convincing evidence the children could not be returned
to her care at the time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing and
termination of her parental rights was proper under section 232.116(1)(f).
2. C.S. Sr.
C.S. Sr., the father of T.H. and C.S. Jr., asserts the children could have
been returned to his care at the time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing
because he “has the finances, intellectual capability, and housing needed to
resume care.” However, he admitted that last time he saw the children was in
May of 2014. When asked why at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, he
replied:
I can’t really give you a reason for it. I can just tell you that after the
first couple of visits, I couldn’t do it anymore. I couldn’t keep
dealing with having my kids ripped from my hands for a reason that
I didn’t understand, because I could take care of my kids. I had an
anger outburst and for some reason my kids were snatched from
me from the life they knew from everything. For what reason, I still
don’t know right now sitting here talking to you. I don’t understand
why.
He also testified he did not participate in services during the CINA proceedings
because he “was lied to [in the beginning]. It’s kind of simple and plain. For DHS
to even get in my household, they lied to me. So the beginning of our
relationship with me with DHS has all been a lie.” He asserted that if he were
given more time, he would start having visits with the children and take anger
management classes, even though he testified he did not believe domestic
violence had an adverse effect on children. We are unpersuaded.
9
C.S. Sr. has a long history of domestic violence and had three prior
founded child abuse reports before this case. The father himself was the victim
named in a 1998 founded-child-abuse report. The mother reported a history of
domestic violence between her and C.S. Sr., stating she still “struggles with
memory loss from [C.S. Sr.] beating her in the head with a gun” in approximately
2008.
Most recently, in January 2014, it was reported the father assaulted
another paramour while children were in the home. As a result of his so-called
“outburst,” his paramour suffered a broken nose, a hair line fracture, injuries to
her left eye, and two concussions. The father testified at the termination-of-
parental-rights hearing, “[M]y kids weren’t watching what happened. I don’t know
where that ever came into play, because I was there. But my kids weren’t
watching it happen and we weren’t in our home.” However, the record evidences
otherwise. His oldest child told the DHS social worker that day she saw her
father “ke[ep] on swinging at [his paramour], hit [the paramour] in the face and
her face was bloody.” She also reported the paramour had a black and purple
eye. The child did admit “she did not see her dad choke [his paramour] or throw
her on the floor because they were in the bedroom with the door closed.” His
other child at issue here told the worker he heard them arguing but did not see
anything until after his father hit his paramour. He told the worker the paramour
had a bruise on her eye with blood on her face and cheeks and she had to go to
the doctor.
10
Either the father was untruthful or misremembered that his children were
present. Regardless, their presence is significant because—despite the father’s
own beliefs—domestic violence does have an adverse effect on children:
Researchers have found that children who witness spousal
abuse suffer from a number of psychological and emotional
problems. More specifically, children suffer from internalizing
problems such as depression, anxiety, and withdrawal. They also
suffer from externalizing problems such as aggression, “acting out”
behaviors, and delinquency. Children from violent homes may also
experience impaired social competence and even post-traumatic
stress disorder [ ]. Some researchers believe that children who
witness spousal abuse are also at risk for substance abuse or
suicide.
Amy B. Levin, Child Witnesses of Domestic Violence: How Should Judges Apply
the Best Interests of the Child Standard in Custody and Visitation Cases
Involving Domestic Violence?, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 813, 832-33 (2000) (internal
footnotes omitted). “Studies estimate that children living in a home with a
batterer have a 70 percent chance of becoming the victim of abuse themselves.
In addition, 40 percent of suspected child abuse involves a history of family
violence.” Amy Allen & Susan Myres, The Impact of Domestic Violence on
Children, 42 Hous. Law. 18, 20 (Sept./Oct. 2004) (internal footnotes omitted).
Here, the father had an opportunity to work towards reunification with his
children by addressing his long-standing anger-management issues and violent
tendencies, putting their needs before his own. He did not even make an attempt
at it during the case. He also chose not to see his children. Given the father’s
long history of domestic violence, coupled with his erroneous testimony and his
lack of participation in the case, it is clear his children could not be placed in his
care at the time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. We therefore agree
11
with the juvenile court that the State proved termination was appropriate pursuant
to section 232.116(1)(f).
