State of Iowa v. Nicole Ann Siders ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1394
Filed May 25, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NICOLE ANN SIDERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lawrence P.
McLellan, Judge.
A defendant appeals her prison sentence imposed following her guilty plea
to possession of a controlled substance. AFFIRMED.
Alexandra D. Frazier of R.J. Hudson Law Firm, P.C., West Des Moines,
for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
2
TABOR, Presiding Judge.
Nicole Siders appeals her prison term not to exceed fifteen years, with a
mandatory minimum of three years, following her guilty plea to possession of
methadone, third offense, as an habitual offender, in violation of Iowa Code
section 124.401(5) (2015). She argues the district court abused its discretion by
imposing incarceration and contends probation or placement in a women’s
residential facility would have been a more fitting sentence. Because we find no
abuse of discretion, we affirm her sentence.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On February 15, 2015, Des Moines Police Officer Nick Lloyd was working
off duty, but in full uniform, at Wal-Mart on Southeast 14th Street in Des Moines.
A loss prevention employee informed Officer Lloyd that Siders had left the store
without paying for $27.40 worth of items. Siders hopped into a car and said, “Go,
go, go” to the driver, who sped out of the parking lot. When Officer Lloyd
stopped the vehicle, he discovered two children in the backseat. He also smelled
an odor of marijuana coming from inside the car. After taking Siders into
custody, authorities searched her purse, finding a prescription bottle holding
methadone pills. The bottle did not have a label, and Siders did not have a
prescription. The purse also contained loose pills determined to be alprazolam
and amphetamine.
On March 27, 2015, the State charged Siders by trial information with
three counts of possession of a controlled substance and one count of unlawful
possession of a prescription drug, in violation of Iowa Code section 155A.21.
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On June 10, 2015, Siders entered a plea of guilty to possession of
methadone, third offense, as an habitual offender. In exchange, the State
agreed to dismiss the other counts, and the parties we free to argue for the
appropriate sentence. At the sentencing hearing on August 18, 2015, the court
imposed a period of incarceration not to exceed fifteen years, with a mandatory
minimum of three years. Siders now appeals.
II. Analysis
Siders advances a single claim: the sentencing court abused its discretion
in denying her request for probation. Siders contends the court did not give
appropriate weight to her family circumstances. The Iowa Department of Human
Services (DHS) removed her two children from her care as a result of the
underlying incident; she believes placing her on probation or in a women’s
residential facility would have allowed her to continue services through DHS,
including supervised visitation.
We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). When the district court imposes a
sentence within the statutory limits, it is “cloaked with a strong presumption in its
favor.” Id. Siders’s sentence is within the statutory limits. See Iowa Code
§ 902.9(1)(c).
A sentencing court must weigh the nature of the offense and attending
circumstances, the defendant’s age, character, propensity, and chances of
reform. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. And before suspending sentence, the
court must consider the defendant’s prior record of convictions, employment
status, family circumstances, and any other relevant factors from Iowa Code
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section 907.5. Id. The district court took into account all of those circumstances
in reaching its decision here. The court reviewed the presentence investigation
report, as well as materials compiled by defense counsel showing his client’s
progress in addressing her drug addiction. The court expressly mentioned
Siders’s family circumstances, the nature of her offense, and her history of
substance abuse. The record shows Siders had previously been on probation
nine times and had a long criminal record, including prior drug convictions.
While the court did not directly refer to Siders’s ability to have visitation
with her children, a court is not required to specifically acknowledge each claim
of mitigation. See State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa 1995) (‘[T]he failure to
acknowledge a particular sentencing circumstance does not necessarily mean it
was not considered.”). The court emphasized its main goal was to maximize
Siders’s opportunity for rehabilitation, telling her: “[Y]ou need to focus on yourself
and get the assistance you need to really overcome this addiction. And the
programs at the Iowa Correctional Institute for Women have these programs.”
When rejecting Siders’s request for probation, the court reasoned:
There are many pressures that are facing you, and the court feels
that if I place you on probation, that without the structured
environment of the institution, you’re probably not going to
successfully complete that. And the court does not feel at this time
that you are equipped to handle that.
On this record, Siders cannot overcome the presumption that the sentencing
court acted within its discretion.
Siders also claims the district court failed to satisfy Iowa Code section
901.5(9)(a), which requires a public announcement that the maximum term of
incarceration may be reduced based on the defendant’s statutory earned time,
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work credit, and program credits.1 The purpose of section 901.5(9) is to “inform
the public of the true dimension of the sentence.” State v. Johnson, 513 N.W.2d
717, 720 (Iowa 1994). “While the court’s responsibility to comply with this
directive is essential to that goal, it serves no function in imparting information to
the defendant that is necessary for a valid plea and sentencing.” Id. Any
omission by the district court does not entitled Siders to a new sentencing
hearing.
Siders closes her brief with a one-sentence argument that during her plea
hearing “neither the State nor the court expressly informed the defendant of the
minimum sentence that could be imposed.” Although making this assertion,
Siders does not challenge the validity of her guilty plea. In any regard, the plea
record reveals she was informed “prior to being eligible for parole, you will be
required to serve a mandatory three years,” and then she confirmed her desire to
enter a guilty plea.
Finding, no abuse of discretion or other error in the imposition of Siders’s
prison sentence, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
1
The written sentencing order informed Siders of the possible reduction.