Jack Cooper Transport Co., Inc., and California Insurance Co. v. Bruce Jones ( 2016 )


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  •                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 15-0960
    Filed April 6, 2016
    JACK COOPER TRANSPORT CO., INC.,
    and CALIFORNIA INSURANCE CO.,
    Petitioners-Appellants,
    vs.
    BRUCE JONES,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B. Hanson,
    Judge.
    Petitioners appeal the district court ruling affirming the workers’
    compensation commissioner’s decision respondent was permanently and totally
    disabled. AFFIRMED.
    Kent M. Smith of Scheldrup Blades, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
    Jean Mauss of Schott Mauss & Associates, P.L.L.C., Des Moines, for
    appellee.
    Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
    2
    BOWER, Judge.
    Petitioners Jack Cooper Transport Company, Inc. and California
    Insurance Company1 appeal the district court ruling affirming the workers’
    compensation       commissioner’s      decision    respondent      Bruce    Jones     was
    permanently and totally disabled. We find there is substantial evidence in the
    record to support the commissioner’s finding Jones sustained permanent
    impairment due to an injury on December 6, 2009.                     We also find the
    commissioner’s finding Jones was permanently and totally disabled is not
    irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. We affirm the ruling of the district court.
    I.     Background Facts & Proceedings
    Jones, who was fifty-eight years old at the time of the administrative
    hearing, had been employed as a truck driver since 1976. Jones injured his back
    on June 19, 2006. An MRI showed a disc herniation compression at the L5 level,
    and Jones had back surgery on August 25, 2006. He continued to have back
    pain, but was able to return to work without limitations. Jones also sustained a
    back injury on April 23, 2009.        An MRI at that time revealed a lumbar disc
    herniation at the left L3-4 level. He had surgery for this injury on June 15, 2009.
    Again, Jones was able to return to work without limitations.
    This case involves an injury which occurred on December 6, 2009. Jones
    was lifting a skid and felt severe pain in his back. Dr. John Larson examined
    Jones on December 23, 2009, and determined the pain appeared to be at the L4-
    5 level.     Dr. Alexander Bailey examined an MRI and found evidence of
    degenerative disc disease at L4-5 and L5-S1, stating “disc bulging is present, but
    1
    We will refer to these two companies together as the employer.
    3
    no gross evidence of recurrent disc herniation, spinal stenosis, foraminal stenosis
    or other.” Dr. Yuri Tsirulnikov stated the MRI may provide an explanation for
    Jones’s pain. Dr. John Ciccarelli found Jones had burning sensations across his
    low back and right buttocks area, which were not present when he returned to
    work in October 2009. Dr. David Boarini stated he did not believe Jones had any
    significant structural abnormality or permanent problem caused by the
    December 6, 2009 injury.
    Jones had an independent medical examination with Dr. Brent Koprivica,
    who determined Jones should be restricted from any squatting, crawling,
    kneeling, or climbing. Dr. Koprivica stated Jones could occasionally lift or carry
    from twenty up to thirty-five pounds. He stated Jones should avoid frequent
    bending, pushing, pulling, or twisting. In addition, Dr. Koprivica restricted Jones
    from “whole body vibration or jarring activities such as operating heavy
    equipment or commercial driving.”           Dr. Koprivica gave the opinion the
    December 6, 2009 injury was the direct and prevailing factor in causing further
    permanent aggravating injury to Jones’s back.
    Jones had left hip replacement surgery on February 24, 2010, which was
    not due to his work-related injury. Jones requested Social Security disability
    benefits, and he was determined to be disabled. He had right knee replacement
    surgery on June 15, 2010.          Jones resigned from his employment on
    September 15, 2010, stating he was in too much pain to continue working.
    Jones filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits on December 5,
    2011.     After a hearing, a deputy workers’ compensation commissioner
    determined Dr. Koprivica’s opinion should be given more weight than Dr. Boarini
    4
    or Dr. Ciccarelli. The deputy found Jones suffered permanent disability caused
    by the December 6, 2009 work injury, noting Jones now had work restrictions,
    which he did not have previously. The deputy found Jones was permanently and
    totally disabled. The workers’ compensation commissioner affirmed and adopted
    the deputy’s decision finding Jones was permanently and totally disabled.
    The employer filed a petition for judicial review. The district court found
    there was substantial evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s
    finding Jones suffered a permanent impairment following the December 6, 2009
    injury. The court also found the commissioner’s conclusion Jones suffered an
    industrial disability and was permanently and totally disabled was not irrational,
    illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. The employer appeals the decision of the district
    court.
    II.   Standard of Review
    Our review in this administrative action is governed by Iowa Code chapter
    17A (2011).        We apply the standards of section 17A.19(10) to the
    commissioner’s decision and decide whether the district court correctly applied
    the law in its judicial review. Des Moines Area Reg’l Transit Auth. v. Young, 
    867 N.W.2d 839
    , 842 (Iowa 2015). “If we reach the same conclusions as the district
    court, ‘we affirm; otherwise, we reverse.’” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    We will reverse the commissioner’s factual findings only if they are not
    supported by substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole. Coffey
    v. Mid Seven Transp. Co., 
    831 N.W.2d 81
    , 89 (Iowa 2013).               “Evidence is
    substantial if a reasonable mind would find it adequate to reach the same
    conclusion.”    2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 
    528 N.W.2d 124
    , 126 (Iowa 1995).