3. D.R. Sr.
D.R. Sr. argues that D.R. Jr. could have been returned to his or the
mother’s care at the time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, and he
requested the juvenile court grant him additional time for reunification. Having
already determined the State established that termination of the mother’s
parental rights under section 232.116(1)(f) was appropriate, we do not address it
further.2
D.R. Sr. also has a long history of domestic violence. In fact, the most
recent case was initiated after the DHS determined the child abuse report—that
this father had assaulted the mother in the child’s presence—was founded. The
father has another founded report of child abuse from an incident in 2006, when
he physically assaulted his paramour while she was holding their child and the
child was injured as a result.3
After the DHS became re-involved with the family in late 2013, D.R. Sr.’s
whereabouts were unknown. The court eventually learned he had been
incarcerated in prison in Illinois in February 2014, but he had been released on
parole. However, he was then picked up for an outstanding warrant in Iowa, and
at the time of the court’s October 2014 hearing, D.R. Sr. was in Polk County Jail.
2
We also note it is well-established that one parent does not have standing to advocate
for the other’s parental rights. See In re K.R., 737 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Iowa Ct. App.
2007).
3
D.R. Sr.’s parental rights to the child who was the subject of that report are not at issue
here.
12
D.R. Sr. was released in December 2014, and there were issues with the
DHS setting up visits with D.R. Jr. right away. D.R. Sr. admitted the DHS worker
at that time had asked to contact his Illinois probation officer to verify he could
leave the state of Illinois, but he refused because he “didn’t feel comfortable
letting her talk to them” and because he and that worker “butt[ed] heads a lot.”
After a new DHS worker began working on the case in April 2015, D.R. Sr.
provided a release, and visits began shortly thereafter. That worker again
requested D.R. Sr. provide his social history to better assess what his needs
were so they could be addressed, but he did not provide the information until the
termination-of-parental-rights hearing, explaining: “I can’t make an excuse for
why I didn’t do it. But, you know, I work a lot and I was just thinking to myself
when I was trying to fill it out, why haven’t I filled this out and bring it back in.
You know, shame on me.” At the hearing, D.R. Sr. admitted he had been
arrested in the past for domestic violence assault, not including the incident with
the mother in this case, and he provided no evidence at the termination-of-
parental-rights hearing that he had made any attempts to address his propensity
for violence. D.R. Jr. even told others he feared his father after witnessing a few
of the incidents. As pointed out above, domestic violence adversely effects
children.
D.R. Sr.’s criminal activities impeded his ability to continue his relationship
with his child, and thereafter, though he eventually had regular visitation, he did
nothing to evidence the child could be placed safely in his care, given his history
of domestic violence. We therefore agree with the juvenile court that the State
proved termination was appropriate under section 232.116(1)(f).
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B. Best Interests and Statutory Exceptions.
The mother and D.R. Sr. further argue termination of their parental rights
is not in their children’s best interests. We address their arguments in turn.
1. Mother.
The mother specifically asserts she and the children share a bond and
termination of that bond would be detrimental to the children. Therefore, she
argues, termination of her parental rights is not in their best interests. Upon our
de novo review of the record, we disagree.
At the hearing, the mother testified, “I just love my kids to death and we’re
just—though we may not be ready today, I will be ready, granted that I get a little
more time.” However, the record evidences the mother has been given time,
time and time again. She has been given a myriad of chances and has been
provided services over the years to demonstrate she can safely parent her
children. She has only shown she can do so, or that she is only willing to do so,
for short periods of time. Though the mother may not physically strike her
children, her choices have put her children at risk of harm while in her care. Her
children are in danger when she fails to supervise them properly, whether it is
because she has chosen to discontinue mental-health treatment and medication,
is self-medicating by way of illegal substances, or is taking painkillers to deal with
her injuries received at the hands of her paramours. Moreover, her choice to
continue domestically-violent relationships—wherein she is abused in front of her
children—affect their mental and emotional health.
