In the Matter of the Estate of Mark D. Levine ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0654
Filed February 8, 2023
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MARK D. LEVINE, Deceased.
MARGARITA CERVERA LEVINE,
Appellant,
vs.
SARA LUNN KEOWN,
Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Craig E. Block,
Associate Probate Judge.
Margarita Cervera Levine appeals the probate court’s decision finding it has
subject-matter jurisdiction over the Estate of Mark D. Levine. AFFIRMED.
Nicholas Critelli of Critelli Law, P.C., Des Moines, and Samuel H. Braland
of Peer, Nelson & Braland, Earlham, for appellant.
J. Michael Boomershine and Louis R. Hockenberg of Sullivan & Ward, P.C.,
West Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Bower, C.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
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BOWER, Chief Judge.
Margarita Cervera Levine appeals the probate court’s decision finding it has
subject-matter jurisdiction over the Estate of Mark D. Levine. Because a probate
court in Polk County has “original and exclusive jurisdiction to administer the
estates of all persons . . . who die leaving property in the county subject to
administration”1 and the decedent died leaving Polk County real property subject
to administration, we affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings.
Mark Levine (Levine) died intestate in Belize on February 8, 2021. At the
time of his death, he owned a joint interest in a mobile home and adjoining real
property in Polk County, a condominium in Belize, and various bank and
investment accounts.
Levine’s adult daughter, Sara Keown (Keown), lives in Polk County. In
September 2020, Levine married Margarita Cervera (Cervera) in Belize. In
January 2021, Levine filed a change-in-beneficiary designation with a life
insurance company, listing Cervera with a fifty-percent share as beneficiary,
Keown with a thirty-five-percent share, and a cousin with the remaining fifteen-
percent share. Levine’s financial accounts listed his Polk County mobile home as
his mailing address.
On February 22, Keown filed a petition for intestate administration of
Levine’s estate in Polk County, requesting she be appointed administrator.2
Keown’s petition stated Levine did not leave a surviving spouse. The inventory
1 See Iowa Code § 633.12 (2021).
2 An estate was also opened in Belize in late February.
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Keown filed in late April listed Cervera as a beneficiary with a note “claims to be
spouse.” On July 7, Keown filed an application for declaratory judgment in the
probate court, challenging the validity of the marriage between Levine and
Cervera.
Cervera filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss under Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.421(a), stating, “This court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the
Estate of Mark D. Levine. Proper jurisdiction is in Belize where deceased resided
for many years prior to his death, accordingly these proceedings should be
dismissed.” Cervera also filed an answer to the application for declaratory
judgment denying any question existed about the legality of her marriage to
Levine.3
On March 3, 2022, the probate court held a hearing on the question of
subject-matter jurisdiction. In its ruling, the court noted legal distinctions between
residency and domicile, and noted evidence of Levine’s residency in both Polk
County and Belize. The court also noted Cervera raised a question concerning
which estate administration should be primary and which ancillary, finding the
question did “not defeat the court’s capacity to exercise jurisdiction.” The probate
court found “jurisdiction is proper in Polk County, Iowa[,] and the motion to dismiss
for subject matter jurisdiction in denied.” The court did not address Keown’s
3 The Iowa Department of Human Services filed an answer to the application for
declaratory judgment and Cervera’s defense, asserting jurisdiction belonged in
Iowa due to the existence of real and personal property and outstanding medical-
assistance debts in Iowa and noting even if the Iowa probate estate was not the
principal estate it should be considered an ancillary estate. The Estate
subsequently paid Levine’s outstanding state medical assistance debts, and the
department withdrew from the Estate proceedings.
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motion for declaratory judgment or make a finding on Levine’s domicile or primary
residency.
Cervera appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
“Our review of the proceedings concerning subject matter jurisdiction is at
law. . . .” Tigges v. City of Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 512 (Iowa 1984).
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong, not merely the particular case then occupying the
court’s attention. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim must
be conferred by a constitutional or statutory grant.
DeStefano v. Apts. Downtown, Inc., 879 N.W.2d 155, 164 (Iowa 2016) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
III. Analysis.
“At the outset, it is important to precisely define the legal issue behind the
subject matter jurisdictional challenge.” Id. The only question under consideration
by the probate court was Cervera’s assertion, “This court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the Estate of Mark D. Levine.”
Iowa Code section 633.10(1) grants the probate court jurisdiction of “the
administration, settlement and distribution of estates of decedents and absentees,
whether such estates consist of real or personal property or both.” Section 633.12
provides additional jurisdictional guidance:
The court of each county shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to administer the estates of all persons who are residents
of the county, or who were residents at the time of their death, and
all nonresidents of the state who have property, or who die leaving
property in the county subject to administration, or whose property is
afterwards brought into the county; to appoint conservators for
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nonresidents having property in the county; and to appoint
conservators and guardians of residents of the county.
The statute clearly gives the court subject-matter jurisdiction over the estate
of any persons “who die leaving property in the county subject to administration,”
regardless of their residency status. Neither residency nor domicile is a necessary
predicate for the court to exercise jurisdiction over an estate with property in the
county. There is no dispute Levine owned real property subject to administration
in Polk County. By statute, the Polk County court therefore has subject-matter
jurisdiction as to an estate administering property in the county.
The parties’ arguments on appeal debate the definitions of residency and
domicile—an important question in determining the primary and ancillary
administration given Levine’s ownership of property in two distinct jurisdictions. 4
While an interesting question, it is not one properly raised in Cervera’s motion to
dismiss or decided by the probate court, and ancillary or primary administration
designation is not properly before us on appeal. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641
N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that
issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we
will decide them on appeal.”).
Cervera’s motion to dismiss challenges the court’s jurisdiction over the
entire estate; it does not question whether the administration is primary or ancillary
4 Cervera argues on appeal the Belize administration should be primary with Iowa
only exercising ancillary administration, challenging the Iowa court’s “full
jurisdiction over the probate of Levine’s estate” and applying Iowa law to his foreign
assets. But Cervera filed no motion with the probate court regarding the foreign
assets, conflict of laws, or the administration in Belize, or seeking designation of
the Iowa administration as ancillary. See Iowa Code §§ 633.500-.504.
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nor does it question the court’s authority to decide Keown’s application for
declaratory judgment. The court considered the question actually presented and
determined it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the estate based on the
existence of property in the county subject to administration. Considering only that
same specific question considered in the probate court, we agree the court has
subject-matter jurisdiction and affirm.
AFFIRMED.