    5
    “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but does not rise to the level of a
    preponderance of the evidence.” Etchen v. Holiday Rambler Corp., 
    574 N.W.2d 355
    , 359 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
    III.   Merits
    A.     The employer claims there is not substantial evidence in the record
    to support the commissioner’s finding Jones sustained a permanent injury on
    December 6, 2009. It states the medical and factual evidence does not support a
    finding Jones sustained any permanent impairment or new pain related to the
    December 6, 2009 work injury. The employer claims the opinion of Dr. Koprivica
    should be discounted because he did not have all of Jones’s previous medical
    records. It also asserts the opinions of all of the other physicians in the record
    support a finding Jones did not suffer a permanent injury.
    Jones testified he was able to return to work without restrictions following
    his previous injuries. He stated before the injury he would be “a little bit stiff and
    sore” by the end of the day. He testified on December 6, 2009, he was lifting a
    skid and felt pain in his back. Jones testified, “Something changed in my back
    during that injury. There was a lot more pain. It was more intense. I don’t know
    if it was more localized or not, but I know it was just more of a sharper pain.” He
    stated, “that pain has continued, even to this day.”
    Dr. Koprivica gave the opinion the December 6, 2009 injury was the direct
    and prevailing factor in causing further permanent aggravating injury to Jones’s
    back. The issue of medical causation is essentially within the domain of expert
    testimony.    Dunlavey v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 
    526 N.W.2d 845
    , 853 (Iowa
    1995). The commissioner, as the finder of fact, determines the weight to be
    6
    given expert testimony. 
    Id. Also, Dr.
    Ciccarelli assigned an additional permanent
    impairment rating of two percent to Jones based on the December 6, 2009 injury.
    While there is contrary evidence in the record, “[w]e do not consider the
    evidence insubstantial merely because we may draw different conclusions from
    the record.” 
    Coffey, 831 N.W.2d at 89
    . “On appeal, ‘our task is not to determine
    whether the evidence supports a different finding; rather, our task is to determine
    whether substantial evidence . . . supports the findings actually made.’” Mike
    Brooks, Inc. v. House, 
    843 N.W.2d 885
    , 889 (Iowa 2014) (alteration in original)
    (citation omitted). We determine there is substantial evidence in the record to
    support the commissioner’s finding Jones sustained a permanent injury on
    December 6, 2009.
    B.     The employer claims the commissioner’s finding Jones was
    permanently and totally disabled was irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. It
    states three physicians gave the opinion Jones sustained a minor back strain on
    December 6, 2009, and did not require any permanent work restrictions. The
    employer claims Jones voluntary retired after December 6, 2009, due to his other
    unrelated medical issues.
    The issue of industrial disability is a mixed question of law and fact. Neal
    v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 
    814 N.W.2d 512
    , 525 (Iowa 2012).               We review the
    commissioner’s findings of fact for substantial evidence.          
    Id. “Because the
    challenge to the agency’s industrial disability determination challenges the
    agency’s application of law to fact, we will not disrupt the agency’s decision
    unless it is ‘irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.’”   
    Id. at 526
    (citation
    omitted).
    7
    “Industrial disability goes beyond body impairment and measures the
    extent to which the injury impairs the employee’s earning capacity.”           Second
    Injury Fund v. Shank, 
    516 N.W.2d 808
    , 813 (Iowa 1994). The commissioner
    considers all of the factors bearing on a claimant’s actual employability, including
    the employee’s “age, intelligence, education, qualifications, experience, and the
    effect of the injury on the claimant’s ability to obtain suitable work.” 
    Id. at 815
    (citation omitted).
    The deputy found:
    The record reflects that the claimant has significant
    permanent restrictions that preclude him from performing the only
    work that he has known. The claimant has no work experience that
    would be relevant to his education, which is now stale. There is no
    reason to believe, based on this record, that the claimant is going to
    return to the workforce. The reason that he is not able to return is a
    direct result of his work injury. The claimant is permanently and
    totally disabled.
    The deputy stated, “Total disability does not mean a state of absolute
    helplessness. Permanent total disability occurs where the injury wholly disables
    the employee from performing work that the employee’s experience, training,
    education, intelligence, and physical capacities would otherwise permit the
    employee to perform.”         The commissioner affirmed the finding Jones was
    permanently and totally disabled.
    The commissioner properly considered the facts and the law in finding
    Jones was permanently and totally disabled. The evidence supports the finding
    Jones was not able to return to work due to the injury he received on
    December 6, 2009.        All of Jones’s previous work experience was as a truck
    driver.     Dr. Koprivica restricted Jones from “whole body vibration or jarring
    8
    activities such as operating heavy equipment or commercial driving,” meaning he
    could no longer drive a truck. We conclude the commissioner’s decision on this
    issue is not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.
    We affirm the district court decision, which affirmed the ruling of the
    workers’ compensation commissioner.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-0960

Filed Date: 4/6/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/6/2016