Additionally, the testimony at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing
established the children have no more time to give her. Children are not
14
equipped with pause buttons. These children are in need of stability, safety, and
permanency now—additional time to work towards reunification would not be in
their best interests. The most recent DHS social worker explained the children
have had very inconsistent attachment throughout their lives, which
is evident, and they need to have permanency. It’s becoming more
and more difficult for them as time passes. . . .
....
Specifically related to the boys [D.R. Jr. and C.S. Jr.], trust in
caregivers, being able to develop—trusting that that bond is going
to be long term. They are both—both of the boys have a hyper-
vigilance that is not normal for children their age of what is going to
happen to them. Is this a reliable person?
....
[D.R. Jr. and C.S. Jr. are] very insecure in what’s going to
happen to them from day to day. They have no clue who and what
is their forever home. [D.J. Jr.] has communicated to me that he
does not want [his mother or father] to be his forever home and he
doesn’t want to live with them because he doesn’t think it would
work out.
While the mother has a bond with E.L., that child is also bonded with her
foster family. D.R. Jr. and C.S. Jr. have an ambivalent relationship with the
mother; both expressed doubt the mother would be an ongoing presence in their
lives and have little-to-no bond with her. E.L. and C.S. Jr. are thriving with their
foster families, and both homes are adoptive placements. T.H. is at an age
where permanency is needed, and she is doing well in her placement with pre-
adoptive relatives. Though there is some evidence of a bond between T.H. and
the mother, there is no evidence termination of the mother’s parental rights would
be detrimental to the child. D.R. Jr. is adoptable and most in need of
permanency.
Considering the children’s safety, their best placement for furthering their
long-term nurturing and growth, and their physical, mental, and emotional
15
conditions and needs, termination of the mother’s parental rights is in each
child’s best interests, and any detriment caused by termination of the parent-child
relationship is overcome by the children finally having permanency in their lives.
Consequently, we agree with the juvenile court that termination of the mother’s
parental rights was in the children’s best interests, and the statutory exceptions in
section 232.116(3) do not apply to preclude the termination of her parental rights.
2. D.R. Sr.
D.R. Sr. also asserts termination of his parental rights is not in D.R. Jr.’s
best interests because of his bond with the child. He claims:
The child would suffer no ill effects if the father is given additional
time to prove that he can adequately care for the child and keep
him safe and/or assist the mother by co-parenting the child. Not
only would the child suffer no harm if the father was granted more
time, but both father and son would reap the benefit of spending a
lifetime together as father and son.
However, the fanciful sentiment is unsupported by the record.
In fact, the record shows D.R. Jr. is in serious need of permanency. This
young man has lived his short life without a home, being shuffled from relative to
other persons. He was sexually abused. He tested positive for illegal
substances. While the child was trying to adjust to his new surroundings,
D.R. Sr. was incarcerated. D.R. Sr. was given time to show he had learned from
his mistakes and had remedied his proclivity for violence. There is no evidence,
other than D.R. Sr.’s self-serving statements, that he participated in a domestic-
violence class while incarcerated or any other services. He chose not to provide
the necessary information to the DHS, which delayed his visits with his child.
The termination of his parental rights is the result of D.R. Sr.’s own choices.
16
Considering the child’s safety, his best placement for furthering his long-term
nurturing and growth, and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions and
needs, we agree with the juvenile court that termination of D.R. Sr.’s parental
rights was in the child’s best interests, and the statutory exceptions in section
232.116(3) do not apply to preclude the termination of his parental rights.
III. Conclusion.
The record in this case shows the parents have continually put their needs
above the needs and safety of their children. Each parent has had ample time to
demonstrate he or she could successfully be a parent. They have not done so,
and their children cannot wait any longer for their parents to grow up.
Upon our de novo review of the record, we agree with the juvenile court
that the State proved the ground for terminating the parents’ parental rights under
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f); termination of the parents’ parental rights was
in the children’s best interests; and none of the statutory exceptions set forth in
section 232.116(3) apply to overcome the need for termination of parental rights.
Accordingly, we affirm the court’s order terminating the parents’ parental rights.
AFFIRMED ON ALL APPEALS.